

The Future of ASEAN-Korea Partnership

Young Perspectives

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YOUNG
PERSPECTIVES

The Future of ASEAN-Korea Partnership



ASEAN-KOREA CENTRE



The Korea Herald

Amb. Kim Young-sun

Secretary General, ASEAN-Korea Centre

At the end of 2015, the dream of ASEAN—the ASEAN Community—was successfully achieved, overcoming the ambiguities of our international political and economic arena. It was a historic moment, receiving spotlight from all over the world. Next year we have the 50th Anniversary of ASEAN approaching, another momentous juncture.

In regard to the ASEAN-Korea relations, the two sides have never been closer, with constantly rising trade and investment flows and tourism and cultural exchange. ASEAN and Korea celebrated their 25th Anniversary of the ASEAN-ROK Dialogue Relations and held a Commemorative Summit in Busan in 2014, and designated year 2017 as the ASEAN-ROK Cultural Exchange Year. In short, ASEAN and Korea are key partners and this will continue in the future.

At this crucial juncture in history, the ASEAN-Korea Centre became curious as to what our youth, as future leaders of our region, know, think, and hope about ASEAN and ASEAN-Korea relations. What do the youth of ASEAN and Korea think about the changes experienced by ASEAN and the growing significance of ASEAN-Korea relations? How do they foresee

the future of the ASEAN Community and ASEAN-Korea partnership?

In order to gain some answers, the Centre launched the 1st ASEAN-Korea Academic Essay Contest under three themes: (1) ASEAN in the Past 50 years, ASEAN-Korea Relations in the Next 50 Years; (2) Where the ASEAN Community is Heading Towards: Challenges and Prospects; and (3) ASEAN-Korea Socio-Cultural Partnership: Towards a Reciprocal Understanding. There were a great number of entries, more than what we anticipated, and it was very difficult to make a selection of 9 essays that we included in this volume of *the Young Perspectives*.

I sincerely appreciate the Korean Institute of Southeast Asian Studies for making this event ever more meaningful and prestigious. I would also like to extend my sincere appreciation to each member of the evaluation committee. Last but not least, I would like to convey my appreciation to The Korea Herald for its cooperation and efforts to publish this booklet.

I am pleased to present to you the perspectives of our youth on the future of ASEAN-Korea relations, and hope that this will serve as a firm foundation for our youth to expand their genuine and lasting partnership.

Dr. Park Sa-Myung

Chairman of the Board of Trustees,
Korean Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
Chair of the Evaluation Committee
of the 1st ASEAN-Korea Academic Essay Contest

In the recent years, the partnership between ASEAN and Korea has made unprecedented progress. The scope of exchanges also has expanded from economic field to socio-cultural field. In this regard, the ASEAN-Korea Academic Essay Contest was designed to further promote mutual understanding between the youth of ASEAN and Korea, the future leaders of the two regions, and to build a foundation for a long-lasting partnership.

It is the first attempt of the ASEAN-Korea Centre to organize the ASEAN-Korea Academic Essay Contest, which targets undergraduate and graduate students in ASEAN and Korea. Therefore, the organizing committee was worried that this program would not be well-received by the target participants and the academic community. But the results proved that these concerns were unnecessary as we received 136 entries from 9 countries, namely Cambodia, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, a figure that is more than what we had expected. This result shows that this Contest was successful

in bridging the ASEAN and Korean youth and deepening their mutual understanding.

During the evaluation process, the judges were surprised at the level of quality of the entries. Systemic analysis of the essays was almost equivalent to that of an academician, showing abundant data and presenting compelling arguments. The themes covered were also diverse, ranging from political-economic and socio-cultural issues to natural science and engineering. All 5 judges found it extremely difficult to choose the 6 winning entries.

The evaluation committee chose the 6 winning entries based on the criteria of creativity, consistency, methodology, and use of relevant data. The reasons for which the essays were chosen are as follows:

First, the essay submitted by Lee Juwon assesses the ASEAN Community in terms of three aspects: individual member states, internal construction, and external environment. In the course of his analysis, he presents an outstanding theoretical basis and consistency. Second, the essay written by Yoon Taejin makes a comparative analysis between the ASEAN Community and the European Community (EC) to analyze the difficulties faced by the ASEAN Community. By examining the historic development of the EC, this essay points out the difficulties of realizing the ASEAN Community, and proposes possible solutions to overcome the challenges in a concrete

and systemic way. Lastly, the essay by Jang Minah focuses on the ASEAN-Korea socio-cultural partnership and reviews the development of the ASEAN-Korea relations in a historical context. She argues that the prospect for a new kind of partnership based upon reciprocity has a significant implication for the future of the ASEAN-Korea relationship.

Entries submitted by ASEAN students also suggest new fresh ideas. The essay by Yong Jia Quan from Singapore analyzes ASEAN-Korea relations by comparing similarities and differences between ASEAN and Korea. His suggestion of having concrete measures to enhance a two-way and mutually beneficial relationship between the two regions is impressive. Secondly, the essay by Dinh Thi Thuy Nga from Vietnam shows a balanced analysis of both positive and negative aspects of the ASEAN-Korea relations that have been covered by many studies. He explains that while there are several issues that impede the further enhancement of the ASEAN-Korea relations, youth, sports, and environment could be effective tools to enhance mutual understanding and partnership of the two regions. Lastly, the essay by Muhamad Fathi from Indonesia sets the ASEAN Centrality as the subject of his analysis. He makes systemic suggestions on whether the ASEAN Centrality is applicable in terms of political and socio-cultural context, and also conducts various arguments to support his implications. 3 more entries submitted by Mun Kihong from Korea, Gianna Francesca M. Catolico from the Philippines, and Afdal Izal Hashim from Malaysia are also included.

Although we were not able to award these three competitive works due to budget constraints, I am pleased to present their essays in this booklet to provide our readers with an opportunity to appreciate their scholarly works.

Through the evaluation process, the judges were able to discover the youth's interests and passion in the ASEAN Community and ASEAN-Korea relations. We were also intrigued by the insightful and in-depth arguments displayed in their essays. I hope the Centre will continue to organize this Contest annually to provide competent students in ASEAN and Korea with a chance to showcase their knowledge and talents. I believe mutual understanding between ASEAN and Korea would be broadened and deepened through this meaningful event.

Members of the Evaluation Committee

- Dr. Park Sa-myung, Chairman of the Board of Trustees, Korean Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
- Prof. Kim Hyung-jun, Professor, Department of Cultural Anthropology, Kangwon National University
- Prof. Normaliza Binti Abd Rahim, Professor, Department of Malay-Indonesian Interpretation and Translation, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
- Ms. Shin Hyon-hee, Reporter, The Korea Herald
- Ms. Kim Se-young, Senior Officer, ASEAN-Korea Centre

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“아세안 공동체에 찾아올 도전은 무엇인가: 2016년 유럽연합이 직면하고 있는 위기에 대한 구조적 분석을 통해 (Possible Challenges of ASEAN Community: Comparative Analysis of Structural Problems by Studying Issues of EU in 2016)”

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
Theme 1

ASEAN in the Past 50 Years, and ASEAN-Korea Relations in the Next 50 Years



Established in 1967, ASEAN is widely recognized as a successful model for regional integration. What factors have contributed to ASEAN's remarkable achievements over the past 50 years, and what is the path that ASEAN and Korea need to take for a mutually beneficial partnership?





From Infancy to Golden Jubilee

ASEAN's Turbulent Voyage and Its Ties with South Korea

—Gianna Francesca M. Catolico Graduate of De La Salle University

Abstract

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN](#) gracefully erects itself as a glorious and successful association that stood the test of time as a key promoter of regional cooperation and resilience in the international arena. Although political and socio-cultural divergences divided the association, the establishment of ASEAN sturdily binds the 10 Member States as they march towards economic integration and smooth multilateral relations. This essay will narrate ASEAN's modest origins and how Southeast Asian

countries faced historical challenges in its five-decade existence. This includes Southeast Asia's struggle to 'break free' from Western tutelage, combat communist insurgencies in their backyards, and resolve military and ethnic conflicts. The Association was established when dignitaries from Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Singapore drafted the Bangkok Declaration mandating the creation of ASEAN. Since then, Cambodia, Laos, Brunei, Vietnam and Myanmar vaulted in the team and partook in engineering ASEAN's vision of "One Vision, One Identity, One Community." In addition, this essay will tackle ASEAN and South Korea's blossoming bilateral ties and its voyage towards a mutually beneficial partnership. Korea can bolster multilateral ties with ASEAN Member States by augmenting educational opportunities, tourism, environmental policies, technology, and cultural exchanges. Lastly, the concept of "ASEAN" will be deconstructed by elucidating the factors that pioneered ASEAN's victory amidst the Cold War, financial crises, and political fluctuations. As ASEAN will blissfully celebrate its fiftieth anniversary in 2017, it can be inferred that ASEAN is climbing the world ladder to rebrand itself as a global economic hub and a shimmering jewel of history and culture.



Introduction

Existing for five laborious decades, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN](#) is a global epitome for enhanced regional cooperation and economic prosperity. With a vibrant economic climate, healthy tourism industries and dynamic educational opportunities, regional cooperation in Southeast Asia offers an amicable environment for bilateral relations with its colossal neighbors such as China, Japan, and South Korea.

This paper will keenly expound on ASEAN's humble beginning and its predictable future vis-à-vis the South China Sea feud, border demarcations, flourishing economic development, and warm ties with South Korea. Likewise, a momentous timeline of ASEAN's fifty-year voyage will be reminisced to identify the factors that spearheaded its successful tourism, education, and economic policies. Lastly, this paper will highlight the key bullet points which define ASEAN-Korea relations and how it can be upgraded for the succeeding generations.



A United ASEAN

From Cold War to Today

Prior to ASEAN's timely birth, several regional initiatives were conceptualized, not only to unite Southeast Asia but to 'deplete' communism and an upsurge of leftist movements during the Cold War epoch. In 1954, eight nations signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty [Manila Pact](#) and established the now-defunct Southeast Asia Treaty Organization [SEATO](#). The Philippines and Thailand, the lone Southeast Asian members of SEATO, swiftly sided with the United States while those nations which attended the Bandung Conference eventually became members of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Furthermore, the post-Cold War period was defined as a dilemma between non-interference of ASEAN to their Member States and the Association's reputation towards the US and Europe. Simon said, "However, the harsh domestic politics practiced in Indochina and Myanmar were seen by other members in ASEAN to be eroding the Association's international stature, especially in its relations with the US and Europe." The United State's containment strategy in Southeast Asia and military deployment was concentrated on its former colony, the Philippines, as a package of its military base rights. ASEAN was a vehicle for the assertion of a regional identity and an arena for military cooperation.

Weatherbee (2008) elucidated, “SEATO was different from NATO in Europe. No military units were assigned to SEATO, and there was no unified command structure.” The second initiative to unite the region was the Association of Southeast Asia, formed by the Philippines, Thailand, and the Malaya Federation. Another organization, Malaysia–Philippines–Indonesia [MAPHILINDO](#), was labeled a partnership of Indonesia and the Philippines to restrain the formation of Malaya Federation. Relations between Malaysia and the Philippines were jeopardized due to the latter’s claim of Sabah, a province located in North Borneo.

Finally, the ASEAN was formed during the peak of the Cold War on August 8, 1967. Five foreign ministers, namely Adam Malik of Indonesia, Narciso Ramos of the Philippines, Tun Abdul Razak of Malaysia, Sinnathamby Rajaratnam of Singapore, and Thanat Khoman of Thailand, drafted the Bangkok Declaration mandating the creation of ASEAN (ASEAN University Network, n.d.). Three goals were implanted upon ASEAN’s birth; Peace, Prosperity, and Progress. And these were the guiding principles of the Association in its five-decade journey towards enhanced regional cooperation and maritime security. According to Acharya (2003), “The establishment of ASEAN was the product of a desire by its five original members to create a mechanism for war prevention and conflict management. The need for such a mechanism was made salient by the fact that ASEAN’s predecessor had foundered on the reefs of intra-regional mistrust and animosity.”

The three Indochina wars, which ravaged Mainland Southeast Asia politically, economically, and historically, ceased with the triumphant victories of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia against their Western and Asian colonizers. Vietnam, which relished its hegemonic throne during the Indochina battles, rebuffed ASEAN's rebuilding initiatives and slammed them as "Washington's puppets" (Weatherbee, 2008). On the other hand, Vietnam eased its hostility towards ASEAN in 1978, when they were coerced to withdraw their troops in their border with Cambodia. ASEAN supported anti-Vietnamese Khmer resistance groups residing in Thai sanctuaries and raised Cambodia's plight to the United Nations Security Council in 1979. To aid Cambodia's swift restoration, ASEAN campaigned for the creation of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia in 1991. Meanwhile, Burmese people held pro-democracy rallies against General Ne Win's rule in 1988. Wistfully, in a twist and turn of events, Myanmar retained a closed-door dictatorship for decades when the military junta failed to recognize the 1990 landslide victory of Aung Sang Suu Kyi's party, the National League for Democracy.

In Maritime Southeast Asia, Portuguese dominance of East Timor halted, and Indonesia ruthlessly militarized the former province in 1975. After a series of grisly revolts, East Timor was liberated in 1999 and is bracing itself to be ASEAN's eleventh Member State. In the Philippines, the Epifanio Delos Santos revolution ousted longtime dictator Ferdinand Marcos, and a set of democratic leaders rebuilt the nation from the shadows of Martial

Law.

The once-ailing Indochina then joined ASEAN, with Vietnam on July 28, 1995; Lao People's Democratic Republic and Myanmar on July 23, 1997; and Cambodia on April 30, 1999¹. With the troop now complete, ASEAN is ready to “rock and roll.”

¹ Brunei Darussalam, joined ASEAN on January 7, 1984.



A Divided ASEAN

Border Disputes, Political Instabilities, Human Rights

Despite ASEAN's decades of victorious free trade agreements and cultural programs, several glitches have tortured ASEAN's untarnished image in the international arena. The igniting fracas in the South China Sea, also known as West Philippine Sea in the Philippines and East Sea in Vietnam, is considered as a perilous threat in tearing down ASEAN and its bilateral relations with China. Under the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation penned in 1976, ASEAN Member States are obliged not to interfere in the internal affairs of one another. In contrast, ASEAN shouldered the responsibility to "police" its members and other non-ASEAN nations from any wrongdoing that infringes human rights and civil liberties.

In 1998, Thailand initiated fellow Member States to consider "flexible engagement" in order to influence Myanmar's "un-ASEAN" domestic politics. After this proposal was disregarded, Malaysia victoriously coerced Myanmar to relinquish its ASEAN chairmanship after the US and EU demanded the military junta to release democracy activist and Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi ("Myanmar gives up," 2005).

On the other side, several ASEAN nations showed interest in investing in Myanmar's powerful military junta. Fink (2009) articulated that Singapore supplied the country with cutting-edge ammunition and military supplies

while Indonesia became Myanmar's model of how a military-backed government "could maintain control at home while developing good relations with international financial institutions and foreign governments." Six months ago, the international community rejoiced with the sweeping victory of NLD. Despite a major flip in the country's political environment, the infant administration was bashed for its fragile stance towards ethnic conflicts, such as the Rohingya crisis, and its short-term micromanagement policies.

In other ASEAN Member States, implementing rigid laws on human rights and securing civil liberties is still a stark and grim reality. In Indonesia, violent protests against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) communities sparked a culture of homophobia and discrimination. The Indonesian government's spokesperson even told the press that "there is no room in Indonesia for the proliferation of the LGBT movement" ("No Room's in Indonesia," 2016), Cambodian political analyst and government critic Kem Ley was slain last July, speculating that the Cambodian People's Party was behind the heinous attack ("Prominent Political Analysis," 2016). He was noted for his ferocious statements about the family business interests and alleged fraudulent transactions of Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen ("Long-time Rights Champion," 2016). In the Philippines, several human rights groups, the US, and the United Nations denounced the spate of extrajudicial killings of suspected drug dealers and Chinese drug lords under President Rodrigo Duterte's watch. In return, Duterte seethed

their pleas and reiterated his plans to wipe out drugs and criminality in the nation.

It is catastrophic to witness a “fragmented” ASEAN –a region not only geopolitically divided by sea but also divided by loyalty in the South China Sea tug-of-war. South China Sea claimants such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, and Vietnam scramble to counter Chinese maritime leverage. Tønnesson (2000) classified that Vietnam and China regarded their ‘tug-of-war’ and the disputed Paracel Islands as a “rival quest for maritime territory,” aquatic resources, and hydrocarbon and coal resources. “The Chinese envy Vietnam of its long coast, and feel that they themselves are being unjustly deprived of ‘maritime territory’ by the presence of foreign insular and peninsular states in the Chinese maritime space: The Koreans, Japan with the Ryukyu [islands], the Philippine Islands, and Vietnam.”

Another possible reason why China is aggressively asserting its claims on the disputed islands is because of its abundance of oil and hydrocarbon reserves. In 2005, the Philippines, China and Vietnam agreed to administer joint seismic surveys to determine the extent of hydrocarbon resources in their overlapping sea territories (Simon, 2008). Adding to that, Buszynski (2012) noted that China’s historical claims over the waters is a tactic to man up against the perceived world hegemon-US. He detailed, “The South China Sea is being integrated into the field of China’s strategic rivalry with the US as China develops an extended naval strategy and deploys new naval capacities.”

In the case of the Philippines, the government was alarmed with artificial islets and runways built by the Chinese navy along the Scarborough Shoal, locally known as the Panatag Shoal. Pro-Chinese ASEAN Member States remained mum on the issue. For instance, Cambodia, a staunch ally of China, nonchalantly blocked any ASEAN statement of the international court ruling in favor of the Philippines during the 49th ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Vientiane ("ASEAN Deadlocked on," 2016).

Problems of border demarcation, which resulted from Western colonization, caused friction and vitriol in Mainland Southeast Asia. Chambers (2009) explained that border chaos between Thailand and Laos was dated back to the Franco-Siamese treaties between 1893 and 1946. Hence, a border conflict escalated between Thailand and Laos in 1987-1988 over the pristine Luang Prabang mountain range. Similarly, Thailand and Cambodia were previously embroiled in a century-old spat over Preah Vihear temple. The military conflict ceased in November 2013, when the International Court of Justice asserted its 1962 ruling in favor of Cambodia (International Court of Justice, 1962).

With these migraines obstructing smooth multilateral relations among Member States, ASEAN was once brandished as a 'toothless tiger' that is unable to sanction its 'delinquent' countries and uplift economic and socio-political cancers. Albeit these glitches, the 'toothless tiger' stood up and growled at its enemies—and has proven that it was gallantly governed the international stage amidst colossal historical events in the past five decades.



ASEAN–Korea Relations

It's Not All About *Hallyu* and *Kimchi*

When a young millennial student residing in ASEAN would be asked to define ASEAN–Korea relations in a nutshell, he or she probably might blurt out the word “K-pop,” or *Hallyu* in Korean. It's the craze that drove the eager and passionate ASEAN youth to storm concerts of their Korean idols and push them to spend relentless hours watching non-subtitled Korean drama.

ASEAN–Korea relations is not solely about K-pop; it is a mutually beneficial partnership between the Republic of Korea and the 10 ASEAN Member States. The Korean dramas which Southeast Asians enjoy, the Korean convenience stores near universities or business districts, or the latest Korean fashion trends displayed in local malls are a result of smooth relations between Korea and the ten Southeast Asian countries.

During the ASEAN-ROK Commemorative Summit held on December 2014 in Busan, South Korea, South Korean President Park Geun-hye pledged for increased political, economic, and socio-cultural cooperation between Korea and ASEAN (“The Philippines in ASEAN,” 2015). Korea welcomed ASEAN during the Sectoral Dialogue Partnership in 1989, and since then, Korea appointed its foreign dignitaries to harmonize relations with ASEAN (ASEAN-Korea Centre, n.d.).

Apparently, trade and investment are regarded as the essential key to determining the ‘ups and downs’ of bilateral relations. In retrospect, ASEAN is Korea’s second largest trading partner while South Korea is the Association’s fifth largest trading partner. Upon signing the ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Agreement [AKFTA](#), trade between Korea and ASEAN is targeted to soar to \$200 billion by 2020. In simple terms, it could mean that many young ASEAN youths could grip premium Korean products and savor delectable Korean cuisine. A few years ago, the most popular Korean dish among many Southeast Asians was *kimchi*, a traditional fermented side dish. With the entry of trendy Korean restaurants and food products, it is guaranteed that *kimchi* is not the only mouth-watering Korean food ASEAN should crave for.

In the terrain of tourism, ASEAN-Korea relations has been thriving throughout the past few years. ASEAN is the most popular tourist attraction and destination, with 4.95 million Korean tourists who visited in 2014. Meanwhile, around 1.8 million ASEAN visitors travelled to Korea in the same year, the third largest after China and Japan. This phenomenon is felt by almost everyone in the Southeast Asia—low-cost carriers such as Cebu Pacific, Tigerair, VietJet Air, and AirAsia which offers incessantly market cheap fare promos for flights heading to Seoul, Busan, and Incheon. Correspondingly, several travel agencies clash to advertise affordable Korean tour packages to adventurous Southeast Asian travelers and backpackers. Despite thriving tourism sectors, several ASEAN nations

could consider rehabilitating safety measures, embellishing transportation and infrastructure, and preserving tourist spots to augment income from tourism.

ASEAN–Korea relations is also determined by increasing and bolstering ties of the ASEAN University Network [AUN](#) and top-notch Korean academic institutions. In the author's country, prestigious universities annually offer student exchange programs bound for Korea. A wide array of scholarships awaits promising Filipino students who ought to pursue higher education in the country. However, there are other areas for improvement in the field of education. Hence, Korean academic institutions should ensure that individuals in each ASEAN nation are granted equal and fair educational opportunities.

On the other hand, there is a hefty number of Koreans venturing to reputable universities in the AUN. In the author's country, Korean students enroll in various courses to cultivate their English speaking skills and be eloquent and fluent in the language. Yang Ha-eun, a Korean student who took up Speech Communication at University of the Philippines-Diliman, mentioned that he chose to study English in the Philippines because of the affordability of tuition fees and the country's proximity to Korea. "It's cheaper to study English in the Philippines than any other country near Korea...and there are already too many Koreans here, we can find home easier [in the Philippines]," he said.

Another compelling reason why Koreans ought to study in Southeast

Asia is its affordable tuition fees and cost of living. The future of ASEAN-Korea relations lies within the brains and hands of the millennial youth; educational opportunities should be stable and “staple” for both Korean and ASEAN students.

Perhaps one of the essential elements of ASEAN-Korea relations is entertainment; from Korean soap operas to upbeat hits, ASEAN youths swoon over brawny Korean hunks and drool over Korean actresses. When anyone takes public transportation or enters a restaurant, there would be college students and young ladies positioning their attention to online replays of ‘Descendants of the Sun’ or music videos of bands like *Super Junior* and *Bangtan Boys*. Not only it has become an ‘addictive drug’ for ASEAN youths but it has also evolved into a lifestyle and cultural fantasy.

Notwithstanding, this Korean wave trend is a plus for *hallyu* and a minus for local entertainment industries. Witnessing teenagers idolizing Korean artists is a pressure for ASEAN cinema and drama to revolutionize their plots and scripts. To spike viewership and revenue, television channels screen Korean dramas dubbed into local languages.

Just like Hollywood and Japanese animated shows, Korean dramas are a clear example of how globalization furnished rigid lines between the ASEAN bloc and Korea. The breadth of interconnectedness has not only stretched social, political, economic, and cultural activities across national borders, but also potentially, across the globe (Heywood, 2011). Transborder activities and swift international trade led to the spread of *hallyu* in

Southeast Asian doors and youths' gadgets.

Korea pledged to support ASEAN's environmental initiatives such as the ASEAN Action Plan on Joint Response to Climate Change spearheaded by the ASEAN Working Group on Climate Change. Several ASEAN Member States suffer from inadequate water resources, and Korea can step up to promote sustainable water resource management projects in the region. Furthermore, Korea could consider investing in green technology, projects related to diminishing greenhouse gas emissions, and renewable sources of energy. Another brilliant initiative Korea can undertake is biodiversity conservation and management; as the ASEAN region is known for its wealthy natural resources and endangered species.

There is no single path which ASEAN and Korea should drive towards long-term economic development and concrete cultural ties. By intensifying the paths of trade, environment, tourism, entertainment, and education sectors, ASEAN and Korea will embark a voyage towards a mutually beneficial partnership in the next fifty years.



Is Southeast Asia without ASEAN Imaginable?

Fast forward to today, ASEAN is an archetype for sprightly economic growth, socio-political reforms, and budding tourism and educational opportunities. Three fundamental factors had contributed to ASEAN's remarkable achievements over the past five decades: A competitive market, regional processes and initiatives, and strong multilateral ties among its Member States.

Firstly, ASEAN is maturing into an integrated ASEAN Economic Community with a healthy and competitive market for ASEAN and international investors. In Kawai and Wignaraja's (2007) research paper, they explained economic integration and how East Asian powers negotiate with ASEAN to eradicate tariffs and harness the efficiency and competitiveness of services suppliers in the region. They expounded, "ASEAN is expected to become a single market and production base by 2020, with a free flow of goods, services, investment, a freer flow of capital, equitable economic development, and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities."

Secondly, the association is now championing regional processes and arrangements, such as ASEAN+3, which includes the East Asian superpowers of Japan, China, and South Korea; ASEAN+6, which is accompanied by India, Australia, and New Zealand, and ASEAN+8, which includes the US and Russia. Aside from multilateral talks with developed

nations, ASEAN hosts its homegrown initiatives, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting, and the East Asia Summit. As the ASEAN bloc lauds its 50th anniversary in 2017, it can be inferred that the Association has surpassed international expectations and galvanized economic and socio-political development throughout Southeast Asia.

Lastly, the fact that all ten Member States cooperate to iron out reforms for fifty years is a hefty factor for the Association's success. A lot of dignitaries imagined what would have happened if ASEAN never existed. Former ASEAN Secretary General, Narciso G. Reyes, once suggested that in order to measure ASEAN's worth, one should ask what could have happened to Southeast Asia without ASEAN. "Southeast Asia minus ASEAN," he articulated, "equals greater political instability, more widespread economic deterioration and, almost surely, the ascendancy of expansionist forces that thrive on the weakness, isolation, and disunity of others" (ASEAN, n.d.).

Concurring Reyes' analogy, the author believes that the formation of ASEAN itself in 1967 is the biggest success in the Southeast Asian timeline of international relations and diplomacy. During an era where superpowers battle over hegemony and regional supremacy, several Southeast Asian nations triggered for regional cooperation and integration; different regimes and political situations did not obstruct them from their goal. Fifty years ago, it can be mind-boggling for the Philippines, dubbed as Asia's "Oldest

Democracy”, to collaborate with Kingdoms like Thailand and Cambodia, a socialist regime like Vietnam, military-backed regimes like Myanmar and Laos, and even countries of Muslim majority such as Malaysia and Indonesia. Indeed, ASEAN is a felicitous example of how “brothers” of contrasting personalities, courageous characters, and assorted ideological beliefs can be buddies dining at the same table.

United Kingdom’s astonishing departure from the European Union [EU](#) exemplified the igniting indignation and fury of many towards the EU and its so-called “paucity” of benefits for its citizens. With EU recovering from the excruciating and bewildering walk-out of its sibling, ASEAN governments should pluck fundamental lessons from this political event and efficiently deal with pressing issues today, including migration, corruption, and the ongoing South China Sea squabble.



Conclusion

In 2017, ASEAN will fete its golden jubilee and five decades of economic progress and multilateral ties. An organization blueprinted by five countries once upon a time has ripened into a prodigious and enthusiastic team of ten Member States strutting into a 'happily ever after.' Indeed, ASEAN's success is unparalleled in countless ways-back in 1991, the association bequeathed 1.7 percent of the global economy, a far cry from the 3.6 percent contribution today ("Can ASEAN's Economic," 2016). It is expected that ASEAN will flourish and open its gates to investment, tourism, and beneficial partnerships with US, China, EU, India, Australia, New Zealand, and East Asia.

Furthermore, ASEAN-Korea relations outstripped its previous trade numbers and heightened its efforts in building political, economic, and socio-cultural cooperation like no other. Laos capped the recently-concluded ASEAN Summit with its covenant to support the policies and initiatives brought forth by its fellow Member States. The Philippines, the author's beloved country, was crowned as the chair of the ASEAN and host of the ASEAN Summit in 2017. President Duterte has assumed the hefty responsibility of leading the Association in its golden jubilee celebration.

To wrap up this research paper, it can be deduced that ASEAN has reaped fruitful victories and achievements in the five-decade turbulent

voyage towards prosperity and development; its compelling legacy can be traced from a simple meeting in Bangkok in 1967, when government officials from five nations sat in a table, conversed, and drafted the idea of “ASEAN” in a piece of paper.

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


Theme 2

Where the ASEAN Community is Heading Towards Challenges and Prospects



What kind of challenges lie ahead of the ASEAN Community and how can ASEAN successfully address them? What would a resilient, inclusive, people-oriented and people-centred community that ASEAN is heading towards, look like?



Why ASEAN Matters for ASEAN?

Regional Interest as an Expansion of National Interest

—Lee Juwon Kyung Hee University

Abstract

This essay discusses the challenge and prospect of ASEAN. The challenge is occasional intraregional discontent, but the prospect is still positive. Critics doubted prospect for an ASEAN cooperation pointing out the realistic regional landscape. The constructivist argument counters this, yet underplays significance of state-centric understanding of ASEAN. This paper argues that ASEAN regional interest is already expanded version of members' national interests. While accepting realistic limitations, this

paper points out that the incentive for collaboration has yet to disappear. Engaging with international society without jeopardizing political autonomy is a shared concern of ASEAN, stemming from historical memories since its independence. ASEAN gained international attention as a group, not individually. Politically, the importance of ASEAN is notable through ARF and EAS. Economically, it is through FTAs and AEC in 2015. This paper calls for the management of Fragility of ASEAN Centrality to minimize the intraregional gap and unifying the organizational stance to maintain and improve regional presence in an international context in respect to national interests of each Member States.



Introduction

The European Union (EU) Referendum or the ‘Brexit Vote’ which took place on 23 June 2016, reaffirmed the intricate nature of transnationalism, and raised concern for the prospect of transboundary interstate collaboration¹. While 51.9% of the British voted in favour of Brexit, skeptics still abound. Slavoj Žižek argued, that while he shared the rage of the people, the ‘leave’ logic ignores existing global problems, such as ecology, biotechnology, and intellectual property, which can make Britain itself more vulnerable. Heavily dependent on the capital market, Britain may have dislodged itself from regional level protection due to the unpredictability of international capitals² (Žižek, 2016). Zigmund Bauman pointed ‘uncertainty’ in every level of human life as the source of growing nationalist rhetoric, prevalent not only in Europe but worldwide (Bauman, 2016). The imperativeness for cross-border cooperation does not seem to

1 The Great Britain, then headed by Former Prime Minister David Cameron, initiated popular vote [referendum](#) on June 23rd 2016 to decide by general will whether the Britain should remain as a member of the European Union [EU](#) or not. 51.9% of the voters chose for ‘leave.’ The specifics following the referendum has yet to come at the point of writing.

2 The main point is that existing problems are essentially transnational. Particularly, for Britain the financial sector can be problematic for its capital London being the biggest financial centre in the world.

have been understood by many.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN](#) is not an exception to such difficulties, just as other parts of the world. Arguably, there are many challenges both in and outside of ASEAN especially in its community building vision. Amitav Acharya argued that the expanded membership makes intraregional cooperation more challenging, due to the need in reconciling differing interests among Member States (Acharya, 2015). In that line, the failure to issue a joint communique during the 2012 ASEAN Summit Meeting is often cited as an example demonstrating how ASEAN is suffering from bringing regional leaders together for common security issues (Hunt, 2012). Alice Ba questioned whether the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership [TPP](#) initiatives and the PRC [People's Republic of China](#) -lead One Belt, One Road [OBOR](#) counterpart will leave the ASEAN Centrality of the ASEAN Community intact (Ba, 2016).

However, since the ASEAN Community building is still at its initial stage, internal discontent and external dynamics can lead to critical changes in the future. With this backdrop, this paper engages with the question regarding ASEAN's current challenges and prospects. I argue that ASEAN's main challenge is its limitation in embracing ASEAN's regional interest with members' national interest. Regional interest refers to the acceptance and recognition by extra-ASEAN countries without the cost of regional, and at the same time domestic, national autonomy within the political and economic relationships. In fact, ASEAN members share such an interest,

and to some extent, there exists a set of shared norms among ASEAN countries, which function as the fundamental incentives for members to cooperate further amid a changing international political environment both in and outside of ASEAN. ASEAN has been and will be a grand project for the domestic interest of all member countries, a point which will lead to my argument and suggestion for the betterment of ASEAN later in this paper.

To proceed my argument, I conducted research on academic literatures related to interstate cooperation, particularly focusing on ASEAN. This will be followed by my alternative argument on ASEAN's challenge and prospects. Second, I will argue that the ASEAN Community vision and agendas are germane to the national interest of Member States through collaboration with neighbouring countries. Intergovernmental organizations like ASEAN, have used sovereign concerns as a focus point of the organization. ASEAN Member States desire more international political and economic representation without jeopardizing their autonomy, which binds the countries together despite occasional disagreements. Finally, this paper proposes suggestions for ASEAN members to create a better future en route their national, regional community building process.



Literature Review

ASEAN, Brief Introduction

ASEAN has articulated and developed its organizational structure since it was first established in 1967. Economic growth and social progress has been part of ASEAN's aim since then, notwithstanding the pursuit for peace and stability through autonomy intact from external influences (ASEAN, 1967). Such is a result of shared memories of each Member State of the atrocities of colonial life.³ Cambodia is the most recent to join as a member, making its entry into ASEAN on April 30th 1999, and the landmark Bali Concord II in 2003 brought an agreement to build the ASEAN Community (ASEAN-Korea Centre, 2016). As per the 2007 Cebu Declaration on the Acceleration of the Establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015 (ASEAN, 2007), ASEAN leaders officially launched the ASEAN Community on December 31 2015.

³ In 1967 there were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand before membership was extended.

Academics on ASEAN

Academics on the issue of ASEAN's status quo and prospects are mainly divided into two approaches. Realists tend to undervalue ASEAN's sustainability, referring to cases in which members failed to cooperate with one another. Constructivists strongly stress the normal dynamics among members of ASEAN, arguing such has encouraged leaders within ASEAN to think differently regarding the notion of interstate cooperation⁴. This paper suggests an alternative understanding to this divide, which will be discussed after reviewing previous literatures. This paper partially borrows the idea of attraction-autonomy deficit by Kihyun Bae in understanding and evaluating the dilemmatic status quo of ASEAN countries (K. Bae, 2014). Yet, while her paper focused on explaining why human rights norm has failed to be accepted by the Member States of ASEAN, my focus is to review and revisit the historical pathway that ASEAN has gone through in relation to extra ASEAN countries, and point out what is currently missing for a better integrated regional entity.

⁴ This does not mean to characterize academicians neatly into this simple categorization, which is impossible.

Realist Pessimism

Years of efforts by leaders notwithstanding, many academics have been challenging the sustainability of ASEAN and its prospect for transboundary cooperation. Geungchan Bae analyzed the domestic political turmoil in both Thailand and Malaysia and the nationalistic foreign policy of Indonesia, to stress the fragility of ASEAN Community building process amid weakened domestic leaderships (G. Bae, 2016). David Martin Jones and Nicole Jenne dubbed ASEAN's efforts as a 'weak-state regionalism,' claiming that ASEAN's crucial norm of non-interference is inhibiting further integration. ASEAN's reluctance to be involved during the Cambodia-Thailand border conflict, transboundary haze issue, Vietnam and the Philippines' reliance to the United States in response to China's rise, and Phenom Phen's overruling of an announcement on South China Sea Issue during the ASEAN Summit's Meeting are main examples for ASEAN's organizational fragility (Jones & Jenne, 2016). Finally, in analyzing the prospect of deepening regional economic integration, Kai Ostwald and Krislert Samphantharak argued that the prospect for ASEAN Economic Community [AEC](#) is uncertain particularly when it comes to the non-trade barriers which affect the service sector. It argues that while the benefit of lowering tariffs seemed clear without much resistance, the paucity of a regulatory body, nationalistic economic policy in some Member States, and inherent ambiguity of the Non-trade Barriers [NTBs](#) makes it difficult for the

service sector to gain economic reform (Ostwald & Samphantharak, 2015). Aforementioned literatures, along with others in similar categories point out the realistic regional context—nationalistic foreign policy, traditional nationalistic decisions, domestic interest groups—as the main reason for the fragility of regional cooperation.

Constructive Optimism

However, such dismal outlook has often been questioned by the constructivist school which focuses more on how ASEAN members have changed their ideas overtime, stressing the impetus of normative dimension in international politics. In arguing ASEAN as an Essentially Contested Concept [ECC](#), Acharya (2008) claimed that ASEAN countries changed their norms after complex interaction and communication at the domestic level. Acharya pointed out that the growing voice from the Indonesian parliament for more openness to ASEAN, embracing even human rights norm after the stepping down of President Suharto in 1998, as an example of how norm dynamics can lead to a more integrated interstate cooperation (Acharya, 2008). Earlier from this argument, Acharya (2004) professed that ASEAN members have always been active in external norm acceptance and localization of those. Acharya compared the ‘common security’ concept and the ‘flexible engagement’ notion to understand why the former succeeded to become ASEAN’s norm, while the latter failed to do so. For him, the

success in localization plays a significant role (Acharya, 2004). Jaehyun Lee mentioned how ASEAN is playing a ‘balancer’ role between growing superpowers like the US or PRC, pursuing diverse regional interests instead of a singular agenda, depending on the dynamics of international politics⁵ (Lee, 2012). Changgu Byun also argued that it is through common regional identity and norms that propelled the establishment of ASEAN, although he admits there are existing challenges (Byun, 2011). To sum up, constructivists focus more on the impetus of norms and how acceptance and communication with individual countries can lead to the fruit of cooperation. This can also allow for the region to be recognized better by extra-ASEAN actors exemplified in the ASEAN Regional Forum [ARF](#).

⁵ Yet it is not correct to predict that his idea is in line with Acharya’s. In his work, Lee argued that Acharya misunderstands the usage of strategies applied by ASEAN. He argues that ASEAN used multiple strategies when needed, instead of using a single strategy at certain point in history, followed by another.

Limitations

Simply put, the question regarding the sustainability of ASEAN and its deepening interaction are divided mainly into two dimensions. On the realist side, the focus is more on the state-centric nature of the region with domestic and sovereign context playing a bigger role, often hampering interstate collaboration. On the constructivist side, the focus is more on the historiography of ASEAN's interaction with the outside world, arguing that ASEAN has been voluntary and cooperative through a dynamic and complex process of domestic, regional, and global communication.

Yet, the arguments stated above are limited in either analyzing the status quo or projecting ASEAN's future. Before I propose my idea at the next section of this paper, I will critically review both approaches here. First, the realist school is limited in imagining what has brought ASEAN members to integrate. While the intra-ASEAN fracture is often mentioned as an example of regional disintegration and dismal outlook, the history of ASEAN collaboration demonstrates that they worked better when it comes to their relation with extra-ASEAN countries. Individual countries within ASEAN gained better momentum in an international setting through ASEAN, by international groupings such as ARF and AEC. In addition, while countries have often bandwagon to certain superpower countries like the US or the PRC, most of those decisions were issue specific. This meant that, involving foreign powers was often used to dissuade one big country's

influence from another—for example, the Filipino naval force training together with their US counterpart—which eventually attempts to maintain the autonomy and freedom of member countries. ASEAN is a collaborative effort with the same goal of autonomy and recognition, which is the reason why countries cannot easily step away from ASEAN.

Second, the constructivist school is limited in overemphasizing the role and impetus of norm. While this paper agrees that a shared norm plays an important role in bringing countries together, realistic perspectives and calculation have always played a significant role in actualizing and specifying the notion of interstate cooperation. In other words, realistic and sovereign based intergovernmental structure is not automatically a rejection of shared norms; it is effort by states to realize the value through the state's resources. In addition, norm argument is limited in explaining the dissenting argument between nation-states in ASEAN. Without taking the realistic dimension into account, it is hard to fully understand why countries experience conflict despite their collective shared norms.



ASEAN in a Global Context

Autonomy

Autonomy from external intervention has been the fundamental underpinning of political security interest of ASEAN Member States. After the 1947 ‘Long-Telegram’ by George Kennan, the confrontation between the Moscow-led Eastern bloc and Washington-led Western counterpart was unlikely to come to an early end (Kennan, 1947). Shared by countries like Egypt and Ghana, Soekarno-led Indonesia was pivotal in making Non-alliance Movement [NAM](#), particularly after the monumental Bandung Conference in 1955, when developed countries in the global north were divided into east and west blocs (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, 1955). The concern was succeeded by five founding members of ASEAN when they declared the ASEAN in 1967, as earlier reviewed in the Bangkok Declaration. In the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 1976, leaders prioritized values like freedom from external inference, sovereignty, or non-interference when it comes to regional cooperation for peace and security (ASEAN, 1976).

ASEAN’s concern is not groundless. Defeating Imperialist Japan and declaring independence was not enough to dissuade previous colonist countries, such as the Netherlands, from claiming territorial rights on the Indonesian soil (Yang, 2015). French presence in Indochina was no less

small for the Laos people before their communist turn (CIA, 2015). Just as the leaders were concerned about the external influence in the region, the US presence during the Vietnam War was humongous, a struggle of which came to an end only after countless US domestic and international societies' condemned the atrocities of the war (Schreiber, 1973). Southeast Asia was no different from other regions of the world in terms of being bound by the global international environment. Through shared memories of colonial time, they were largely exposed to hegemonic and ideological confrontation which made keeping national and regional autonomy very difficult.

Engagement

However, simply calling for an intact region has shown its limitation in helping the region and countries within to prosper. Post-Cold War political environment meant that the ideological tension was no longer radical. A notable experience is when the Cambodia-Thailand conflict ended under the auspice of UN. Instead of remaining as an involuntary sub-player of political security agendas, ASEAN took several measures to become an internationally recognized agent of global peace and prosperity through the redefinition and expansion of their national interest beyond territorial demarcation. First established in 1994, ARF is an outstanding example of how ASEAN-centered security framework has involved and influenced numerous stakeholder countries in Asia. The Southeast Asian Nuclear

Weapon Free Zone [SEANWFZ](#) Treaty, or the Bangkok Treaty, written in 1995, obliged ASEAN member countries to obviate the use of nuclear weapons in the region, and is furthering its effort to include 5 nuclear weapon possessing countries to sign the agreement. ASEAN is still a pivotal part in imagining Asian Regionalism as a whole, which has been the interest of Mohammad Mahatir (Park, 2014), former Prime Minister of Malaysia.

ASEAN in a global context is the most conspicuous and crucial in economics. After all, economic development in general is often understood as part of every state's core interest. Political stability is often mentioned as the fundamental prerequisite for economic development, and it was not until 1992, after the end of Cold War, that ASEAN could trigger and sign the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement [AFTA](#). Adopted and signed by the leadership in 2007, the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2007 clearly states that ASEAN envisages four characteristics—single market and production base, highly competitive economic region, a region of equitable economic development, and a region fully integrated into global economy—based on their consideration for the importance of external trade to ASEAN, as well as the need to look outward from ASEAN (ASEAN, 2007). In the same year, the ASEAN-Korea FTA entered into force on goods, and in 2009, the full FTA went into force when a service agreement was added (Ministry of Knowledge and Economy, 2010).

ASEAN in the World

The increased interaction has resulted in two dilemmas for ASEAN and its members: between autonomy and engagement, which I call the ‘Fragility of ASEAN Centrality.’ The binding demand from ASEAN is to be recognized equally in the international society without giving up regional autonomy linked with counterparts of member countries. Taking ASEAN Centrality into account, the dilemma or difficulty of maintaining the balance stems from the Fragility of ASEAN Centrality. I define Fragility of ASEAN Centrality into two levels; one is intra-ASEAN discontent on regional issues, and the second is the ASEAN underrepresentation in the global atmosphere. I point out here that managing and balancing regional autonomy and international engagement will depend on how ASEAN manages the Fragility of ASEAN Centrality; bridging the internal gap and making a unified voice to the world, which is interlinked with one another.

As a result of increased global engagement, ASEAN has exposed its organizational challenge to international actors. Both the PRC and the US have been stretching their muscles in ASEAN as part of their increased global competition amid already high mutual dependence (Baek, 2011). In this context, intraregional discontent in ASEAN is viewed as an opportunity for superpowers to co-opt some countries for their interests. The South China Sea issue best demonstrates this mutual discordance on top of differing interest within ASEAN countries. For the PRC, particularly after Xi Jinping’s

reign, it favours bilateral negotiation over multilateral talks so to dissuade any unfavourable actor of the conversation, in pursuit for Chinese national interest. For the US, not only does its involvement restrict Chinese expansion in ASEAN, but also helps to promote multilateralism particularly focused on Asia (Y. Yoon, 2015). This picture gets trickier given that the PRC takes up 15.2%, and US takes up 9.3% of ASEAN's total trade (ASEAN, 2016). For direct stakeholders related to this issue, such as Brunei, Malaysia, or the Philippines, how ASEAN is posited in this issue greatly determines the fate and position of the country.

Taking historical footprints and the dilemmatic status quo into account, the following can be found. First, ASEAN actors could engage with the international society through ASEAN. Politically, the ASEAN-led ARF and EAS involved numerous international actors. Volatile issues, like the South China Sea dispute were brought up to establish the fact that it needs to be resolved through peaceful means. Second, the underrepresentation of ASEAN in the recent international landscape is due to the Fragility of ASEAN Centrality. Countries within have often demonstrated limitations in reconciling differences regarding issues on migrant workers, transboundary haze problem, and the South China Sea conflict. This was exacerbated by growing multipolar international politics, exemplified by the US-PRC conflict presence in the region. The divide was taken as a chance for international actors to embrace favourable countries and exclude less friendly counterparts, regardless of the given grouping of ASEAN. The

puzzle got trickier due to high economic dependence of ASEAN in both countries.

Third, the very necessity to manage this dilemma is what helps to bind ASEAN countries. International representation grounded on political autonomy and economic development is what triggers interstate cooperation, in spite of occasional discontent. These agendas remain as the main issues that respective countries toned to resolve, but such international momentum has only been possible because ASEAN countries grouped together to propel the discourse. None of the countries boast absolute military power; countries rather claim to resort on peaceful means to resolve conflicts and declared nuclear weapon free zone. In addition, the countries have yet to reach outstanding economic attractiveness; AEC is still in the process of betterment and refinement amid China's growth, intraregional economic inequality, and the issue of connectivity. Yet, only through ASEAN, were the countries able to get ARF and EAS going, including the AFTA and AEC. Collective effort mattered despite limitations, signifying that the answer is for more integration, rather than the opposite.

Finally, this reiterates the validity and necessity of ASEAN for ASEAN members. While countries are still prone to act on their own national interest, this does not automatically dismiss the significance of ASEAN. In fact, the establishment of ASEAN has been a collective effort of nation states since its beginning, and this has persisted to the point where they declared the launching of the ASEAN Community on December 31,

2015. ASEAN Blueprint 2025, a collection of future agendas for ASEAN countries, is designed to represent interests of states within ASEAN en route to 'resilient' community building. Bandwagoning to certain powerful countries may bring about short term gains, but in the long run, national and regional interaction with the superpowers will determine its fate. That is the lesson learned from the tragedy of Vietnam War, and that is the challenge that countries are currently faced with, in the recent US-PRC struggle. Countering the peril of autonomy is possible through the integration of the regional actors and stepping away from temptation of disintegration is what is asked to the leaders of ASEAN.



Conclusion

This paper analyzed the challenges of ASEAN and discussed its prospects. Unlike how academics would normally view, this paper argues that the prospect for remaining integrated as a collective organization is still positive, despite realistic regional conditions. The argument is that all ASEAN Member States share the need for international representation pivoting on political autonomy and integration into the international economic chain. As a result, countries have improved their political representation through ARF and EAS, all of which surround ASEAN, AEC, and AFTA, generating grand discourse pertaining to ASEAN's economic development. The question is relevant, exemplified in the US-PRC conflict, though other poles of international landscape still matter on this issue. Improvement is possible through solidified integration, management of discordance within, and overcoming the Fragility of ASEAN Centrality within and without ASEAN.

This paper reiterates the significance of ASEAN and calls for Member States to harmonize over occasional disagreements. ASEAN is already part of its Member States' national interest, and it is a failure to recognize the already expanded national interest that countries often forget to take into account. If regional interest is a collection of national interests, and if group effort galvanized non-ASEAN members to better recognize and understand

regional interest, it is through obviation of the Fragility of ASEAN Centrality, and solidification of ASEAN Centralism that countries can truly position themselves in the contemporary international landscape.

This paper's contribution is to reinterpret the nature of national interest. Critics often referred to this as a barrier for interstate cooperation and sustainability of multinational organizations. Yet, I explored and demonstrated that Member States are 'better represented' in such a setting and have an expanded version of interest and incentives to collaborate. Occasional intraregional discontent does not provide an excuse for non-cooperation because the aforementioned necessity for reciprocity still exists.

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
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Where the ASEAN Community is Heading Towards: Challenges and Prospects

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Abstract

After almost 50 years of its establishment, ASEAN has been celebrated as a successful regional cooperation, having been able to manage conflicts and avoid war in the region. ASEAN has also become a driving force for regional cooperation in East Asia through its initiatives like East Asian Summit and ASEAN Regional Forum. ASEAN Community was established on the 31st of December 2015 with a vision of having an integrated economy that is vibrant, and a competitive and inclusive community with long lasting peace

and prosperity. Challenges towards realizing this vision has been identified, such as maintaining ASEAN Centrality, balancing the norms of ASEAN Way to come up with effective solutions to regional problems, narrowing the disparity between CLMV countries [Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam](#) and the other 6, raising public awareness and perception about ASEAN as well as realizing the notion of a people-centered ASEAN, and the challenge of forming a collective ASEAN identity. These challenges need to be addressed in order to realize the vision of the ASEAN community. At the end of this essay, it is noted that ASEAN's future remains bright, with large potential not only because of its large population and economy, but also its ability to put forward alternative perspectives and engage with its Dialogue Partners.

Forty-nine years have passed since the establishment of Association of Southeast Asian Nation [ASEAN](#) in Bangkok on 8th of August 1967. From the initial membership of 5 countries, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, ASEAN has grown larger as Brunei joined in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia two years later in 1999.

Since its establishment, ASEAN has been celebrated for its successful feat in maintaining regional peace and cooperation amongst its member countries. With the establishment and adherence of norms for inter-state relations, ASEAN has contributed in the prevention of conflict within the region. It has achieved its main fundamental aim of managing conflicts among its members peacefully. This can be proven by noting that no two ASEAN Member States have ever gone to war against each other after the establishment of ASEAN.

In addition, ASEAN has successfully promoted cooperation in the region and also became the “bridge builder” between countries in the region of East Asia as well as Asia-Pacific. This can be seen in the ASEAN-led initiatives, such as the East Asian Summit [EAS](#) and the ASEAN Regional Forum [ARF](#). ASEAN has also successfully established cooperation with major powers, actively pursuing mutual interest by engaging them as ASEAN Dialogue Partners.

Established on 31 December 2015, ASEAN Community is a major milestone in regional integration within ASEAN. It encompasses three main

pillars: Political-Security Community, Economic Community, and Socio-Cultural Community. It is hoped that ASEAN Community will be able to ensure lasting peace and prosperity in the region, with vibrant economies and integrated, competitive and inclusive community (ASEAN, 2015).

Almost one year has passed since the establishment of the ASEAN Community. The implementation process of what has been planned has not been entirely smooth. There are numerous challenges faced by ASEAN. This essay will inspect the challenges in actualizing the ASEAN Community and map out its predictions and prospects.



Challenges

Maintaining ASEAN Centrality

One of the principles of ASEAN is to maintain its centrality when dealing with external powers. ASEAN Centrality is a concept where ASEAN Member States should always remain in the center of regional cooperation. The ASEAN Charter mandated this concept of centrality in Article 1, stating that ASEAN needs “to maintain the centrality and proactive role of ASEAN as the primary driving force in its relations and cooperation with its external partners in a regional architecture that is open, transparent and inclusive” (ASEAN, 2008).

It is widely agreed that ASEAN, into some extent, has been able to play a leading role in managing regional cooperation in Asia, especially in establishing and managing the ASEAN Regional Forum [ARF](#) and the East Asia Summit [EAS](#). However, it is still a challenge for ASEAN to maintain its centrality amidst pressure from the major powers, as it seems that ASEAN is pulled in different directions by the big powers, especially between the United States [US](#) and China. This becomes a threat to the ASEAN unity when there are divisions between ASEAN Member States; some states aligning with the United States, while others with China.

This challenge has become greater with the recent issue of territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Observers have already started to doubt

the ability of ASEAN to maintain its centrality when ASEAN members failed to issue a joint communique during the 2012 ASEAN Foreign Minister Meeting in Cambodia. Even recently, ASEAN failed to issue a joint statement in response to arbitral tribunal on the South China Sea. Implementation of the Declaration of Conduct [DoC](#) for Peace & Stability in the South China Sea, is said to have not been effectively fulfilled (The Habibie Centre ASEAN Studies Program, 2016a).

On a side note, it is a bit unfair to simply focus on the apparent divisions within ASEAN arising from lack of joint statements in the issue of South China. The Joint Statement released during the Sunnylands US-ASEAN Summit has shown that ASEAN still has some ability to maintain its centrality. Though hosted by the United States and seen as an opportunity for the US to push its agendas, there was no explicit mention of the South China Sea in the statement (Tsjeng, 2016). Not only that, the fifth paragraph of the Joint Statement affirmed its support for ASEAN centrality and ASEAN-led mechanism in Asia-Pacific (The White House, 2016).

Maintaining ASEAN centrality despite pressure from major powers will continue to become a major challenge to the ASEAN unity, which is the central essence of ASEAN Community. In the era of ASEAN Community, ASEAN Member States should speak with a unified voice and remain in the driver's seat in pushing for regional integration based on common interest.

The ASEAN Way

ASEAN adopted a series of norms and principles rooted from the shared values of ‘musyawarah’ [consultative](#) and ‘muafakat’ [consensus](#) used in diplomacy as well as solving issues and conflicts. These norms and principles would later be collectively known as the ASEAN Way (Goh, 2003). The ASEAN Way is affirmed in the ASEAN Charter which defines it as respect for “the principles of sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, non-interference, consensus and unity in diversity” (ASEAN, 2008). This is again reaffirmed in Article 2 of the Charter which reiterates the importance of Member States’ independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity (ASEAN, 2008).

However, ASEAN has been heavily criticized for its strict adherence to the ASEAN Way. Critics have said that the ASEAN Way practice has been ineffective in solving a number of regional issues, such as the transboundary haze, Southeast Asia migrant crisis as well as human right issues. The norms and principles of consensus and non-interference are said to have caused the problems of not being able to reach a consensus. This happens because ASEAN and its Member States continuously avoid taking hard and firm decisions and continuously turn into using the ASEAN Way. It is still true that in ASEAN, national sovereignty has been prioritized over regional prosperity. Archarya (2001) also noted that the practice of ASEAN Way has resulted in avoidance of sensitive issues due to belief that those issues were

better dealt at the bilateral level.

The issue of Southeast Asian transboundary haze can be used as an example for this problem. The transboundary haze that affects Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand is said to be caused by land-clearing activities. It is argued that the reason why haze mitigation efforts have been ineffective is due to the ASEAN style of regional engagement which focuses on the maintenance of its members' national sovereignty. This can be seen in the negotiations and implementation of agreements and initiatives, such as the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution [ATHP](#), which are shaped by the ASEAN Member States in a way that preserves their own political and economic interests (Varkkey, 2012).

There are now calls for ASEAN to reform how the ASEAN Way is being applied in solving regional issues. Kim (2007) says that unless a reform towards the implementation of ASEAN Way is conducted, ASEAN's effort for further integration and solving regional issues would remain ineffective. However, Kim (2007) also put a side note, saying that the norms of the ASEAN Way should not completely be abandoned, so that the smaller states would not be simply disregarded and brushed by the larger states.

In order to move forward, ASEAN should find a way on how to balance its norms of ASEAN Way and how it is being applied to drive an effective solution to ensure that the objectives of ASEAN will be achieved and regional issues be solved.

Disparity & Development Gap

As ASEAN Community evolves, the ASEAN Economic Community [AEC](#) remains to be one of the most important pillar in ASEAN. The ASEAN Economic Community is based on four elements: a single market and production base, a highly competitive economic region, a region of equitable economic development, and a region fully integrated into the global economy. The ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint also contains 17 “core elements” and 176 priority actions.

ASEAN Economic Community has brought benefits and will surely bring many more to ASEAN Member States. However, it is argued that the benefits would not be distributed equally to each ASEAN Member States as their economic footing differs. Simply put, countries like Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia have stronger economic foundations, developed infrastructures, and other competitive advantages as compared to the CLMV countries.

CLMV countries have to struggle more in order to reap the benefits from the ASEAN Economic Community as they are relatively less competitive due to its poor infrastructures, lack of skilled labor, low awareness of opportunities brought by the ASEAN Economic Community among private sectors and small and medium sized enterprises [SMEs](#) , and lack of fluency in the English language.

The greatest challenge faced by the CLMV countries is the inadequacy of facilities and infrastructures. Vietnam may have better infrastructures. However, Laos, which is ranked 98th in Global Competitive Index (World Economic Forum, 2015) in terms of infrastructure, does not have certain basic facilities like railways to carry goods. As a land-lock country, not having an efficient transportation system makes it harder and costlier for them to move products. Cambodia also has a comparatively poor infrastructure as a result of the conflicts that happened in the country while Myanmar ranked even lower due to poor management (World Economic Forum, 2015).

Another problem faced by CLMV countries is the lack of skilled labor, which makes it difficult for them to reap the benefits of higher labor mobility brought by the ASEAN Economic Community. Under the ASEAN Mutual Recognition Agreement [MRA](#), there are 8 different professions that are recognized regionally, and people in these professions are allowed to move freely within the region. These professions are engineers, nurses, architects, surveyors, dentists, doctors, accountants, and tourism professionals. Certain level of education is required for these professions, which, unfortunately, is not possessed by many people in CLMV countries. Communication also remains a problem for CLMV countries as they lack proficiency in English, which is the official language of ASEAN.

Furthermore private firms, especially small and medium sized, usually do not possess awareness and knowledge of existing opportunities brought

by the ASEAN Economic Community. They tend to be not aware of the implications as they enter the ASEAN Economic Community. This is even worse when businesses and governments have poor coordination and collaboration between each other. Moreover, unlike Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore whose large companies have been regionally dominating, CLMV countries are lacking big players that have regional presence, hence making it even harder for them to compete. Thus, it is argued that lack of information, capacity, and readiness of companies in CLMV countries have caused lower participation in the ASEAN Economic Community (The Habibie Centre ASEAN Studies Program, 2016b).

Although we need to acknowledge that several measures have been taken to narrow the development gaps and disparity among ASEAN Member States, such as the Initiative for ASEAN Integration [IAI](#), many more are needed to be done. The current situation of ASEAN is still far from its vision of a community where all states have equal opportunities to develop together and enjoy the benefits of economic integration with no one left behind. Unless ASEAN and its member countries put more efforts to level the playing field to be more fair, such as by improving the infrastructure in CLMV and further promote and increase the awareness of the ASEAN Economic Community, this issue of development gap and inequality will remain a challenge. With a more integrated economy, not only would the new members be able to uplift and develop their economies, the developed members could also gain from the economies of scale (Das et al., 2013) and move forward together.

ASEAN Awareness & A People Centered ASEAN

Efforts in actualizing the commitment of the ASEAN Community surely needs support and participation from the public. This is why the notion of a people-centered ASEAN was voiced out and later declared. However, the reality is far from the ideal. Awareness and knowledge of ASEAN and ASEAN Community remain low, and people participation in actualizing the ASEAN Community are not very visible.

Based on a conclusion drawn from Asian Barometer Survey [ABS](#) conducted from 2014 to 2016 in eight ASEAN member countries; Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, only 11% of the respondents felt a very close connection to ASEAN, and 40% felt a close connection to ASEAN. In contrast, 49% did not think the same, 37% of which felt no connection at all, while the remaining was unable to choose due to their lack of awareness on ASEAN (The Habibie Centre ASEAN Studies Program, 2016c). This trend is worrying.

Surprisingly, among the countries surveyed, the two countries with the lowest sense of connectivity to ASEAN are its founding members: Indonesia (22%) and Thailand (34%) (The Habibie Centre ASEAN Studies Program, 2016c). This result is worrying not only because they are the founding members of ASEAN, but also because these two countries are among the most populated country in this regional organization. In fact, Indonesia is

not only the most populated country in Southeast Asia, but has long played a leadership role in the organization before 1997.

News reports from ASEAN countries are also showing similar trends. In an interview conducted by Antara, an Indonesian news agency, Siti, an Indonesian migrant worker in Singapore said that “Singapore is ASEAN, and Indonesia too. That’s all I learned at school. I don’t know about the activities of ASEAN” (Assegaf, F., 2013). Similar opinion was voiced out by another migrant worker, Irma. In another report, a survey conducted by the Indonesian Institute of Sciences [LIPi](#) 30 days before the official implementation of the ASEAN Community showed that there was low awareness of the AEC among Indonesian people (Amindoni, 2015).

Without even having knowledge and awareness of ASEAN amongst the public, it would be difficult to expect much from the citizens to participate to join efforts and realize the ASEAN Community, let alone them—the public— becoming the center of ASEAN, as envisioned in the concept of ASEAN Connectivity.

ASEAN countries have done minimum efforts in promoting ASEAN to its people. The ASEAN immigration lane in Thailand for example, are merely symbols. Non-ASEAN visitors can freely go through the ASEAN lane, the immigration lane designated to be used only by ASEAN citizens. Although symbols, logos, posters, and advertisement are increasingly visible in all ASEAN countries, their impact is still not felt.

Furthermore, in order to make the region more people-centered,

ASEAN needs to allow greater participation of civil societies, youth-led organization and local communities in decision making processes as well as in implementation. ASEAN and its member countries need to do more in order to instill the sense of belonging of ASEAN to its people and make the people feel the importance of ASEAN and reap the benefits from the ASEAN Community. This can be done through roadshows, people-to-people exchanges, and more importantly, a modification in education curricula and systems to be more ASEAN-centric. More efforts need to be done to ensure that ASEAN would not only be discussed in academic forums and official meetings, but also in night markets and coffee shops. Maybe, a first step to this is by having an effective ASEAN immigration lane in airports all around the region to showcase to the public the benefit of being part of ASEAN.

Forming ASEAN Identity

“One ASEAN, One Vision, One Identity” is the motto of ASEAN. The call for a need to form ASEAN identity has become greater since the establishment of ASEAN Community in 2015. But ASEAN identity, what it consists of, and how ASEAN states could create a balance in maintaining the national identity and instill a regional identity in each and every citizens of ASEAN still remains a question.

The concept of forming a regional identity perhaps falls under the

pillar of Socio-culture. Though the Socio-cultural aspect of the ASEAN Community is, in fact, the center and the most important pillars in the Community, it is argued that a relatively lower attention is given to this aspect. Socio-culture aspect, especially a regional identity, can be considered as the nucleus of the ASEAN Community. It is emphasized in the Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009-2015 Section E Article 42 that “ASEAN identity is the basis of Southeast Asia’s regional interests” (ASEAN, 2009).

Little work has been done in addressing this issue. Indeed, forming an identity is not an easy task, especially in a region with diverse political systems, cultures, social environment, and histories. Balancing out between having regional identity and keeping nation-state identity at the same time is even a harder task. ASEAN needs to establish the ‘we feeling’ of ASEAN. The hurdle of this task is that ASEAN Member States may be close to each other, but their people do not really know and understand each other very well.



Prospects of ASEAN

With all the challenges presented above, one may become pessimistic about the ASEAN Community. Can the vision the region dreams of become a reality? Can ASEAN solve those challenges? What would be the future of ASEAN?

In order to remain optimistic, one needs to look beyond the said challenges, and focus on the big potential that ASEAN process. ASEAN is home to more than 630 million people, which is bigger than the entire population of the European Union or North America. ASEAN is the third most populated, after China and India. The region also has a very large market as well as a large pool of resources and labor force. If ASEAN were a country, it would be the seventh largest economy in the world with a total combined GDP of more than USD 2.4 Trillion. It is projected to be the fourth-largest economy in the world in 2025 (Vinayak, Thompson & Tonby, 2014).

ASEAN has also become the key player and a driving force of regional integration of East Asia through ASEAN-led initiatives like the East Asian Summit [EAS](#) and the ASEAN Regional Forum [ARF](#). The fact that it now has 10 big powers as Dialogue Partners: Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America, proves that ASEAN

has become the interest of many big powers in the world. This partnership could amplify the potential that ASEAN already possesses.

ASEAN, will undeniably remain important to the world today, However, the challenges listed above need to be addressed in order for ASEAN to move forward and actualizing the vision of ASEAN Community that is “resilient, inclusive, people-oriented, and people-centered.”

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아세안 공동체에 찾아올 도전은 무엇인가

2016년 유럽연합이 직면하고 있는 위기에 대한
구조적 분석을 통해

Possible Challenges of ASEAN Community: Comparative Analysis
of Structural Problems by Studying Issues of EU in 2016

– 윤태진 서울대학교

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Abstract

ASEAN is on the verge of taking a step forward to becoming a more cohesive and capable entity by launching ASEAN Community in 2015. This attempt is for the purpose of increasing its competence amidst the turbulent international situation, especially the escalating strife between China and US in East Asia. However, ASEAN Community still can confront a few difficulties because of the flaws that intergovernmental associations inherently possess. To identify the challenges that the ASEAN

Community can face arise from 'Structural Problems', 'Comparative Methods' will be used. One of the problems is the discordance between the actual measure of intergovernmental association and the original aim of it. This could not satiate members. Another also hinges upon whether the identity of supra-organization discords with that of group members. These are deduced by studying affairs which EU undergoes these days. One is the Brexit, which is the referendum, deciding the British secession from the EU. Another is disseminated Euroscepticism. These phenomena are usually called 'a crisis of intergovernmental union' or 'a crisis of Neo-functionalism.' When we project the above conditions to ASEAN, the ASEAN factors – Elitism and Security – would cause different ostensible aspects compare to the EU, though the outcome would be the same, a weakened association.



연구소재 및 연구방향에 대하여

연구소재

2007년, 아세안^{ASEAN}은 아세안 공동체^{ASEAN Community}를 앞당겨 추진하기로 한다. 이는 아세안의 통일성을 심화하여 지역의 내적 역량을 강화함과 동시에, 아세안이 가지고 있던 고질적 문제를 해결하고, 외부적 국제정치 지형의 변화에 잘 대처하려는 목적이었다. 1990년대, 아세안의 외연이 확장되면서 아세안 원리를 적용시키기가 어려워졌다 (Foreign Policy 2011). 또한 이 문제가 1997년 아시아 경제위기와 복합되면서 아세안의 국가 간 조율 및 중재 능력에 한계가 나타났다 (Stubbs 2002). 오늘날 아시아의 국제정세는 심상치 않다. 중국과 인도가 빠르게 부상하면서, 지역패권으로 성장하기 위해 동남아시아에 대한 영향을 키우려 노력하고 있으며, 특히 2007년 서브프라임 사태로 인한 세계적 금융위기 이후 중국과 미국의 대립구도가 강해졌다. 미중관계가 보다 극단으로 나아간다면, 동남아시아는 양자택일을 해야 하거나, 그들에게 관리되는 처지에 놓일 수도 있다 (배금찬 2015). 이러한 상황이 아세안에 영향을 준 것이다. 역내 문제 해결을 목표로 하던 이전과 달리, 오늘날에는 역외 주요 행위자들과의 관계의 중요성이 부각된 것이다(이동운 2012).

아세안 공동체가 강조하는 개념인 ‘복원력 있고, 포괄적이며, 사람지향의 사람중심적 공동체^{resilient, inclusive, people-oriented and people-centred community}’는 아세안이 기존에 가지고 있던 한계들을 뛰어넘으려는 의지를 담고 있다. 국가의 주권을 지나치게 강조하여, 중요한 사안에서 합의를 보지 못하거나 이

전까지 쉽게 다루지 못했던 영역-예를 들자면, 지속가능성, 균형성, 인권 등-의 문제도 해결하겠다는 것이다. 그리고 이를 바탕으로 보다 응집력 있고 건전하며, 영향력 있는 주체가 되려는 것이다. 특히 이를 위한 노력으로 2012년 채택한 아세안 인권선언에서는 아세안 헌장에서 언급되었던 기본 원칙 중 국내 문제 불간섭 원칙이 제외되기도 하였다 (한-아세안센터 2016). 아세안 공동체는 아세안의 구조적 문제를 개선하여 지역통합의 심화를 이루는 동시에 국제사회에서 중심성을 확보하기 위한 방안이다. 아세안의 역량을 강화해, 조직이 분열되고 중심을 잃어 역외 강대국들에 의해 좌지우지되면서 국제사회에서 주변화 되는 일을 막겠다는 것이다. 이러한 점에서 이 프로젝트는 아세안에 있어 명백히 최대의 사안이다. 아세안 공동체가 나아가면서 직면하게 될 문제를 고민하는 것으로 아세안의 미래에 대해 논하는 것은 가치 있는 연구가 될 것이다.

연구방향

이 글에서는 아세안 공동체가 신기능주의 이론에 기초하여 추진되고 있는 경향이 강하다고 전제하여 바라볼 것이다. 아세안 공동체를 신기능주의적이라고 바라보는 이유는 아래와 같다. 우선, 본래 정치-안보 중심적이며 주권의 확실한 보장을 천명했던 아세안과는 다르게, 아세안 공동체는 국제정치학적으로 현실주의적 색채가 강한 정치·안보 측면 이외에도 자유주의적 특징이 강한 경제공동체 그리고 구성주의적 성향이 강한 사회·문화 공동체를 ‘동일’한 중요성을 지니는 요소로 간주한다. 다음으로 아세안 공동체는 1997년 아시아 경제 위기 이후 종래의 문제가 부각되면서 빠르게

추진되게 되었다. 경제적 상호의존의 가치가 요구된 것이다. 특히 다른 두 공동체에 비해서 2년 빠른 2007년, 경제공동체의 청사진이 우선 발표되는 등 경제적 중요성이 부각되었다. 뿐만 아니라, 새로이 생성된 전문위원회 중 대부분이 경제와 관련되어 있으며, 경제장관회의를 공식화 하는 등의 추세를 반영한 결과이다.

위 생각에 바탕하여 신기능주의가 오늘날 그 구조적 특징으로 인하여 겪고 있는 문제를 문헌과 현안 중심으로 분석하여 아세안 공동체에 적용시켜볼 것이다. 이때 비교분석 대상은 신기능주의로 자유주의의 부흥을 이끌었고, 현재 가장 성공적인 국가 간 연합체라고 볼 수 있는 유럽연합^{EU}의 경험이다. 이러한 방식은 이전에 일변도적으로 진행되었던 것처럼, 서구에서 파생한 이념으로 아시아를 설명하려는 시도가 아니다. 유럽연합은 국가 간 연합체가 가지는 구조적 특징을 거시적으로 파악하기 위한 사례이다. 그리고 그로 인해 나타나는 미시적인 모습은 동남아 중심의 시각으로 분석할 것이다. 이 글의 목표는 신기능주의의 위기가 어디서 기인하는지 찾고, 아세안 공동체에 구체적으로 어떠한 문제가 찾아올 수 있는지를 내다보는 것이다. 이는 적실하지 않은 비교를 통해 무의미한 결과를 제시하던 기존의 연구에 비해 (동남아정치연구회 1992), 현실성 있는 결과를 도출할 수 있는 장점을 지닌다. 나아가 어떻게 대처할 수 있을지도 논할 수 있을 것이다.



신기능주의로 바라본 아세안 공동체

자유주의 이론은 국가 간 협력이 가능하다고 믿는다. 자유주의의 입장에 근간을 두는 신기능주의는 국가 간 기능의 통합을 거치면서 점차 상위의 영역, 즉 정치적 측면에서도 통합을 이루어낼 수 있다고 믿는다. 신기능주의는 1950년대 후반부터 60년대 초까지, 그리고 다시 90년대의 유럽통합을 설명하는 주요한 이론이다. 그 이름에서도 알 수 있듯이 신기능주의는 기능주의라는 이론에 바탕 하면서 변용을 가한 이론이다. 따라서 신기능주의를 이해하기 위해서는 기능주의에 대한 이해가 우선되어야 한다.

기능주의는 19세기 후반 기술적 국제기구들의 설립과 함께 처음 등장한다. 국제기구의 발족과 그 운영에 참여한 사람들은 기술 중심의 국제기구에서 도모된 국가 협력이 국가들을 통합시키는 데 기여할 수 있다고 보았다. 이러한 생각은 2차 대전 이후 미트라니에 의해 발전된다. 미트라니는 경제·사회적 여건의 격차가 인간의 절망, 탐욕, 증오심 등을 초래하여 전쟁을 일으키기 때문에, 이 격차를 줄이는 것이 필요하다고 보았다 (Mitrany 1948). 이러한 관점은 인간은 본성적으로 전쟁을 좋아하지 않고, 단일 국가인 사람들의 욕구를 모두 충족시키기에 능력이 부족하기에 경제·사회적 차원에서 국가 간 협력이 이루어져야 한다는 가정과 전제 위에서 기능주의 이론으로 발전한다. 사회, 경제적 분야에서의 국가 간 협력은 반복을 통한 학습을 통해 다른 영역의 국가 간 협력으로 이어지고, 궁극적으로는 정치적 부문으로까지 확대된다는 것이다.

하지만 동서갈등으로 국제적 상황이 변화면서 기능주의 이론에 대한 재

평가가 시도되었고, 하스는 이를 수정·보완하여 신기능주의를 주장한다. 하스는 권력과 복지는 구별될 수 없고, 국제기구를 통한 성공적 업무수행이 필연적으로 국민들의 충성심을 국제기구로 이동하게 하지는 않는다고 주장한다(全雄 1979). 즉, 신기능주의는 국가 간의 통합과 평화유지는 비정치적 공동 사안의 기능적 수행만으로는 목적을 달성하기 어렵기 때문에, 국가들을 구속할 수 있는 초국가적 기관의 역할이 중요하다고 본다(全雄 1979). 이러한 방식으로 보다 높은 층위의 통합과 안정을 이루어 낸 질서는, 분절적이던 상태에 비해 보다 역량 강한 주체가 되어 국제사회에서의 위상이 강화된다. 이러한 신기능주의 이론은 아세안 공동체가 추진하는 내적 역량 강화의 목적, 그리고 지금까지의 역사적 경로와 일맥 한다(신윤환 2009). 이러한 시각을 통해 아세안 공동체를 바라본다면, 중심 추진력은 경제공동체에 있을 것이다. 아세안이 주목하는 중심축이 안보에서 경제의 영역으로 이동한 것이다.

신기능주의가 제일 활발하게 이루어지는 영역은 바로 경제이다. 기능적 분화가 용이하면서, 동시에 초국가적인 질서도 이룰 수 있는 부분은 경제 뿐이기 때문이다(全雄 1979). 안보의 경우, 기능적으로 분화하기 어렵고, 사회와 문화를 구속력 있는 실체를 통해 조정하는 것은 적절하지 않기 때문이다. 이러한 맥락에서 등장한 아세안 경제공동체의 의미는 동남아시아 지역이 경제금융 분야에서 전면적인 통합을 이루는 것이라고 할 수 있다(Severino 2006). 이는 동남아 전역을 하나의 시장으로 묶어 경제구조 및 투자 등에 있어 효율을 추구하는 한편, 협력을 통해 하나로의 유대감을 형성하기 위함이다. 이전까지 아세안은 역내의 경제적 통합이 미약했고, 현재 아세안 각국은 경제 구조 및 산업 구조에서 상이한 모습을 보이고 있

다. 물론 경쟁하는 분야 또한 존재하겠지만, 이는 기본적으로 아세안 각국이 국제시장에서 기능적으로 상호 보완할 수 있게 하는 형태이다. 이렇게 경제통합이 성공한다면 아세안 공동체의 역량을 크게 제고할 수 있을 것이다. 이는 중국에 대한 경제적 의존도 상대적으로 줄일 수 있다 (한-아세안센터 2016). 또한 경제 분야의 협력 심화가 정치적으로도 스펀 오버(spill over)된다면, 정치적으로도 아세안 중심성을 점차 회복해갈 수 있을 것이다.

이러한 경제공동체 중심의 신기능주의적 지역통합 방향은 동남아시아의 역사적 경험에서 비롯되었다. 아세안 국가들이 경험한 1997년 경제위기는 개별국가 혼자서 막거나 감당하기 어려움을 알려주었다. 개별국가로의 대응이 아니라, 국가 간의 공동 협력이 필요한 것이다. 또한 개별 인간 행위자들의 능력에 의존하기 보다는 국가 단위의 역할과 초국가적으로 중심이 될 수 있는 기구의 필요성이 요구되었다. 이러한 기능적 요구 이외에도 아세안이 구체적으로 신기능주의적 경제 통합을 추진하는 배경에는 역사적인 성공 사례가 존재한다. 유럽연합의 성공이다 (한-아세안센터 2016). 몇몇 그룹 국가들의 경제협력에서 시작된 유럽연합이 1990년대에는 통화 통합까지 이루어 내는 것을 보며 아세안 국가들은 경제통합에 대한 확신을 가지게 된 것이다. 실제로 아세안은 경제통합을 추진하는 과정에서 유럽의 경험을 연구하고 있다 (New York Times 2007). 따라서 이 글에서 유럽연합을 분석하는 일은 아세안 공동체의 미래에 함의를 전할 수 있을 것이다.



유럽연합을 통해 바라본 신기능주의의 위기

1952년 석탄철강공동체로 시작했던 경제협력 노력은 여러 도전들에도 불구하고 느리지만 점진적으로 하나의 유럽을 향해 발전해왔다. 특히 유럽 연합은 그 변화가 두드러졌던 50년대와 90년대에 신기능주의적 설명의 대표적인 사례가 되어왔다. 한편으로 오늘날 유럽이 겪는 사태들에서 신기능주의의 한계에 대한 비판이 더욱 잘 나타나고 있는 점은 특히 참고할 만하다. 물론 정체기도 있었으나 점진적으로 발전해오던 유럽 연합은, 2016년 현재 처음으로 ‘Ever closer union’이라는 내러티브에서 벗어나는, 즉 후퇴를 맞이할 수도 있는 국면에 접어든다. 이전까지 유럽은 ‘허용적 동의 공동의 목표를 추구하는 과정에서 특별한 반대가 존재하지 않는 것’ 상태에 있다고 평가되었으나, 현재 반대의견들이 적극적으로 표명되고 있다 (Clifford 2001). 이전까지 수면 아래 잠겨있던 것들이 수면위로 표출되고 있는 것이다. 특히 이는 단순히 담론으로 남아 있지 않고 실질적인 행동으로 이어지면서 유럽연합의 위기를 만들어내고 있다. 비록 이러한 현재의 상태가 지금까지 누적된 분노가 일시에 터져 나온 것인지, 혹은 단지 오늘날 문제의 정도가 임계를 넘기 때문인지, 또는 공동의 목적이 어느 정도 추구되면서 묻어두고 있던 것들로 관심을 돌렸기 때문인지는 알 수 없지만, 크게 두 가지를 원인으로 분석할 수 있다. 첫째는 협력기구의 근본적 속성에 대한 위기이고, 두 번째는 공동체적 정체와 국가·시민적 정체성의 불일치이다. 각각의 요인은 2016년에 발생하고 있는 일련의 사태들에서 찾아볼 수 있다. 즉, 상위조직 보다는 국민국가에 더욱 방점을 두며, 하층의 협력이 보다 고차원적인 맥락에서까

지 통하지는 않을 수 있다는 비판의 실증이다. 한편 이러한 내적 속성에 의한 문제들이 발생하도록 만든 결함은 국제조직이 가지고 있는, 주권국가와 그 상위조직의 복층 구성의 구조적 특성에서 기인한다는 점이 주목된다.

영국의 EU 탈퇴 결정

소위 ‘브렉시트 [Brexit](#)’이라고 불린 사건이다. 최종적으로 2016년 6월 23일, 영국국민 스스로가 국민투표에서 유럽연합으로부터의 탈퇴를 결정지었다. 아직까지 영국이 유럽연합이라는 조직으로부터 완전히 분리된 것은 아니다. 그러나 이번 투표 결과는 그 소식만으로도 전 세계적인 영향을 주었다. 또한 의사결정을 내리는 데에 있어 아직까지는 영국이 포함되어 있기에, 구조적인 문제에 직면하게 되고, 기능발휘의 효율성에 문제를 가지게 만드는 등 유럽연합 자체에도 혼란을 가져올 것이다. 특히 회원국들 중 첫 탈퇴결정이라는 점에서 유럽연합이 맞이한 큰 도전이다. 이러한 결과의 원인을 찾는 연구 및 언론에서는 다양한 요인들이 제시되고 있으며, 필경 복합적으로 작용하고 있을 것이다. 예를 들자면, 난민 유입과 상위체에 대한 속박, 법체계 차이가 만들어내는 긴장, 그리고 이러한 이유들로 발생하는 크고 작은 갈등들이 있다. 그러나 이러한 원인들은 최종적으로 하나의 지점으로 귀결된다. 경제문제이다. 즉 유럽연합이라는 협력적 기구의 근본적 속성, 그리고 그 성공적인 작동에 대한 의문이다.

외부적 환경을 살펴보자. 현재 세계 경제는 다극화를 향한다. 특히 2007년 세계 금융위기 이후, 미국의 양적완화로 인해 달러에 대한 불신이 증폭되면서 이러한 경향은 더욱 강화되었다. 그 추세는 단지 경제적 지역화를

만들어내는 것에서 끝나는 것이 아니라 각국이 자국의 경제를 최우선하도록 이끌었다. 금융위기 이후, 세계 각국은 자국의 경제적 이익을 우선시하며 행동한다. 필리핀은 남중국해 문제를 두고도 경제적 이익을 위해 미국과의 합동훈련을 포기했으며, 한국은 싸드^{THAAD} 배치를 둘러싼 갈등 속에서도 중국과 정경문제는 분리해서 보아야 함을 강조하며 다가서고 있다. 영국에서는 유럽연합이 경제적 장애가 된다는 의견이 지속적으로 제기되어 왔다 (The Telegraph 2015). 부담금, 조약법 등을 비롯한 부문들에서의 충돌, 유럽에 속하면서 발생하는 외부 무역에서의 이득 제한 등이 그 주장이다 (시사저널 2016). 타국에 비해 경제적 문제가 특히 컸던 영국은, 그 위기가 심각해지자 결국 유럽연합으로부터의 탈퇴를 통해 자국의 이익을 좇아간 것이다.

다시 말해, 유럽연합을 통한 경제협력, 이를 통한 이윤 추구가 효과적으로 이루어지지 않게 되자 불만이 누적되고, 나아가 유럽연합이라는 근본적 목적, 경제협력에 대한 의문이 생겨나게 된 것이다. 즉, 국가 간 협력 기구의 실효성, 그 기구에 속해 있을 필요성에 대한 의심이 생겨난 것이다. 유럽연합 제도와 기구들에 대한 영국 시민들의 신뢰부족이다. 이는 특히 유럽연합이 발전해오면서 이루어 낸 상부 통합-대표적으로 정치적 통합-에서 생긴 문제가 아니라, 기본적인 단초에 대한 의문이 생긴 것이기에 그 의미와 후과가 더욱 크게 나타난 것이다. 원초의 목적 또한 달성하지 못하는 것 아니냐는 비판 속에 협력기구의 존재 의의 내지는 가치에 대한 부정이 이루어지게 된 것이다.

민주성 결핍에 대한 지적

‘유럽회의주의 [Euroscepticism](#)’은 유럽에서 만연한 회의주의를 일컫는 신조어로 유럽연합에 대한 회의감을 나타낸다. 이 현상은 현재 전 유럽에 급속도로 퍼지고 있다. 유럽연합의 위기이다. 사실 앞선 영국의 유럽연합 탈퇴도 유럽회의주의의 영향을 받기도 했다. 그러나 둘을 구분한 이유는 방향을 각기 다른 분야에 두고 있기 때문이다. 앞서 브렉시트 부분에서는 경제적 부분에서 접근해 ‘국가 간 협력기구의 본질적 목적의 실패’라는 본질에 도달했다면, 이번 챕터에서는 민주성의 결핍이라는 측면에서 접근할 것이다. 유럽의 주요 의사결정기구들이 충분히 민주적이지 못하다는 의미이다 (McLaren 2007). 이는 시민들이 자신들이 속한 정치체에 대해 어떠한 기대를 가지고 있는지의 ‘정체성’ 문제로 이어진다 (Project-Syndicate 2016a). 한 단계 더 나아가자면, 유럽연합이라는 공동체적 정체가 시민들이 가지고 있는 이상 혹은 그들 국가의 정체와 불일치를 보이는 것이다.

유럽연합은 개인주의적 전통을 하나의 정체로 가진다. 서유럽은 로마제국과 프랑크왕국의 거대한 힘이 만들어낸 역사 속에서 고대 그리스의 헬레니즘과 중세 기독교의 영향을 받는다. 그리고 이 둘의 결합을 통해 개인주의적 가치가 공통으로 형성되었다 (이길용 1997). 유럽연합은 서유럽 국가들로부터 시작되어, 정치·경제·사회·문화에서 비슷한 특징의 국가들을 선별하고 포섭해 묶어나가면서 하나의 정체를 유지해왔다. 유럽의 개인주의 전통에서 한 가지 주의할 점이 있는데, 유럽의 개인주의는 반사회적인 극단적 개인주의를 의미하지 않는 것이다. 오히려 사회인으로 공동체 구성원의 책임 및 의무를 다하는 것을 의미한다. 독립적인 동시에 자신의 권익

을 보호하려고 노력하는 것이다. 이러한 사조는 유럽 정치철학의 바탕이 된다. 이후 오늘날에 이르기까지 개인주의적 정체는 그제 어떤 형식의 정치체제이든 간에 유럽인들이 ‘민주성’을 추구하도록 하는 데 있어 큰 원동력이 되었다 (이길용 1997).

유럽연합이 ‘허용적 동의’를 바탕으로 한다는 것이 초기의 유럽에서는 유럽 통합 자체에 많은 관심이 있었다는 것을 의미하지는 않는다. 처음 형성된 유럽 연합은 오히려 소극적 지지 혹은 수동적 태도에 의해 만들어진 것이다 (Hurrelmann 2007). 이후 1993년의 마스트리히트 조약과 2007년 리스본 조약에서 보인 현상들 — 투표율 내지는 재투표 — 은 유럽연합에 대한 유럽인들의 관심이 높아진 것을 보여준다. 동시에 정체의 갈등이 발생하게 된 것이다. 유럽인들에게 내재화된 개인주의의 전통, 민주성 추구라는 가치가 자신들이 속하고 있는 집단에서 결핍된 것으로 느끼는 것이다. 이는 집행위원회와 유럽의회 사이의 권력 불균형, 나아가 기구 내의 민주성 문제 — 유럽 시민의 정치 참여 가능성 등 — 에 대한 제도적인 측면 외에 유럽연합이 근본적으로 초국가적인 의사결정체라는 점에서 기인하는 다양성 부족 등의 민주성 결핍 문제가 있다 (Kaniok 2012). 근대국가는 동일한 국민 개념을 형성하면서 그 정치적 권위의 정당성을 지닌다. 그러나 유럽연합 내 국민국가들이 여전히 유효한 정치적 행위자이자 범위로 존속되면서, 유럽 시민들에게 복수의 정체성을 요구하게 된다. 그러나 유럽연합에는 시민성 향상을 위한 공론의 장이 마련되지 못했고, 국민국가에서는 만족이 되는 ‘민주성’의 부분을 유럽연합은 만족시키지 못하게 되었다. 따라서 유럽 시민들은 유럽연합에 대한 소속감과 유대를 형성할 수 없게 된 것이다. 특히나 유럽연합은 일정한 정치·경제적 수준이 이루어진 국가만

을 회원으로 받아들이기 때문에, 상당한 동질성을 지님에도 불구하고 문제가 발생한 것이다. 그리고 그에 따른 반동이 일어나게 된 것이다. 즉, 자신들의 정체와 더욱 일치하는 국민국가를 위하는 쪽으로 행동하고, 지향하는 움직임을 보이게 된다. 오늘날 유럽에서 나타나고 있는 반EU주의를 표방하는 극우주의 정당들의 득세는 이러한 맥락에서 이해할 수 있다 (Project-Syndicate 2016b).



EU의 사례를 통해 바라본 아세안 공동체

유럽연합이 지금까지 축적해온 모든 경험들을 아세안 공동체에 직접적으로 유효하게 연관시키기는 어려울 것이다. 실제로 아시아가 가지는 미시적인 차이점으로 인해 자유주의적 성과를 거두기 힘들다는 주장은 이미 많이 존재한다 (이승주 2015). 이는 애초부터 타당한 비교 자체가 힘들다는 것을 뜻하여, 적용과 분석 자체가 의미 없음을 가리킨다. 그러나 앞선 분석 사례들은 아세안 공동체에도 적용 가능하다. 보다 보편적으로 적용될 수 있는 장점을 지니는 것이다. 왜냐하면 요인적인 접근이 아닌, 초국가 기구가 구조적으로 가질 수 있는 문제를 보여주고 있기 때문이다. 다만, 유럽연합과는 다른 환경과 내적 속성을 지니기 때문에 반응이 어떻게 나타날지는 다시 세밀하게 살펴보아야 한다. 그렇다면 앞서 유럽연합의 사례를 통해 분석했던, 국제조직에서 발생 가능한 두 가지 문제를 아세안에 적용시켜보겠다. 첫째로는 연합기구의 방향이 본래 목적에 부합할 것으로 기대되는지를, 다음으로는 회원국 내지 시민들의 정체성이 국가연합의 정체와 갈등을 일으키지는 않을지의 여부이다.

아세안 공동체의 합목적성

아세안은 본래 정치·안보적 목적의 성향을 강하게 지닌 채 탄생했다. 초창기 아세안 발족 국가들과 새로이 가입한 회원국들 모두 국제정치적으로 주요한 행위자라고는 할 수 없는 작은 나라들이다. 발족 당시 목적은 역내 지역 분쟁을 평화롭게 해결하고, 공산화의 위협에 맞서는 한편, 무엇보다 지역적 힘의 공백 사이에서 운신의 폭을 넓히기 위함이었다. ‘아세안 중심성’이라는 그들만의 방향성은 그러한 당시의 생각을 잘 담아내고 있다. 비록 지금은 아세안 공동체가 경제에 초점을 맞추고 있긴 하지만, 결국 안보적 속성이 제일 기초에 있는 것이다. 따라서 안보적 역할을 아세안 공동체가 충분히 해내지 못한다면 아세안은 유럽처럼 위기를 겪게 될 것이다. 그렇다면 현재 아세안 공동체가 직면할 수 있는 안보적 위협은 무엇이며, 이에 잘 대처할 수 있는지를 살펴보겠다.

안보 개념은 시대를 거치면서 보다 확대되었다. 탈냉전기, 안보담론은 ‘국가안보’뿐 아니라 개인과 집단에 대한 안보도 다루게 된다. 소련이 해체되면서 이념 대립은 약해졌지만, 테러, 난민, 환경과 같은 비전통적인 이슈들이 새로이 부각되었다. 동시에 동남아시아라는 지역은 미-중 사이의 갈등의 주요 공간으로, 전통적 안보문제도 여전히 중요시된다. 현재 동남아시아는 테러 위협과 난민, 어업노동자 인권 등에서 문제를 겪고 있고, 또한 남중국해를 둘러싼 문제에서는 아세안 국가 내부에서 의견 불일치를 보이는 등 정치안보적으로 불안정해지고 있다. 이에 잘 대처하기 위해 아세안은 아세안지역안보포럼 [ARF](#)을 설립하면서, 여전히 역내 정치안보 문제를 중요시 하고, 아세안 중심성을 잃지 않으려는 모습을 보인다 (Jac Bong

Park 2014). 그리고 아세안 공동체 건설에서도 정치안보공동체 APSC 를 3대 축 중 하나로 선정하면서, 그 중요성을 유지하고 있다. 그런데 과연 APSC 는 현재 아세안이 직면하고 있는 안보 문제들을 잘 다룰 수 있을 것인가?

APSC는 경제, 사회문화공동체와의 융합을 통해 보다 높은 수준의 통합을 성취해 다양한 안보위협에 대처하려는 아세안의 노력이다. 특히 아세안 중심성을 확고히 하기 위한, 내적균형을 이루려는 의지이다. 그러나 한계 또한 지닌다. 안보의 영역은 자유주의자들의 스피로버 효과를 통해 보장되기 힘들다는 현실주의적 인식이 강하다. 예를 들면, 비록 포괄적 안보의 원칙이 수용됨에도 불구하고, 인간안보의 개념은 APSC 논의상의 공식문헌에 나타나지 않는다 (김형중 2014). 국가 주권의 보장을 위해 제도상의 틈을 열어둔 것이다. 결국 문제가 교착상태에서 해결되지 않게 될 상황이 열려있는 것이다.

무엇보다 정치안보라는 그 자체의 특성으로 인해 APSC가 목적을 잘 수행하고 있는지 확인하는 데 한계를 가진다. 경제와 같은 부문은 성과를 정확히 수치적으로 파악할 수 있지만, 정치안보는 ‘스코어 카드’라는 방식을 통해 실적을 객관적으로 측정하는 데에는 한계가 있다. 안보적 협력이란 목표는 다른 영역에 비해 구조적으로 상대적 불안정성을 지니는 것이다. 특히 인권과 같은 핵심 개념이나 목표에 대한 단일한 기준을 형성하기도 어렵기 때문에 구체성이 떨어진다. 또한 특성상 일회성으로 이루어지는 사업으로 인해서는 포괄적 안보가 추구하는 목적을 달성했다고 확신하기도 힘들다 (김형중 2014). 또한 이러한 사업들의 결과 및 평가가 투명하게 공개돼야 장기적으로 효과를 보일 수 있을텐데, 정치안보가 가지는 민감성은 투명한 공개를 어렵게 만든다. 이렇듯 아세안 탄생의 목적은 그 자체가

가지는 특성으로 인하여, 그것이 제대로 지켜지고 있는 것인지에 대해 회의 및 의구심이 계속되도록 만든다. 따라서 아세안 공동체는 순간순간 국가 간 분쟁의 여지가 있는 현안에 직면할 때마다, 특히 안보라는 목적 성취에 대한 실효성, 나아가 합목적성에 대해 지속적으로 도전 받을 것이다.

2016년 현재 아세안 공동체 또한 외부적 요인으로 인해 위기에 놓여있다. 처음부터 안보를 목적으로 가지는 것 때문에 태생적으로 지니는 한계가 있고, 더구나 각국의 주권을 강조하는 아세안의 특성상, 아직 충분히 성숙해지지 못한 상태에서 첨예해지고 있는 남중국해 갈등과 미중경쟁은 아세안에게 큰 걱정이다. 2012년 정상회의에서 캄보디아가 중국과의 관계를 고려하며 편향적 행동을 취한 결과 의장성명서 발표가 무산된 점은 아세안 내부로부터의 분열에 대해 걱정하게 만든다 (배공찬 2015). 2016년 국제중재재판소의 판결은 중국이 앞으로 취할 행위에 국제법적 위반의 표식을 부여하여 중국의 불만족도를 상승시켰다. 이미 미국에 대해 상당한 불만족이 누적된 중국이 부상하면서, 동남아시아 지역에서는 미중긴장이 고조되고 있다. 이렇게 점차 강대국 정치가 부각되면, 미중의 세 모으기는 지역 세력들을 선택의 기로에 놓아 동남아를 양분화 시킬 염려가 있다. 아세안의 분열이다. 아세안의 핵심 외교 기조인 ‘아세안 중심성’을 상실할 수도 있는 위험이다 (김예경 2008). 결국 아세안의 근본 목적인 안보를 놓치는 결과를 낳게 만들며, 아세안 공동체 존재의 목적성이나 실효에 대한 의문으로 이어진다. 이 경우에 아세안 공동체는 앞선 유럽연합처럼 그 합목적성에 대한 도전에 직면하게 될 것이다. 아세안 공동체의 위기이다.

아세안 공동체의 정체와 회원국·시민 정체와의 차이

아세안의 정신, 정체라고 볼 수 있는 ‘아세안 방식 [ASEAN Way](#)’은 주권을 존중하며, 각 회원국들이 형성하고 있는 정치체제를 존중한다. 그러나 아세안의 외연 확대는 아세안 회원국 간의 격차를 확대시켰다 (Stubbs 2002). 이에 아세안 공동체 내에는 공산당 체제, 자유민주주의, 독점적 자유민주주의, 입헌군주제 등 다양한 정치체제가 존재한다. 심지어 쿠데타를 통해 군부가 집권하는 경우도 발생한다. 아세안 공동체가 운영되는 원리와 각국의 정치체제 사이에서 차이가 필연적으로 있을 수밖에 없는 것이다. 즉, 각국의 의사결정구조와 아세안의 시스템 사이에서는 간극이 생긴다. 이러한 구조적 문제로 인해 각 국가들 나름대로 불만족도가 점차 높아질 수 있는 것이다.

한편, 이러한 특징을 절충하기 위해 아세안이 고안한 의사결정 방식은 합의 [mufakat](#)와 협의 [musyawarah](#)를 통한 만장일치 제도이다. 이는 동남아시아 농경사회의 전통과도 닿아있어, 회원국들 모두 나름대로 수용한 것으로 보인다 (김대창 외 2011). 그러나 이는 저차원적 영역에서는 효과를 보였으나 고차원적인 부분, 예를 들면 남중국해에 대한 대응과 인도네시아의 연무 [haze](#)와 같은 초국경적 지역문제에서 난항을 겪고 있다. 이에 만장일치 합의 원칙에 대해서도 회의감이 높아지고 있는 실정이다 (헤럴드경제 2016). 한편, 1980년 싱가포르 리완유가 제시했던 5-X 방식이 확대되어 ASEAN-X의 방식을 사용할 수도 있게 되었다 (김대창 외 2011). 그러나 이는 결국 예외를 허용하는 것으로 아세안의 내적 역량이 모여지기 힘든 한계를 인정하는 것이기도 하다. 합의 방식에 있어, 각 국가들의 체제에 대한 존중과

효율성 사이의 딜레마이다.

또한 조직구조를 보면, 아세안 헌장은 최상위 의사결정 기관을 아세안 정상회의로 규정하고 하부에 조정이사회와 공동체이사회를 둔다(김대창 외 2011). 정상을 비롯하여 고위 공직자들이 모이는 행정부적 회의체 조직이다. 또한 의회 등을 통한 분권화가 되어 있지 않기 때문에 권한 집중의 엘리트주의 특성이 강하게 드러난다. 다양성 속의 통합을 주창하는 아세안에서 사회의 다양성이 반영되지 않는 것이다(Kymlicka 1996). 시민들이 아세안에 참여할 수 있는 통로의 부재로, 양자가 유리된다. 특히 아세안의 공식 언어를 영어로 채택한 것은 엘리트주의 경향을 강화시킨다(Bhatt 2001). 이미 언어, 민족의 차이로 인해 응집이 힘들고 정치적 불만도 있는 상황에서 문제가 증폭되는 것이다(Leng 1980). 결국 시민들은 아세안 공동체를 자신과 연관된 것이라고 느끼기 힘들게 된다(동남아정치연구회 1992). 유럽의 모습과는 다른 양상으로, 정치의 엘리트화, 일반인으로부터 타자화이다. 그 결과 아세안 공동체의 비민주성에 대한 반발보다는 오히려 나와 상관이 없는 것으로 무관심화, 유리화가 나타난다.

동남아시아에서는 이전부터 지도자의 권위가 초자연적으로 인정되곤 했다. 또한 부락공동체에서 ‘협상’은 전적으로 수장의 리더십에 의존되어 왔다. 이는 하나의 동남아시아 지역의 동일성을 표현하는 문화적 개념이 되었다(동남아정치연구회 1992). 이러한 특징이 아세안의 성립에 있어서도 동질적 문화와 교류 등의 본질 보다는 국가 엘리트의 인식과 의지가 중요하도록 만든 것이다(신윤환 2009). 이는 결국 아세안 공동체를 하나의 빗장동네 *gated community* 로 만들어 대중들로부터 격리시킨다. 한편으로 아감벤 G. Agamben 이 동남아시아를 규정하는 방식인 ‘State of Exception’에서 바

라본다면, 하층부 혹은 소수민족이 느끼는 아세안과 자신 사이의 괴리는 더욱 클 것이다 (High 2009). 이러한 모습은 동남아에서 민주성이 강해질 때, 큰 불만 사항이 될 수 있다. 결국 아세안 공동체의 존립 근거를 약화시키는 것이다 (The Diplomat 2016b). 아세안 헌장은 각각의 아세안 공동체가 나침의 의사결정 구조를 설정할 수 있도록 한다 (ASEAN 2007). 이때, 나침의 구조가 어느 국가에게 불합리하게 받아들여진다면, 아세안 시민과 아세안 사이에서 만연한 내러티브의 불일치는 불만을 증폭시킬 수 있다 (The Diplomat 2016a). 아세안 공동체는 이러한 위협을 안고 있는 것이다.



아세안 공동체 성공의 실마리

유럽연합이라는 국제조직이 맞이한 위기를 구조적 시각으로 분석하여 아세안 공동체가 직면할 수 있는 도전들을 바라보았다. 그 결과 아세안 공동체는 그 조직 자체가 가지는 목적성 그리고 회원국들 간 차이로 인하여 구조적 문제에 취약성이 있다는 것이 나타났다. 자유주의적 전망이 현실과 괴리가 생기는 패러독스를 내적 요인이 아니라 체계 차원에서 분석한 결과이다. 이러한 상황을 타개하기 위해서 아세안 공동체는 과연 어떠한 노력을 취해야 하는가? 해답은 아세안 사회문화 공동체 [ASCC](#) 이다. 아세안 공동체는 정치안보와 경제에 직접적으로 관련하는 부분을 제외한 나머지 사안들을 모두 ASCC의 영역으로 포함시키고 있다. 하지만 이는 ASCC 혹은 사회문화적 요인을 안보와 경제를 제외하고 남은 주변적, 부차적인 대상으로 간주하는 것은 절대 아니다. 오히려 이들이 조화되게 만드는 접착제 역할이다. 오늘날까지 아세안은 문화와 정체성에 대한 고민을 지속적으로 해 오고 있으며, 이는 아세안 방식이나 아세안 규범을 설정하는 바탕이 되었다. 또한 현재는 보다 확대된 안보개념 그리고 경제정책의 후과와도 밀접하게 관련한다는 인식이 강조된다. 문화 및 정체성의 안보공동체, 경제공동체와의 결합이다.

앞서 구조적 요인으로 인하여 아세안 공동체가 직면할 수밖에 없는 위험들에 대해 살펴보았다. 이를 예방할 수 있는 유일한 방법은 구조적 격변이 있지 않는 이상, 내부에서 구성적 변화의 노력일 것이다. 따라서 아세안 공동체의 목적 실천성과 조직과 회원국·시민들 사이의 정체 불일치를 해

결할 수 있어야 한다. 이를 위해서는 ASCC가 필요하다. 즉, 안보에 있어서는 상호간 신뢰를 강화하고, 아세안 공동체-국가·시민을 일치시킬 수 있어야 하는 것이다 (박사명 2014). 이러한 상호 신뢰와 협력, 나아가 연대감을 형성할 아세안 정체성은 모두 ASCC의 핵심 사안이다 (김형중 2015). 혹자는 지난 1998년 스망기 [Semanggi](#) 사건으로 인한 반 [反](#) 수하르토 시위의 가운데 인도네시아는 처음으로 진정한 ‘다양성 속의 통일’을 보였다고 말한다. 민주성에 대한 강한 열망이 서로의 다름을 하나로 연대시킨 사례이다. 아세안 공동체에서도 이러한 연대를 형성하는 것이 결정적이다. 베네딕트 앤더슨이 제시한 ‘상상의 공동체’가 일국 단위가 아닌, 아세안의 단위로 이루어질 필요가 있는 것이다. 비록 앞으로 ASCC가 어떠한 모습으로 나아갈지는 감히 예측하기 힘들지만, 아세안 공동체가 직면할 수 있을 구조적 문제를 해결할 수 있는 유일한 실마리임에는 틀림없다. 아세안 공동체의 미래는 ASCC에 달려있는 것이다.

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
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Youth, Education and Building of an Identity

ASEAN Community Forging Ahead Together

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Abstract

In order to achieve a resilient Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN, the youths of ASEAN will need to prepare themselves through education, and form a sense of belonging through incorporating the ASEAN Identity. This paper explores the continuity of ASEAN 2025 as mentioned in the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community ASCC Blueprint 2025 for the youth, education and the ASEAN identity's indicators. ASEAN Member States prepared for a Post-2015 ASCC's towards 2025, and has

achieved a relatively respectable achievement that ranges from a commission on promoting and protecting the rights of women and children; the credit transfers and quality assurance networks under the ASEAN University Network [AUN](#) that is designed to facilitate more students and faculty exchanges. This paper argues, that in order to achieve these goals, it is crucial to create and achieve a common objective for the ASEAN Member States with the resources they have. ASEAN needs to develop a common or standardized educational system focusing on science and mathematics, as well as the arts for continued creativity and innovation for the younger generation. It is recommended that ASEAN schools should introduce coding and computational thinking and an exchange program at the levels of teachers and administrators to acquire best practices and emulate the model to their respective countries.



Introduction

ASEAN Community: Challenges and Prospects

King Sejong the Great, the fourth king of Joseon Dynasty of Korea who reigned during the fifteenth century ¹⁴¹⁸⁻¹⁴⁵⁰ decreed that: “The people are the roots of a nation, and the roots should be strong so as to create a peaceful nation” (Kim, 2015). King Sejong contributed towards the making of Korea’s history and social structure by encouraging the development of science and technology (Kim, 1998), the Korean alphabet *Hangul* (Kim, 1990) and instituted many other efforts to stabilize and improve prosperity. During that era, only the elite were able to read and write. By introducing *Hangul*, the Korean alphabet, the lower classes were the ones who took the most advantage of it. In any changing environment, it is a norm that most government officials and aristocrats would oppose to the usage of *Hangul* vis-à-vis to the most common use of Chinese characters. The majority of the lower class supported and accepted the new Korean alphabet system, which helped them become literate, and were able to communicate with each other through writing. Thus, reiterating King Sejong’s decree can be discerned that a peaceful nation comes from those who are highly educated.

Now, how do we define ASEAN in today’s context? In its simplest form, it can be defined according to its motto of “ASEAN: One Vision, One Identity, One Community.” Will it stand the test of time as King Sejong’s

hangul and his transformation policies? Will it be adopted by the younger generation and the leaders of tomorrow? Will ASEAN be able to develop its educational system in order to become a powerhouse in fifty years to come? This paper will highlight the importance of ASEAN's youth and its educational system in terms of readiness to create a revolution of a creative and innovative society. Gone are the days when the commodity or richness of a country is based on her earth minerals and raw materials. ASEAN with a population of 622,348,000 (ASEAN, 2015) and with more than 65 percent of ASEAN's population under the age of 35 (Kellerhals, 2014), proves as an astounding indicator that ASEAN will have the energy and the will soar upwards (Lee, 2016). However, this does not come easily and needs the proper tools and methods to address it.

Firstly, we must understand the definition of "Youth." According to the United Nations (UN), Youth is defined as "those persons between the ages of 15 and 24 years old, without prejudice to other definitions by Member States." The fourth UN Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim first referred to the current definition of youth in 1981 in his report to the General Assembly on International Youth Year (UN Secretary General, 1981). However, in both reports, the Secretary-General also recognized that, apart from that statistical definition, the meaning of the term 'youth' varies in different societies around the world (UN Secretary General, 1981).

The United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation [UNESCO](#) defines Youth as "a period of transition from the dependence of childhood

to adulthood's independence and awareness of our interdependence as members of a community." This is where youth is observed as a more fluid category than a fixed age-group. For activities at the national level, for example, when implementing a local community youth program, "youth" may be understood in a more flexible manner. UNESCO adopts the definition of "youth" as used by a particular Member State. It can be based, for instance, on the definition given in the African Youth Charter where youth means "every person between the ages of 15 and 35 years" (What do we mean by "youth"? n.d.). This paper will attempt to emphasise the education and continued learning of the ASEAN youth as a stepping stone to create the ASEAN Community that is ready to compete globally, and a resilient community that creates and innovates through formal education and training.



ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community^{ASCC}

ASEAN Community 2015 and ASEAN Forging Ahead Together 2025

In 2009, ASEAN Heads of State/ Government pledged to achieve the ASEAN Community by 2015. The primary means of achieving this is through the Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009-2015 and consisted of the three Community–Socio-Cultural, Economic, and Political-Security Blueprints as well as the Initiative for ASEAN Integration^{IAI} Work Plan II (Letchumanan, 2016). Since ‘youth’ has been clearly defined, we now need to understand the context of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community^{ASCC} in “ASEAN Community 2015” as well as “ASEAN Forging Ahead Together 2025,” which cover human development and building an identity.

What has ASCC achieved in its ASEAN Community 2015? In 2015, ASCC’s Scorecard had a total of 208 participants who agreed and approved the following indicators which includes; (1) Human Development; (2) Social Welfare and Protection; (3) Social Justice and Rights; (4) Ensuring Environmental Sustainability; and (5) Building ASEAN Identity (ASEAN, 2016).

This paper will explore two matters: the argument on how to achieve a resilient ASEAN, and how the youths of ASEAN will need to prepare themselves through education, and form a sense of belonging through

incorporating the ASEAN Identity. Even though Korea is a homogenous society which is different from that of ASEAN, the fact that King Sejong the Great still remains a great hero even centuries after his death and reign, shows that we can certainly learn that a shared Korean identity remains a pride to the Korean people and should be applied to the core foundation for ASEAN. In this study, it is understood that the key performance indicators **KPIs** are invariably in the minds of ASEAN Member States, but further studies need to be performed to evaluate whether the KPIs have been achieved and how well it has performed. Furthermore, we need to analyse the tangible impacts made to the peoples of ASEAN (Letchumanan, 2016). The author will use the KPIs and impacts to argue the notion on what needs to be applied to create an ASEAN that thinks and acts as one.

ASCC Scorecard (A) Human Development

Through the ASCC Scorecard, the objectives on human development (A) is formulated to enhance the well-being and livelihood of the peoples of ASEAN by providing equitable access to human development opportunities by promoting and investing in education and life-long learning; human resource training and capacity building; encouraging innovation and entrepreneurship; promoting English language usage; utilizing information and communication technology **ICT**; and applying science and technology in socio-economic development activities (ASEAN, 2009).

In this initiative under human development indicators, there are seven key areas that ASEAN has highlighted: (A.1.) Advancing and prioritising education; (A.2.) Investing in human resource development; (A.3.) Promotion of decent work; (A.4.) Promoting Information and Communication Technology (ICT); (A.5.) Facilitating access to applied Science and Technology (S&T); (A.6.) Strengthening entrepreneurship skills for women, youth, elderly and persons with disabilities; and (A.7.) Building civil service capability (ASEAN, 2009).

Another indicator that this paper will focus on is (E.1.) Promotion of ASEAN awareness and a sense of community. Indicators (B) – (D) of the ASCC Blueprint 2009; (B) Social Welfare and Protection; (C) Social Justice and Rights; (D) Ensuring Environmental Sustainability. These indicators are not discussed in this paper, not because of its ineffectiveness or lack of tools and methods for the youth to be engaged with, but this paper would like to highlight the capacity to build ASEAN's next generation of leaders to be well prepared to think and act as a collective ASEAN with its shared ideals and identity through education and training. The indicators of A.3. to A.7. is considered an advanced field which require the youth to be competent at schools, training centres, and universities before we can discuss the intricacies of a smart, skilled and knowledgeable labour force.

How can we achieve this in ASEAN, a region composed of diverse multi-cultured individuals who speak various different languages and dialects, as well as rural slangs and urban dictionaries, not to mention the social media's

memes, short forms and the digital divide of languages (Kirkpatrick, 2012)? ASEAN's indicators in providing its people with equitable access to human development opportunities by (A.1.) promoting and investing in education and life-long learning, (A.2.) human resource training and capacity building with qualitative and quantitative are documented in ASCC characteristic, with 34 on quantitative, and five on qualitative. The objective set on education was to "ensure the integration of education opportunities into ASEAN's development agenda and creating knowledge based society." The ASCC Scorecard did not indicate the 9 out of 39 indicators that were adopted and agreed under the Human Development Scorecard. Furthermore, it also stated that incomplete data hindered its assessment of progress in terms of educational qualifications (ASEAN, 2016).

In relation to the strategic objective of (A.2.) "investing in human resource development, enhance and improve the capacity of ASEAN human resource through strategic programs and developed qualified, competent and well-prepared ASEAN labour force" (ASEAN, 2009), ten indicators were adopted, and the performance of the Member States has shown significant improvements. The Scorecard was reported in 2011, and Singapore reported an admirable 100 percent enrolment rates at the primary education level. The Philippines also reported a big improvement from 89.43 percent in 2009 to 92.21 percent in 2011. Lao PDR's enrolment rate increased from 91.61 percent to 95.2 percent in 2012. For secondary net enrolment rates, the ASEAN Member States have made progress with Lao PDR, Myanmar

and Thailand where these countries showed that they have the potential to gain further ground in secondary education. Malaysia and Thailand's enrolment rates in tertiary education are relatively high, while Cambodia and Laos, even with their improvements, still have a long way to catch up (ASCC Scorecard, 2016). Table 1 and Table 2 indicate the ASCC in figures.

What implications do this have for the ASEAN Youth and the shared identity of ASEAN in the future? Will the disparity gaps of quality education and access to its people be one of the main factors to contribute towards the main goal of establishing a One ASEAN Community to work together? Reiterating King Sejong's mantra or decree; "The people are the roots of a nation, and the roots should be strong so as to create a peaceful nation," it is time for high quality and achieving academics from ASEAN Member States to share their syllabus and curriculum to students in primary/elementary as well as secondary/high schools with the models of ASEAN University Network [AUN](#) (Akhir & Akhir, 2014). AUN Program was established in November 1995 to spearhead regional cooperation among ASEAN Member States. Its specific objectives are to promote cooperation and solidarity among scientists in ASEAN, as well as to develop academic and professional human resources in the region; and to produce and transmit scientific and scholarly knowledge and information to achieve ASEAN goals (Akhir & Akhir, 2014).

AUN can share its expertise and best practices to ASEAN Schools Network [ASN](#) through collaboration with its partners, specifically with

Table 1. Adult Literacy Rate 15 Years Old and Above(in percent)

Country	Famale			Male			Total		
	2012	2013	2014	2012	2013	2014	2012	2013	2014
Brunei	95.8	96.3	-	97.8	98.1	-	95.8	97.2	-
Cambodia	73.2	-	-	86.9	-	-	79.7	-	-
Indonesia	86.3	91.4	94.1	94.1	95.5	97.6	90.1	93.9	95.9
Lao PDR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	79.0	-
Malaysia	92.1	92.1	-	96.0	95.1	-	94.1	94.2	-
Myanmar	95.1	95.4	86.9	94.8	94.8	92.6	95.6	95.1	89.5
Philippines	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Singapore	94.4	94.6	94.9	98.5	98.5	96.4	96.4	96.5	96.7
Thailand	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Vietnam	92.9	93.1	-	96.6	96.6	-	94.7	94.8	-

• Source: ASEAN Community in Figures.

Table 2. Net Primary Enrolment Rate(in percent)

Country	Famale			Male			Total		
	2011	2012	2013	2011	2012	2013	2011	2012	2013
Brunei	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cambodia	94.6	97.0	-	95.8	98.2	-	95.2	97.0	-
Indonesia	90.5	97.0	-	91.6	92.4	-	91.1	92.5	95.6
Lao PDR	93.3	94.3	-	94.9	96.0	-	94.1	95.2	-
Malaysia	96.2	96.5	97.3	95.6	96.4	97.3	95.9	96.4	97.3
Myanmar	-	-	-	-	-	-	84.6	84.6	86.37
Philippines	-	-	-	-	-	-	89.9	-	-
Singapore	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Thailand	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Vietnam	95.4	96.6	96.5	95.2	96.4	96.7	95.3	-	96.6

• Source: ASEAN Community in Figures.

schools in Korea, as they represent one of the top five academic achieving nations under the Program for International Student Assessment [PISA](#) , Organisation for Economic Co-operation Development [OECD](#) . This can be established through pilot projects for selected schools in the rural areas and the city centres that target all ranges of school systems. Language would be one of the barriers to this initiative but a cohesive effort for ASEAN students to learn Korean language and *Hangul* would be an added advantage to the labour workforce of ASEAN who are not only competent in English and their mother tongue, but a non-Korean speaker could bridge the gaps in ASEAN schools and universities.

Malaysia's Look East Policy in 1982 which was established under the former Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad has resulted in a surge of investment and technology transfer to Malaysia from Japan and Korea. A notable example is the construction of the 13.5km Penang Island Bridge in 1985, built by Hyundai Engineering. It helped create many Malaysian engineers and technical experts, where they had the opportunity to increase their expertise in the area through the experiences they gained during the construction (Mohamad, 2011). This event changed the reputation of Malaysian engineers to be hardworking and trustworthy, and have become internationally recognised in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and a number of Middle East nations. This represents a trait that Malaysia has learned from Korea's working culture. Thus, the exposure of ASEAN to Korea at an early stage could spur the interest of ASEAN's identity.

Korea's success with its CAMPUS Asia program, which was participated by the Republic of Korea, China and Japan, may be replicated to a number of ASEAN's universities and schools with shared funding from the Education Ministry of the respective Member States. The CAMPUS ASIA Program is an educational collaboration to train new generation of leaders in Asia and aims to nurture future leaders of East Asia with global competence and thorough understanding of East Asian values. The CAMPUS Asia Program aims to establish an East Asian academic community and also to deepen mutual understanding among Korea, China, and Japan, in order to pave a new path for East Asian regional integration (Overview, n.d.). This initiative may be intertwined with ASEAN universities or be coined as "International CAMPUS ASEAN-ROK Program," with the same approach of educational collaboration, nurturing future leaders, regional and global competence through understanding Southeast Asian and East Asian values as well as encouraging high quality academic community.

An excellent example of this model is Malaysia's National University [UKM](#) located in Bangi, Selangor. UKM and a number of Malaysian universities have been very active in sending their bright young undergraduates to the "ASEAN International Mobility for Students" program. Ahmad Afiq Md Hashim, an undergraduate from UKM, was fortunate to be selected to attend a semester—about five months—at Tsukuba University in Japan with partial funding from the Japanese Government and Malaysia's Higher Education Ministry. The setting was in a Japanese University, but with

ASEAN students excluding Singapore who learned, played and enjoyed each other's acquaintance and bonded throughout their stay (Hashim, 2016). This can surely change their mind-sets and help these students to prepare them as the future of ASEAN. Another example is the International Islamic University of Malaysia [IIUM](#) located in Gombak, Kuala Lumpur. There are currently a few Korean students who are attending a number of semesters at the campus and have played a significant role in raising the interest of Malaysians to learn cultures outside of Islamic or Middle East. There have been numerous efforts made to enhance it but the impact towards the local society is still seen as minimal (Hashim, 2016). For the next part, we will look into ASEAN's Forging Ahead Together and the continuity for ASEAN's youth, education and its identity.

ASEAN Forging Ahead Together 2025

On 21 November 2015, the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead Together was signed by the ASEAN leaders during the 27th ASEAN Summit. The Declaration, amongst others, adopts the ASEAN Community Vision 2025 and the three Community Blueprints 2025. The Declaration decides that the Initiative for ASEAN Integration [IAI](#) Work Plan III and the ASEAN Connectivity 2025, which has been adopted in 2016 (What is ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead Together?, n.d.). The ASEAN 2025 comprises five documents:

- a. Kuala Lumpur Declaration on ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead Together;
- b. ASEAN Community Vision 2025;
- c. ASEAN Political-Security Community [APSC](#) Blueprint 2025;
- d. ASEAN Economic Community [AEC](#) Blueprint 2025; and
- e. ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community [ASCC](#) Blueprint 2025

In this sub-section, this paper will look into the continuity of the youth, education and the ASEAN identity's indicators for ASEAN 2025 mentioned in the [ASCC](#) Blueprint 2025. ASEAN Member States having prepared for a Post-2015 [ASCC](#) towards 2025 has had a relatively respectable achievement to begin with (Thuzar, 2016). There have been notable accomplishments over the 2009-2015 ASEAN Community Roadmap as well. These ranges from a commission on promoting and protecting the rights of women and children; the credit transfer and quality assurance networks under the ASEAN University Network [AUN](#) in order to facilitate more student and faculty exchanges (Akhir & Akhir, 2014; Thuzar, 2016). The vision of ASEAN 2025 focuses on building more people-to-people connections, evolving ASEAN outside of the intergovernmental circles of officials and bridging them closer to the people.

One fine example is ASEAN Foundation's program headed by Ms. Elaine Tan, the Executive Director. A program under the ASEAN Leaders Program [ALP](#) 2016 had its inaugural course held in Singapore, Jakarta and

New York starting June 2016 with Part I and Part II held at different cities. The participants were mainly selected from senior leaders at their respective organisations such as Non-Governmental Organisation NGOs, presidents of manufacturers associations, academicians, techno and entrepreneurs, civil society and welfare organisations as well as private and public's senior leaders. The ALP selected its participants via on-line applications and Common Purpose Organisation, a not for profit entity based in the United Kingdom but has offices in Hong Kong and Singapore, was responsible for designing the curriculum content. Multi-national companies such as General Electric, PriceWater Cooperhouse, Intel, Cisco and McKinsey are strong supporters of this program. The author had the opportunity to participate in this maiden course with many new networks with ASEAN Leaders who are active in the region. Most of the leaders were chosen for their ability to lead beyond their boundaries or authority. The ability to influence their peers and subordinates, and the ability to promote volunteerism, sense of belonging to ASEAN and a sense of pride to be selected as its pioneers. Each year the ALP is organized under various themes and offers challenges for the participants to solve. For 2016, the challenge was "What makes a city smart." The nine-day program held in two parts was a resounding success in bridging advance cities such as Singapore and its participants to understand the basics of what makes a city intelligent (Common Purpose, 2016). Jakarta, Indonesia was another city that the participants were able to visit, a booming megacity with many

potentials and talented youth just ready to develop and prosper.

In this foray, greater people-to-people links would certainly contribute towards achieving the priorities of the ASCC, ranging from networking and exchanges to deepen academic knowledge and qualifications towards greater competitiveness of the region's workforce. For this part, it helped create a sense of regional identity, thus sharing information and experiences to heighten the national and regional responses to cross-cutting trans-boundary issues (Thuzar, 2016). This also refers to the ASCC Scorecard discussed earlier in this paper to assist the monitoring of progress, of which ASEAN's priorities could find traction with and participation from the people (Thuzar, 2016).

In ASEAN Forging Ahead Together Blueprint 2025, it reported that the ASCC's strategy and planning mechanism, implemented from 2009 to 2015 had shown to be effective in developing and strengthening the coherence of policy frameworks and institutions: Human Development, Social Justice and Rights, Social Protection and Welfare, Environmental Sustainability, ASEAN Awareness, and Narrowing the Development Gap (ASEAN, 2015). However, ASEAN could not simply ignore that tens of millions remain in extreme poverty. Intra-ASEAN migration is on the rise, from 1.5 million in 1990 to 6.5 million in 2013 (UNDESA, 2013). Almost 50 percent of international migrants are women, who are increasingly moving to seek for employment opportunities. An estimated one in eight migrant worker is aged between 15 and 24 (UNDESA, 2013). These figures show a worrying

trend for ASEAN's youth who are destined to be out of the radar for an inclusive people of ASEAN.

At the same time, the region also experienced an expand in the number of middle class, improvement in health and education, a growing workforce serving regional and global labour needs, a rapidly rising urban population that generates new services, city infrastructure development, and an evolving and improving lifestyle for the population in ASEAN (ASEAN, 2015). However, the achievements and goals are small-scaled, and ASEAN still needs to address these issues and resolve them.

Characteristics and Elements of ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint 2025

There are five characteristics approved and agreed upon by the ASEAN Head of States/ Government in November 2015, namely:

- a. Engage and Benefit the People
- b. Inclusive
- c. Sustainable
- d. Resilient
- e. Dynamic

From the five characteristics, this paper finds that under the “Dynamic” strategic measures that really address the ASEAN Community Blueprint 2015 on Human Development, specifically on its youth, education and identity. In ASEAN 2025, the objective is to strengthen the ability to continuously innovate and be a proactive member of the global community. It aims to provide an enabling environment with policies and institutions that engender people and firms to be more open and adaptive, creative, innovative, and entrepreneurial. The key result areas and corresponding strategic measures are as follows:

E.1. Towards an Open and Adaptive ASEAN

Strategic Measures

- a.** Promote greater people-to-people interaction and mobility within and outside ASEAN;
- b.** Provide opportunities for relevant stakeholders for knowledge sharing, which include exchange of best practices and studies;
- c.** Encourage volunteerism among ASEAN Member States to strengthen the ASEAN Community;

E.2. Towards a Creative, Innovative and Responsive ASEAN

Strategic Measures

- a.** Enhance the competitiveness of ASEAN human resources through the promotion of life-long learning, pathways, equivalencies and skills development as well as the use of information and communication technologies across age groups;
- b.** Promote an innovative ASEAN approach to higher education, incorporating academics, community service, regional placement, and entrepreneurship incubation and support;
- c.** Encourage regional cooperation in the areas of education, training and research, and strengthen ASEAN's role in regional and global research

- network by promoting initiatives and providing incentives and support for research and development, including research publications;
- d. Promote the free flow of ideas, knowledge, expertise, and skills to inject dynamism within the region;
 - e. Strengthen curricula and system of education in science, technology and creative disciplines;
 - f. Encourage and support creative industry and pursuits, such as film, music, and animation;
 - g. Promote ASEAN as a centre for human resource development and training;
 - h. Strengthen regional and global cooperation in enhancing the quality and competitiveness of higher education institutions; and
 - i. Encourage the government, private sector and community to develop a system of continuous training and re-training to support lifelong learning and workforce development (ASEAN, 2015).

This paper finds that these measures are the right way forward for ASEAN's preparedness of its youth, education and life-long learning. The centre of it all should be about the people. Singapore's Foreign Minister, Vivian Balakrishnan said during his speech at the ASEAN Leaders Program 2016 on 27th June 2016, "wealth of a nation is not the richness of one nation's commodity or richness in its oil and gas, but the wealth of a nation is its people" (Balakrishnan, 2016). The ten year vision is a high and

daunting task not only for the government but it now needs more people-to-people engagement at all levels.

At the ALP 2016 program, one of the main session was a master-class with speakers who were experts in predicting the task and jobs that will be of high demand in the future. The author chose a session with Mr. Anshul Sonak, Regional Director of Education and Innovation from ASEAN Intel. In his class, he distinctly identified the jobs and workforce for ASEAN to gauge in 10 to 15 years' time. Mr. Sonak elaborated that technology and innovation are drivers for sustainable development. He expressed that jobs are changing and evolving; jobs in the future will make current jobs obsolete; education should also evolve with technology; youth today should master computational thinking—early exposure to coding and basic computer language as children today are smarter than their parents and grandparents when they were their age due to the advanced technology, hence how to address them when they are in the workforce.

Mr. Sonak believes that ASEAN should support new and innovative ideas to promote the younger generation to create new ideas. Under Intel, he supported the initiative of local ideas to solve local problems. One example he shared was about boys in India who created energy through transforming their household waste. This is a perfect example of solving problems at a minimal cost. The boys managed to learn the techniques through YouTube. This creates new flow of ideas and showed that it is the people that navigate technology and not the other way round. Intel in ASEAN knows this and

continues to propagate that the fundamentals are the people, and they are ASEAN's future. Hence, it is never enough to reiterate that youth and education are the socio-cultural and upward mobility for ASEAN's prosperity.



ASEAN Identity – How can ASEAN Successfully Address them

The remnants of Angkor Watt in Cambodia, Chandi Borobodur and Temple of Muara Jambi in Indonesia, and Lembah Bujang in Malaysia have distinctive similarities in their construction and the sense of cultural affiliation. During a three episode documentary titled "Inventing Southeast Asia" aired on Channel News Asia, an interview with Ujang Hariadi of Muara Jambi from Indonesia was conducted where he commented that:

"Custom is related to cultural issues or culture, we see that old cultures developed here [Muara Jambi] is different from current ones. In the past, it was saturated with Buddhism, but then it was replaced by Islam, but the modern Islamic culture evolving in Muara Jambi is still imbued with the old culture. So Islam came, but the old culture remained. It wasn't diminished." (Hariadi, 2016)

What does this mean for ASEAN? Does it say a lot about our past and our future ahead? How do we understand this and make this work for ASEAN's sense of community and identity? Surely, there are arguments that the cultures of Islam and Christianity came to Southeast Asia's shores more than 500 years ago, but prior to that, ASEAN or the Southeast Asian nations were mostly Buddhist, Hindus and were ardent practitioners of

Animism and Confucianism. ASEAN were cultured and civilized even before imperialism and colonisation closed in to Southeast Asia's borders (Hannigan, 2012).

As mentioned in the ASCC 2015 [E.1.] Promotion of ASEAN awareness and a sense of community, this paper would like to propose a link and a connector to ASEAN's history and civilisation that transcends historical linkages of colonial era or pre-colonial era. Most ASEAN Member States hardly ever existed 100 years ago, and now is the time they should learn the history of its nations and understand that they are interconnected in terms of society and culture. The peoples of ASEAN Member States should be proud to be ASEAN citizens as the Koreans have, even after decades of oppression and legacy under colonial rule (Akita & Palmer, 2015).

Dr. Noor in his documentary "Inventing Southeast Asia" asked the viewers: "How did Southeast Asian identities originate?" The author after viewing the documentary somewhat agrees that the legacy of the 19th century even before ASEAN nation's independence—excluding Thailand or known as Siam then—and the fight for freedom in the 20th century, continues to shape the way ASEAN citizens are thinking. According to Dr. Noor's commentary in the series of his episodes:

"Southeast Asia is perhaps better connected now than ever before, or so one would think—if one were unaware of how interconnected

all of Asia once was before the advent of colonial rule, and before the creation of the colonies that would gain their independence as the nation-states we recognise today.” (Noor, 2016)

Dr. Noor further emphasised that Southeast Asians today are caught up in the web of identity politics, as appropriate elements of history, language and material culture as “Ours”—the neighbouring ten Member States have a tendency in arguing which culture belongs to whom—and it pays to remind ourselves that many of the things that Southeast Asian Nations, in this nuances the ASEAN Community regard as “Ours” in the nationalistic sense, emerged and developed in a pre-modern Southeast Asian region. Communities were once more mobile than the peoples of ASEAN today realise, and where movement, migration, settlement and commerce linked the respective nations together (Noor, 2016).

In Dr. Noor’s commentary he ended by connecting the dots of the ASEAN Member States “...that while Southeast Asians have always had their own understanding of who and where they were in the global frame of things, the 19th century re-imagining of Southeast Asia-as a land of opportunity, as a market for goods, as a place of thrills and danger-has had a lasting impact upon the region...” (Noor, 2016)



Recommendation and Conclusion

Creating and achieving a common goal for the ASEAN Member States and developing a standardised educational system focusing science and mathematics, as well as arts for continued creativity and innovation for the younger generation should be one of the main priorities. It is also recommended that ASEAN schools collaborate with countries such as Korea to introduce coding and computational thinking for students at an early age. ASEAN should develop an exchange program not only among its students but also for teachers and administrators to acquire best practices and emulate the model to their respective countries.

ASEAN's work initiative to encourage free flow of talents and migration of workers—or Initiative for ASEAN Integration^{IAI} Work Plan II and III; where skilled and semi-skilled may be interchanged but also has to address the challenges for ASEAN Member States when they encounter brain drain, where top talents would target high paying jobs in a conducive environment as well as attractive remuneration packages. However, work culture has evolved where salary is not the main concern for the younger generation, but they prefer flexible working hours, freedom of doing their work at their own pace and delivering their ideas at any part of the world as long as there is an existence of high technology and ICT to promote their ideas. A skilled and talented worker may be in Yangon but still reports to

their boss in Singapore or Vientiane, through the social media and internet such as Facetime or even Facebook to communicate with their team. These workers may be hundreds of miles away from their office but they may still work from their “time off of work” at Krabi or perhaps in Seoul with their family and friends.

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
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Toward a People-oriented and People-centered ASEAN

The Concepts of 'Regionalism' and 'Regionalization'

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Abstract

ASEAN has been praised for its success and consolidation history as a regional organization in the contemporary world. ASEAN Community will be celebrating its 50th Anniversary next year, 2017. In this regard, it is the right time to explore the challenges and prospects to ASEAN in the future. To analyze this contemporary issue, the difference between the concepts of 'regionalism' and 'regionalization' will be applied to the paper's theoretical background. Regionalism primarily takes a top-down institutional creation

process. In contrast, regionalization is driven by social forces which represent a bottom-up process. These two concepts, which seem to operate in different directions, have a mutual relationship and interactions. Although the organization faces challenges from several domestic and international issues including unstable political capacity, and economic gaps among the member countries, ASEAN has successfully developed and strengthened its regional ties and external relationships by emphasizing institutional building in addressing the issues. However, there will be still various challenges ahead of ASEAN to move towards a meaningful ‘regionalization [the bottom-up process](#).’ The organization needs to develop and use different approaches for listening and reflecting voices from the people with diverse background towards ‘people-oriented’ and ‘people-centered’ ASEAN.



Introduction

ASEAN has been praised for its success and consolidation history as a regional organization in the contemporary world. Scholars pointed out that as ‘new regionalism’ became an important concept, ASEAN has served as one of the important case studies for understanding the concept in the field of international relations (Charrier, 2001; Ghoshal, 2008). Mukherjee even further made comments on this organization’s successful operation as a regional organization compared to others such as South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation [SAARC](#) (2013). However, there have been challenges to ASEAN from inside and outside of the region. The problems have emerged from inside of the area related to the economic crisis, political instability, and inequality of social development of each member country. The organization has also dealt with the strong power of the United States, as well as rising power of China in Asia and the world.

Since the establishment of ASEAN in 1967, the regional organization has managed to overcome challenges by cooperating and collaborating closely. ASEAN established and consolidated ‘ASEAN way’ for about 50 years of history. It is the right time to explore the challenges and prospects to ASEAN in the future for two reasons. First, in 2017, ASEAN will soon celebrate its 50th years of anniversary of its establishment. In each celebration of 30th and 40th anniversary, scholars and the organization itself

investigated the past successes and challenges ahead. For the second reason, I would argue that regionalism is having a difficult time in strengthening its ties. There was a sensational event that the exit of the Britain from the European Union had confirmed by the referendum in this past June 2016, threatening the existence of the EU, which had once regarded as one of the most successful regional organizations since the regionalism emerged in the world history.

In this context, ASEAN needs to look at what challenges and prospects are ahead to fortify the regional ties and to overcome the problems for truly people-oriented and people-centered community. In this essay, I will deal with the topic of 'where ASEAN community is heading towards' broadly by trying to answer two following questions: What kind of challenges lie ahead of the ASEAN community, and how can ASEAN successfully address them? What will be the prospects for a resilient, inclusive, people-oriented and people-centered community that ASEAN is heading toward? Specifically, at first, by looking at the definitions of 'regionalism' and 'regionalization,' I will try to explain what identity and features the organization has and sought to pursue. Then, the focus will move on to past challenges and responses of ASEAN. Last but not least, from two previous analyses, I would like to draw future challenges and make suggestions for more people-based organization.



Regionalism and Regionalization

The concepts of regionalism and regionalization varies from positivist to constructivist, though these have gained increasing perception and usage over time with some converging meanings (Solingen, 2010). Specifically, the concept of regionalism contains 'soft-regionalism' which includes the growth of people's flow, the development and the spread of multiple channels and complex social network, and the formation of transnational regional civil society. Regionalism focuses on economic integration and political cooperation among countries in close geographic proximity (Haggard, 1993; Hurrell, 1995; Mansfield and Milner, 1997). Furthermore, Munakata (2006) distinguished differences between the two concepts. He argued that regionalism refers to institutional frameworks to support regional economic development and integration established by governments, mentioning free trade agreements as one of the stable forms of regionalism. Fawcett (2004) defined "[R]egionalism [as] a policy or project, [while] regionalization is both project and process."

For the concept of regionalization, it has been viewed from the economic growth perspective as well. An economic process including trade and investment in a particular region grows more rapidly than the rest of the world, and it produces social integration (Haggard, 1993; Hurrell, 1995). However, regionalization puts emphasis on not only the role of

the states, but also on the roles of other actors such as NGOs, private companies, media and the informal sectors (Marchand, Boas, and Shaw, 2000). Considering this definition, regionalism takes primarily the top-down institutional creation process. It pursues projects or policies involving government cooperation, which aimed to deal with common transnational issues by formalizing semi-permanent structures in a region (Pempel, 2005). By contrast to this approach, regionalization process is driven by social forces which represent the bottom-up process. Katzenstein (2006) argued that regionalization is a process that engages actors.

When we apply the concept of regionalism and regionalization, how do we locate ASEAN among those definitions? Does ASEAN pursue both top-down and bottom-up approaches for regional consolidation?



ASEAN Regionalism and Regionalization

A formation of regional organization can be accounted for several reasons to strengthen regional ties to compete with powerful countries, to protect and avoid internal and external threats, and to foster economic development making enable environment with a regional cooperation. Regional studies explain that security is the fundamental reason for region building by grouping countries. It is to protect themselves from internal conflicts and external threats. In this regard, ASEAN was found to block the spread of communism in Southeast Asian region and strengthen their power to compete against powerful neighbor countries (Fioramonti, 2012). The creation of ASEAN in 1967 was led by the founding members with their own rights and own sets of interests. The aim of the establishment of ASEAN is to promote regional peace through the acceleration of economic growth and development, and to promote social progress and cultural development. The most notably, Treaty of Amity and Cooperation [TAC](#), signed by member countries, stating the respect for territorial integrity of all Member States, non-interference in each other's domestic affairs and amicable settlement of disputes (Mukherjee, 2013). The norms have played a significant role in nation-building in the early phase of ASEAN and remained as a cornerstone of the ASEAN today. According to Morada (2008), the organization served as a major driving force for the founding

countries by providing the environment for national resilience to focus on nation building and national development that enabled ASEAN to pursue regional resilience.

From the historical perspective of the establishment of ASEAN, the process of the development organization can be regarded as strengthening ‘regionalism.’ ASEAN has put many emphases on building and promoting regional peace and stability for their national identity preservation through strict rules, such as respect for sovereignty, non-aggression, and non-interference in members’ domestic affairs (Snitwongse, 1998). Specifically, during the 1960s and 1970s, the countries’ top priority was to maintain an internal stability by implementing policies aimed at nation building, and national development could violate liberal values such as human rights and democracy. In this regard, the non-interference principle made countries concentrate on domestic matters, avoiding interference or criticism from other states (Katsumata, 2004).



Challenges and Prospects Analysis From the Historical Perspectives

Regarding the relationship between regions and crises, Fioramonti (2012) argues that the two factors are closely related to each other either by boosting or hindering regional cooperation. In the case of ASEAN, crises have fostered and consolidated regional cooperation rather than decomposing the region. How has ASEAN dealt with the past challenges posed by internal and external factors? Since its establishment, regional and international economic, political environment has changed significantly. For instance, the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s gave international actors new attitudes towards international cooperation and resulted in the decentralization of the international order from bipolar to the multipolar system (Fawcett, 1995). At the celebrations of 30th and 40th years of the establishment of ASEAN, scholars tried to investigate what the organization has achieved by overcoming challenges and what prospects are ahead to become more stable and rigid regional community (Snitwongse, 1998; Dosch and Mols, 1998; Morada, 2008; Stubbs, 2008; Ghoshal, 2008).

Political and Security Challenges

Since the region has various seeds of potential conflicts that are domestic, regional and inter-state, conflicts and territorial contestations still exist and

will be continued. According to Dosch and Mols (1998), there have been several conflicts involving different state actors. For example, South China Sea dispute involves Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia, Brunei, and Singapore as well as China and Taiwan. Malaysia and Indonesia have disputes on the Sipadan and Ligitan Islands. Indonesia and Vietnam have a problem of an overlapping issue of South China Sea. However, the authors pointed out that thanks to effective ASEAN dialogue mechanisms, the region could manage conflict peacefully.

Under security, the end of the Cold War raised a concern about moving the power structure from bipolarity to multipolarity. In the Fourth ASEAN Summit in 1992 held in Singapore, the organization faced the challenge of the post-Cold War era and decided to put security cooperation on ASEAN agenda for the first time. Southeast Asia recognized the external challenges that the region is not a self-contained area either economically or strategically, and came to take the active and leading role in establishing frameworks for security dialogue for the Asia-Pacific such as ASEAN Regional Forum [ARF](#) (Snitwongse, 1998).

The political stability of Member States remains one of the major issues. On the 40th anniversary of ASEAN, Myanmar's brutal crackdown of Shaffron Revolution became a controversial issue. However, Myanmar held the general election in 2015 without significant domestic violation issues. The election was praised as a relatively free and fair election, though the inclusiveness of Rohingya and Muslims were disputed and inexperienced electoral administrations were criticized.

Economic Development Challenges

Regarding economic integration, member countries in ASEAN have enjoyed high growth rates compared to countries in other regions. For ASEAN as a whole, the Asian financial crisis, which is one of the most significant economic problems that the Asia region experienced, provided the impetus for enhancing economic cooperation among its members but also among the other East Asian countries. This financial crisis led to “the formation of the ASEAN Plus Three mechanism, which eventually formalized the Dialogue Partnership of ASEAN with China, Japan, and South Korea” (Morada, 2008). During the height of the Asian financial crisis, the APEC could not deal with financial crisis properly, and led the emergence of the ASEAN Plus Three and the East Asian Summit [EAS](#) (Mukherjee, 2013).

The development gap among ASEAN Member States also became an issue since the organization expanded the membership. ASEAN has provided several strategies to narrow down the gap in the region including active and various projects from ASEAN Economic Community [AEC](#) pillar. More specifically, they introduced tariff reductions for the promotion of intra-ASEAN trade, liberalized trade services, and promoted investment through the ASEAN Investment Area [AIA](#) (Morada, 2008).

Challenges to Other Regional Norms and Issues

The more pointed problems, including the economic issues and political stability among member countries, seem to be well dealt with so far. However, not all the political and security dialogues were meaningful. Ghoshal (2008) pointed out in his article that a political crackdown in Myanmar in 2007, a relatively slow development of the establishment of human rights mechanism in ASEAN, the participation of civil society in the decision-making process, and the difference in the economic development of member countries as major issues at 40th of the organization. In the article written by Noel M. Morada (2008), he pointed out several challenging issues to the ASEAN: development gap in ASEAN, good governance and the rule of law, human rights and democracy, regional identity and shared values and the realization of ‘people-centered ASEAN.’ In addition to Morada, Ghoshal (2008) also casted doubt on “whether the ASEAN can play a leading role in advancing democracy and ensuring the protection of human rights.”

The consolidation of regionalism as ASEAN can be regarded as quite successful. However, since the early 2000s, the “ASEAN Way,” which is precisely represented by the principles of non-interference, has been on the discussion table for modification. For example, in 1998, Thailand proposed the concept of flexible engagement in ASEAN’s diplomacy. Why is the changing of ASEAN’s fundamental norms discussed? For this question,

Katsumata (2004) analyzed this from two different theoretical perspectives. From the conventional and rationalist perspective, the actors of ASEAN tried to find ways to deal efficiently with problems, which include environmental issues, the pollution haze problems, economic recession, illegal migration and drug issues. Constructivists viewed the movement of diplomatic change affected by a normative shift at the global level focusing on the norms of human rights and democratic values. Although the author was reluctant to conclude on which perspective is superior to the other, the Asian financial crisis pointed out the common causes that the region would move to accept different normative views. From this analysis, it is evident that accepting the universal norms of human rights and democracy will still be controversial issues since non-interference principles operates in the region.

Challenges and Prospects Ahead of ASEAN

By looking at past challenges and the ways that ASEAN has dealt with, this paper draws the challenges ahead of ASEAN. First of all, the different views on the bilateral and multilateral relationship will be one of the key issues. In the history of Southeast Asia, each country has divergent views on the bilateral relationship, specifically with the U.S and China. For example, historically, Thailand and the Philippines are close allies of the United States. However, Vietnam and Myanmar were not the strategic partners for the U.S. Recently, after the new president was elected in the Philippines,

the strong ties between two countries loosened. This different view will affect the ASEAN dialogue process when members discuss the relationship with significant powers.

Secondly, narrowing down economic development gap and the differences in political stability and systems have been difficult issues, and will complicate problems as well. As Slater (2008) argued that the countries are in proximity by sharing their borders, but the political regimes, social and cultural traits are varied. One of the examples representing the complexity is countries' political regimes. Indonesia and Philippines are well known for following electoral democracy, but the fame fluctuates from time to time. Malaysia, Cambodia, and Singapore possess competitive authoritarian, but with some democratic characteristics. Vietnam, Laos, and Brunei practice authoritarian regime, where the leading party or system is different from the communist party, military, and religion. For Myanmar, the notorious military regime was changed to civilian-elected government through 2015 general election without having any bloody causalities. There has been positive political development for decades in Southeast Asia. However, there are fluctuations from time to time, and unified universal democratic values seem not to be popular in this region, yet. For the economic development, some member countries in ASEAN enjoy rapid economic growth, thanks to regional economic integration, but economic development gap between ASEAN 6 and CLMV still exists as the table shown below.

Table 1. Gross Domestic Product per capita in ASEAN from 2009–2015
(At current prices(nominal) in US dollars)

Country	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Brunei Darussalam	28,454.0	32,062.9	42,431.5	42,445.5	44,560.3	41,505.3	30,942.1
Cambodia	735.1	785.1	881.7	951.5	1,017.3	1,104.5	1,198.5
Indonesia	2,359.2	2,977.0	3,498.2	3,563.8	3,636.0	3,525.7	3,357.1
Lao PDR	913.0	1,079.3	1,262.4	1,442.7	1,612.7	1,740.8	1,831.2
Malaysia	7,215.7	8,771.8	10,258.8	10,670.8	10,771.2	11,152.6	9,656.8
Myanmar	538.0	811.4	1,126.7	1,189.8	1,208.7	1,277.1	1,246.1
Philippines	1,828.6	2,147.2	2,363.4	2,596.6	2,738.2	2,854.5	2,850.5
Singapore	38,577.3	46,570.0	53,089.3	54,452.6	55,617.2	55,903.9	52,743.9
Thailand	4,213.8	5,070.9	5,484.3	5,853.2	6,156.1	5,892.4	5,736.9
Vietnam	1,232.4	1,337.8	1,542.7	1,754.5	1,907.5	2,052.5	2,108.8
ASEAN	2,637.1	3,259.1	3,753.2	3,934.3	4,063.8	4,057.0	3,866.8
ASEAN 6 ¹	3,307.6	4,043.7	4,626.8	4,816.9	4,954.4	4,901.1	4,632.1
CLMV ²	952.5	1,109.2	1,339.8	1,490.2	1,593.5	1,708.8	1,741.2
Gap ³	2,355.1	2,934.5	3,287.0	3,326.7	3,360.9	3,192.3	2,890.9

• Source: ASEAN. Retrieved from <http://asean.org/storage/2015/09/table7.pdf>

¹ Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand

² Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam

³ Between ASEAN 6 and CLMV

Thirdly, there will be continuous conflicts between ‘ASEAN Way [Value](#)’ and ‘universal values’ on human rights and democracy. The values of democracy and human rights are still contentious issues conflicting with regional norms and principles of the decision-making process (Morada, 2008). Specifically, the norm of non-interference has been challenged by the discussion of ‘constructive engagement.’ For example, Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar in 2008 leaving catastrophic results. Apart from the country’s political regime, humanitarian needs were acutely addressed. However, the government denied any access from the outsiders causing conflicts on the concept of ‘state sovereignty’ and ‘responsibility to protect [R2P](#)’. The case was successfully dealt with ASEAN’s tripartite system in cooperation with the United Nations, ASEAN, and Myanmar. Related to ASEAN’s traditional decision-making system, people will keep making voices on more guaranteed participation in the process. To be truly ‘people-centered’ and ‘people-oriented’ ASEAN, the organization, should actively locate people in the center of organizational structures and listen to them. There is a limitation in the vision document that stated how ASEAN promote awareness of those concepts, but it did not mention specifically how they will put people in the center.


Towards Meaningful Regionalization

The concepts of regionalism and regionalization, as indicated in the chart, show that the two concepts have a mutual relationship. Regionalism the square is a concept that includes the process of regionalization the circle. Historically, ASEAN has emphasized establishment of regionalism by distinguishing the region from others with ASEAN's unique values, and building firm institutions to respond challenges derived from the unstable political environment, economic development gaps, and the rapidly changing international situations. It is evident from historical perspective. During and after the Second World War, the conceptualization of Southeast Asia began to recognize its increasing strategic significance and political importance in international relations (Fifield, 1975; Huxley, 1996). So, Mukherjee (2013) argues in his article that "the idea of a 'Southeast Asia' region was originated from the top rather than emerged naturally from inside of the region itself."

However, without bottom-up process of regionalization, there would be a 'hole' in the big picture of regionalism. It is the right time to concentrate on internal stability and sustainability with collective actions. According to Charrier (2001), the success of a regional organization depends on the formation of a meaningful and collective spatial identity since the member countries can be embraced upon common cultural, economic and political bases. Then what commonalities made this region as the one Southeast Asia or ASEAN community? According to Mukherjee (2013) "these traits include

the importance of the family, social harmony and cohesion, the importance of duty, respect for authority, acceptance of hierarchy, academic excellence, thrift and frugality, consensus building, the importance of the community and all other areas discussed in the ‘Asian values’ debate.”

Chart 1. Diagrams of the concepts of regionalism and regionalization



• Source: Produced by the author

‘People-centered’ ASEAN became a buzzword after the declaration of Bali Concorde II. Following the catchphrase, an Eminent Persons Group [EPG](#) on the ASEAN made following recommendations to be forward-looking, transformative, and more people-oriented for the Charter amendment in 2006: 1 the creation of a regional human rights mechanism, 2 inclusion of international humanitarian law and the responsibility to protect [R2P](#) ;

3. non-consensus based decision making; 4. the creation of consultative mechanisms including civil society groups; 5. provisions against unconstitutional change of government; 6. sanctions against erring member countries. However, in the end, none of the recommendations were reflected in the final version of the Charter in the 13th ASEAN Summit (Morada, 2008). This result shows that the ASEAN is still hesitating to open its door to people. Civil society groups have commented on this issue; “the Charter is a disappointment. It is a document that falls short of what is needed to establish a ‘people-centered’ and ‘people-empowered’ ASEAN.”

In the vision paper, ‘ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead Together,’ the appreciation for the people explicitly stated in Article 4:

We resolve to consolidate our Community, building upon and deepening the integration process to realize a rules-based, people-oriented, people-centered ASEAN Community...[re]inforcing our sense of togetherness and common identity, guided by the purposes and principles of the ASEAN Charter.

‘ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint 2025’ states that rules-based, people-oriented, people-centered community in Article II. A, strengthen democracy, good governance, the rule of law, promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as combat corruption in Article II. A. 2.

From the perspective of regionalization, actors were not encouraged to participate in building up 'democratic values' in ASEAN itself. When democracy is discussed among the people, the participation of people in the political discussion and liberalization of people's rights are considered as important criteria. There are still debates on inclusiveness and consideration of people, and it is encouraged when we look at ASEAN Charters and documents.



Conclusion

From the historical perspective, Southeast Asia region was not regarded as one entity until the mid of the 1900s. According to Dosch and Mols (1998), ASEAN did not originate from a long-standing geopolitical cohesiveness and shared history. Southeast Asia is well known for its diversity in culture, society, economic and political systems. Since the decolonization for Southeast Asian countries, the nation building process was stable even with its short period due to regional organization and its unique way of addressing problems. For the last 50 years, ASEAN has arduously worked on establishing a strong 'regionalism' by defining a unique regional identity which can be distinguished from other regions by protecting themselves from inside and outside threats. During this period, the regional organization has successfully expanded its internal boundaries by accepting more member countries and external boundaries by establishing ASEAN plus relationships such as East Asia, the U.S., and the Europe. Some Member States, however, still struggle with nation building process, economic development, and security issues with external powers. For ASEAN, challenges such as economic development, national peace, stability, and unity will be significant concerns. Establishing and strengthening domestic government and governance and the rule of law should be considered as the priority. ASEAN will need to be politically

and economically cohesive more than even to deal with the new strategic challenges. Lastly, to move towards a meaningful ‘regionalization,’ the organization needs to develop and use different approaches to listen and reflect voices from the people with diverse background towards ‘people-oriented’ and ‘people-centered’ ASEAN.

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Theme 3

ASEAN-Korea Socio-Cultural Partnership Towards a Reciprocal Understanding



Ahead of the ASEAN-Korea Cultural Exchange Year and opening of the ASEAN Culture House in Busan in 2017, it is worth assessing the past and current developments of socio-cultural cooperation between ASEAN and Korea. What kind of cooperative efforts have there been, and what further actions must be taken for a better understanding among the peoples of ASEAN and Korea?





ASEAN-Korea Socio-Cultural Partnership

Towards a Reciprocal Understanding

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Abstract

ASEAN and Korea today have seen a long standing 26 years of a cooperative relationship. There has been huge progress in economic ties –with ASEAN now being Korea’s 2nd largest trading partner and investment destination. Socio-cultural exchanges between both sides such as that of tourism, pop-culture and food have likewise been flourishing (ASEAN-Korea Centre, 2015). However, beyond these gleaming statistics, underlying complexities of what an ASEAN-Korea socio-cultural partnership

entails, as well as how it would be possible for both sides to come towards a reciprocal understanding should be covered.

To delve into this matter, complexities related to ASEAN as a region should first be looked into. Next, how these ASEAN relevant complexities in return relate to the partnership with Korea should be checked. Past efforts between ASEAN and Korea, looking at both its successes and limitations should be analyzed as a follow-up. Finally, there would also be some proposals on what could be done to further strengthen the socio-cultural partnership between ASEAN and Korea.

I would like to end with more optimistic note that socio-cultural partnership between ASEAN and Korea still needs progress but holds potential in over time coming closer to a mutual understanding on both sides.



Introduction

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN](#) in 1967, has come a long way since its foundation by five Member States, namely Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. With the final addition of Cambodia in 1999, it has become an organization with ten Member States. Constant changes both within and outside have led ASEAN to continuously evolve in the way the bloc conducts itself in the political, economic and socio-cultural spheres nowadays.

In this context, we should note that the complexities of ASEAN are multi-dimensional and cannot be generalized in any manner. Also, just like any regional bloc or grouping, ASEAN has its own successes and limitations.

One of the noteworthy achievements of ASEAN would be its engagement with external partners. Its relations with the partners are an evidence and relevance that external partners have with ASEAN bloc. Considering this, we have come to the focus of this paper, which looks at the ASEAN-Korea partnership, moving towards a mutual socio-cultural partnership between ASEAN and Korea.

Since 1989, Korea has been a sectoral partner to ASEAN and later became a full Dialogue Partner in 1991. The ever-growing partnership between ASEAN and Korea is a good example of how relationship between

ASEAN and its partners have flourished (ASEAN-Korea Centre, 2016).

Similarly, since the start of the ASEAN-Korea partnership, the socio-cultural links between both sides have come a long way. The ASEAN-Korea Cultural Exchange Year and ASEAN Culture House in Busan to be established in 2017 show ever-close ties between ASEAN and Korea.

However, before painting a rosy picture about the ASEAN-Korea socio-cultural partnership, it is important to understand the inherent complications within ASEAN and between ASEAN as a bloc vis-à-vis Korea.

In addition, the past efforts by both sides would be analyzed. This will be followed by a proposal of future possible steps for ASEAN and Korea to take to have a mutual understanding in their socio-cultural partnership.



ASEAN

Relevance or Irrelevance in Diversity?

When one visits the region of Southeast Asia, one would no doubt be amazed by the great diversity within this 'region' politically, economically, geographically and or socio-culturally.

Politically, there are a range of diverse systems, stemming from an absolute monarchy (Brunei Darussalam), constitutional monarchies (such as Thailand), occasional military governments, and 'guided democracies' (as what Singapore is considered) (Mutalib, 2000).

Economically, the differences between ASEAN members are also diverse. Based on the World Bank criteria, Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, and Malaysia belong to the high-income level, while Lao PDR and Myanmar are in the lower middle income group, with the rest lying in the middle at varying levels. The economic gap between the former group and the latter are particularly huge. Singapore's GDP per capita is 20 times higher than those in the latter group (ASEAN, 2013).

Geographically, Southeast Asian countries can be categorized into Maritime and Mainland Southeast Asian countries due to the interconnected land masses of Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, whereas Indonesia, East Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei and the Philippines are connected through sea.

Finally, socio-culturally, we can note that there exist wide disparities in religious, linguistic and cultural practices amongst and within Member States. Majority of island Southeast Asian countries are Muslim, having Philippines (majority Catholic) and Singapore (majority without religion) as exceptions. On the other hand, Mainland Southeast Asian countries are mostly Buddhists, as in Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. There are also various significant minority groups, religions, and native religious practices within the Member States. Finally, most Member States have various different spoken languages (as well as many indigenous dialects), which at times become a barrier that is hard to overcome, despite the increasing usage of English. Most states also have many various ethnic groups and are hardly homogenous, with many still retaining their local customs and practices.

The above has shown us how diverse ASEAN is in all aspects of the term 'diverse.' However, despite such diversity with all its internal and external challenges, ASEAN has stayed as a bloc since 1967 and continues to develop in many aspects up to this day.

I would thus argue that its diversity does not necessarily bring it down. And this is important as we look to its socio-cultural partnership with Korea, which is altogether a different entity on its own, yet relations have continued to prosper and grow.

Based on a deeper look at Korea, and matching it back with ASEAN, we will be better able to understand the prospects for mutual relations between the two.



A Homogenous and Wealthy Korea Vis-à-Vis a Highly Diverse ASEAN Nations

As compared to ASEAN, Korea is often regarded as being highly homogenous, stemming from the idea of Koreans descending from one ethnicity, sharing one culture, and speaking one language (Lim, 2010). Although number of long term foreign residents and inter-ethnic marriages in Korea have increased, the vast majority of people share one ethnicity, language and culture.

Korean society as a whole is far more homogenous than many countries are in ASEAN, where citizens relate their nationalities to their country of birth and have identifications to their own ethnic groups and cultural norms at the same time. For example, Malaysians may regard themselves as ethnically Malaysian- Malay/ Iban/ Chinese or Indian. This is similar with many of the other ASEAN nations.

Also, economically, apart from Singapore and Brunei, and to a lesser extent Malaysia, the economic gap between Korea and ASEAN Member States is particularly huge, with Korea being the 4th largest economy in Asia (Kit, 2015), and 11th largest in the world (Statistica, 2016), regardless of much smaller population size to other ASEAN members which are far less economically developed, such as the Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam.



Pushing Ahead Despite the Challenges

Yet, despite the overwhelming differences, there have been efforts taken by both ASEAN and Korea to build upon the ever-growing socio-cultural partnership. Such efforts can be seen through the past developments which have led to the strong ties of now.

One great example would be the ongoing people-to-people exchange between ASEAN and Korea. In this aspect, exchange programs are held between cultural experts, government officials, media personnel, academic and youth funded by the Korea-ASEAN Future-Oriented Cooperation Project [FOCP](#) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, 2013). The promotion of youth exchanges between ASEAN and Korea is especially promising, given that ASEAN has a large young population, and youth are the future of the potential cooperation between both sides. The ASEAN University Network [AUN](#), which allows exchanges between university students from both sides creates opportunities for those in higher educational institutions to learn more about each other at an in-depth level. The various cultural exchanges among ASEAN and Korean youth also allow greater understanding and awareness of each other at a more casual yet effective level.

Another aspect to highlight would be the promotion of tourism between ASEAN and Korea. While having no doubt in its limitations in terms of a

reciprocal relationship¹, it has allowed a greater knowledge and awareness of each other just on the basis of being present in the particular country and seeing things. Tourism despite limitations is still an effective way to learn more about the culture of another country, and it does help that tourism between both sides is at an all-time high, with ASEAN tourists being 3rd largest group visiting Korea and ASEAN being number one tourism destination for Koreans (ASEAN-Korea Centre, 2015).

¹ In this instance I mean that tourism may have many limitations in promoting a reciprocal relationship as what is experienced when travelling or the intentions for travelling vary. For example, if the intention is to travel to a particular country for sex tourism, then although it is indeed considered tourism it is assumingly not something that is desirable and leads to a reciprocal understanding.



The Real Rationale Behind the ASEAN-Korea Social Cultural Partnership

Simply Mutual Economic Benefit?

However, critics might say that socio-cultural cooperation between ASEAN and Korea cannot be any of comparison to the economic partnership, where most of the people focus on. Socio-cultural partnership may just be a case which both parties desire economic benefits from each other rather than aim for true socio-cultural partnership based on reciprocity.

Furthermore, one of the aims and purposes of ASEAN is to ‘accelerate economic growth’ along with socio-cultural and political stability as clearly stated in the ASEAN Declaration (ASEAN, 2008). The ASEAN Economic Community [AEC](#), is also one of the 3 main pillars, to allow ASEAN to function as a more attractive regional economic bloc to make it more competitive within the global economy (ASEAN, 2015).

ASEAN is a major source of trade and investment opportunity as well as the large potential market. This can be noted by the investments in terms of foreign direct investments [FDI](#) pouring in from the developed countries such as Korea. In fact, Korea is one of the largest FDI providing country to ASEAN (ASEAN-Korea Centre, 2015). Thus, relationship between

ASEAN and Korea is economically mutually beneficial, with ASEAN being an attractive growing market for developed nations such as Korea. Still growing ASEAN would further require investments from Korea to aid in its economic development.

Despite the real world needs of economic interests on both sides, I would argue that this is not a bad thing as it can be a good way to generate more interest in relations based on more practical grounds leading to tangible results. In other words, it can indirectly lead to greater socio-cultural cooperation. Relations between various parties are often multi-dimensional, and it is not surprising that other factors such as economic factors take precedence, since the governments eventually should answer their citizens by providing them with an improvement in their living standards. One might even say that the end justifies the means.

The economic dependency and opportunities both sides see in each other have no doubt led to spillover effects in the socio-cultural partnership. With increased human capital flows, presence of various multinational companies and organizations flourishing in each other's countries, there is no doubt that socio-cultural understandings between peoples are also being enhanced regardless of its limitations. The understanding that it is a mutually beneficial economic relationship brings alternative form of reciprocity realizing that it is not a unilateral relationship and all should gain from it.



The Future Between ASEAN and Korea

What Further Needs to Be Done

As mentioned at the beginning, ASEAN is highly diverse region that is not easy to understand even by the peoples of ASEAN, given their varying differences amongst themselves, let alone those outside the region. Thus there is a need to build up greater understanding of the region for Koreans. Likewise, ASEAN peoples too need to be able to see beyond what Korea stereotypically represents.

While there has been greater interaction between both sides, it must be emphasized again that a lot of the interactions are still at a superficial level, especially on tourism and trade. I would like to propose four points to be considered.

1. A Promotion of Broad Based General ASEAN/ Korea studies

I would like to emphasize the promotion of a general ASEAN/ Korea studies scheme, whereby making more broad and general study group of people, rather than a detailed form of selected groups of people. It should be palatable and more simple for general public to understand.

There are several ways to promote greater understanding towards ASEAN, such as the wide-spreading of general ASEAN knowledge in Korean institutes—preferably even before the tertiary level². There can also

be the promotion of learning ASEAN languages, and Koreans can indeed benefit by learning languages that are used by the large population, such as Bahasa Melayu/ Indonesia. ASEAN peoples can also learn Korean, which is also highly beneficial in ASEAN since Korea is powerful in ASEAN.

2. Avoiding Socio-Cultural Traps: The Trap of 'Voluntourism' and The Need for a Meaningful Exchange

On a darker note, while greater people to people interactions are generally good, they may not always lead to meaningful results, particularly when the context of the area or country is not well understood. Citizens of developed countries are brought up at raised in vast different situations from those of newly developing countries. It can be possible that their well-meant intentions may not be altogether good, and do not end up in a good way. 'Voluntourism' can be a good case example.

In recent years, there has been an increase in volunteers—particularly tertiary students—from developed countries who wish to 'do good' in the less developed countries. This is of course applaudable, but may lead to negative results if based on the 'idealized' intentions not backed up by any

2 Wide-spreading of ASEAN and Korean knowledge in schools need not be done in ways which are tedious or require heavy manpower and time. For example, simple acts such as displaying pictures of the flags of the ten ASEAN nations with a short description of each country near a stairway where students might walk past in school can be a simple and cost effective way of spreading such knowledge about ASEAN to young Korean students.

understanding of the context. Being brought up in vastly different and more sheltered environments, these volunteers may be unable to see through the multi-faceted problems faced by the locals whom they desire to help, and focus upon what they think is the ‘right’ means to solve a solution, which may in fact have minimal or even harmful consequences (Martin, 2016).

There are many instances we can think of for those in developed countries who volunteer overseas. For example:

- a. Is teaching English for a week in a highly rural village beneficial for the children there if they are not going to have a chance to practice their English skills and forget them soon after the volunteers leave? In this case, wouldn’t teaching tangible techniques and skills have been more useful?
- b. Volunteers can volunteer in an overseas orphanage, do a really good job, only to leave the place and later find out that many ‘orphans’ were actually forced into the orphanages which generate revenue from foreigners³ .
- c. Volunteers may have a ‘save the world’ mentality, and feel good about themselves with the work they have done, posting pictures on social media celebrating their ‘good’ work. Posting pictures of recipients of the volunteer mission without their consent may not actually be

3 It is highly important to check that the orphanage is registered and run by a reputable owner and not one that exploits children.

something the recipients appreciate, and volunteers often forget to appreciate that the experiences they gained while volunteering has helped them just as they have helped others, and should not be taken as a one-way help.

The idea of ‘voluntourism’ is a mainly to show the difference between how a mere superficial understanding can lead to very different meanings of how peoples see each other and possible resulting less beneficial effects despite increased interaction apparently supposed to be a ‘good thing’.

3. Looking Beyond Korean Pop Culture

The way Korea is perceived by peoples of ASEAN also can use a similarly deeper understanding of it, beyond the knowledge of it being a strong Asian economic powerhouse as well as its Korean Pop culture.

It would be beneficial to know more about Korea’s rich history and have a better understanding of Korea’s proud heritage. There could likewise be a greater promotion of learning of the Korean language and Korean studies in ASEAN countries, not just at the tertiary level. I would argue that instead of promoting such cultural studies and exchanges at the tertiary level, it would be far more beneficial to start earlier, but at a more general level, which although less in-depth would lead to masses’ understandings of Korea.

4. Broad Based Interaction Between ASEAN and Korean Youth

This would then lead to my final proposal in what needs to be done in furthering the ASEAN-Korea socio-cultural partnership in a reciprocal manner. The focus of people to people interactions and inculcating of knowledge of ASEAN vis-à-vis Korea is yet narrow in the demographics of the peoples involved, and this is a great hindrance to the progression in our partnership. By focusing on exchanges between ASEAN-Korea think tanks, academics, civil servants and tertiary students, this would no doubt mean a very selective group of people from both sides having the opportunity for in-depth understandings and exchanges with one another.

I would propose more deregulation on how people to people interactions between ASEAN and Korea peoples are being made, focusing on the youth population with the greatest significance—not disregarding other demographic groups but simply putting more emphasis on the youth.

Individual schools in ASEAN and Korea, both tertiary and pre-tertiary can propose and seek more exchanges between their students. Exchanges between ASEAN and Korean students can provide an experience in which most students in every country get to enjoy, not just those from top or selected institutions.

It must not be considered as developed countries tend to lose out due to students from less developed countries require more financial assistance to visit their countries. This is a false assumption to a large extent as exchanges do not always require cost especially if it is well-managed⁴. Arrangements

can be made to ensure minimal requirements for both sides.

There is probably also a need to consider the benefit of ‘cultural capital’ in today’s globalized world. With deregulation and more individual schools and institutions promoting greater exchanges, their own students and youth would have plenty to gain from. Even in a highly developed country like Korea, opportunities are not equal for all, when you compare the youths living in Seoul and rural areas like Yeosu or Mokpo. More exchanges organized by schools and institutions in these smaller cities are cost-effective in providing similar opportunities for students to learn more about other cultures than their counterparts from the larger cities like Seoul and Busan. In this way, abundant opportunities will be provided to students across the country, and will benefit more people in return through the multiplier effect.

4 For example, one can try to minimize their expenditure by housing visiting students in cheaper in-house accommodations or dormitories. Furthermore, if programmes are sustained ones and regular, it is easier to get better rates, familiarity with organizing can also lead to cost cuts.



Conclusion

An Optimistic Future of A Reciprocal Relationship Between ASEAN And Korean's Socio-Cultural Partnership?

We have come to an understanding that the nature of ASEAN as highly complicated. There are no ways to generalize the region as a homogenous unit. How ASEAN is being partnered with again a different entity like Korea makes it even less clear-cut of what holds for both parties.

Furthermore, if one is to talk about socio-cultural relationships, as mentioned above, economic interests often takes precedence, and the despairing levels of economic developments amongst ASEAN within themselves as well as vis-à-vis Korea is tantamount to adding the oil to the already blazing fire.

Considering the negative information, we can also learn the need to embrace practicality in certain issues, and be more flexible. While unfavorable preconditions—intrinsic complexities of ASEAN and Korea— as well as having individual benefits—in mind prioritizing economic progress—, truly intrinsic desire for cooperation might be less than desirable. We need to sometimes just accept that the world we live in is multi-lateral and we do need to compromise if the means justify the ends. Economic prioritization does lead to eventual need for greater socio-cultural partnership as both

need to come hand in hand for substantial progress to be made.

Looking at the brighter side of things, efforts in the positive manner have also been taken on both sides, and tangible progress has indeed been made—such as in people to people exchanges. All these efforts should not be disregarded in anyways, as they also have tangible results to be shown. These efforts should pave the way for the potential and greater cooperation between ASEAN and Korea.

Looking towards the future, challenges that will always continue to rise, evolve, and change as it moves along with the ever-changing world and regional landscapes. The proposals I have proposed are nowhere near enough, and nowhere near exhaustive, but simply some potential efforts can be built upon already existing efforts to complement them. We should also note that whatever proposals or plans are made that are relevant now, may be less relevant in the future as ASEAN and Korea continues to evolve. There is a need to continuously improve and adapt accordingly, with no room for complacency.

Finally, I would like to point out that it is very easy to be ignorant on the efforts made that do not immediately show tangible or significant results. Thus efforts made by ASEAN and Korea till this day and the plans for way forward may seem as if socio-cultural partnership may not have smooth progress.

However, small changes should be not be disregarded, and sum of small parts can become a whole different great changes. The initiatives taken by

both sides may in the long run lead to the success of a grand forest started simply by planting these ‘insignificant’ small seeds.

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
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Towards a True Socio-Cultural Partnership

Putting People at the Heart of ASEAN-Korea Relations

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Abstract

Some imbalances exist in ASEAN-Korea relations. Socio-cultural cooperation has generally lagged behind the economic or political cooperation since the establishment of ASEAN-Korea relationship. However, the socio-cultural element should not be depicted as a mere additional or minor element in inter-state relations. It is important for Korea to further enhance its strategic partnership with ASEAN countries not only in political and economical terms, but also in the socio-cultural sector.

This essay aims to examine the socio-cultural dimension of the relations between ASEAN and Korean. By examining the history of ASEAN-Korea socio-cultural relations, it shows the evolution of the socio-cultural ties between ASEAN and Korea, which was initiated by the governments in the establishment phase, expanded by society in the development phase, and then finally institutionalized by both the governments and societies of ASEAN and Korea.

To address the limitations of the current status, this essay suggests ASEAN and Korea to enlarge the scope, develop reciprocity and sustainability to forge stable and mutually beneficial socio-cultural ties. Finally, it highlights the concept of examining ASEAN-Korea relations through the lens of socio-cultural exchange, since the socio-cultural sector is the only sector in which the key players are the people.

Two years ago, in 2014, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations^{ASEAN} and South Korea^{hereafter Korea} celebrated the silver jubilee of their partnership dialogue and declared the Joint Statement of the ASEAN-ROK to outline their strategic partnership. This was followed by a Plan of Action that outlined its implementation during the period 2016 to 2020. The Plan of Action mainly covered the cooperation required between two sides in three sectors: (1) political and security, (2) economic, and (3) socio-cultural (ASEAN & ROK, 2014). These three pillars are in line with the structures of the ASEAN Community, established in 2015, which is comprised of the ASEAN Political-Security Community, the ASEAN Economic Community, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. The action plan shows an official commitment by both ASEAN and Korea to become comprehensive partners and to actively engage more in cooperation in all sectors.

However, imbalances do exist in ASEAN-Korea relations. The relations between ASEAN and Korea developed at the beginning of globalization with economic need as the catalyst; thus, economic cooperation is a priority and driving force of ASEAN-Korean relationships (Yang & Mansor, 2016). Political and security cooperation between ASEAN and Korea is less developed than the interdependence of the growing economies of the two sides (Prasetyo, 2007). As awareness in political security increases, the role of ASEAN in the region changes. The call for participation and cooperation by Korea in the political-security sector has become more urgent (Prasetyo, 2007). Problems mainly rise from the final pillar, socio-cultural cooperation.

Throughout history, the socio-cultural element has often been neglected, or at best, relegated to a secondary position. A movement to give more attention to the socio-cultural sector arose in the 2000s, more than a decade after Korea became a Dialogue Partner with ASEAN (Chae, 2009). Socio-cultural cooperation has generally lagged behind economic or political cooperation since the establishment of ASEAN-Korea relationship.

However, the socio-cultural element should not be depicted as a mere additional or minor element in inter-state relationships. The socio-cultural feature is the capability owned by a nation that is most stable and least affected by external circumstances. It can even enhance the conventional competencies such as economic or political power (Apsalone & Sumilo, 2015). Strong socio-cultural cooperation can therefore be a good stimulus, welding both sides together. As significant as political-security disputes and economic crises, cultural gaps between societies of different countries could also create the first cracks in inter-state relationships (Ackermann, 2003). In other words, inter-state relationships built on solid socio-cultural partnerships not only boost the traditional ties of political and economic agreement but also become more resistant to change and last longer. One good example comes from a close neighbor of ASEAN and Korea, Japan. Many ASEAN countries had painful experiences with Japan during the World War II. However, over time, Japan has succeeded in changing the perception of ASEAN countries toward themselves from suspicion as ex-colonial parties to trustworthy partners by not only promoting its vigorous

economic policy but also developing a considerable human-oriented cultural partnership with ASEAN countries (Singh, 2002). It is therefore obviously important for Korea to further enhance its strategic partnership with ASEAN countries not only in political and economic terms, but also in the socio-cultural sector.

This essay aims to examine the socio-cultural dimension of ASEAN and Korean relationship; it consists of two parts: (1) an examination of the history of socio-cultural relations between ASEAN and Korea to analyze both achievements and limitations; and (2) suggestions for future developments for the ASEAN-Korea socio-cultural partnership. The first portion highlights the three phases that have formed the socio-cultural background to ASEAN and Korea's relationship over time, namely establishment, development, and consolidation. Each phase roughly covers a decade. The first phase, the establishment, took place from 1989 to 1998. This establishment phase began immediately after Korea established a sectoral dialogue partnership with ASEAN in 1989; at this time, the socio-cultural relationship occurred mainly at a government level. The following decade, from 1999 to 2008, was the development phase, when Korean culture started to be introduced to, and enjoyed by, the people of Southeast Asia. Socio-cultural relationship between ASEAN and Korea were then extended to a societal level. The last phase is the consolidation phase, which began in 2009 and covers the present; some official institutional efforts at government level have been made by both ASEAN and Korea in order to

strengthen socio-cultural ties between the two sides, and active participation in the partner's society is encouraged. The second part contains some suggestions to address the limitations of the current, to further help enhancing the scope, reciprocity, and future sustainability of ASEAN-Korea socio-cultural relationship. Based on the Plan of Action of Joint Declaration of ASEAN and Korea, tourism is classified as a subsector of economic cooperation; however, this essay takes tourism into account since it involves people-to-people exchanges between ASEAN and Korea.



History of ASEAN-Korean Socio-Cultural Relationships

Assessing inter-state relationships in the socio-cultural sector is not easy because the scheme is too wide and the output is likely to be wider than other sectors such as economics or politics (Le Thu, 2014). There is no single standard that can be applied to measure whether inter-state socio-cultural relationship are successful or not. This essay therefore tries to examine the question from a historical perspective. The historical dynamics of ASEAN-Korean socio-cultural relationship can help compare socio-cultural ties between ASEAN and Korea in each period of interest and allow a comparison of how these have changed and developed over time.

Establishment Phase: 1989–1998

This phase was important for both ASEAN and Korea as they engaged in an official partnership and Korea began a sectoral Dialogue Partnership with ASEAN in 1989. This was 16 years later than Japan but 4 years earlier than China. Korea became a full Dialogue Partner in 1991, and in 1997, the ASEAN-Korea partnership elevated to summit level (ASEAN, 2016). Official socio-cultural exchanges between Korea and ASEAN were initiated by the Korea International Cooperation Agency [KOICA](#), a government organization for Official Development Assistance [ODA](#). When the Korea

Overseas Volunteer [KOV](#) program, a former body of KOICA, was created in 1989, it dispatched the first official overseas volunteers to four countries in 1990. Two of the four initial destinations were ASEAN countries, Indonesia and the Philippines (KOICA, 2010). KOICA, after its official establishment in 1991, signed the Conclusion of Agreements on KOV with five ASEAN countries over the period until 1997: the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Myanmar (KOICA, 2010). This attempt was followed by an increase in the ASEAN-Korea Special Cooperation Fund [SCF](#). The SCF was launched in 1990, following the establishment of a Dialogue Partnership between ASEAN and Korea, and its aim was to intensify ASEAN-Korean cooperation. Its annual fund expenditure was 1 million USD until the second year after launching, and this figure doubled in the third year. This funding was mainly used for cooperation in the economic sector, including trade and investment. Half of the SCF was separated off in 1996 and renamed the Future Oriented Cooperation Project Fund [FOCF](#). Unlike the SCF, this FOCF was developed to enhance people-to-people exchanges between ASEAN and Korea, including youth exchanges, journalist exchanges, and cultural and art exchanges (Hong, 2009).

In this phase, the people of Southeast Asia did not have a lot of information regarding Korea, and vice versa, because even official cooperation was barely established. Thus, the agenda was mainly carried out at a government level, rather than a societal one. Therefore, significant socio-cultural exchange between societies did not take place in this phase.

Nevertheless, people-to-people exchanges between the two sides steadily increased. Korea Tourism Organization's statistics show that the number of people from ASEAN visiting Korea in 1989 was only 172 thousand, however, by end of 1998, more than 323 thousand people from ASEAN countries visited Korea annually (KTO, 2015). The number of Korean visitors to ASEAN grew even more quickly. Only 103 thousand Korean people visited ASEAN in 1989, but by the end of 1998, a total of 4.2 million Koreans had visited ASEAN (KTO, 2015). The Asia Financial Crisis, which happened in the middle of 1997, affected both Korea and ASEAN countries, and this created a sense of urgency among Asian countries in terms of fostering a stronger Asian identity and encouraging deeper cooperation in the region (Plummer, 2009). Such triggers improved cooperation in the conventional sectors such as politics and economics as well as the socio-cultural sector. The most meaningful and significant achievement in this phase was official interaction at a government level that was established by ASEAN and Korea. This official tie became a platform supporting further socio-cultural exchanges in the ensuing years.

Development Phase: 1999–2008

Hallyu Korean wave is a key word used to describe socio-cultural relations between ASEAN and Korea in this period. *Hallyu*, used to refer to the popularity of Korean popular culture, began with Korean TV dramas being

aired in ASEAN countries during this era (Kim & Ryoo, 2007). Several Korean dramas such as *Autumn in Love* [Gaeul Donghwa](#), *Winter Sonata* [Gyeoul Yeonga](#), and *Jewel in the Palace* [Dae Jang Geum](#), gained a lot of popularity in ASEAN countries after 1999. The love of ASEAN people for Korean drama [K-Drama](#) developed into an expanding regard for Korean celebrities, Korean music, and other Korean culture. *Hallyu*, along with the rapid economic development of ASEAN countries, contributed to the increasing number of ASEAN visitors to Korea. The total number of ASEAN visitors to Korea in this period was nearly 6.4 million, double the previous decade's numbers (KTO, 2015). In 2008, six of the ten countries with the largest numbers of visitors to Korea were ASEAN countries. Altogether, ASEAN people were the third largest visitors to Korea (KTO, 2015). The number of Korean people visiting ASEAN countries also rapidly increased. In this decade, a total of 18.6 million Koreans visited ASEAN countries, nearly four times more than in the previous decade (KTO, 2016). The resurgence of the Korean economy means that the number of people travelling overseas during their vacation increased, and their favorite destinations were ASEAN countries. This period was also affected by an increase of ASEAN immigrants to Korea. The total number of ASEAN nationals residing in Korea at the end of 2008 was approximately 188,000, making them around 22% of the total number of foreigners in Korea (Korea Immigration Service, 2009). These figures suggest that Korea was no longer an unfamiliar country for ASEAN people; at this time, ASEAN was also becoming

familiar to Korean people.

Government efforts to foster socio-cultural ties between the two sides continued. KOICA initiated the ASEAN Special Capacity Development Program in 2000 (KOICA, 2009), and after ASEAN and Korea elevated their relationship to a Comprehensive Cooperation Partnership in 2004, the year marked the 15th anniversary of the ASEAN-Korea relationship, a Korean Cultural Center aiming to promote Korean culture and facilitate cultural exchanges overseas opened in Hanoi for the first time in Southeast Asia (KICS, 2016). In this development phase, socio-cultural relations between ASEAN and Korea became more robust and well-developed. Compared to the previous decade, where socio-cultural interaction was mostly initiated and carried out by the government, in this development phase, the societies of ASEAN and Korea helped to provide core agencies for the agreements. Hearteningly, the dialogue was clearly two-way: Korean culture was introduced to ASEAN people through *Hallyu*, but ASEAN cultures also started to enter Korea society.

Consolidation Phase: 2009–Present

Just as the French-German Youth Office played a pivotal role in the Franco-German cultural relationship (Defrance, 2013), institutions often become powerful agencies that enhance the socio-cultural sector in inter-state relationship. In the aforementioned consolidation phase, Korea

became the Strategic Partner of ASEAN and thus established a number of prestigious institutions to enhance socio-cultural cooperation with ASEAN. This effort was started by the ASEAN-Korea Centre, which was established in March 2009. The ASEAN-Korea Centre is an international organization established under agreement between Korea and ASEAN countries; its aims are not only to enhance the ASEAN-Korea partnership but also to promote mutual understanding between ASEAN and Korean societies by encouraging socio-cultural exchanges (ASEAN-Korea Centre, 2016). Korean Culture Centers for ASEAN countries additionally opened in Jakarta [Indonesia](#), Taguig City [the Philippines](#) in 2011, and also in Bangkok [Thailand](#) in 2013 (KICS, 2016). In 2012, an Ambassador for the permanent mission of Korea to ASEAN was dispatched to support both conventional and public diplomacy, including socio-cultural exchanges between the two sides (The Mission of the Republic of Korea to ASEAN, 2014). Annual FOCF expenditure, which had been 1 million USD since the fund was established, increased to 3 million USD in 2010. From 2015, the fund began to operate as the ASEAN-Korea Cooperation Fund [AKCF](#), with expenditure increasing to around 7 million USD annually (MOFA, 2016). Numerous seminars and forums underlining socio-cultural exchanges between ASEAN and Korea have been funded by the government in this era, including the ASEAN-Korea Culture and Arts Forum, which has run since 2010, and the Seminar on Korea-ASEAN Socio Cultural Partnerships, which has existed since 2014.

The institutionalization effort of the governments was accompanied and followed by more active social interactions between the cultures. In this era, socio-cultural exchange between the people of ASEAN and Korea become more dynamic. From 2009 until 2015, nearly 9.5 million ASEAN people visited Korea (KTO, 2015), while by the end of 2015, more than 400 thousand ASEAN people, 23% of the total foreign residents, are living in Korea as workers, students, partners of Korean nationals, and so on (Korea Immigration Service, 2016). The increasing number of ASEAN people in Korea has also helped to introduce ASEAN cultures to Korea. Cultures of ASEAN countries started to actively enter and influence Korean's lifestyles during this growth period, resulting in the "Southeast Asian Phenomena" in Korea, particularly in Seoul (Shim, 2012). ASEAN artists debuted and gained popularity in Korea during this time, such as Nickhun, a Thai member of 2PM, a popular idol group. Southeast Asian foods are now part of the in-demand cuisine in Korea, and many Thai and Vietnamese restaurants have sprung up in Seoul (Kim, 2011). In 2015, approximately 5.6 million Korean people chose countries within ASEAN as their overseas destinations (ASEAN-Korea Centre, 2015).



Future Socio-Cultural Ties

Scope, Reciprocity, and Sustainability

Korea has a relatively weak ties with ASEAN in terms of economics and politics among the “Plus Three” countries (Hernandez, 2007). Comparing with China and Japan in economic and political sectors is not simple and easy, given their enormous economic power and significant political positions at the international stage. Japan, for example, has established the Asian Development Bank^{ADB}, and China responded to this by creating the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank^{AIIB} that engages further with ASEAN in economic and political terms. It is not easy for Korea to follow the same path as those countries. However, as the development of cultural exchanges shows, socio-cultural relations between ASEAN and Korea have rapidly improved. This suggests that Korea has remarkable strength and potential in the socio-cultural sector.

Undeniably, *Hallyu* has improved Korea’s image with the people of ASEAN; *Hallyu* has also contributed to the increased economic power of Korea (Song, Kim, & Jang, 2013; Kang, 2009). Unfortunately, *Hallyu* has a relatively short history, and its influence is limited. *Hallyu* has become an enormous stimulus to cooperation between ASEAN and Korea, yet ASEAN and Korea need to work together to develop a strategy beyond *Hallyu* that takes advantage of its impetus. Three main focuses are therefore suggested

to improve future partnerships between ASEAN and Korea in terms of the socio-cultural sector.

The first consideration is scope. In the past, the influence of Korea in ASEAN or vice versa reached out to limited audiences on certain fields only. For instance, people in ASEAN countries usually associate Korea with popular culture such as K-drama or K-pop, while in Korea, many people associate the term “Southeast Asia” with immigrants or multicultural families, perceiving ASEAN in a distinct context. It is therefore important to create policies that promote ASEAN and Korea in a larger scope. Sport, with its more general audience, may be one target for additional attention.

The second thing to consider is reciprocity. Compared to the perception of and affection for Korean culture of ASEAN, Korean’s knowledge and attention to the cultures of ASEAN is relatively lower. In future, this kind of imbalance should be addressed to achieve reciprocity. Southeast Asia as a region owns not only splendid traditional structures, such as Angkor Watt in Cambodia and Borobudur in Indonesia, but also showcases a great deal of exotic intangible cultural heritage as listed by UNESCO, such as Wayang shadow puppet, Batik wax-resist dyeing technique, Sbek Thom shadow theater, and Nhã nhạc court music. However, many Korean people still know very little about this cultural heritage; this is not because these things are not attractive to Korean people, but rather that few chances are provided for them to engage with such things. It is therefore important to provide an institution that introduces and teaches ASEAN cultures and languages, as well as the

concepts behind ASEAN itself, to Koreans, in the same way that Korean Culture Centers in several ASEAN countries operate to promote Korean heritage. The opening of ASEAN Culture House in Busan next year may prove to be an excellent initial step towards this goal.

The final point to consider is sustainability. Large eye-catching events are good ways to introduce Korean culture to ASEAN, and vice versa. But if these remain as one-time events, their significance will have limitations in the long run. Long-term projects that are to be conducted continuously should be developed between ASEAN and Korea. For example, the establishment of “ASEAN and Korea” modules in prestigious universities of ASEAN and Korea would assist students in both areas to better understand one another.



Conclusion

By examining the history of ASEAN-Korea socio-cultural relations, this essay shows the evolution of the socio-cultural ties between ASEAN and Korea. This was initiated by the governments in the establishment phase, expanded by society in the development phase, and then finally institutionalized by the governments and societies of ASEAN and Korea. This essay also offers suggestions to develop the scope, reciprocity, and sustainability of the relationship in order to forge stable and mutually beneficial socio-cultural ties between ASEAN and Korea.

This essay also highlights the concept of examining ASEAN-Korea relationships through the lens of socio-cultural exchange, since, as Le Thu argues, the socio-cultural sector is the only sector in which the key players are people rather than corporations or governments (Le Thu, 2014). Interstate relationships that rely heavily on political-security and economy may be vulnerable when the administration changes, the economy is bankrupt, or markets suffer from their poor economy. However, a solid relationship built at a societal level that is based on deep understanding and trust cannot be easily destroyed under any circumstances.

As a Korean who has spent half of my lifetime in Korea and the other half in ASEAN countries, I have personally experienced the importance of socio-cultural partnership in ASEAN-Korea relations. In the past, ASEAN

friends of mine had no idea how to locate Korea on a map, while many of my Korean friends portrayed Southeast Asia simply as a less-developed region. Now, however, many of my Indonesian friends study in Korea and sometimes they know popular and traditional culture of Korea better than I do. Similarly, my Korean friend, who was amazed by the exotic culture and everyday kindness of people during her trip to Southeast Asia, is learning Indonesian as her second language. I believe that without these types of exchanges, where people of ASEAN and Korea can come to understand each other better, the relationship between ASEAN and Korea will remain incomplete.

Aristotle, a famous Greek philosopher from antiquity, said “Wishing to be friends is quick work, but friendship is a slow ripening fruit” (Aristotle, Ross & Brown, 2009). In other words, someone can pretend to be a friend in the short-term period, but it requires long-term effort and commitment to become a true friend. Undeniably, ASEAN and Korea have been good friends to each other during the last 27 years. However, both sides need to maintain efforts to strengthen this friendship in the future. Governments have played a pivotal role in establishing and facilitating the friendship between ASEAN and Korea, but it is the people of these regions who must encourage the friendship to flourish and thrive. Next year is ASEAN-Korea Cultural Exchange Year. Now is the perfect time to put people at the heart of ASEAN-Korea relations to help ensure everlasting friendship between ASEAN and Korea in the future.

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
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Engaging ASEAN and Korea

Towards a Better Socio-Cultural Partnership

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Abstract

The partnership between Association of Southeast Asian Nations **ASEAN** and Republic of Korea **ROK** has achieved several milestones especially in the areas of diplomacy, people-to-people exchanges, and economy since its establishment in 1989. For nearly three decades, they have embarked on several cooperative efforts to strengthen their bilateral relations. However, obstacles that prevent the current socio-cultural partnership and reciprocal understanding of the two sides from further deepening still persist. This

essay will highlight achievements of the ASEAN-Korea partnership in the mentioned areas of cooperation, identify and analyze the three main obstacles that the two sides are facing with regard to enhancing their relations, and finally present solutions and suggestions to strengthen the ASEAN-Korea relations. Statements are presented according to the author's viewpoint.



INTRODUCTION

Why cooperate?

The last decades of the century saw a divided world as a result of the Cold War. But nowadays states generally agree to the idea that a global peace is beneficial for their own economies and improvement of their society. However, due to globalization, competition among countries intensified, leading the countries to cooperate with each other and establish regional integration.

In an effort to build a truly peaceful cooperation, the 10 ASEAN Member States have established the ASEAN Community in 2015 based on the three pillars of political-security, economic, and socio-cultural to deepen regional integration and strengthen a bilateral cooperation among like-minded partners, especially with the members of ASEAN+3.

ASEAN and South Korea formally established their relations in November 1989 and have since been closely working together to enhance their partnership in different areas of cooperation. Despite this, it is noticeable the two sides still have much left to cover. The author supposes that this is due to Korea prioritizing the security affairs in the Korean peninsula during the nascent stage of ASEAN-Korea relations. Nevertheless, the security in South Korea has greatly improved in the recent years, allowing the country to resume its massive efforts in deepening its relations

with ASEAN member countries.

Korea and ASEAN can play a bridging role among countries in East Asia. In this way, both sides can optimize their goal of instilling international prosperity. However, to achieve a long-lasting cooperation and genuine mutual understanding, diplomacy and people to people exchanges should be emphasized.



ASEAN-ROK Cooperative Efforts

Diplomatic Efforts

The diplomatic relations between South Korea and ASEAN commenced in 1989 as sectoral Dialogue Partnership. The two sides deepened their partnership when they became Full Dialogue Partners. Several more milestones were achieved by the ASEAN-Korea relations in the following years: the holding of the First ASEAN-ROK Summit in 1997, and the adoption of the Joint Declaration on the Comprehensive Cooperation Partnership as well as the entry into force of the ASEAN-Korea FTA in 2007. To foster economic and socio-cultural ties with each other, ASEAN and Korea inaugurated the ASEAN-Korea Centre in 2009. In 2009, the leaders adopted the Joint Declaration on ASEAN-ROK Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity and its Action Plan, which covered the period of 2011-2015, elevating the ASEAN-ROK dialogue relations from comprehensive cooperation to a strategic partnership. The International Association of Korean Studies in Indonesia [INAKOS](#) was also opened on May 7, 2009 in an attempt to keep developing Korean-Indonesian studies and partnership between Korea and Indonesia. New Asia Initiative [NAI](#) was also launched in 2009 with an expectation of Former Korean President Lee Myung-bak to “enhance substantial cooperation with all the countries of Asia, and ASEAN in particular” (Yu, 2009). In 2013, a leap was made for

the bilateral relations between Korea and Vietnam, an ASEAN Member States, when Korean President Park Geun-hye selected the country as the destination for her very first state visit. The year 2015 is also seen as significant not only because of the establishment of the ASEAN Community but also for the progress of the socio-cultural relations between ASEAN and Korea.

Figure 1. Year of the diplomatic establishment of 10 ASEAN states with Korea

	Country	Year of the establishment of diplomatic relations(chronologically)
1	Philippines	1949
2	Thailand	1958
3	Malaysia	1960
4	Indonesia	1973
5	Myanmar	1975
6	Singapore	1975
7	Laos	1974 / Severance–1975 / Reestablishment–1995
8	Cambodia	1970 / Severance–1975 / Reestablishment–1997
9	Brunei	1984
10	Vietnam	1992



People-to-people Exchange and Mutual Understanding

Although ASEAN–ROK relations officially started in November 1989, most of the ASEAN Members Countries had begun their commercial trade and other exchanges with Korea years before (Figure 1). This has facilitated a favorable condition to foster people-to-people exchanges between the two sides and contributed to building an impressive national image and enhanced mutual understanding. Korea is ranked as the third favorite destination of ASEAN citizens after China and Japan. Meanwhile Southeast Asian countries are the most popular destination among Koreans according to statistics of Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015. Until September 2016, about 185,000 people from ASEAN visited South Korea, making ASEAN the 3rd biggest source of foreign visitors to ROK (KTO, 2016).

In the aspect of education cooperation, South Korea has designed a variety of exchange programs, and scholarships, which effectively promote education as a vehicle to achieve socio-economic development. Korea Development Institute [KDI](#) has established programs for international graduate students, with emphasis not only on what to do with development assistance but how to share these development experiences. In recent years, the majority of students at KDI are from Southeast Asian countries, especially Cambodia, Vietnam, and Indonesia (“South Korea’s Influence,” 2012). The number of exchange students is also growing. As of 2007,

Figure 2. South Korean community in ASEAN countries in 2014-2015

ASEAN countries	Number (from highest to lowest)	People-to-People Exchanges(2015)
Vietnam	about 140,000	ROK visitors to Vietnam: 1,110,000 Vietnamese visitors to ROK: 170,000
Philippines	about 89,000(2014)	ROK visitors to the Philippines: 1,340,000 Philippine visitors to ROK: 40,000
Indonesia	about 41,000	ROK visitors to Indonesia: 338,671 Indonesian visitors to ROK: 193,590
Singapore	about 20,000(2014)	ROK visitors to Singapore: 577,082 Singaporean visitors to ROK:160,153
Thailand	about 19,700(2014)	ROK visitors to Thailand: 1.37 million Thai visitors to ROK: 0.37 million
Malaysia	about 12,690	ROK visitors to Malaysia: 378,228 Malaysian visitors to ROK: 223,207
Cambodia	about 8,500	ROK visitors to Cambodia : 390,000 Cambodian visitors to ROK : 25,000
Myanmar	about 3,106	ROK visitors to Myanmar: 58,472(2014) Myanmar visitors to ROK: 59,797(2014)
Laos	about 2,000	N/A
Brunei	about 300	Bruneian visitors to ROK: 2,345

• Source. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea.

Korea and ASEAN exchanged over 20,000 students annually for language education and degree courses, and about 16,000 Korean students went to ASEAN nations during 2008, compared to 4,000 six years before (Lee, 2009). These students are expected to provide multi-cultural experience and enhance the mutual understanding between ASEAN and South Korea during their study and after coming back to their homeland.

In terms of youth development, from 1998 to 2015, ASEAN and ROK have conducted many youth exchange projects in different fields such as ASEAN-Korea Youth Exchanges and Cultural Community Building Program, ASEAN-Korea Frontier Forum, ASEAN-Korea Youth Square, ASEAN-Korea Forum and Advanced Seminar, ASEAN-Korea Future-oriented Cooperation Project, Youth Exchange Program, ASEAN-Korea Youth Taekwondo Cultural Exchange Camp, Korea-ASEAN Cooperation Project on Education, and Exchange Program for Young Scholars in Women's Studies. These programs intend to provide multi-cultural experience, deepen mutual understanding among the youth of ASEAN and Korea.

Additionally, ROK's experiences on socio-economic development can be an invaluable asset and source of assistance for some ASEAN nations. Through the ASEAN-ROK Special Cooperation Fund, problems about social welfare and development with the focus on children, women, older people, people with disabilities and migrant workers are approached closer. ASEAN was the largest recipient of South Korea's ODA (US\$1.13bn) in 1987-2006 (Han, 2012). As an emerging donor, South Korea is interested

in assisting more in capacity-building and human resource development areas, through education and vocational training.

Economic Ties

Thanks to the ASEAN-ROK Free Trade Agreement, a strengthened economic tie and widely cultural values were introduced to ASEAN and Korea. Customers in ASEAN supermarkets have become more familiar and accepted Korean outlook such as beauty or fashion style through exported Korean brands.

In terms of Investment, Korea's FDI to ASEAN has concentrated on several ASEAN countries and expanded recently. For 2008-2012, Vietnam became the most important recipient of Korea's FDI accounting for 24.9 percent of Korea's FDI to ASEAN, followed by Indonesia (20.2 percent), Malaysia (15.6 percent), Singapore (13.5 percent), and the Philippines (8.7 percent) (Lee & Bang, 2013). Furthermore, the trade volume between the two regions has increased (Export: 84.6 billion USD, Import: 53.4 billion USD) in 2014, helping ASEAN surpass US, EU and Japan to become Korea's second largest trade partner (ASEAN-Korea Centre, n.d). Trade agreements such as the ASEAN-Korea Foreign Trade Agreement on Goods, which entered into force in June 2007, and the ASEAN-Korea FTA on Services and on Investment, went into effect respectively in May and September 2009, have deepened understanding between Korea and ASEAN.



Concerns Confronting the Relation

When ASEAN-Korea diplomatic relations was upgraded, the cooperative level, as the result, was enhanced considerably, creating an increase in interaction between two sides. There is a growing number of people from ASEAN going to South Korea for labor export, while Koreans also show strong interests travel and settle in this region. These frequent exchanges have enriched both societies and cultures, but at the same time, pullulated the potential for cross-cultural conflicts affecting ASEAN citizens working in South Korea as well as the Koreans residing in Southeast Asia. Therefore, it is needed to be addressed as both countries anticipate frequent interactions not only at the government level but also at the public level.


Labor Issues

Southeast Asian employees working in foreign countries often face problems of illegal immigration, labor exploitation, human rights violations, and cultural gaps. Most ASEAN undocumented immigrants in Korea are unskilled and from underprivileged living condition in their homeland. They have to spend a significant expense to travel to South Korea. And it might be no surprise that some of them are in high-desire of earning money and actually hope to work in Korea as long as possible even after

the contractual period and at an illegal status. The thing is that in this case, employers can save a big cost in terms of insurances and tax by recruiting those undocumented laborers, which probably encourages more foreign people to work illegally. Sadly, those working at an illegal status are unprotected by the law, leaving them highly vulnerable to exploitation and violence.

Vietnamese are the largest number immigrant employees to South Korea, followed by Filipinos, Thai, Indonesian and Myanmarese (Figure 3). Problems of Southeast Asian workers are not only in the undocumented group but low-skilled foreign labors who are possibly discriminated and isolated from local communities. Language is another problem for

Figure 3. Southeast Asia Workers in South Kore by coutries



• Source: Korea Immigration Service(Dec 31, 2009)

workers from Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia. While most Indonesians are Muslims, Islam in Korea is a very small minority religion which is almost entirely formed by foreign workers. Hence, there will be many inconveniences to them i.e few mosques to pray at and not many stores sell halal food for Muslims. Additionally, due to lack of Korean language ability, foreign workers face challenges to communicate with their employers, making these foreigners hardly to adapt well to the locals.

While their presence produces economic benefits, some of the Koreans living in Southeast Asia can also create cross-cultural tensions owing to its large scale. For example, in Indonesia, a 31,000m² Korea town block constructed in North Jakarta Pulomas gathers approximately 40,000 Koreans, which makes Indonesia the 12th largest country with Koreans living outside of South Korea (“Investors to Advance,” 2008). Korean immigrant community in Malaysia is the 20th largest community of overseas Koreans (Overseas Korean Foundation, 2007). Also, the most well-known Korean town in the Metro Manila, Philippines area is located in Makati's Barangay Poblacion and in Singapore in the Upper Bukit Timah and the Tanjong Pagar area. These areas need more attention to ensure a cross-cultural engagement.

Foreign Brides in South Korea

Many so-called ‘leftover men’ in wealthy Korea are seeking wives from less affluent areas in Southeast Asia, especially Vietnam and Cambodia. Vietnamese women made up 34% of South Korean men’s international marriages in 2011, significantly more than brides from other Southeast Asian countries—9% were Filipinos and 4% were Cambodians— according to a report by Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (“A Perfect Match,” 2014). However, it’s more than a simple purpose of a wedding, those foreign brides are then often abandoned in exploitation, abuse, and isolation when arriving in Korea.

The marriage matching is technically an indirect form of human trafficking with a number of foreign women being sent to Korea through matchmaking services. Marriage matchers lie to women with promises of a bright future in other countries but actually sell them to families to become a “breeding machine” or babysitters only. The victims are not only those foreign brides but also their children who are mixed blood and often underestimated within the local community in South Korea. Those innocent children who should have been well-grown up in a positive social environment are suffering from social prejudice. If the phenomenon is not controlled, the human trafficking line hidden in such matchmaking agencies will harm more and more girls and women and worsen the national image of countries. Cambodia in 2010 temporarily banned marriages between

Cambodian women and South Korean men, after many women were allegedly sold by matchmakers.

Speaking of solutions, governments of countries should emphasize the legal protections for migrant women, domestic violence prevention, and awareness-raising of the human rights. Although there are centers providing practical classes for migrant brides, such as Korean Language Instruction, they do pretty marginally and does not seem to work effectively. For instance, only 400 hours a year of language education, equivalent about an hour a day, is guaranteed at any particular center (Iglauer, 2015). Like an iceberg, these classes just likely solve obvious issues on surface. The larger one, shrinking deeply underneath the water, has not been approached. But more importantly, governments should take a high concern to women in rural areas by creating more job opportunities for them as a long term project to tackle the problem. Additionally, immigration procedure to South Korea should be checked carefully. Embassy of South Korea in developing countries should ask for a specific purpose to visit Korea before approving visa.

K-Wave

South Korea is well-recognized for achieving remarkable success when it transformed itself from an impoverished, war-torn society into a modern, developed, and democratic nation. It is undeniable that interests of South

Korea have increased in Southeast Asian region. Thanks to deliberate policies on cultural exports via channels of media, diplomacy and commerce that not only *Hallyu* [Korean Wave](#) and Korean cultural patterns have become more familiar with ASEAN citizens. Young people in many Southeast Asian countries start getting used to Korean language, K-pop bands, songs, dramas and other consumer cultures including food, fashion, make-up trends, and even plastic surgery. Yet, as frequently pointed out by critics, it remains unclear exactly what the cultural identity is Korea trying to display through *Hallyu*-besides its national brands. Owing to the drastic increase in volume and frequency of Korean bands and dramas, it might become counterproductive with an unexpected react to K-wave, like a way a person in indigestion.

Most countries in Southeast Asia live in generation families where gaps in lifestyle and mindset between grandparents, parents and their children are often an intractable problem. Adolescents who are too crazy about Korean singers tend to wear and imitate their idols with short skirts and dyed hair. Reasonably, these changes on appearance do not match with a fundamental concept of most elderly people, which might make their grandparents and parents have a distorted impression on K-wave and want to stop their children to approach with Korean culture.



Recommendation

Youth Empowerment

Youth can play an important role in enhancing socio-cultural partnership. Young people love exploring the world, making friends and having fun together. Therefore, they might not restrict themselves by an invisible barrier of conflicting issues to express hostile behaviors towards other ones from different countries.

With their leadership, youth can enhance integration and foster common understanding among countries, facilitating a stronger socio-cultural partnership between ASEAN and South Korea. Take for example, in ASEAN nowadays, there is a strong connection in the regional youth community. Projects run by ASEAN young leaders have attracted a huge number of participants to tackle together problems in the region and enhance a peaceful regional integration. For instance, the ASEAN Peace, a project contributes to the peace and environmental protection efforts of the conflict-affected regions of the Philippines and Thailand through youth-led social enterprise initiatives or ASEAN Coralranger Project with its mission to save corals and marine environment mainly in Vietnam and Malaysia by reducing amount of plastic released to oceans and building an ecological lifestyle in youth communities. Importantly, when young people grow up and eventually become country's leaders, with a broad understanding

about their region and a friendship networking built in former community projects they used to join, they might probably show goodwill to solve discord peacefully and make a commitment to strengthen a regional cooperation.

Besides their leadership, young people can work as ambassadors of peace in regional competition by utilizing their specialized capabilities. Sports and athletic tournaments are substantial in building a strong people-to-people social communication among nations. Promoting the sports programs will be a bridge to transcending cultural, linguistic, and political prejudices to nurture a closer national as well as political relation. Moreover, with success in advanced development of the cyber world and social media networks, news can be spread quickly, sending their peaceful messages widely and supporting significantly for friendship between countries. A peaceful cooperation between ASEAN and South Korea might be possibly built by these youth “engineers” who are full of enthusiasm and hospitality for a peaceful harmony.

Sports Diplomacy and Martial Spirit

Playing sports is believed to improve human societies in mediating estrangements, resolving conflicts, tolerance, compassion, equality of opportunity and evoke people’s patriotism, especially through international sporting events. Sports can be a powerful medium to reach out and build

relationships across cultural and ethnic divides with its positive message of shared values. Both ASEAN and South Korea share a long history about martial arts. While Southeast Asia is famous for Pencak Silat, Kali, Krabi Krabong, Muay Thai, Vovinam and Bando Burmese martial art, Taekwondo of South Korea is also welcomed which is practiced by around 70 million people worldwide (World Taekwondo Federation, 2016) and selected as a sport game in international events such as the Olympic Games, the Commonwealth Games and the World University Games. Ministries of Foreign Affairs can concentrate on martial arts and develop it into sports diplomacy via hosting international sports games or cooperating with other countries to organize exchanges and learning courses. Thanks by these international sports events that citizens of both are encouraged to come to both ASEAN and South Korea, which can create more opportunities for cultural exchanges. In this way, sports can be an effective foreign policy resource to strengthen ASEAN and Korea towards a better socio-cultural partnership.

Unlike performing arts such as singing or dancing, martial arts require an endurance and high determination to master rather than the action of showing off. Understanding martial spirit, learners can learn about the country where the martial art comes from. Additionally, martial arts stress the importance of spiritual discipline, which can be enjoyed by both men and women. Speaking of educational effects, with typical discipline and tenacity of martial arts, they are emerging as a treatment option for

young people addicted to online games or social media. This argument can persuade people from different genders and generation to get involved in martial arts.

Environment Solving Experiences

As an emerging region, Southeast Asia has been facing environmental problems caused by a fast industrialization and urbanization, such as transboundary haze, biodiversity protection, and marine and freshwater conservation. Acknowledging drawbacks of a rapid growth, ASEAN Community aims to a sustainable development with friendly-environmental industries and trustful health care society. Although each country has their own typical problems, the starting point when South Korea shifted to industrialization about a decade ago, almost shares with the current initiation of ASEAN countries. Furthermore, as the result of economic ties, there are more and more Korean firms and special industrial area established in ASEAN countries. Hence, if their manufacturing activities stick with a priority of environmental protection, South Korean companies will be greatly welcomed. This environmental cooperation can facilitate considerably more a closer socio-cultural partnership between ASEAN and Korea.

The environmental cooperation between ASEAN and South Korea can be divided into three categories (Ministry of Environment of Republic of

Korea, n.d). The first is about contribution to environmental conservation in countries of this region. The second is about supporting or promoting activities of Korean environmental companies in South East Asia. The third is about seeking pragmatic environmental diplomacy by establishing Korea's broad base of support on the international stage. Besides, there are already efforts in environmental cooperation between ASEAN and South Korea to prove a promising possibility of the policy. For example, ASEAN+ 3 Environment Ministers Meeting (since 2002), "Korea-ASEAN River Restoration Forum," "Project for Building Korea-ASEAN Biological Diversity Research Capability," "Seoul Initiative for Green Growth" or trainings about how to Cope with ASEAN Climate Change. Currently, ASEAN leaders also show a great interest in the Korean paradigm of low-carbon green growth.

There are antecedent measures to facilitate a socio-cultural partnership between South Korea and ASEAN. Rather than harmony in diplomatic relation, understanding among grassroots is possibly decisive for a truly sustainable peaceful cooperation. Hence, if efforts of governments can increase bonding among their citizen, especially youths, they can feasibly help a better ASEAN-Korea reciprocal understanding, and a peaceful, and prosperous region.

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