



PARTNERING FOR TOMORROW

ASEAN-Korea
Relations



ASEAN-KOREA CENTRE



**PARTNERING
FOR
TOMORROW**

**ASEAN-Korea
Relations**

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ASEAN-KOREA CENTRE

KISEAS
KOREAN INSTITUTE OF
SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

A

ABAC	APEC Business Advisory Council
ACMW	ASEAN Committee on Migrant Workers
ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADMM	ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting
ADMM+	ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus
ADSOM	ASEAN Defence Senior Officials' Meeting
AEC	ASEAN Economic Community
AFAS	ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
AIM	ASEAN ICT Masterplan
AKFTA	ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Agreement
AMM	ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting
AMRO	ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office
APSC	ASEAN Political-Security Community
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASCC	ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community
ASED	ASEAN Education Ministers Meeting
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ATR	ASEAN Thesis Repository
AUN	ASEAN University Network

B

BIMP-EAGA	Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative

C

CLMV	Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam
CSAP	Consolidated Strategic Action Plan
CoC	Code of Conduct
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
CUES	Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea

D

DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DMB	Digital Multimedia Broadcasting
DMZ	Demilitarised Zone
DoC	Declaration of the Code of Conduct
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea

E

EAEG	East Asian Economic Group
EAS	East Asia Summit
EASG	East Asia Study Group
EATOF	East Asia Inter-Regional Tourism Forum
EAVG	East Asian Vision Group
ECI	Economic Complexity Index
EEC	European Economic Community
EPS	Employment Permit System

EU European Union
 EWG Expert Working Group

F

FDI Foreign Direct Investment
 FPC Final Planning Conference
 FTA Free Trade Agreement
 FTX Field Training Exercise
 FVA Foreign Value Added

G

G20 Group of Twenty
 GATT General Agreement on
 Tariffs and Trade
 GDP Gross Domestic Product
 GNI Gross National Income
 GVC Global Value Chain

H

HADR Humanitarian Assistance
 and Disaster Relief
 HRD Human Resources Development

I

IAI Initiative for ASEAN Integration
 ICT Information and Communication
 Technology
 ILO International Labor Organization
 IMT-GT Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand
 Growth Triangle
 IOM International Organization
 for Migration
 IPC Initial Planning Conference
 ISEAS The Institute of Southeast
 Asian Studies
 ISG Inter-sessional Support Group
 ITS Industrial Trainee System

K

KASEAS Korean Association of
 Southeast Asian Studies
 KBS Korea Broadcasting System
 KDI Korea Development Institute
 KF Korea Foundation
 KISEAS Korean Institute of
 Southeast Asian Studies
 KOICA Korea International
 Cooperation Agency
 KSP Knowledge Sharing Program

L

LIC Like-Interest Countries

M

MBC Munhwa Broadcasting System
 MCT Ministry of Culture and Tourism
 MDGs Millennium Development Goals
 MNEs Multinational Enterprises
 MOSF Ministry of Strategy and Finance
 MRA Mutual Recognition Arrangements
 MPAC Master Plan for ASEAN
 Connectivity
 MPC Mid-Planning Conference
 MSMEs Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises

N

NAFTA North America Free Trade
 Agreement
 NRF National Research Foundation
 of Korea
 NTS Non-Traditional Security

O

OFDI	Outward Foreign Direct Investment
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

U

UNESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

P

PoA	Plan of Action
-----	----------------

W

WTO	World Trade Organization
WTO	World Tourism Organization

R

RAfT	Regional Aid for Trade
RCEP	Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
RIHED	Regional Centre for Higher Education and Development
ROK	Republic of Korea

S

SBS	Seoul Broadcasting System
SCS	South China Sea
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SEAMEO	Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization
SMEs	Small and Medium-sized Enterprises

T

TAC	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
THAAD	Terminal High Altitude Area Defence
TiVA	Trade in Value Added
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
TTS	Table-top Exercise
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education Training

Foreword

ASEAN celebrates its 50th anniversary this year, and 2017 has also been designated as the ASEAN-ROK Cultural Exchange Year by the Leaders of ASEAN and Korea. In this momentous year, the ASEAN-Korea Centre (AKC), the Korean Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (KISEAS), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea and JoongAng Ilbo, organised the International Conference on ASEAN-Korea Partnership under the theme *Partnering for Tomorrow*, covering the three pillars of cooperation: political-security, economic, and socio-cultural. The Conference gathered policymakers and scholars from both ASEAN and Korea, to review the last 50 years of ASEAN's progress and the evolution of regional cooperation, and to discuss the prospects of enhancing cooperation between ASEAN and Korea.

This book is a compilation of the research presented at this Conference and the discussions that followed. It hopes to provide insight to its readers on the development of ASEAN over the last five decades, how ASEAN-Korea relations prospered since their beginning in 1989, and the direction this partnership should take in the next decades to come. The common understanding among all policymakers and scholars was the significance of ASEAN-Korea relations to both ASEAN and Korea, as well as to the East Asian region as a whole. In the uncertain and unpredictable era we live in today, with major power rivalries, growing protectionism and anti-globalisation sentiments, it is important that ASEAN and Korea do not seek immediate profits, but work toward sustainable relations that will last for centuries. ASEAN and Korea are

partners that want and need each other for regional peace, stability and prosperity.

ASEAN and Korea relations have developed by leaps and bounds during the past decades. The security, stability and prosperity of ASEAN and the Korean peninsula are closely interconnected, and the two regions are substantially interdependent. However, for a sustainable partnership between ASEAN and Korea, it is important to build a strong foundation of socio-cultural cooperation. This kind of cooperation takes place mostly at the people-level, and therefore is in line with ASEAN's efforts to build a people-centred and people-oriented ASEAN. While there is already a substantial amount of research on political, security and economic cooperation between ASEAN and Korea, more studies need to be conducted in the area of socio-cultural cooperation. In the latter half of the International Conference on ASEAN-Korea Partnership, there was a great focus on socio-cultural cooperation under three specific themes: Embracing Diversity for a Participative and Inclusive Community; Working Together towards a Sustainable and Resilient Community; and Exploring Cultural Cooperation for a Dynamic and Harmonious Community. In this sense, the contributors to this book are pioneers who are exploring ways to engage our people in building a sustainable partnership between ASEAN and Korea.

In 2010, the AKC and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) published a book titled *Korea's Changing Roles in Southeast Asia*. As a continued effort to expand the scope of research on ASEAN-Korea relations, the AKC and KISEAS have published this book, *Partnering for Tomorrow: ASEAN-Korea Relations*, in hopes that it will enlighten our readers and provide a clearer direction for the future of ASEAN-Korea partnership.

With the inauguration of the new Korean administration, which has notably taken larger steps toward deepening Korea's relations with

ASEAN, the publication of this book cannot be more timely and relevant. It is a great pleasure to be presenting this book to the Leaders of ASEAN and Korea at the upcoming ASEAN-ROK Summit, and I hope that it will serve as a stepping stone for more concrete strategies and action plans to enhance the partnership between ASEAN and Korea.

I take this opportunity to express my deep appreciation to KISEAS, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea and JoongAng Ilbo for their support and cooperation, and particularly, I would like to thank Dr. Lee Choong Lyol, Director General of KISEAS and Professor of Korea University, for his extensive contribution and dedication to the Conference and this publication.

Kim Young-sun
Secretary General of
ASEAN-Korea Centre

Overview

2017 marks the 50th anniversary of the founding of ASEAN and the 28th anniversary of ASEAN-Korea relations. It is therefore very timely that the International Conference on ASEAN-Korea Partnership was held in Seoul at the end of August 2017 to review the progress of ASEAN during the last 50 years as well as to look into the prospects of further enhancing cooperation between ASEAN and Korea.

The ASEAN-Korea relationship has progressed substantially since sectoral dialogue relations were initiated in November 1989. In 2012, Korea established its Mission to ASEAN in Jakarta where the ASEAN Secretariat is located and appointed its first resident Ambassador to ASEAN. In September 2017, the first ASEAN Culture House among ASEAN's ten dialogue partners was established in Busan, Korea. ASEAN-Korea relations cover a broad range of issues in the political, security, economic and socio-cultural sectors.

In the political sphere, Korea has been supportive of and engaged in ASEAN-led multilateral mechanisms such as ASEAN Plus Three, East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM+). At the International Conference on ASEAN-Korea Partnership, the consistent message coming across is that ASEAN can be the linchpin of regional peace and prosperity. Korea is committed to working with ASEAN to further the cause of multilateralism, to manage big-power rivalry in the region and to strengthen peace and stability through the development of the ASEAN Political-Security Community.

One key issue which would determine peace and security in the region is the role of North Korea(DPRK). The International Conference on ASEAN-Korea Partnership noted that the DPRK is a regular participant in the ARF which is an important forum for regional political-security dialogue. ASEAN has consistently supported the denuclearisation of the DPRK and the immediate need for multilateral engagement to bring about more common understanding on security and challenges facing the region. At the same time, the recent moves by the DPRK have also reinforced the significance of purposeful cooperation and dialogue through the ADMM+ and the EAS.

Turning to the economic front, we have seen significant improvements in ASEAN-Korea trade, investment and tourism since formal relations were established in 1989. Cooperation between ASEAN and Korea has brought about mutual benefits and added to the regional value chain. Extensive research has shown that there are prospects for greater cooperation in the service industry, particularly medical, finance and ICT services. Small and medium enterprises have flourished and more policy attention should be directed to them. Governments from both sides should work with market participants to devise a more comprehensive strategy for further economic cooperation and coordinate policies in areas such as trade and investment flows as well as official direct assistance from Korea within the framework of the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity.

Over the past few decades, Korea has made significant contributions to ASEAN economic integration in terms of ASEAN's major infrastructure projects all across the Southeast Asian region. Korea has also contributed significantly to the official development assistance programmes in the respective ASEAN member states. Looking ahead, there is vast potential for ASEAN and Korea to further strengthen their partnership by working together to deal with common challenges

and learning from each other. This would also facilitate initiatives in continued trade liberalisation and market opening thereby delivering on the promise of the bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements. Therefore, the benefits of the envisioned ASEAN Economic Community would be realised sooner than later.

With regard to ASEAN-Korea socio-cultural cooperation, it is indeed heartening that this International Conference on ASEAN-Korea Partnership addressed a few important and salient issues. There is a need for more research concerning medium to long-term immigration between the ASEAN member states and Korea, so as to better understand the inherent problems and suitably tailor official policy making. Next, the phenomenon of more prevalent high education ASEAN-Korea exchanges should be explored. In order to nurture human capital and community development in ASEAN, there must evolve a sustainable ASEAN-Korea partnership in higher education that moves beyond commercial or foreign aid relationships.

In addition, the history, impact and potential of the “Korean Wave” as a positive enabler of Korean culture in ASEAN nations ought to be studied more deeply. This takes place within the milieu of improved ASEAN-Korea relations and prevalent cultural exchanges. The participants in the International Conference on ASEAN-Korea Partnership viewed that more interaction in culture would lead to regional unity and called for all quarters to be mobilised to promote culture. Such a move would also bring people-to-people organisations closer and help build stronger civil society linkages. This in turn would contribute to the development of a viable and vibrant ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.

Lastly, with reference to a pending challenge for our region, there is the problem of an ageing population and its socio-cultural implications. This would eventually be a sustainability issue for Korea

and ASEAN member states like Singapore and Thailand in the next 20 to 30 years, when today's group of middle-aged adults retire and if birth rates continue to stagnate at their current low levels. In the event that this happens, Korea and its like-minded partner nations should seriously consider specific continual education programmes to help keep tomorrow's senior citizens conversant with the digital transactional landscape. However, even as future retirees are likelier to be more tech savvy, societal infrastructure must still evolve to become more elderly friendly. From this perspective, the more developed regional states like Korea and Singapore could set examples to other countries on how public and transport facilities can be modified so as to accommodate the needs of older citizens and avoid the negative implication of the "greying tsunami."

To sum up, the ASEAN-Korea relationship is a wide-ranging and comprehensive partnership that has grown from strength to strength over the past 28 years. I am confident that this relationship will reach even greater heights in the years ahead as both sides cooperate increasingly to deal with the challenges of a transformed global environment and seize the available opportunities for the benefit of their respective populations.

Ong Keng Yong

Former Secretary-General of
ASEAN (2003 – 2007)

Preface

This book is an outcome of the 2017 International Conference on ASEAN-Korea Partnership on 30 August 2017 under the theme of *Partnering for Tomorrow* organised by the ASEAN-Korea Centre in Seoul in collaboration with the Korean Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (KISEAS), the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Joongang Ilbo. It was aimed at reviewing the past 50 years of ASEAN-Korea relations so as to further broaden and deepen cooperation and integration in the next 50 years.

Since the establishment of ASEAN in 1967, ASEAN-Korea relations have undergone three crucial transformations: protracted conflict in Cold War battlefields without ‘peace’ in about two decades or more from 1967 to 1989; broadening cooperation in post-Cold War marketplaces for ‘prosperity’ up to economic crisis in about decade or less (1990-1997); and deepening integration in post-crisis public spheres for ‘progress’ in the two decades from 1998 to 2017.

The dynamic changes in ASEAN-Korea relations reflect the drastic alteration of objective conditions involving the contraction and extension of time and space owing to globalisation. While the “Asian Drama” (1968) by Gunnar Myrdal witnessed pessimism under the Cold War, “The East Asian Miracle” (1993) by the World Bank represented optimism after the Cold War. However, the East Asian debacle of 1997 revealed the vanity of an impending “Asian Century.”

The first two decades or more (1967-1989) of ASEAN were riddled with various Cold War conflicts. In contrast to the Cold War in Europe,

the Cold War in East Asia was marked by consecutive hot wars: the Chinese Civil War(1946-1949), the Korean War(1950-1953), the Vietnam War(1954-1975), and the Cambodian War(1976-1989). The divided Korea was intertwined with ‘Balkanised’ Southeast Asia, making the normalisation of ASEAN-Korea relations impossible.

The second stage(1989-1997) of ASEAN corresponds to the first stage of formal ASEAN-Korea relations, featured by broadening bilateral cooperation. As the Cold War, groomed in Yalta(1945), came to a close in Malta(1989), East Asia followed the sea change. ASEAN incorporated Vietnam(1995), Laos and Myanmar(1997), and Cambodia(1999). Korea was elevated from “sectoral dialogue relations” in 1989 to the status of “full dialogue partner” in 1991.

The decade between 1990 and 2000 recorded a significant growth in the ASEAN’s trade share among total trades of major East Asian countries: from 7.2% to 11.5% of Korea, from 6.3% to 8.3 from China, and from 12.1% to 14.9% in Japan. The trade shares of East Asia from each East Asian country also increased: from 51.1% to 56.4% of ASEAN, from 34.1% to 44% of Korea, and 28.7 to 40.5% of Japan. Only China recorded a big decrease from 5.39% to 50.9%.

The third stage of ASEAN-Korea relations in the last two decades(1998-2017) was characterised by deepening integration. ASEAN elevated its relations with Korea to a “comprehensive cooperation partnership” in 2004 and solidified them into a “strategic partnership for peace and prosperity” in 2010. Their relations were also broadened as they participated several multilateral meetings such as the ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF, 1991), the ASEAN+3(APT, 1998), and the East Asia Summit(EAS, 2005).

The crisis, sweeping over Southeast and Northeast Asia in a very short span of time, awakened the entire East Asia to the stark reality that, in the words of then Korean President(1998-2003) Kim Dae-jung,

“Northeast and Southeast Asia are not two separate regions but one integrated region.” Indeed, the two sub-regions of East Asia formed the “Balkanised” battlefields of the Cold War and the “flying-geese” marketplaces after the end of the Cold War.

With the effective breakthrough out of the economic breakdown of 1997-1998, the trade share with East Asia among total trades of ASEAN between 1990 and 2015 increased from 51.1% to 63.1% and those of Japan and Korea did from 28.7% to 50% and 34.1% to 50%, respectively. That of China decreased only in China from 59.3% to 39.9%. The year 2015 was remarkable in terms that East Asia surpassed for the first time the European Union (EU) in total volume of trade.

The regional endeavours to overcome economic devastation were designed on the one hand for regional cooperation in marketplaces instead of national competition in battlefields, and on the other hand for comprehensive—political, economic, socio-cultural—cooperation in public spheres instead of mere economic cooperation in marketplaces. In 2004, thus, the ASEAN+3 Summit agreed on an East Asian community as a long-term goal of East Asia.

Korea played the role of catalyst in proposing and presiding the first East Asia Vision Group (EAVG I) in 1998, the East Asia Study Group (EASG) in 2001, and the second East Asia Vision Group (EAVG II) in 2011. While the EAVG I report of 2001 presented a proactive vision of an East Asian community of peace, prosperity and progress, the EAVG II report of 2012 suggested a realistic programme for the East Asia Economic Community by 2020. For a new regional order of East Asia, while the ASEAN community is its necessary condition, an East Asian community is its sufficient condition.

In the architecture of a new regional order, the sound solidarity of ASEAN and Korea forms a strategic cornerstone. Sandwiched between continental and maritime powers, ASEAN and Korea share diverse

geopolitical, geoeconomic and geocultural imperatives in coping with the challenges and opportunities of globalisation and regionalisation. It is my wish for this book to contribute to a new regional order as a milestone toward a brave new East Asia.

Park Sa-Myung
Chairman of the Board of
Trustees of Korean Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies

**SPEECHES FROM
THE 2017
INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON
ASEAN-KOREA
PARTNERSHIP**

International Conference on ASEAN-Korea Partnership

Opening Remarks

KIM YOUNG-SUN
Secretary General of ASEAN-Korea Centre

Welcome to the 2017 International Conference on ASEAN-Korea Partnership under the theme, “Partnering for Tomorrow.”

We, the ASEAN-Korea Centre, are very pleased and honoured to be co-hosting this Conference with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Korea, in the momentous year of 2017. This year, we celebrate the 50th Anniversary of ASEAN and the ASEAN-ROK Cultural Exchange year.

We all know well that ASEAN has made great achievements over the last 50 years. With the launching of the ASEAN Community at the end of 2015, it has become a model for regional integration. In particular, it has been an important foundation for peace and prosperity in our region.

The partnership between ASEAN and Korea has also seen great progress since dialogue relations was established in 1989. Relations were elevated to a Strategic Partnership in 2010, and we celebrated the 25th Anniversary of relations in 2014. Ever since, cooperation between the two sides has deepened in all political and security, economic and socio-cultural sectors.

As you know, there have been many uncertainties arising in our international community. Amid such unpredictable events, there is growing attention and emphasis on the importance of ASEAN-Korea relations. Korea is in need to seek for a true partnership, one that is mutually beneficial and sustainable.

To further deepen the partnership, there are some questions that arise. How has our partnership developed over the past three decades, and what more should we be doing?

To address these questions, we have here today prominent ASEAN and Korean policymakers and scholars from all around the region. It is very timely and relevant to be having this Conference today.

The answers to these questions are not simple. But, from today's sessions, I hope that we will gain valuable insight into preparing and laying out our future directions to deepen our partnership.

Your valuable insights will be put together into a publication, which will be presented at the ASEAN-ROK Summit later this year. We hope that this book will be an important reference for both policymakers and the academia working to further enhance ASEAN-Korea relations.

Ladies and gentlemen,

When you look at a tree, the bigger the roots, the stronger the tree. Just like a tree, partnership also has roots. The stronger the roots, the stronger the partnership. In fact, the roots of a partnership are how much we understand each other. So, the more that the people of ASEAN and Korea understand each other, the stronger the partnership between ASEAN and Korea will be.

Based on this belief, we hope that this Conference today will allow us to gain a better understanding of ASEAN and Korea, so that our partnership will grow bigger roots, and become stronger in the future.

I hope the discussions will not end today, but be a starting point for

further discussions. To do so, various partners need to be involved—not only the government and the academia, but also the private sector, the mass media, the civil society, and so on.

Thank you once again for being here with us today, where we will see another step of progress of ASEAN-Korea relations towards a long-lasting partnership. I hope that you will all have a fruitful and valuable time.

International Conference on ASEAN-Korea Partnership

Congratulatory Remarks

LE LUONG MINH
Secretary-General of ASEAN

I thank the ASEAN-Korea Centre and the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Korea for their initiative organising this International Conference on ASEAN-Korea Partnership.

2017 is a milestone year for both ASEAN and ASEAN-ROK relations as we are celebrating the 50th founding anniversary of ASEAN and the ASEAN-ROK Cultural Exchange Year. The timing of this Conference cannot be more opportune. As ASEAN is entering a new phase of Community building and integration, the Conference offers a good opportunity for us to review the achievements of ASEAN-ROK relations and reflect on how we envisage to move the partnership forward.

The birth of ASEAN 50 years ago manifested the aspiration of the peoples of Southeast Asia for regional peace and prosperity, which has been the determining factor of success in its process of constant evolution and development. From a fledging association in a region embroiled in Cold War tensions and conflicts, ASEAN has persevered and prospered over the past five decades to become an indispensable player and major contributor to peace, security and prosperity in Southeast Asia and beyond. ASEAN today is widely recognised as an

effective model of regionalism in all three key dimensions: maintenance of regional peace and security, economic integration and institution building. ASEAN has also provided the platform for ASEAN member states and external partners, including major powers, to discuss and cooperate in finding solutions to issues affecting peace, stability and security in the region.

Following the formal establishment of the ASEAN Community at the end of 2015, with the ASEAN Community Vision 2025, ASEAN is “forging ahead together” toward a community that is politically cohesive, economically integrated, and socially responsible, a Community which is rules-based, people-centered able to effectively respond to challenges for the common good, an outward-looking community that deepens cooperation with external partners, upholds ASEAN centrality in the evolving regional architecture and plays a responsible and constructive role globally.

Strengthening and deepening ASEAN’s dialogue partnerships and external relations is essential for ASEAN in realizing the targets of the ASEAN Community Vision 2025.

The Republic of Korea has always been one of the most active and important partners of ASEAN. The ASEAN-ROK relationship has come a long way since its inception in 1989. ASEAN-ROK cooperation has expanded and deepened in a wide range of political-security, economic and socio-cultural areas. The ROK has extended support to ASEAN’s Community building efforts and ASEAN’s central role in the regional mechanisms.

The momentum of ASEAN-ROK cooperation continues as both sides are committed to further strengthening the Strategic Partnership and deepening multifaceted collaboration. ASEAN and the ROK agreed to strengthen dialogue and cooperation on political-security issues to contribute to regional peace and security, including in

addressing non-traditional security challenges such as terrorism and transnational crimes, maritime security and safety.

ASEAN and the ROK are intensifying economic cooperation in pursuit of shared prosperity and development, including by maximising the use of the ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Area(AKFTA) to maintain the trade growth momentum towards achieving the target of two-way trade worth \$200 billion by 2020. Both sides are also committed to contributing to the preservation of a free and fair trade regime in the region including through the early conclusion of negotiations on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership(RCEP).

ASEAN appreciates the ROK's continued support in narrowing development gaps, enhancing regional connectivity and in addressing global challenges such as climate change and natural disasters through sharing of best practices and experiences.

Friendship and mutual understanding between the peoples of ASEAN and the ROK continue to be nurtured through the promotion of cultural and people-to-people exchanges, especially among youths and in the fields of academic, intellectual, arts, sports and tourist activities. The designation of 2017 as the ASEAN-ROK Cultural Exchange Year and the launch of the ASEAN Culture House in Busan are vivid manifestations of our shared resolve to promote cooperation in this area of important humanitarian significance.

Moving forward, it is important that we build on the achievements and seize the opportunities arising from the new stage of ASEAN's development in order to add momentum and substance to the ASEAN-ROK partnership. I believe that this Conference, with distinguished participants, will be another meaningful platform to share our views and offer excellent suggestions on ways to advance ASEAN-ROK relations. I wish the conference fruitful deliberations.

International Conference on ASEAN-Korea Partnership

Keynote Speech

KANG KYUNG-WHA
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the ROK

It is truly a great honour and pleasure for me to be here in this morning. My heartfelt welcome to guests from all corners of Southeast Asia, in particular those who have travelled long distances to join us here in Seoul including Secretary Cayetano who had a little bit of a rough ride to be here in this morning.

I would also like to thank Secretary General Kim of the ASEAN-Korea Centre for timely hosting today's conference in this monumental year of the 50th anniversary of ASEAN.

My sincere appreciation also goes to the Korean Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, co-organiser of this conference together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for playing an active role in facilitating academic exchanges between ASEAN and the ROK.

For me, personally this summer, my first month as a Foreign Minister, has had a distinct ASEAN flavour. August, started with the ASEAN related Foreign Ministers' Meetings in Manila, and September will start with the opening ceremony of the ASEAN Culture House in Busan and the 7th Mekong-ROK Foreign Ministers' Meeting on September 1. And in between these events, I am really delighted to be a part of today's

conference which draws upon interactions and inputs of thought leaders and decision makers all geared towards further strengthening the ROK-ASEAN partnership.

ASEAN has indeed played a crucial role in resolving disputes and nurturing solidarity in the region for the past 50 years. It has developed a rich array of institution of dialogue and cooperation with the aim of maximising common interests.

Furthermore, based on its centrality, it has generated several multilateral cooperation mechanisms for regional peace and prosperity including ASEAN+3 (APT), the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

The ASEAN Community, launched in 2015 with a population of 640 million and GDP of \$2.5 trillion, is the focus of renewed attention in the international community.

With anti-globalisation sentiments and protectionist threats, terrorism and violent extremism gaining more force in many parts of the world, we have particular hopes that ASEAN's effort to realise its Community by 2025 will serve as a source of inspiration and lesson to other parts of the world.

Sharing similar geopolitical landscapes, ASEAN and Korea have rapidly increased the level of bilateral cooperation in a whole range of areas since the establishment of Sectoral Dialogue Partnership in 1989.

Our trade and investment figures are very impressive, reflective of the dynamic economic relationship between the two sides.

ASEAN is Korea's second largest trading partner as well as investment destination. From ASEAN's perspective, Korea is ASEAN's fifth largest trading and investment partner. We look forward to further cooperation to achieve the shared goal of increasing trade volume between ASEAN and Korea to \$200 billion by 2020. In particular, we hope to further expand the ASEAN-Korea FTA, and strengthen

cooperation in the emerging fields such as Micro, Small, and Medium-sized Enterprises (MSMEs) and Smart City movement in the era of the 4th industrial revolution.

In the fields of politics and security, our cooperation is equally solid. ASEAN has shown undivided support for our North Korea policy to achieve peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. In this regard, it is indeed my sincere hope that ASEAN will continue to be a strong supporter of the 'Berlin Initiative' which sets out President Moon's new North Korea policy direction.

Taking this opportunity, I would like to reiterate my deep appreciation for ASEAN for their recent issuing of the Ministerial Statement on the developments on the Korean Peninsula adopted on August 5th. The statement clearly reflected the growing recognition of the gravity and urgency of the threat posed by the North Korean nuclear and missile programmes and urged North Korea to comply fully with its obligations under the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.

Besides the impressive economic and political achievements I have mentioned, people-to-people ties between our two sides have also prospered amounting to sum 8 million in 2016. And approximately half a million ASEAN residents, including students, migrant workers and spouses, are now living in our country.

My government's initiative to further upgrade the ASEAN-Korea partnership a new level was conceived against this very rich background. Indeed promptly after being sworn in, President Moon took the unprecedented step of sending a special envoy to ASEAN. And recognising ASEAN as the second important region to Korea in terms of trade and investment, he noted that ASEAN is as important to Korea as our immediate neighbours.

Just three weeks ago at the ASEAN-ROK Foreign Ministers' Meeting, I presented three directions in which my government hopes

to upgrade our relations with ASEAN. And I was delighted to see ASEAN Foreign Ministers welcoming them, with high expectations. Allow me to elaborate a bit on the three directions.

First, “Sustainable Prosperity” seeks to expand the ASEAN-ROK economic cooperation in a mutually beneficial manner. The Korean Government stands ready and willing to provide support for the advancement of the ASEAN Economic Community. And this will, in turn, facilitate the ASEAN-ROK economic cooperation, creating a virtuous circle between ASEAN Economic Community and Korean economy.

ASEAN Connectivity is key to the successful realisation of the ASEAN community. Drawing upon the experience and knowledge in vocational training we have gained in the process of economic development, Korea will focus on providing Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) for the further enhancement of ASEAN connectivity.

With regard to narrowing the development gap among ASEAN member states, Korea has put the Mekong region at the centre of our development cooperation policy vis-a-vis ASEAN. I very much look forward to continuing our discussions at the upcoming Mekong-ROK Foreign Ministers’ Meeting.

Second, “Two-way, People-centred Exchanges” seeks to see more active exchanges, in which our peoples are the principal actors. This will enable the peoples of ASEAN and Korea to enjoy tangible benefits from ASEAN-ROK cooperation.

As an example, the ASEAN Culture House will play an instrumental role in promoting cultural exchanges between ASEAN and Korea. I look very much forward to it emerging as a hub for people-centred cooperation.

On another note, my government places great importance on youth

exchanges which will provide fertile soil for the development of the future of ASEAN-ROK relations. In this regard, we are conducting various youth exchange projects. Key examples include the “Fostering ASEAN Future Leaders Program” and the “Global Korea Scholarship for ASEAN Countries’ Science and Engineering Students”.

Last but not least, “Peaceful and Secure New East Asia” aims to expand the scope of security cooperation in response to growing non-traditional security threats such as terrorist attacks, violent extremism and cyber crimes.

If we are to achieve mutual prosperity of ASEAN and Korea, securing peace and stability in the region is an essential element. In this regard, I hope we will continue to work together to expand the scope of cooperation to the areas of terrorism, violent extremism, transnational crime and cyber security, and enhance the institutionalisation of such cooperation.

I am very optimistic that today’s conference will offer a valuable opportunity to share ideas on future cooperation between ASEAN and Korea. Following today’s meeting, the Korean government will continue our discussions with academia, industries and members of the National Assembly in the run-up to the ASEAN-ROK Summit in November. I hope that we can garner your wisdom to develop a tangible guideline for the ASEAN-ROK cooperation which will be officially announced at the Summit.

I believe that today’s conference will see our footprints we have left, and shape a plan for the path ahead. I look forward to all the experts here to share their insights, their vision, so that at the end of the conference, we will have an even clearer sense of how ASEAN and Korea can embark upon the next five decades of flourishing cooperation. And on the various expressions of thank you, I can only say “ditto” to what Ambassador Kim has shared because I have not mastered that just yet. Thank you very much.

International Conference on ASEAN-Korea Partnership

Keynote Speech

ALAN PETER CAYETANO

Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines

The morning is good.

I was told that there are several ways to say “good morning” in Korean, and in all these ways it exemplifies the congenial disposition of our Korean friends.

This good morning, I bring with me the greetings of your equally cheerful friends, the Filipino people and President Rodrigo Roa Duterte: *Magandang umaga po*. The meaning is the morning is beautiful.

Your Excellency, Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Kyung-wha, ASEAN Secretary General Le Luong Minh, Secretary General Kim Young-sun of the ASEAN-Korea Centre, Distinguished Presenters, Discussants and Moderators of the International Conference on ASEAN-Korea Partnership, Honourable Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen thank you for allowing me to share insights on the anniversary of ASEAN’s 50 years, with you.

One thing that makes waking up to a good morning even better is waking up and being “in love”. ASEAN and the world went to sleep one day without saying good night to Korea but woke up being in love with Korea. Our young people love K Pop, women love Korean cosmetic

products, whole households laugh and cry together with Korean soap operas while sending messages to their loved ones abroad on their Korean-made mobile phones.

My first order of business as ASEAN Chair is to convey appreciation for this tribute paid by the Government of the Republic of Korea and the ASEAN-Korea Centre (AKC) to ASEAN's 50th anniversary. We applaud the proponents of this Conference, including the Korean Institute for Southeast Asian Studies (KISEAS) and Joongang Ilbo, for gathering the region's strategic minds and help chart a path for ASEAN-Korea partnership well into the future.

In this Year of ASEAN-Korea Cultural Exchange, we recognise that the sum of our ASEAN-Korea partnership is greater than the formal cooperation established in 1989. The strong bond between ASEAN and Korea predates 1989.

But being in love in a relationship is never enough. Relationships, as my wife reminds me constantly, need constant communication, interaction, patience and hard work.

As a Filipino, it's quite easy to forge stronger ties and better partnerships with the Koreans because our partnership has a long history. Yesterday we were and have been allies. Today we are partners, tomorrow we are brothers and sisters.

Consider the post-war geopolitical forces in our region that caused our historical narratives and security imperatives to converge along the path to a natural partnership.

We had just, at that time, risen as independent nations from tumultuous circumstances; events which, in turn through the wisdom of the ALMIGHTY shaped our relationship and security alliances. By virtue of which, the Philippines was first in Southeast Asia to establish diplomatic ties with South Korea in 1949. Thailand and the others in the region soon followed.

We revere the Filipino soldiers who fought alongside contingents from other countries, including Thailand, in defence of South Korea's sovereignty. Southeast Asian blood spilled on Korean soil has remained, to this day, thicker than the waters separating ASEAN and South Korea.

In its own humble way, the Philippines helped rebuild South Korea by way of development assistance. Both our countries lived through martial law and harnessed people power to restore democracy.

Even more remarkably, historical links with Viet Nam predate Korea's connections with most of Southeast Asia and go all the way back to the 13th century.

To be sure, trestles of partnership between Southeast Asia and Korea were already in place, even before ASEAN was born in 1967.

In those days, our nations lived in a geopolitical and economic mire characterised by tensions from rivalry between East and West. Instead of yielding to either side of the ideological tug-of-war, ASEAN's founding members mustered the political will to band together and carve out a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality.

Fifty years hence, the ASEAN miracle prevails with greater political and economic prospects that continue to hold global attention. ASEAN has overcome the divisions, fears, and hostilities of the past. We have brought ten nations of Southeast Asia under a single ASEAN roof. We have used regional cooperation to promote growth, development and integration and peaceful settlement of disputes.

In between, South Korea's own economic miracle, another game changer in regional dynamics, would accelerate the construction of the ASEAN-ROK dialogue.

Let us look at ASEAN and World today. We will see so much potential. In ASEAN we have 628 million people and in Asia more than 4 billion people – that is 60% of the world population. Some predict that by 2025, 2/3 of the world population will be in Asia.

That's 4 billion people who are connected and interconnected. For example, in mobile subscriptions, the Philippines has 129.4 million subscribers; much more than 105 million Filipinos. In the Philippines, 1/3 of our population is below 14 years old. We have a very young population, who loves the digital age. In Southeast Asia, 854 million people are subscribers or 133% of the ASEAN population. In Asia-Pacific, 4 Billion subscribers or 96% of the Asia Pacific population. In Korea alone, 115% of the population are mobile subscribers and 90% of the population, one of the highest in the world, have access to the internet.

In 2015, East Asia and the Pacific contributed 29.2% of the global economy. Developing Asia is expected to contribute to 60% of world growth. ASEAN economies continue to accelerate with regional GDP expanding 4.8% annually and ASEAN is projected to rank as the 4th largest economy by 2050.

Please indulge me as I underline some points special to the ASEAN-ROK relationship and touched upon by Foreign Minister Kang and the Secretary General before me.

- First, during our 25th anniversary in 2014, both sides agreed on a vision of ASEAN-ROK partnership that builds trust and brings happiness. As of September 2016, we have completed 122 ASEAN-ROK programmes amounting to close to \$19 million and; 22 ongoing ones totalling close to \$4.6 million.
- Second, quite constructively, ASEAN provides a forum for both big and small to engage in dialogue at the leaders-led East Asia Summit. The ASEAN Regional Forum also serves as a direct channel for dialogue and to express concerns on the DPRK.
- Third, the unprecedented ASEAN Culture House opening on September 1 in Busan substantiates Korea's firm commitment to our enduring partnership.

- Fourth, *Hallyu*, or the Korean Wave, has been capturing the hearts and minds of many in ASEAN. In Korean soap operas and movies, Southeast Asians associate themselves with the Asian ethos and transcends language and affirms our shared family values. By and large, such elements of Korea's soft power have made it natural for ASEAN Members to welcome over 400,000 Korean residents to our local communities and over 5.83 million Korean visitors to ASEAN.
- Fifth, our projects show a sharp focus on shared humanitarian concerns and on young people. Quite a few projects aimed at intensifying people-to-people ties among our youth have been implemented over the years. In addition, our collaboration in Active Ageing or Home Care for Older Persons in ASEAN and training physicians or law enforcers in anti-narcotics operations or ASEAN Children's Librarians demonstrate the primacy of our people-centred, people-oriented agenda.
- Sixth, ASEAN and South Korea participate actively in the Forum for East Asia and Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC). FEALAC remains to be the primary link facilitating bloc-to-bloc cooperation between East Asia and Latin America – its members' economies account for 34.5% of world GDP, 32.9% of world trade and 39.7% of the world's population. The Philippines, with its Spanish heritage, is favourably positioned to be a bridge to strengthen South Korea's connections to Latin America.
- And seventh, Korea's great contribution to development especially inclusive development is being scaled up. Korea's home-grown *Saemaul Undong* movement to narrow development gaps where needed to support ASEAN community building and economic integration, is a tremendously timely program that will benefit all of our people.

All these reinforce the foundations of a modern partnership that should continue to grow especially now that the world's center of gravity is shifting to Asia.

Dear Friends:

PricewaterhouseCoopers projects that five ASEAN member states, that is to say, Indonesia (no. 4), Philippines (19), Viet Nam (20), Thailand (24) and Malaysia (25) will be among the 32 biggest economies of the world by 2050. ASEAN joins dialogue partners China (1), India (2), the United States of America (3), the Russian Federation (6), Japan (8), ROK (18), Canada (22) and Australia (28) in this league of economic powerhouses in about three decades from now.

Between now and then, we in ASEAN have much to do to accelerate community building and integration. On the road to ASEAN Vision 2025, we stand firm on maintaining ASEAN centrality insofar as it affords our region greater political weight for purposes of fostering peace, security, stability and prosperity for our peoples. On the economic front, we hope to close our development gaps and spread the fruits of economic growth to the extent that no one is left behind. Socio-culturally, we are striving for a cohesive community with one vision and one identity.

The shock of rapid changes being felt around the world must not immobilise us. In fact, it behooves ASEAN to choose to actively shape and secure its own future – from within, and in partnership with our external partners. While the future that awaits our region remains to be bright and prosperous, we need to think more of ourselves as one community and as one region.

The Republic of Korea invests heavily on ASEAN's socio-cultural community where its strengths speak to the region's deficiencies. As

it stands, ROK is ASEAN's sixth largest source of funds for ASEAN projects and programs. I imagine that the sessions addressing the socio-cultural pillar will also draw heavily from the wellspring of goodwill forged by our broad people-to-people ties.

That said, I also submit that our future endeavours should consider spending more if not equal more energy on the inter-connected political-security and economic aspects of our strategic partnership.

We appreciate ROK's engagement in the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Defence Ministerial Meeting Plus (ADMM+) and the ARF where we have cooperated in areas such as maritime security. Our shared stake in regional peace and stability calls for much closer consultations in light of serious developments that could impact the security of nations beyond the Korean peninsula. ASEAN has made known its position on the DPRK issue on multiple occasions with a clear bottom line and that is to support "an environment conducive to sustainable development, social progress and improved quality of life for all peoples in the region." That is why yesterday, we reiterated our August 5 statement for North Korea to stop provocative actions.

The RCEP and the ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Area are likewise key topics for discussions today as they advance our commitment to free trade in the face of emerging protectionism and our target to expand our trade volume to \$200 billion by 2020.

As ASEAN Chair, the Philippines endorses to our experts here today our thematic priority of inclusive, innovation-led growth. We also wish to work more closely with ROK to fulfil ASEAN's connectivity targets.

While keeping in mind our sustainable development goals, I hope that the Conference will also explore ideas as Foreign Minister Kang said, helpful to MSMEs, look into ways for ROK to assist ASEAN in tapping into global supply chain and examine the Korean model as it applies to developing global ASEAN brands in the manner of Samsung,

LG, Daewoo and Hankook, among others. Further down the road, the Korean experience could teach ASEAN how to avoid the middle income trap.

We are fortunate to have in our corner the ASEAN-Korea Centre which has been diligently carrying out its mandate to increase ASEAN-ROK trade volumes, accelerate investment flows, invigorate tourism, and enrich our cultural exchanges.

Recently, AKC put together in a single book, *Gourmet Trips to ASEAN*, all four ingredients to further grow ASEAN-Korea economic relationship. I must cite this publication as a fine example of how we could drill down ASEAN-Korea engagement to the level of our citizens. For all those who made this publication possible, thank you and congratulations.

Our efforts will be for naught unless we have a body of citizenry supporting our best laid plans.

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, Brothers and Sisters;

ASEAN and ROK share a robust history of mutually beneficial cooperation. Our political-security arrangements, based on mutual trust, continue to grow bilaterally and through ASEAN-led fora. Our healthy economic ties hold the promise of greater prosperity for our people. Our strong people-to-people connections remain solid and, our joint efforts, will enhance further in years to come.

Tried and tested, ASEAN-ROK cooperation has encouraged confidence in the power of our abiding friendship to build a future of shared peace and prosperity.

We have come a long way since we began our journey. Over the last fifty years, ASEAN has facilitated our region's transformation from a troubled neighbourhood to a caring and sharing community. Despite our inherent differences in culture, our political systems and sometimes

our ideologies, we have managed to avoid major conflicts and to fully cooperate with each other.

The future holds challenges for us but if we want to overcome all these challenges, we must realise the opportunities, celebrate who we are but start to think less as Filipinos, less as Koreans, less as Japanese, less as Chinese but think of ourselves more as Asians. While understanding that we have to do what we need to do to promote and fight for national interest, let's put in our hearts that we do have a larger regional interest.

May ASEAN – Korea relations take a quantum leap into the future as brothers and sisters. And may we continue to link hands the ASEAN way to partner for change, to engage, and to change the world.

With utmost trust in our capacity to deliver beneficial outcomes from this Conference, I thank the Korean Government and the good people behind this auspicious event for inviting me here.

To our allies yesterday, partners today and brothers and sisters tomorrow.

SPEECHES

Part I

POLITICAL
PARTNERSHIP

ASEAN-Korea Strategic Partnership: Where is Security Cooperation Heading?

STEVEN CM WONG¹

ABSTRACT

This chapter argues that the prospects for ASEAN-Korea security cooperation relations to be substantively addressed in the coming years are good. Amidst heightened tensions in the region, including in the Korean Peninsula, political and defence cooperation is thriving. On political cooperation, while ASEAN ministers and leaders have always been vocal in their support for denuclearisation, dialogue and peaceful negotiations, their statements since Korea becoming a strategic partner have been more pointed and urgent, in line with regional tensions. In order for ASEAN to continue playing any kind of role on the issue, however, it is imperative that it be able to engage both the North and South, and not be drawn into the conflict. On security cooperation, the establishment of the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus Eight (ADMM+8) process and possibilities for ADMM-Plus Korea Defence Ministers' Informal Meetings pave the way for better and closer defence cooperation. Korea participates actively in the Plus Eight but it has yet to be established what appetite there is on either side for further Plus One cooperation. Regardless, the political road to security cooperation has been paved and widened, and progress in the next quarter of a century should markedly contrast from the previous one.

* Key words: Strategic partnership, Security cooperation, ASEAN+3, ADMM

1. INTRODUCTION

“Based on the understanding that the security of Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia are closely interconnected, we agree to reinforce political-security cooperation to promote sustainable peace and stability in the region.”

– Joint Statement of the ASEAN-Korea
25th Anniversary Commemorative Summit, 2014

The 50th anniversary of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) presents a convenient milestone to evaluate the past and think about the future. In the case of dialogue relations with the Republic of Korea (henceforth, Korea), a comprehensive retrospective has been provided by the Korean Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (KISEAS) and the Korean Association of Southeast Asian Studies (KASEAS) in their 2015 publication celebrating 25 years of relations (1989-2014).² In his contribution, Lee Jaehyon noted that a hard security cooperation component was “conspicuously missing” from the strategic partnership and that “in the field of security cooperation, ASEAN and Korea have not made meaningful progress.”³ This chapter focuses on this issue.

The first quarter century of ASEAN-Korea relations had indeed seen a hard security void. ASEAN itself experienced such a void for almost four decades after its creation. Developments since then, however, suggest that interests are merging, that limitations – both apparent and real – are receding, and that the investments made in building mutual trust and confidence are paying off. Amidst heightened tensions in the region, defence cooperation is thriving and prospects for the missing security component to be substantively addressed are high. Naturally, there are risks and uncertainties. The political road, however, has been paved and widened and the scope of defence-related activities along with it. The growing momentum of activities in the region points to the real

possibility that progress in the next quarter of a century will markedly contrast from the previous one.

2. PROSPECT FOR POLITICAL RELATIONS

Political relations between ASEAN and Korea have been characterised by stable foundations and few problems with much credit going to the latter. Despite facing an aggressive and unpredictable neighbour, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), contending with a rising and dominant China, and disputing territorial claims, responsibility for war crimes and historical revisionism with Japan, Korea has adopted careful and patient diplomacy towards ASEAN. Dealing with ASEAN is oftentimes frustrating for dialogue partners, given the many interests and views of the former. Despite its considerable security challenges, Korea has managed to show itself to be a supportive, reliable and, importantly, non-domineering strategic partner.

For its part, ASEAN has provided mutually beneficial economic opportunities and receptiveness to Korean soft power. ASEAN's initiatives to be at the centre of East Asian architecture also provide Korea with an option to participate in peaceful community building efforts, not to supplant but to supplement its own initiatives. Against these positives, it would be remiss not to register some measure of disappointment with ASEAN and its role in East Asia, felt not only by Koreans but also by other dialogue partners, and within ASEAN itself. Harsher critics maintain that there is little that ASEAN can do that is of relevance to the issues of the day, while gentler ones decry the lack of leadership, initiative and the often inefficient and burdensome processes. A favourite phrase of ASEAN commentators in earlier years was that it was good at "making haste slowly."

With the 2015 Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of

the ASEAN Community and the adoption of the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) Blueprint 2025, expectations have been rising and questions are being asked as to what differences, if any, there will be. Can the ASEAN Community deliver on its much-heralded promises and will the APSC Blueprint elevate peace and security cooperation to a much higher level? And, of course, what implications will these have for the ASEAN-Korea agenda? These are all reasonable questions and answers need to be forthcoming.

2.1 Nature of the ASEAN Community

The answers, however, depend greatly on what one's worldview of ASEAN's fundamental nature is, a subject that has long been debated in policy and academic circles. Those looking at it purely through the lens of power and utility are usually dismissive of ASEAN, regarding its role as peripheral at best and unproductive at worst. For example, Eaton and Stubbs describe ASEAN as being more concerned with "process than problem solving, being more of an ineffectual talk shop masquerading as a potent regional organisation."⁴ Realists criticise ASEAN's propensity to talk but frequently failing to reach consensus, never mind take concrete actions on many burning issues. For decades, critics have lamented ASEAN member states' diversity and lack of political will.

What critics condemn as ASEAN's weaknesses though are taken as strengths by others. In the absence of a hegemon to impose rules and legal frameworks to ensure compliance, ASEAN has had little option but to work around the weaknesses of its members. Acharya argues that ASEAN norms and practices based on discreteness, informality, consensus building and non-confrontational bargaining styles are factors behind its endurance and resilience.⁵ Concurring, Jetly points out that these principles were instrumental in ASEAN's early days where there were many hot-button issues.⁶ ASEAN norms of sovereignty, consensus

and mutual respect, the so-called “ASEAN Way,” have many faults but promoting inclusiveness and ensuring institutional longevity are not parts of them.

Criticisms and praises of ASEAN can both be said to be legitimate. Rather than submit to the pitfalls of binary (‘either-or’) thinking, ASEAN might be more productively thought of as a constructive enterprise that is firmly built on a bedrock of enduring – but not immutable – interests of the member states. In the absence of a supranational authority, ASEAN has to rely on underlying member states’ interests, or more accurately, states’ perceptions of their own interests to progress.⁷ Additionally, member states are acutely aware of the importance of expectations that ASEAN remains relevant to stakeholders. This accounts for something that few critics take into account: the demonstrated capacity of ASEAN to evolve, broaden and deepen its interactions over time.

The combination of changing national interests and external pressures has forced ASEAN to respond to, and manage tensions. Thus, ASEAN is not entirely insincere when setting lofty-sounding goals and plans under the three pillars of Asean Community, of which the APSC is one. This includes defence cooperation, an area that was considered out-of-bounds for many decades because of cross-border sensitivities and fear of being mistaken for a defence pact. Given the different context-specific requirements of countries, such efforts usually begin cautiously with non-constraining activities, of which dialogue and consultation is the start. This is followed by more focus on non-traditional security (NTS) issues, and over time, ratcheting up to traditional ones.

2.2 ASEAN and the Korean Peninsula

From a Korean perspective, there can perhaps be no greater litmus test as to check the value of the ASEAN-Korea strategic partnership than developments in the Korean Peninsula. There is the idea among some

that ASEAN is reticent about being drawn into an on-going security conflict that involves major powers, especially one in which it has little influence. ASEAN, however, is an interested party as the many official statements made over the past three decades demonstrate.

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has been a primary platform for dialogue on the Korea Peninsula, with ministers closely following developments since its inception in 1994 (see also page 10). So too have ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meetings (AMMs) and, on occasions, the ASEAN Summit. Since becoming a strategic partner of ASEAN, their statements have become louder and sharper, in line with rising regional tensions. The 17th Meeting of the ARF in July 2010, for example, expressed "deep concern" over the sinking of Korea's Pohang-class corvette, the Cheonan, with the loss of 46 lives on board. The DPRK, however, was not cited as the party responsible.⁸ The investigations surrounding the Cheonan sinking were disputed by some countries, notably China and Russia, and resulted in the ensuing United Nations Security Council (UNSC) statement staying silent on the matter. This no doubt contributed to ASEAN's reluctance to attribute blame for the incident, which ASEAN statements typically try to refrain from anyway. ASEAN foreign ministers also "deplored" the sinking of the vessel and while again there was no mention of any perpetrator, called on "all parties to exercise the utmost restraint."⁹ ASEAN leaders discussed but made no public mention of the incident at their Summit.

The DPRK's bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island in the same year was not mentioned at the 18th ARF held in Bali, Indonesia in 2011 but the Chairman's Statement was notable in that it referred to the meeting held on the side-lines between the South and North Korean Delegations to the Six Party Talks. It called for inter-Korean dialogue to be sustained, a call that it had made in the past, and saw the ARF (then) as a possible contributor to the resumption of the Six Party Talks given that all parties

were represented at the table. The two Koreas have had ARF side-line meetings on four previous occasions and twice held informal meetings.¹⁰ This time, ARF ministers went beyond the usual call for the “complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula” to express concern at North Korea’s uranium enrichment activities and made the pointed call for North Korea to abandon all existing nuclear programs.¹¹

In 2012, the ASEAN and ARF Chair, Cambodian deputy prime minister and foreign minister Hor Namhong, made a visit to Pyongyang to lobby North Korea to return to the Six Party Talks. The Chair’s Statement noted that “the visit highlighted the enhancing [sic, enhanced] role of the Chair.” Interestingly, this was the second time that foreign minister Hor had visited North Korea in his capacity as ASEAN and ARF chair, with the first in 2002 when he made a fact-finding mission.¹² This makes him one of the most important figures in ASEAN-Korea relations. Calls for denuclearisation, compliance with UNSC Resolutions and commitment to the Six Party Talks were made in the ARFs in the following three years.

In 2016, in response to North Korea’s two nuclear tests, and rocket and ballistic missile launches, both ASEAN foreign and ARF ministers produced increasingly frank and specific statements. The Joint Communique of the AMM-49 in Ha Noi, Vietnam, in 2016 pointed out that the nuclear test, rocket launch and ballistic test by the DPRK were in “violation of the UNSC resolutions” and urged compliance. At the 28th and 29th ASEAN Summit in Vientiane, Laos, leaders essentially repeated the earlier statement by their foreign ministers, indicating the seriousness of the situation.¹³ In April 2017, ASEAN foreign ministers again expressed “grave concerns” over the heightened tensions in the Korean Peninsula,¹⁴ and that same month, the Chairman’s Statement of the 30th ASEAN Summit again directly attributed the “escalation

of tensions that can affect peace and stability in the entire region” to the DPRK.

In March 2017, DPRK foreign minister Ri Yong Ho took the rather unusual step of writing to ASEAN leaders, ahead of their Summit, to raise the issue of the 2017 ROK-US joint military exercises, codenamed Foal Eagle and Key Resolve, as a threat to stability in the region. The DPRK has forcefully condemned ROK-US military exercises on many occasions at the ARF but rarely ever appealed to ASEAN to raise it at Summit level. In the letter, Ri wrote that, “I express my expectations that ASEAN, which attaches great importance to the regional peace and stability, will make an issue of the ROK-US joint military exercises at ASEAN conferences from the fair position [sic] and play an active role in safeguarding the peace and safety of Korean Peninsula.”¹⁵ A similar letter was also sent to the UNSC President, calling on it to discuss the matter.

At the May 2017 ASEAN-US meeting in Washington DC, it was the turn of Rex Tillerson, the US Secretary of State, to pressure ASEAN, this time to implement UN sanctions on the DPRK and to downgrade relations with Pyongyang. There were even reported attempts that the US tried to have the DPRK excluded from the 24th ARF to be held in early August 2017 in Manila, Philippines. ASEAN was founded on the principles of sovereignty, non-interference and mutual respect. Although these are being challenged in one way or another, they remain the basis for its own actions and their dealings with dialogue partners. ASEAN’s reactions to Tillerson’s call were equivocal at that time as undoubtedly there would have been concerns as to the implied messages this would send not just to Pyongyang but also Beijing and Moscow. No doubt the US will continue to press its case for some time.

One possible interpretation of the DPRK’s action is that it was attempting to portray itself as a victim and not aggressor for domestic

political reasons. There are arguments that the ROK-US exercises are now regular affairs and that the North understands fully well that they are not a prelude to any invasion or regime change.¹⁶ Attempts by any party to initiate conflict would likely lead to its own destruction as well as that of its neighbour. It is nevertheless possible to see how the conduct of large-scale annual military exercises aimed at deterring North Korean “aggression,” the installation of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) missile system (suspended by the incoming Korean administration at the time of writing this paper), the sailing of the Carrier Strike Group One made of USS Carl Vinson and other ships to Korea, and periodic over-flights by US stealth bombers might lead one to this conclusion. While not often or openly articulated, there are more than a few in the region, and, indeed, around the world, who sympathise with North Korea’s plight and see US military actions not only on the Korean Peninsula but in Afghanistan, Eastern Europe, Iraq, Libya and elsewhere as destabilising and significant threats.

Despite repeated reassurances that the THAAD is aimed at the DPRK and not intended to degrade China’s strategic capabilities, the latter’s reaction has been severe, as one might expect from such a significant strategic development right on its border. Russia’s reaction to the placement of US Antiballistic Missile Systems in Romania (and in the future, Poland) is similar despite assurances that they are only meant to protect Europe from missiles from “rogue Middle Eastern states.” The US itself reacted in this way during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and presently with Pyongyang’s apparent ballistic missile capabilities. Suffice it to say that any major power for that matter would be hostile to such an act and react in the same way. The capacity and costs of strategic miscalculations in the environment of heightened tensions are extremely worrying with no party yet yielding to the other.

The complexity that the involvement of Asia Pacific superpowers

adds to ASEAN-Korea security cooperation is sometimes underappreciated. As previously discussed, ASEAN does have institutional limitations, but there is also the added desire to avoid overtly compromising its neutrality. In the case of the Korean Peninsula, the latter is not inconsequential for at least two reasons. First, all ten ASEAN member states have diplomatic relations with the DPRK, with five having embassies in Pyongyang. Meanwhile, North Korea maintains eight in ASEAN. Even after the assassination of Kim Jong-nam, Kim Jong-un's estranged half-brother, in February 2017 at the Kuala Lumpur International Airport and the subsequent travel bans by both sides, the decision was taken not to cut diplomatic ties although the embassies of both countries are now without envoys or staff.¹⁷ Second, the Korean Peninsula problem is contested by major Asia Pacific powers, all of whom are also ASEAN dialogue partners.

At the political level, ASEAN has proven to be perfectly comfortable with adopting (and repeating) what is tantamount to the safe and accepted international consensus on the Korean Peninsula. To be asked to collectively or individually adopt a strategic tilt, regardless of whether it is at the behest of the US or the DPRK, has the potential of undermining its position with stakeholders and contribute to its declining role in regional affairs. The very fact that ASEAN has not mentioned the actions and behaviour of parties other than North Korea may itself amount to such a tilt. Most policymakers and analysts in ASEAN believe that peace in the Korean Peninsula is a matter for the Six Parties to resolve and ASEAN's role is best played by being an open channel for dialogue between the North and South should it be required. This should not be construed as a sign of ASEAN's indifference or irrelevance on the issue.

3. PROSPECT FOR SECURITY COOPERATION

The APSC Blueprint is largely concerned with the internal strengthening of the regional grouping and envisages continuity albeit with room for improvements. For strategic partners like Korea, it is significant because the Blueprint seeks to strengthen mutually beneficial relations between ASEAN and dialogue partners. Specific paragraphs talk of improvements of the mechanisms of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia, which is important because both South and North Korea are High Contracting Parties of the TAC. Korea has also the ability to continue working with ASEAN to explore, initiate and implement concrete cooperation activities within the context of the ARF, the ASEAN+3 and East Asia Summit (EAS). These are also reinforced in the ASEAN-Korea Joint Declaration, and the Statement and Plan of Action (PoA).

It is important though to understand that the APSC Blueprint does not cover the full spectrum of activities going forward. The ASEAN Plus Korea agenda has been a driving factor and it can be widened at the parties' discretion.¹⁸ For example, the two parties can mutually agree to extend the agenda to include traditional security components to complement those in other forums and activities taken by other dialogue partners. As previously mentioned, the ARF and its Inter-Sessional Support Groups (ISG) have been important platforms for political-security engagement. Others, such as the ASEAN+3, EAS and, interestingly, the ADMM-Plus, complement and extend the political-security dialogues to harder security aspects. Each of these will be briefly reviewed in subsequent sections.

3.1 ASEAN-Korea Strategic Partnership

In October 2010, the ASEAN-Korea relations was elevated with the

Joint Declaration on ASEAN-Korea Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity (SP or Strategic Partnership). To translate the Declaration into reality, a five-year PoA (2011-2015) was adopted. This PoA opened the door to security exchanges, dialogues and cooperation projects of all kinds but specific mention was made of NTS subjects such as combating international terrorism, transnational crime and cyberspace. The NTS subjects are generally regarded as safer subjects and precursors to more direct ones in time.

The 25th Anniversary of ASEAN-Korea relations held in Busan, Korea in 2014 produced the Joint Statement of the Commemorative Summit, one aim of which was to “foster greater cooperation in traditional and non-traditional security challenges.” The inclusion of both areas is important. One area singled out in the Joint Statement was maritime security, an issue that both ASEAN and Korea share. With the heavily armed Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) to the North, Korea is effectively an island state depending on sea lanes of communication for strategic and economic reasons. This includes not just the Yellow Sea and East Sea but also the South China Sea (SCS).¹⁹ Following the end of the first PoA, a second one (2016-2020) was signed to Implement the Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in 2015. This PoA, which acts as the framework for activities going forward, identified maritime security as an area, in addition to the usual NTS issues.

Interestingly, there are similar provisions in the PoA to Implement the ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership (2016-2020) but with the main difference being that in the latter, there are more references to implementing the Declaration of the Code of Conduct (DoC) on the SCS and working towards the early conclusion of the Code of Conduct (CoC). There is also a paragraph calling parties to “undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or

escalate disputes and affect peace and stability.” There are no such strictures in the ASEAN-Korea PoA, not just because Korea is not a claimant in the SCS but also because its actions have not made such a call necessary.

What the above suggests is that the political ground has been prepared on both the ASEAN and Korean sides for a wider set of actions going forward. While the Declaration, Statement and PoA are not mandatory and may not always be put into action, a frequent criticism made by analysts, but they do provide legitimate pathways for parties to act should they wish to do so. While these pathways invite parties to explore more concrete security cooperation, Korea may have its valid reasons for not wanting to do so, at least not of the nature that others are engaging in, and ASEAN may as well. The possibility of expansion however, is open, a sign of the mature and trusting relation.

3.2 ARF, ASEAN+3 and EAS

Korea has actively participated in the ARF since its inception in 1994. From the very first meeting, the Korean Peninsula issue was discussed, a “signal that the ARF is ready to address any challenge to the peace and security of the region.”²⁰ Apart from ARFs, which invariably monitor developments in the Korean Peninsula, Korea has co-chaired or hosted ISG meetings of heads of national defence colleges, confidence building measures, preventive diplomacy, transnational crime, peacekeeping operations, cyber-terrorism and so forth. None of these though have had a traditional security dimension. The ASEAN+3 remains to be an important forum for discussion of broad regional security matters, but, given its participants and characteristics, it is unlikely to contribute to any meaningful filling of the hard security void that exists between ASEAN and Korea.

Reflecting the fact that the ASEAN+3 was born out of the 1997

Asian Financial Crisis, its activities have very much focused around the financial, economic and social dimensions. It includes some of the most tangible outcomes that have so far come out of ASEAN external relations. ASEAN+3 foreign ministers and leaders regularly discuss developments on the Korean Peninsula. The ASEAN+3 Cooperation Work Plan (2013-2017) does contain paragraphs to strengthen peace and stability, combat transnational crime and other NTS issues and promote maritime security but none can be considered significant in any sense. Going forward, the ability of the ASEAN+3 to contribute to security matters, whether general or hard, would seem to be in some doubt.

The EAS was designed to be a leaders-led forum for discussion, although some participants have long made known their desire for it to be actively involved in community building efforts. Having a greater number of influential participating countries than the ASEAN+3 has meant the EAS has tended to overshadow the former and there remains some tension between the two. ASEAN, however, sees this as a threat to its centrality and prefers to find new modalities to keep participants fully engaged while remaining in control of it. The EAS has come out with important statements on NTS issues such as non-proliferation, trafficking in persons, cybersecurity, terrorism and infectious diseases but none on military matters.

3.3 ADMM & ADMM+8

The ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) was established to be the "highest defence consultative and cooperative mechanism" scheduled to meet annually.²¹ The (then) ASEAN Chair, Indonesia, first proposed the idea in 2003 and the groundwork for it was laid in 2004 after leaders officially adopted the ASEAN Security Plan of Action at the 10th ASEAN Summit in Vientiane, Laos. The inaugural meeting was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in 2006. In what may be a contrast to other

ASEAN bodies, the ADMM's objectives were not only for it to conduct dialogue and cooperation to build mutual trust and confidence, but most importantly, also capacity. This means that after almost four decades of existence, defence cooperation was no longer deemed to be “too sensitive” an area to be engaged.

The following year, 2007, an ADMM Retreat was held and the 2nd ADMM met to initiate a Three-Year Work Plan and to adopt an ADMM-Plus (ADMM+) concept paper suggested by Singapore. The 3rd meeting in 2009 laid out the principles for ADMM+ membership, namely, (1) countries had to be existing dialogue partners, (2) have significant interactions with the ASEAN defence establishment and (3) be able to work with ASEAN to build technical capacity.²² Initially five areas of cooperation were mandated and a further two subsequently added. The seven areas of cooperation currently sanctioned are: (1) maritime security, (2) counter-terrorism, (3) humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), (4) peacekeeping operations, (5) military medicine,²³ (6) humanitarian mine action²⁴ and (7) cybersecurity.²⁵

The first ADMM-Plus Eight (ADMM+8) was held in Hanoi, Vietnam in 2010. Expert Working Groups (EWGs) in the first five areas above were established to enable activities such as hands-on practical training and exercises. The ADMM+8 has been unusually active and its achievements may have exceeded ASEAN's expectations. Following two table top exercises (TTX) in 2012 in areas of military medicine and maritime security, 2013 saw, for the first time, live exercises in HADR and military medicine, counter-terrorism, and maritime security field training. Added to this have been TTX and field training exercises (FTX) on humanitarian mine action and peacekeeping operations. Since 2014, these exercises have been conducted on 3-year cycles. For the 2017-2020 cycle, Singapore and Korea co-chair the EWG on maritime security.

3.4 ADMM-Plus Dialogue Partner Informal Meetings

Almost as soon as the ADMM+8 was established, some dialogue partners expressed their interest in deepening relations with the ADMM on a “Plus One” basis. To distinguish this process from the official ADMM+8 track, these have been designated as informal meetings. One country that has annually accessed this track since 2011 has been China, while the US has done so very regularly. Japan has held two such meetings. The ADMM-China Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting and ADMM-US Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting (AUSDMM) have the distinct privilege of being able to be held outside of ASEAN and need not be in conjunction with ADMM+8 meetings or retreats. The US has hosted two meetings in Honolulu (2014 and 2016) and China once, in Beijing (2015).

Naturally, there are concerns that the dialogue partner track will strain the resources of ASEAN member states, especially the smaller ones. Apart from the ADMM and the ADMM+8, the ASEAN Defence Senior Officials’ Meeting (ADSOM), ADSOM-Plus, ADSOM Working Group, ADSOM-Plus Working Group and the six ADMM+ EWGs have to be provided for in terms of funding and personnel. On the top of this are the multiple planning conferences, workshops and exercises that are held. EWGs typically have initial (IPC), mid (MPC) and final (FPC) planning conferences for TTX and FTX.

The dangers of overlapping agendas also exist. Multiple dialogue partner informal meetings can not only duplicate but overlap the activities of the ADMM+. This reduces the transparency of processes by creating blind spots for other participants with their non-inclusion. The latter can be particularly important as one of the primary purposes of the ADMM and ADMM+8 is to build trust and confidence among parties and thus lead to a reduction of conflict.

At the ADMM-China Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting,

held in conjunction with the 7th ADMM in 2013, China expressed its commitment to advance defence and military cooperation with ASEAN, including military education, training, and joint exercises. In 2015, China proposed that the informal meeting be considered a security mechanism, that is, to be institutionalised. It unveiled a comprehensive list of proposed cooperation activities, including humanitarian assistance, military medicine, peacekeeping, anti-piracy, intelligence sharing, counterterrorism exercises and border defence – in essence replicating much of the ADMM+8 agenda. It also offered to hold joint training on a Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), maritime search and rescue, and disaster relief with ASEAN countries in 2018, off China's territorial waters and not the SCS.²⁶

This places ADMM in the dilemma of acceding to these requests – which given China's role in the region, many ASEAN member states may want – but at the same time not overtly seem that it was giving it priority over other dialogue partners' requests. This would be seen as eroding trust in the regional association and undermining its role.²⁷ Perhaps largely in response to this, ASEAN in 2015 adopted guidelines to manage the requests for the holding of informal meetings.²⁸ One provision was that these meetings should be held only in years that the ADMM+8 does not meet. Even then, there should only be a maximum of two meetings a year and these would be held alongside the ADMM and ADMM Retreats.

Requests for informal meetings must be decided by consensus based on their merits and the urgency. Those that cannot be accommodated will be considered in the following year. Finally, informal meetings should not require the establishment of preparatory working groups or follow-on activities. A great deal of thought appears to have been given in crafting these guidelines. The issue now though is whether they can be effectively implemented given the parties involved and the present momentum.

Insofar as the AUSDMIM is concerned, the US has been an active defence partner participating every year from 2011-2016 except for 2015. In two years, when informal meetings were held in Hawaii, the name was changed to the US-ASEAN Defence Forum (2014) and the US-ASEAN Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting (2016). This gives the impression that it is not linked to the ADMM process, although the ASEAN Chair is a co-chair of the meeting. This view was reinforced by (then) US Secretary of Defence, Ashton Carter, when he noted that the 2016 meeting was "the second such informal dialogue". In that meeting, he also referred to ASEAN as part of the US's "principled security network", a term that he had used earlier in the year at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. This network, Secretary Carter described, was one where every country regardless of strength can be included and contribute free of threat or coercion. While some of this was no doubt intended to please his audience and hardly represents the idea of a superpower such as the US, it would appear to fit ASEAN to a tee.

4. ASEAN-KOREA SECURITY COOPERATION GOING FORWARD

Korea has participated in ASEAN activities with composure and interest. Since establishing dialogue relations in 1989, the horizons have expanded beyond the political and with defence coming into the picture. The ADMM+8 is an asset for Korea and perhaps even more so for ASEAN. China has taken advantage of the ADMM+1 to attempt to engage very extensively with ASEAN and not only through meetings but military exercises. Should Korea do the same?

It is not known whether Korea has any specific interests in requesting for an informal meeting given the conditions in the Korean Peninsula. The option is certainly there should it wish to do so. ASEAN-Korea political-security relations could understandably be relegated to

back-burner priorities. It is not difficult to envisage situations when this could happen given the geostrategic tensions in the Korean Peninsula.

There are reasons, however, to believe that an ADMM-Plus Korea might be a strategic move and one that could have positive consequences for peace and security in Northeast Asia. First, in contrast to the military exercises that Korea carries out at present with the US, *ad hoc* (i.e. non-regular) defence cooperation exercises with ASEAN member states would not be seen as aggressive or threatening to any country. Indeed, it could be used as a confidence as well as capacity building measure. Second, to address issues of transparency, non-participants could be invited as observers to witness security cooperation at work for peaceful purposes. This would send an important counterpoint message to surrounding nations.

Obviously, much thought will have to be given to the nature of the meetings and the projects, if any undertaken, and the timing must be right. In an environment of rising security tensions and mistrust, cooperative projects may not be possible or desirable, not least by some ASEAN member states, which might take the view that they could be unwittingly dragged into the Korean Peninsula conflict. Under the right conditions and with the right timing, however, there can be creative initiatives to use such measures.

A longer-term project might be for Korea to offer to work with ASEAN on strengthening the TAC in line with the APSC Blueprint, and perhaps begin multilateral discussions on the feasibility of extending the 'footprint' to the whole of East Asia rather than just Southeast Asia. Again, such an effort is potentially fraught with conceptual and practical challenges but could help reframe the narrative from the current dialectical (and militaristic) one.

These may or may not directly or significantly impact the Korean Peninsula security dilemma, which is, after all, an issue for the major

Asia Pacific powers. They can have important effects for South Korea and Southeast Asia and can be argued to be worthy of consideration. In any case, the ASEAN-Korea Strategic Partnership today has more hard security possibilities and discretion that were not available when they started off in 1989. This can decidedly only be considered a good thing.

ASEAN-Korea Political-Security Cooperation: Building a Partnership between the ASEAN Political-Security Community and Korea

LEE JAEHYON

ABSTRACT

This chapter discusses the ways for political and security cooperation between ASEAN and Korea. The two have developed a cordial economic and socio-cultural partnership since their official tie in 1989. Political and security cooperation is somewhat lagging behind the other fields of cooperation. The author first surveys regional strategic circumstances as a backdrop of ASEAN-Korea political security cooperation. The chapter, then, moves on to analyse the building of ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) with which Korea has to construct future political and security cooperation. The author points out that APSC has to conceptualise a more proactive role in regional security issues including the Korean Peninsula matter. In return, Korea has to provide necessary support for the successful implementation of the APSC and overall ASEAN Community, by extending support and assistance for a more balanced growth of the three pillars of the Community. In addition, Korea has a good reason to revive regional multilateral architecture together with ASEAN member states, which in turn would strengthen the argument of ASEAN Centrality, and subsequently the position of APSC in the region.

* Key words: Political and Security Cooperation, APSC, ASEAN Community

1. INTRODUCTION

This year, 2017, marks the 50th anniversary of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Despite all the criticisms and shortcomings of ASEAN, the maintenance of regional cooperation in the dynamic and sometimes turbulent region of Southeast Asia is a substantial achievement that many regions in the world can only dream of.¹ Now, ASEAN is a community in the pipeline. The leaders of ASEAN member states had already announced the establishment of the ASEAN Community at the end of 2015.² Although some question the true nature of ASEAN as a regional community, the political, economic and social desires to establish a successful regional community are there in place, as shown by various inter-governmental meetings, consultations and agreements.

This chapter examines ASEAN-Korea political and security cooperation. In general, intra-ASEAN and extra-ASEAN cooperation and partnerships have three distinctive areas: political-security, economic and socio-cultural. Among these three, political and security cooperation is different from other cooperation areas in one important aspect – political and security cooperation is a governmental responsibility from beginning to end. In the other areas, once inter-governmental dialogues pave the way for cooperation in the form of treaties or institutions, then the follow-up is left to the private sector. It is private companies, associations and individuals that deepen the cooperation. In contrast, there are no private sector actors directly engaging in political-security cooperation. It is a government that initiates, develops, deepens and completes political-security cooperation. Therefore, political-security cooperation is difficult, complicated, controversy-ridden and lagging behind to that of the private sector in many cases.

The conceptual illustration of the ASEAN Community shows that

the three pillars of ASEAN—ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and ASEAN Socio-cultural Community (ASCC)—have to grow in a coordinated and proportional manner. Otherwise, the ASEAN Community will collapse. The objective of this chapter is to suggest ways to ensure both a success of the APSC and a brighter future relations between ASEAN and Korea. To this end, this chapter begins with an assessment of the regional strategic environment in which the political and security cooperation between ASEAN and Korea is unfolding. Based on this assessment, the author examines the opportunities and challenges of the APSC, and the way Korea can make meaningful contributions for the success of the APSC. Before concluding, the future prospects for ASEAN-Korea political and security cooperation will be discussed.

2. STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT WE ARE FACING

The current strategic environment surrounding ASEAN and Korea can be epitomised by five keywords. They are: unstable superpower relations; ineffective multilateralism; divided small and medium regional countries; emerging new security threats; and finally, uncertain regional order. All these are intertwined and probably the last keyword is a consequence of the rest. Superpower competition threatens effective multilateralism in the region, which subsequently results in small and medium countries in the region being divided. With this weak cooperative network of small and medium countries, multilateralism in the region cannot flourish.

It is worth looking back to the last days of the Cold War to survey the regional strategic environment since it includes the regional order issue as well. There was too much uncertainty in the regional order right after the end of the Cold War in this part of the world. The old superpower rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union was

over. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US had significantly withdrawn from the region. Of course, there was a regional difference here. While the US had retreated substantially from the Southeast Asian front, it maintained a significant forward deployment in Northeast Asia where the Cold War legacy was still alive and well. The US had emerged as the only superpower in the world, while the would-be superpower, China, was not on the horizon yet.

This circumstance created an important power vacuum in the region, especially in Southeast Asia.³ This was the time when some regional leaders were diligently searching for an alternative to the Cold War balance of power. The perspectives of Southeast Asian leaders were heavily influenced by a few developments in other regions. The first signs came from the economic field. Both Europe and North America, which were the main export markets for Southeast Asian countries, were building economic blocs. The European Economic Community (EEC) and North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) did not bode well for the economic prosperity of East Asian countries.⁴ Around this time, Southeast Asian leaders realised a need for building their own economic leverage in the form of a multilateral economic cooperation.

At the same time, the power vacuum left behind by the US withdrawal and the Soviet Union collapse had to be filled somehow. Although there was a substantial decrease of the traditional security threats, some mechanisms were still needed to manage potential security challenges in the region.⁵ With these concerns, regional leaders came up with the idea of creating the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asian Economic Group (EAEG). The former was the first multilateral security arrangement in the region, while the latter was a kind of economic bloc suggested by then Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad. Although the eventual success of the two multilateral proposals differed, both were meaningful as the first attempts

at building multilateral cooperative platforms in the region soon after the Cold War.⁶

Since then, nobody in the region is confident to say that the regional order has been successfully built. With the failure of some communist regimes, there were some who predicted that the combination of liberal democratic order and free market economy has eventually proved itself to be the winner.⁷ For some years, it seemed that the liberal order would prevail in the region as well. With that, it was expected that superpower rivalry could be replaced by a more equitable multilateral order in the region. Looking back, neither the liberal international order, nor a robust sustainable multilateral order had gained momentum in the region.

The power vacuum left behind by the collapse of the Soviet Union was rather swiftly filled by the rise of China. In the 1990s, China was accepted as a new (economic) opportunity for regional countries. With the introduction of its economic reform and opening up, China was successfully integrating into the global economic order and, what is more, was emerging as a new engine of growth. Countries in the region wanted to jump on the bandwagon of the economic boom created by the emerging China. By the time of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the Chinese economy had grown to such a level that it could provide economic assistance and some breathing room for those crisis-hit countries in the region.⁸ Following this period, the economic engagement of China with regional countries, and especially with Southeast Asian countries, gained momentum, which can be described as a period of geo-economic engagement by China.

The economic euphoria about China did not last that long. At the end of the 2000s, China's sudden turnaround in the South China Sea dispute augmented a sense of security threat potentially shared by a majority of regional countries. Regional countries found that they were caught in a dilemma – economically, China was crucial for their

sustained economic growth, at the same time, China posed a substantial security and strategic threat to them. With enormous economic and military power, China emerged as a superpower competing against the US not just in the region. Since 2013, China has been implementing its global economic vision in the form of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which technically covers all continents except the Americas.

The US, for a period after the end of the Cold War, has been absent from the region, especially from Southeast Asia. In those years, the economic engagement that the US had with regional countries was substantially dented by Chinese economic expansion in the region.⁹ The US attempt to come back to the region after the 9/11 terrorist attacks has failed due to resistance from regional countries, especially from Muslim-dominated Malaysia and Indonesia.¹⁰ It was only after the Obama administration announced its 'Pivot to Asia' and after the regional countries became aware of the potential security threat of China that the US's return to the region started to progress.

With the US pivoting to Asia, the old superpower rivalry revisited the region: it is the US versus China. A majority of regional countries had hoped the US engagement with the region could provide some security assurance against any potential security threat from China. Meanwhile, regional countries did not expect much from the US when it came to economic engagement. Still, regional countries had to depend on Chinese economic power for their continued economic prosperity. This situation created a new and more complicated strategic dilemma for regional countries. In the old Cold War days, the choice was easier: either in the liberal bloc or in the communist bloc, and the economic and security assurances were provided as a package. In other words, if a country was in the liberal bloc, both assurances were provided by the US. Now, regional countries have to find security assurances in their relations with the US, while the economic benefits were more likely to be

provided by China.

Almost 30 years since the end of the Cold War, East Asia or the Asia-Pacific region is experiencing another superpower rivalry between China and the US. The regional order in this part of the world is likely to be determined largely by the consequence of this superpower rivalry. Roughly there are three likely paths – extended tension and rivalry between the superpowers, all-out war between the superpowers, and finally a concert of the power between the two superpowers. The likely outcomes for regional countries differ too. If the superpowers maintain their strategic rivalry, regional countries will have to stay vigilant to safeguard their own interests in the competition. It means continued strategic stress and uncertainty for regional countries. If the two superpowers initiate an all-out war to decide who would be the dominant power in the region, it is the regional countries that will have to absorb the devastating consequence of such dispute. The region is likely to be a battle field. If the two superpowers reach a strategic consensus and consequently agree on a power condominium in the region, disputes are not likely. Nevertheless, the structure of the power condominium is not likely to take regional small and medium countries' interests into consideration.

Whatever the form of regional order will eventuate, the interests of small and medium countries of the region are guaranteed to be less than satisfactory. Bilaterally, each regional country is rather powerless against those superpowers. The best way to secure the interests of those regional countries is through a robust multilateral regional architecture. Regional countries can manage the superpower rivalry and their interests through a multilateral architecture. There was a short period from 1997 to the mid-2000s when multilateral cooperation in the region was very active. This was largely because regional countries shared a sense of crisis or threat that they experienced during the Asian Financial Crisis. The momentum did not last long.

Multilateral cooperation in East Asia is facing internal and external challenges. Internally, the memory of the economic crisis is gone thanks to a quick economic recovery that ensured. The region does not have regional leaders like Mahathir and Kim Dae-jung who were very instrumental in the early days of the ASEAN+3 and East Asia Summit (EAS).¹¹ While the regional multilateral cooperation went on, there were mushrooming institutions under the umbrella of the ASEAN+3 and EAS. It created the problem of inter- and intra-institutional balancing.¹² Rivalry among countries and among institutions of similar nature balanced each other, overall resulting in delay in the advancement of cooperative institutions and lack of concrete cooperation results. Externally, superpowers like China and the US exploited regional multilateral cooperation for their own respective strategic advantage in the region, rather than promoting multilateral cooperation. As the strategic rivalry intensified between the US and China, regional countries, rather than putting their hands together to work towards their regional common good, aligned themselves with superpowers for their national interests, further weakening regional multilateral cooperation.

In recent years, the emerging non-traditional security issues are becoming one of the most important security threats in the region. Non-traditional security issues cover such diverse areas from famine to terrorism or cyber-security.¹³ In addition, it is not certain if the threats have only recently emerged or if they have recently become noticeable due to regional countries having more room to take those threats into consideration after overcoming more immediate existential threats with economic growth. Whatever the case is, it is certain that non-traditional security threats are central to the ASEAN cooperation. Furthermore, in recent years, it is non-traditional security threats that claimed more human lives and inflicted economic loss than any other type of threat, notably traditional security threats.

In sum, after the end of the Cold War, this region never had a clear-cut regional order. Multilateralism built right after the Cold War and the Asian Financial Crisis was not enough to shape the regional order. It did not serve the interests of regional countries well enough, not because of the flaws of multilateralism, but more because of various internal and external challenges to multilateralism. In that context, the interests of small and medium countries in the region have not been securely guaranteed. Again, the region is dominated by superpower rivalry between the US and China, which largely shapes the behaviour pattern of regional countries.

3. BUILDING THE APSC: SECURING ASEAN'S SPACE IN THE REGION

Today, ASEAN Community building is largely led by economic cooperation under the auspices of the AEC. It is also widely accepted that regional community building starts from economic cooperation and integration. Economic cooperation itself and its benefit is easily visible in the form of numbers. For political leaders of individual countries, it is a lot easier to persuade domestic audiences of the benefits from economic cooperation rather than of those from political-security cooperation or socio-cultural cooperation. For three decades from the 1980s to 2000s, ASEAN member states put more emphasis on economic cooperation, which could expedite the economic growth of individual countries.¹⁴ As a result of this three-decade effort, ASEAN integration and community building is currently led by economic cooperation.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, however, the origin of ASEAN is in political and security cooperation among five ASEAN member states – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. These five countries faced lots of political and security challenges in the early

1960s, which made the initial nature of ASEAN as a cooperation body focused on political and security issues. First, individual countries had daunting domestic, political and security challenges such as the threat from domestic communist movements, the task of national integration, and political instability. Along with economic stabilisation and growth, political stability was one of the top priorities of national leaders of the five countries in the 1960s.¹⁵

Second, ASEAN member states had trouble with their neighbours. There was tension between Malaysia and Indonesia, called 'Konfrontasi' or confrontation. Political instabilities in the southern provinces of Thailand made bilateral relations between Malaysia and Thailand strained. Malaysia and the Philippines had different views on Malaysia's annexation of Sabah and Sarawak.¹⁶ Singapore was not free from these intra-regional tensions. As a small Chinese-majority city-state, Singapore had concerns over not just economic survival but also its political and security resilience given it was surrounded by much bigger Muslim-dominated Malaysia and Indonesia.¹⁷

Third, except for Indonesia in the early 1960s, the other four countries had security concerns over potential infiltration by communists from the outside, notably from mainland China. When General Suharto took power in Indonesia and re-oriented its economic and foreign policy, Indonesia joined this group of Southeast Asian countries which had concerns over potential communist takeovers in the region. In addition, four out of those five countries had experienced colonial rule of varying forms. Some had achieved independence after violent independence struggles. Naturally, these countries wanted to secure their autonomy and prevent intervention from former colonisers or superpowers surrounding Southeast Asia.¹⁸

These contexts of the ASEAN formation essentially made ASEAN from the beginning a political and security regional cooperation

framework. ASEAN initially aimed to face these three-tiered security and political threats: domestic, intra-regional and extra-regional. Of course, there were economic incentives for regional cooperation. Early Southeast Asian economic growth was largely dependent on foreign direct investment (FDI) from outside ASEAN.¹⁹ What is important for the inflow of the FDI is political stability in the region. For those five ASEAN member states, economic integration among them was not really the top priority at the beginning. Instead, it was crucial to build a stable regional environment so that foreign capital had confidence in investing in Southeast Asian countries. To this end, political and security cooperation was necessary for ASEAN member states.

Today, the APSC has its eyes on the much higher and noble goal of political and security cooperation and integration in the region. The purpose of the APSC is best summarised in the APSC Blueprint. It has three main pillars. First of all, under the title of “A Rule-based Community of Shared Values and Norms,” the blueprint elaborates political development in individual ASEAN member states as well as the basic norms shared by the member countries.²⁰ The main theme of this pillar of the APSC is how to advance the political development of individual countries. It includes topics like the rule of law, good governance, human rights, combating corruption and promoting democracy. In a sense, these topics could be controversial since some ASEAN member states display less than satisfactory progress in improving governance, human rights record, democracy and fighting corruption. Given the traditional ASEAN way, which encompasses consultation-consensus, respect for sovereignty and non-intervention, the APSC’s inclusion of human rights, corruption and democracy in the first pillar of the blueprint was a brave move.²¹

The second pillar of the APSC, “A Cohesive, Peaceful, Stable and Resilient Region with Shared Responsibility for Comprehensive

Security,” deals with various security threats to ASEAN. This part starts with elaborating confidence building and dispute settlement, and referring to the ARF. Then, non-traditional security issues receive a special highlight. The APSC Blueprint points out transnational crime, counter terrorism, disaster management, emergency response etc. as major threats emerging in the eyes of ASEAN member states.²² While the first pillar deals with domestic issues, this second pillar of the APSC is more about intra-regional issues with ASEAN member states and about region-wide security threats shared by all member countries.

When we discuss the APSC and Korea’s potential contribution towards its success, the third pillar of the APSC blueprint is relevant. The third pillar, “A Dynamic and Outward-looking Region in an Increasingly Integrated and Interdependent World,” intends to find ASEAN’s right place in regional strategic dynamics. It says, “ASEAN remains outward-looking and plays a pivotal role in the regional and international fora to advance ASEAN’s common interests” and “ASEAN will exercise and maintain its centrality and proactive role as the primary driving force in an open, transparent and inclusive regional architecture to support the establishment of the ASEAN Community by 2015.”²³ It is clear that the APSC aims to be a crucial player in shaping the regional order and for that intends to strengthen ASEAN Centrality. This is a way to advance ASEAN’s political and security interests in this region.

The third pillar has three main items to implement, whose directions are invariably outward-looking and extra-regional. The first item to implement is “Strengthening ASEAN Centrality in Regional Cooperation and Community Building.” It is mainly about promoting the concept of ASEAN Centrality in the context of regional architecture. ASEAN has a belief that the ASEAN Centrality concept is the source of ASEAN power in its relations with regional countries and with the superpowers.²⁴ As a group of mostly small and developing countries,

ASEAN would not have power and voice in regional international affairs if it is not for ASEAN centrality and unity.

The second item to realise through the building of the APSC is “Promoting Enhanced Ties with External Parties.” What it means by “external parties” is those regional countries beyond ASEAN, its dialogue partners as well as various international organisations. By enhancing cooperative relations with these parties, ASEAN wants not just to elevate its international and regional status, but also to secure various benefits and concessions from these external parties. The third item is “Strengthening Consultations and Cooperation on Multilateral Issues of Common Concern.” It is an expression of ASEAN intentions to engage with regional countries in the area on wider regional and global issues and concerns, and present itself as a crucial and meaningful international player in the region through multilateral cooperation.

The overall impression of the APSC blueprint — particularly focusing on its external relations, which would include ASEAN’s partnership with Korea — is that the APSC has to do more on its vision of external relations with regional countries. The third pillar is allocated least space in the blueprint, while the other two items are described in detail with more space. The number of paragraphs and pages dedicated to the external relations, of course, does not represent what ASEAN invests into its relations with external parties. Nevertheless, the overall blueprint gives the impression that ASEAN, despite the building of the APSC, remains inward-looking. ASEAN remains largely pre-occupied with internal ASEAN security and political matters. When it mentions relations with extra-regional parties, the theme is invariably about ASEAN and ASEAN’s political and security interests. As has been the case before, ASEAN, despite the APSC vision, is still not really going beyond the boundaries of ASEAN to touch upon wider regional security issues.

ASEAN, and particularly the APSC, has to expand its scope of political and security concerns to be a more meaningful player in the region, and to secure the cherished ASEAN Centrality concept. It has to set eyes on wider regional security matters and concerns. Of course, there are still ongoing debates regarding ASEAN's capacity to go beyond the traditional boundaries of ASEAN's security concern. Some argue that ASEAN, given the size and capacity of its members and, more importantly, given the difficulties of reaching consensus within ASEAN, is not able to expand its security concerns beyond ASEAN.²⁵ If ASEAN is too ambitious, it would be entrapped in superpower rivalry and the wider regional strategic game. This argument has a good point when it comes to the capacity that ASEAN has today. However, if ASEAN is just satisfied with what it is and does today, it would never increase its capacity and international status.

ASEAN has a few security and strategic concerns that it could potentially lead in engaging in political and security issues beyond its geographical boundaries. There is a strategic competition going on between China and the US. Of course, ASEAN cannot directly control the behaviour of these two superpowers. Nevertheless, there is a point that ASEAN can use its leverage in dealing with the competing interests of the two superpowers. Another major security issue in the region is, of course, the Korean Peninsula issues. ASEAN is not immune to the negative impacts coming from a contingency in the Korean Peninsula. In addressing this risk, what is more, ASEAN would get so much credit if it shows its performance in managing tension and in building peace on the Korean Peninsula. On the one hand, these are challenges for ASEAN. But on the other, these could be opportunities for ASEAN to elevate itself into a significant and influential regional player.

4. KOREA'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE APSC AND ASEAN COMMUNITY BUILDING

Then, what can Korea do for the successful fulfilment of the APSC and the wider ASEAN Community? As a cooperation partner of ASEAN, Korea can and should make three efforts for the success of the APSC.

First of all, it can provide direct support to the APSC. Korea has to make statements in support of the APSC whenever it can. What is crucial for the initial success of the APSC is the support of dialogue partners and concerned international institutions. The expressed support for the APSC would enable ASEAN to keep its momentum for its continued development.

In addition, Korea has to make every effort to address ASEAN's various non-traditional security issues. As indicated in the blueprint, most of the immediate security concerns that ASEAN has are invariably non-traditional security issues. At the moment, Southeast Asian countries do not have an immediate traditional security threat in either the intra or extra-ASEAN region. The only exception is the South China Sea disputes. It is non-traditional security threats such as natural disasters, climate change, pandemic disease, human and drug trafficking that materialise, resulting in more human casualties rather than traditional security threats in the region. The occurrence of a natural disaster such as a severe typhoon, tsunami or flood can lead to enormous economic damage as well as countless human lives lost.

According to research by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), the Asia-Pacific region incurred \$45.1 billion in economic damage in 2015 due to natural disasters, and almost 60 million people in the region were affected by 160 disasters, resulting in 16,046 deaths.²⁶ Other UNESCAP statistics accounting for the period 1970 to 2015 show that \$1.15 trillion was lost

due to natural disasters in the region and more than 2 million deaths were inflicted.²⁷ One of the major natural disasters in Southeast Asia was the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami. According to research, the 2004 Tsunami alone left around 190,000 people dead and caused \$10 billion in economic loss, region-wide.²⁸ Myanmar was hit by Cyclone Nargis in May 2008. In a month, it was revealed that the cyclone left in Myanmar some 85,000 dead, 53,000 missing, 20,000 injured and 800,000 homeless. In total, more than 7 million people were affected by the cyclone. Some \$780 million in economic loss was reported, which was about 3% of the official GDP by the government in that year.²⁹ The impact of Cyclone Nargis was so substantial that this single event alone could destroy 3% of national GDP.

The APSC has to address non-traditional security threats for peace and stability in the region. If the APSC can successfully manage these non-traditional security threats, we can say that it has been a success. Discussing non-traditional security issues in Southeast Asia requires assistance and cooperation from external countries. If Korea can make a meaningful contribution in managing and addressing those non-traditional security threats in Southeast Asia, it would make a great contribution for the success of the APSC.

Another item for political cooperation through the APSC is supporting the rule of law, democracy, human rights and good governance in Southeast Asian countries. So far, these items of cooperation have been sensitive in talks between ASEAN and Korea. Both sides have avoided these issues. Nevertheless, the APSC tries to promote the rule of law, democracy, human rights and good governance within the ASEAN context and also in individual countries. Korea has to engage with Southeast Asian countries and ASEAN collectively to improve the rule of law, democracy, human rights and good governance. Minding the sensitive nature of the issues, Korea has to

make an approach to Southeast Asia either in a bilateral context or in a multilateral context such as the ASEAN+3, EAS and so on. A significant improvement by ASEAN member states in these issues will definitely be a great contribution for the consolidation of the APSC.

There is also need for indirect support for the success of the APSC. The APSC is part of a wider ASEAN Community, which has two other pillars – AEC and ASCC. Currently, the progress of establishment of AEC is far ahead of other two pillars. A successful building of the ASEAN Community requires equal and balanced development and growth of other pillars as well. In this regard, the AEC and the ASCC have to make balanced progress as well. Regarding the ASCC, what Korea can do is to facilitate the development of cultural industries in ASEAN member states and to improve cultural exchanges between Korea and Southeast Asian countries. It is believed that Korea has some knowledge and expertise in nurturing cultural industries due to the huge success demonstrated by the so-called Korean Wave in Southeast Asian countries.

Another contribution that Korea can make for the success of the ASCC is to promote cultural exchanges between ASEAN and Korea. At the moment, there is a cultural and social exchange imbalance between ASEAN and Korea. For example, more than 6 million Koreans visit ASEAN member states annually while only less than 1.5 million people from ASEAN member states visit Korea.³⁰ What is more important is the imbalance in cultural product consumption. While Korean dramas, songs, movies and other cultural products are very popular in Southeast Asia, Korean people do not know much about Southeast Asian culture. Of course, in recent years, there is an increasing trend of consuming ASEAN culture in Korea due to younger generation's quest for Southeast Asian culture. Despite that, the imbalance in cultural interactions between ASEAN and Korea is still huge. More balanced

cultural interactions between ASEAN and Korea will contribute not only to a successful ASCC, but also to a more culturally enriched Korea.

Although AEC building is far ahead of other community building efforts, there are still contributions that Korea has to make for the success of the APSC and the ASEAN Community. Two issues are important here. First of all, Korea has to make more effort to lend a helping hand for the ASEAN Connectivity initiative. ASEAN Connectivity is a crucial lynchpin for the building of the ASEAN Community in general and AEC in particular. Korea cannot match the economic resources invested in ASEAN Connectivity by its neighbouring countries like China and Japan. Nevertheless, Korea can mobilise whatever it has to help connectivity building in ASEAN. What is more, Korea should think about niches or spots left behind by bigger donors such as the US, China and Japan. If Korea can fill the gaps left by programmes financed by bigger countries, then Korea's contribution can be regarded as invaluable for ASEAN Connectivity building.

The second area where Korea can make a contribution for the success of the AEC is narrowing the development gaps among Southeast Asian countries. At the moment, Korea is doing what it can do to provide development assistance to ASEAN developing countries. Annually, Korea provides around \$400 million to Southeast Asian developing countries. This amount is a quarter of Korea's international ODA(Official Development Assistance) which is offered to more than a hundred countries around the world. Meanwhile, we cannot safely say that Korea is making enough contribution for ASEAN developing countries. Of course, Korea's international ODA amount is not below the recommendation of the OECD DAC(Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Assistance Committee). The OECD DAC proposed that OECD DAC countries should allocate at least 0.7% of their GNI (Gross National Income) for ODA.³¹ Korea has a target of 0.2% of GNI

for ODA by 2020. Korea spent only 0.13% of GNI for ODA in 2014, which is far below international recommendations.³² Given this, there is big room for improvement, which means more economic assistance for ASEAN developing countries.

Last but not least, multilateral cooperation is quite important for the successful building of the APSC and a meaningful operation of it. In that regard, there is a significant potential contribution that Korea can make. As the APSC Blueprint correctly points out that ASEAN Centrality is very crucial for the success of ASEAN and the APSC in the region. As a group of rather small and developing countries in Southeast Asia, ASEAN has to stick to the concept of ASEAN Centrality to secure its space, voice and autonomy in regional strategic dynamics. If it is real or not, bigger countries' acceptance of the concept will safeguard ASEAN's dignity in the region. More importantly, as the concept of ASEAN Centrality is accepted and recognised as a part of the norms and rules of the regional architecture, bigger countries will be subjected to the rule. Based on this, ASEAN can maximise its leverage in the region against bigger cooperation partners. What is crucial here is the existence and working of multilateral platforms in the region. The concept of ASEAN Centrality is best served in a multilateral context with institutions such as the ASEAN+3, East Asia Summit (EAS) and ARF to name a few.

Unfortunately, regional multilateral mechanisms are in a bad shape for various reasons. In this context, Korea together with ASEAN can strive for the revival or rejuvenation of regional multilateral cooperation. It works for the best interests not just of ASEAN, but also of Korea. What Korea can do in this context is to promote regional minilateral cooperation in which some regional countries can share their views on regional strategic circumstances and on regional multilateral cooperation. Those countries can build a strategic consensus to restrengthen regional multilateral cooperation. With this objective in mind, at the moment,

Korea is joining like-minded countries in informal consultation on the occasions of regional inter-governmental meetings. In addition to this, Korea has to work to promote Like-Interest Countries (LIC) unilateralism as a way to build more intensive unilateral networks of regional countries. This LIC means countries with similar specific concerns or threats can jointly pursue a solution through unilateral cooperation. While they can work together to solve specific crises or to address potential threats, they can also share their views on regional strategic issues and on regional multilateral cooperation.

5. CONCLUSION:

ASEAN-KOREA POLITICAL-SECURITY COOPERATION 20 YEARS ON

It is always tempting to make a future prediction. At the same time, it is quite dangerous to do so. A way to avoid this danger is to discuss future scenarios. Then, what are the best and worst scenarios for the future of ASEAN-Korea political and security cooperation 20 years from now?

Let me make scenarios based on each actor's security concerns. For Korea, the biggest security concern is, of course, Korean Peninsula peace and stability. For ASEAN, the members are putting so much energy in building a political-security community. The worst scenario we can imagine with these two variables is that ASEAN's political security community building effort bears no fruit and that the Korean Peninsula is plagued by instability and provocations. Then, ASEAN and Korea would not afford the luxury to build a solid cooperation basis in the area of political and security since both parties would be preoccupied with their own tasks.

The best scenario for ASEAN might be building a robust political-security community with ASEAN member states, and developing stable

domestic politics with an enhanced record of human rights, democracy and governance. While intra-ASEAN strategic consensus is strong and working, the APSC is securely positioned in the regional strategic environment with the consolidation of ASEAN Centrality. For Korea, the best scenario will be to secure lasting peace in the Korean Peninsula or at least meaningful progress be made towards permanent peace or unification. With this situation, both sides have better room for security and political cooperation.

In this context, ASEAN and Korea can put their hands together to be an anchor of peace and security in the region. Through their joint efforts, the two sides can stabilise the region through a vibrant regional multilateral cooperation. The two parties can jointly address various non-traditional threats in the region, while actively involving regional superpowers into their effort to address those threats. At the same time, ASEAN and Korea can emerge as core partners in strategic cooperation among regional small and medium countries. The two can invite other regional small and medium countries to form a strong coalition. This coalition can strengthen regional multilateralism further, and to a degree, constrain the superpowers by the rules and norms of regional multilateral cooperation. It can substantially reduce regional strategic uncertainty, and can also reduce the strategic burden and stress carried by regional countries. The situation in turn would encourage regional countries to concentrate more on future-oriented cooperation for the regional common good.

Discussion Paper

CHUNG HAE-MOON

On this section, first I would like to give my opinion on ASEAN-Korea relations on two aspects and later, give some comments on the chapters by Steven Wong and Lee Jaehyon.

My first idea is from the question “why political-security cooperation is needed and justified, and how should we enhance cooperation?” The two sides agreed to reinforce political-security dialogue several years ago at the official levels and later, the scope of political and security cooperation continues to grow, corresponding to the ever-expanding nature in our overall bilateral exchanges and interactions.

Enhanced collaboration on the political-security issues, both traditional and non-traditional, has tended to foster the common understanding that the security of Northeast Asia is closely intertwined with that of Southeast Asia. The challenge we face in this regard is how to translate the common understanding of security into the common perception and even common conviction of security. ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Statement on the Developments in the Korean Peninsula on 5 August 2017 was an appropriate and timely response to the threat posed by the DPRK’s provocative behaviours. It will be in the security interests of ASEAN member states for them to enforce methodically

and rigorously all the United Nations Security Council Resolutions related to the DPRK's nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles tests.

Then, how should we boost the common security perceptions between two sides of ASEAN and Korea? I think we need to undertake a series of outreach targeting a cross-section of stakeholders across the region, engaging them to embrace and spread the imperatives of the interconnectedness of security between Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. The media can play a very important role in this regard. Another useful idea might be to teach young students the close correlation of security between Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. On the other hand, non-traditional security challenges have emerged more prominently in recent years. While ASEAN and Korea see eye to eye on most if not all of the non-traditional security issues, nonetheless, it is incumbent on both of us to step up our joint efforts at addressing non-traditional security threats such as transnational crimes, terrorism, maritime security, cybersecurity, food and energy security, climate change, disaster management, drugs and pandemic diseases, refugees, among others.

My second point may be an answer to the question of "How creative and innovative should we be in making ASEAN's community building experience relevant to other regions?" The unveiling of the ASEAN Community in the year 2015 and the ASEAN Community Vision 2025 will continue to serve as a beacon of inspiration for other regions, such as Northeast Asia, the wider East Asia and the Asia Pacific to move steadily in the same direction that ASEAN has spearheaded. The experience and know-how accumulated by ASEAN over the past five decades while focusing on the Community building since its inception, are truly a precious and priceless asset that can be utilised as both regional and global public goods. ASEAN and Korea are encouraged to forge another partnership which can be a bridge towards a more integrated Northeast Asia and act as a catalyst for propelling East Asia

integration for realising an East Asia Economic Community. Our mutual interest and determination will be sure to serve and to ensure the partnership also remains instrumental in reenergising an East Asian community building process.

In regard to Lee Jaehyon's chapter, with respect to the first pillar of the APSC, which refers to "a Rules-based Community of Shared Values and Norms," Korea's Anti-Corruption & Civil Rights Commission has built very productive working relationships with its counterparts in Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam in a bid to share Korea's experience and know-how to combat corruption in the public sector, with much success. Korea can extend similar cooperation to other ASEAN member states. Korea has also actively participated in the Bali Democracy Forum initiated by Indonesia under the presidency of Yudhoyono. The forum has focused its attention on how to strengthen democratic institutions across nations in the Asia Pacific region. Korea has done a lot to contribute to the success of the forum by sharing its experience of building democratic institutions, upholding the rule of law, consolidating good governance, securing independence of the judiciary and ensuring freedom of the press, etc. I think Korea still has a lot more to share with the ASEAN member states on this pillar.

Regarding the second pillar of the APSC, which refers to, "a Cohesive, Peaceful, Stable and Resilient Region with Shared Responsibility for Comprehensive Security," as I already indicated, Korea has no reason why it should not expand its cooperation with ASEAN to jointly and vigorously address non-traditional security challenges for our two regions.

Regarding Steven Wong's chapter, within the context of the ARF, ASEAN and Korea have maintained solid cooperation to strengthen the foundations for dealing with both traditional and non-traditional security challenges regionwide. Although the ARF has been a primary

platform for dialogue on the Korean Peninsula, ASEAN and Korea can still work together to make sure that the ARF remains a more effective channel of communication between the international community and the DPRK. I believe that the ARF is in a good position to show the DPRK that there is an alternative path to peace, prosperity and wellbeing.

Within the framework of the ADMM+, Korea and Singapore co-chair the Expert Working Group on maritime security for the 2017-2020 cycle, indicating Korea's willingness to contribute to peace and security in the region. The Humanitarian Assistance & Disaster Relief is one of seven areas of hands-on practical training and exercises of the ADMM+, in which Korea has been very active. When in 2013 Super Typhoon Haiyan struck Tacloban in the Philippines with devastating impact, Korea responded by dispatching the National Disaster Relief Team and a contingent of military engineer and medical units. Korea also participates in the annual Cobra Gold field training exercise to contribute to enhancing humanitarian civic assistance projects in various Thai communities by sending a combined contingent of Navy and Marine Corps. Food security is another important aspect of the non-traditional security challenge where ASEAN-Korea cooperation could make a difference. A good example of it was set in June 2017 when Thailand decided to ship one million eggs to help ease a domestic supply shortage in Korea caused by the outbreak of the avian flu. The cyber security has become a serious global concern where the enhanced cooperation between ASEAN and Korea within the context of the ADMM+ will be expected to bear fruit by sharing experience and know-how accumulated in tackling cybersecurity related issues.

As ASEAN and Korea gradually expand defence-related cooperation, defence industry cooperation has come to prominence recently. Korea has been helping to beef up the defence capacity of

Thailand and the Philippines by completing the delivery of T-50 planes, which are 21st century supersonic advanced trainer and light attack jets designed with state-of-the-art technology. Indonesia is the first foreign country that has taken delivery of a submarine built in Korea. Furthermore, Korea and Indonesia are currently co-developing the next generation of fighter jets at the Korea Aerospace Industries, with the participation of 80 technicians from Indonesia.

Finally, with respect to the possibility for the ADMM+ROK Informal Meeting, I think, we are reminded that ASEAN and Korea agreed to reinforce political and security cooperation to promote sustainable peace and stability in the region at the 2014 ASEAN-Korea Commemorative Summit held in Busan, Korea. As such, the informal meeting might prove to be useful, beneficial and worthwhile if the two sides could identify specific areas of cooperation, set meticulous agenda and make steady progress in preparations based upon mutual understanding and trust. But, how to combine the right conditions with the right timing could be crucial.

Part 2

ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP

ASEAN-Korea Economic Relations through 2025

FEDERICO MACARANAS

ABSTRACT

Korean economic relations with ASEAN in the 21st century has to be approached from a Whole-of-ASEAN Community approach in the spirit of the 50th Anniversary theme of ASEAN 2017, “Partnering for Change, Engaging the World.” This requires recognition of: (1) global trends including political and socio-cultural forces that shape trade in value added; (2) equity in addition to efficiency issues emphasised in ASEAN roadmap through 2025 that underpins the Master Plan for ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) and the relations of SME and large firms in global value chains, and; (3) a fresh approach to Korea’s development assistance and private trade and investment at the regional and sub-regional level, to complement the bilateral activities with individual ASEAN member states. These are important to the economic relations as (1) ASEAN share in Korea’s FDI flows to Asia has gone up dramatically after the 2008 financial crisis, while Asia’s share in Korea’s global FDI has trended downward in what is believed to be the Asia-Pacific Century, and (2) over the past decades, Korean investment in ASEAN has become more focused on SMEs rather than large firms.

* **Key words:** Economic relations, Trade in value added, Global value chains, Bilateral activities, Sub-regional level, Connectivity

1. INTRODUCTION

Former Korean Foreign Minister Han Sung-Joo, in his 3 August 2017 keynote address of the conference of “ASEAN@50: The Way Forward: The New World Order in the 21st Century,” states:

“Using reason and science to guide decisions, paired with leadership and good will, human society can and should progress to higher and higher levels of well-being and development [...] How can ASEAN, a most successful endeavour at regional multilateralism, at the age of 50 contribute to establishing a new world order that will promote peace, enhance human welfare, integrate people, regions and the world? It has proven to be inclusive, tolerant, and exemplary in bringing peoples and nations together for the common goal of peace, prosperity and progress. It has successfully displayed leadership and, yes essentiality in bringing the people, the sub-region, the pan-region, and the world together. I believe it can continue this good work and help us to build a new world order that is based on a more complex and inclusive internationalism. Only when we work together can we battle the illiberal and destabilizing trends that are threatening the fabric of our societies and the peaceful global order. Congratulations on ASEAN at Fifty!”

Against these thoughtful remarks, what are the perspectives for the new ASEAN-Korea economic relations to 2025? What are the implications for the policies to build an approach to the relationship that keeps the spirit of ASEAN-Korea aspirations as documented in various reports?

2. WHOLE-OF-ASEAN COMMUNITY VIEW

Korea’s economic relations with ASEAN has to be approached with the lens of 21st century issues of the Whole-of-ASEAN Community

view that will evolve in new ways of interactions: ASEAN 2025 looks at economic issues in a systems-wide, cross-pillar relationships within and across ASEAN member states, and even with dialogue partners. Furthermore, all economic players are faced with value chains in international production systems that are impacted by non-economic forces of globalisation, technology disruption, populism, and millennial sentiments. Additionally, equity issues, in relation to efficiency concerns, are gaining in importance even in bilateral ASEAN economic relations due to the ways small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) relate to large ones in global production and distribution markets.

2.1 Trade Interdependence in ASEAN+3


Stages of economic development

The Whole-of-ASEAN Community view must begin with changing how member states are perceived across diverse stages of economic development. To this point, bilateral ASEAN-Korea economic relations is different from individual ASEAN member states' bilateral relations with Korea.

The former (bilateral ASEAN-Korea economic relations) is the preferred 21st century approach in integrating the member states in the different stages of economic development: Stage 1 (factor-driven) + Stage 2 (efficiency-driven) + Stage 3 (innovation-driven) and the in between stages (see Figure 1 below). This is the spirit of narrowing the development gaps in ASEAN among the latecomers and the original members as the group engages in the global value chain with Korea and Northeast Asia (ASEAN+3) in the 21st century.

The latter (individual ASEAN member states and Korea relations) is the early model for traditional Official Development Aids (ODA) which led to development of country programs. A later development is the Regional Aid for Trade (RAfT): an early 21st century approach for

Figure 1. Various Stages of Economic Development of ASEAN Countries and Some Dialogue Partners



development assistance that international organisations had adopted to increase efficiency via economies of scale and scope, in wider geographic areas covered by regional or even sub-regional arrangements.¹ An observation of traditional Korean ODA is that it seems to be based on a fast-growth culture of an emerging major donor that allows room for learning from the general experience in project implementation on pre-surveys, monitoring evaluation and long-term sustainability.²

It has also been suggested that ODA recipients in country programs can also be taught proper project formulation with more focus. For example, of the 121 projects under the ASEAN-Korea Plan of Action (2013-14), only 23 were initiated by ASEAN, 47 by Korea, and 51 were jointly initiated.³ This is especially urgent as ASEAN-wide cross-border linkages will be improved with the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) focusing on five areas of physical, institutional, and people-to-people connectivity such as (1) sustainable infrastructure; (2) digital innovation (3) seamless logistics, (4) regulatory excellence and (5) people mobility.

Indeed, the grouping of major Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) projects includes industry and energy, rural development, health and education in Cambodia; environment, governance, and industry and energy for Indonesia; education, rural development, health, industry and energy in Laos; rural development, environment and education in Myanmar; agriculture and fisheries, industry and energy, and health in the Philippines, and; environment, education, and industry and energy in Vietnam.⁴ It will be of interest to ASEAN 2025 how these are all able to contribute beyond regional understanding of best practices, as these may lead to South-South cooperation among ASEAN member states, the more advanced of whom have their own technical assistance programs which Korea can leverage for cross-ASEAN replication. Likewise, the key groupings of projects suggest room for ODA project location in some areas where private Korean direct investment may be situated, an issue for possible consideration in bilateral ASEAN-Korea talks.

Long-term view of economic issues

The Whole-of-ASEAN Community view suggests understanding longer term economic trends as affected by political and social forces arising from disruptive technologies. On one hand declining nation-states and Westphalian political borders were brought about by revolutions in transport and communication. Rising economic communities were, on the other hand, brought about by revolutions in industry, agriculture, and now services due to digitalisation in the information and knowledge age. These have impacted the world differently. In ASEAN and Korea, the Asian financial crisis of the late 20th century and the global financial crisis of 2008 taught several crucial lessons. These include:

- (a) redirecting of investment flows which favoured ASEAN as Korea's outward FDI increased in Southeast Asia relative to other parts of Asia;


- (b) strengthening macroeconomic fundamentals through robust monetary and fiscal policies in open markets including capitalism's variants in market socialist systems and;
- (c) real economy policies for employing people productively and innovatively in the face of jobless growth and poor physical and people connectivity, which China hopes to mitigate through its One Belt One Road initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) 2025 issues have to be approached simultaneously with political-security issues and socio-cultural issues because of long-term forces such as:

- (a) the maritime access to South China Sea accommodated trillions of global trade flows, and Chinese current position as a major trading partner of over 120 countries;
- (b) the tri-continental infrastructure grand design by China for connectivity to Asia and Europe through land and sea opens access to natural resources and new markets;
- (c) socio-cultural issues of younger markets in ASEAN and Korea — how millennials adapt to the digital economy, how mentally prepared they are for accepting the redefined war against civilization that is terrorism, and for adopting continuous or life-long learning for entrepreneurship in very volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) times (see Figure 2 below).

The 2014 Busan Commemorative Summit for 25 Years of Korea as a dialogue partner of ASEAN resulted in major initiatives to increase ASEAN-Korea trade from \$150 billion in 2015 to \$200 billion by 2020, and complete the negotiations on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) by 2015 which has been unrealised but is

Figure 2. Long Term View of Economic Issues



being pushed by the Philippines as Chair of the 2017 ASEAN meetings. Pertinent to the ASEAN 2025 vision of a narrower development gap among ASEAN member states, Korea's development experience, including the *Saemaul Undong* or the New Community Movement, will be promoted. Likewise, there will be widened educational cooperation for job training for ASEAN students, enhanced Korean studies and ASEAN-area studies and training courses for government officials and next generation of opinion makers.

The Busan Summit also addressed political and security cooperation in line with what analysts see Korea as a middle power: strengthening institutions led by ASEAN, supporting ASEAN Community building, and ASEAN Centrality, deepening security cooperation in traditional and non-traditional fields, and holding security dialogues in the annual ASEAN-Korea dialogue. On the Korean Peninsula, its denuclearisation for sustainable peace and stability is foremost; pressing North Korea to fully implement international commitments. Busan aimed to build the environment for the resumption of the Six Party Talks and to lay the basis for complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation, to promote trust building and a vision for peaceful unification and the

Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative.⁵

ASEAN and Korea two-way trade declined from \$131.4 billion in 2014 to \$122.9 billion in 2015. Nevertheless, Korea remains the 5th largest trading partner of ASEAN. FDI flows from Korea to ASEAN grew steadily. Korea's FDI to ASEAN rose from 1.7 billion in 2011 to 4.3 billion in 2013 and 5.7 billion in 2015. This makes Korea the fifth largest investment partner of ASEAN.


Investments for GVC transformation

The third perspective needed from ASEAN 2025 is investment in the global value chain (GVC) transformation. The empirical concept useful for this is "Trade in Value Added" (TiVA) which separates the contribution of globally purchased supplies added to local input providers in ASEAN and Korea for their own exports. What is the necessary investment in physical, human, social, and other forms of capital to help attain overall sustainable economic development for ASEAN?

For Korea, the composition of its Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) flow to the world is changing. The ASEAN Investment Report 2016 shows the bilateral relations are at the fourth stage of Korean FDI flow to ASEAN after the financial crisis of 2008. Korean SMEs' FDI to ASEAN now accounts for 54% of Korea's total FDI to ASEAN as every nation faces GVC integration. This fourth stage is called the accelerated globalisation stage, following the 1996 to 2008 restructuring stage (post-Asian financial crisis), 1986 to 1997 growth stage, and the 1982 to 1987 initial stage of government-led industrialisation. The ASEAN share of Korean FDI to Asia is trending positively in an increasing way (see Figure 3 below). It shows how ASEAN is becoming more important to Korea's economic relations in the entire Asia.

ASEAN's share in the Asian FDI received from Korea is represented

Figure 3. Korea FDI to ASEAN, Asia and the World



* Source: ASEAN, *The ASEAN Investment Report 2016*

by the middle line; the polynomial curve fit shows a U-shape indicating the increasing trend after a period of decline, with the turning point occurring around 2005. In stark contrast, the Asian share of Korea's world FDI is the upper inverted-U trend line with turning point also occurring around 2006, declining after a rising period. The combined trends however (lowermost curve fit) show that the ASEAN share of Korea's FDI to the world is slightly rising, if at all. In a more protectionist world, this aspect of ASEAN-Korea economic relations demand careful study.

This is where TiVA gains importance as the metric for global economic relations – “a statistical approach that estimates the sources (country and industry) of value that is added in the production of goods and services for exports.”⁶ For development purposes in the ASEAN 2025 roadmap, this is the appropriate measure of the contribution of trade to an economy – the local wages, profits, interest incomes, and rents earned

by domestic factors of production that accrue to residents who hopefully recycles them within the economy for sustaining growth and development. TiVA calls attention to the cross-regional economic relations (ASEAN+3) and China's central role in the Northeast-Southeast Asian GVC, as the largest partner of over 120 countries of the world today.


Appendix A delves in greater depth into the ASEAN+3 view given China's role in ASEAN-Korea economic relations.

2.2 GVC Transformation

How can the ASEAN 2025 emphasis on more inclusive growth be factored into the SMEs in global markets? This is the subject of GVC transformation in an ASEAN ICT Masterplan (AIM) Study for APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC) featuring several ASEAN+3 domiciled companies. Various types of GVC connectivity between large enterprises and micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) are studied based on the combinations shown in Figure 4 below.

- (a) old and new business motives — traditional (mainly for profit), impact investing: investment in target sectors for more focused impact on employment, environment, or other concerns, with profits returned to investors who use these wherever they see fit) social enterprise (same as impact investing except that profits are recycled into the same firm to realise their own vision), or corporate social responsibility (CSR where no profits are sometimes not expected provided they meet certain social obligations), and
- (b) different impact levels — system-wide (many firms adapting same project across a national economic system, or even regional or global systems), replicability at lower level (many firms adapting same project in a region), scalability (other firms adapting model firms), sustainability (many projects in one firm), and shared value stages (one project in one firm where stakeholder values are shared with shareholders).

Figure 4. Motives vis-à-vis Impact of Business Model



The study shows sustainable growth with equity or shared prosperity can be achieved within the Southeast Asian economies and with Northeast Asia (ASEAN+3) through various connectivity models. These include traditional SME or large enterprise provision of inputs or supplier relations (labour, raw materials, capital, knowledge, technology), or more complex relationships which can be implemented through

- (a) subsidiaries – 14 major Korean Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) had 116 subsidiaries in ASEAN in 2015 across 8 member states
- (b) venture capital funds – through Korean initiatives in APEC and ASEAN SME working groups
- (c) industry associations – Korean standards setting for ASEAN suppliers
- (d) public-private partnerships – Korea programming of ODA along ASEAN Consolidated Strategic Action Plan for ASEAN Economic Community 2025 Blueprint

(e) an ecosystem connecting various public goods and services to MSMEs or large enterprises – such as in Korea the Startup Alliance.

The AIM-ABAC cases may be linked to the Vision of the MPAC “to achieve a seamlessly and comprehensively connected and integrated ASEAN that will promote competitiveness, inclusiveness, and a greater sense of Community.” The cases include references to physical, institutional and people-to-people linkages classified under sustainable infrastructure, digital innovation, seamless logistics, regulatory excellence, and people-to-people mobility.

Three policy perspectives for both public and private leaders are presented: continuous study of MSME-large enterprise linkages for the GVC, simultaneous collaboration and competitive positioning, and more inclusive business approaches. More specific recommendations are suggested at various stages of GVC transformation.

The ASEAN 2017 focus on MSMEs was launched by both government and industry leaders in the Philippines; many Korean businessmen and officials participated in the discussions. The additional interest that can be pushed through for ASEAN-Korea relations will be the RAfT perspective so that groups and associations of SMEs in particular industries can be assisted, e.g., creative cities that feature traditional cultural products.

The case studies on Korea are Startup Alliance and CJ Cheiljedang, represented in Figure 4 in the second circle under Traditional Business motive and across Replicability for impact level. This group combines traditional business (*mainly profit* motivated) with *replicable practices* in linking SME players with large enterprises in other settings. The position of these Korean companies suggests new ways of looking at the 21st century ASEAN-Korea relations. The movement can be to the upper circle, northwest circle, or to its right in the Figure.

Consider the first-movement to the upper circle, where the Alibaba case is instructive. The profit-oriented Alibaba engages its Taobao Village e-tailer in digital commerce space across the whole of China; Alibaba gives preferential funding to firms in villages with more than 20% of local production sold through their site, and it is available across the entire country. Once Korea's Startup Alliance is applied to economic sectors like agriculture, where digital applications can be designed in an eco-system framework, then it can move to the upper circle (system-side application). Korea can help ASEAN in this regard, with CJ Cheiljedang as a possible collaborator in wider public-private engagement across CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) or The Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA).

Consider next the movement to the northwest with the Impact Investing case of Maybank Islamic. Its loan portfolio uses Shariah bank risk-sharing principles that have definite social impact when SMEs engage large enterprises in GVCs. Korea's largest banks have invested in ASEAN; it may be fruitful to collaborate on creating new fintech models for more inclusive activities with SMEs, e.g., efforts of central banks to promote national retail payments system that will enable country-wide penetration of the unbanked who can then finance the production and distribution activities of cooperatives and larger economic units trained in *Saemaul Undong* principles.

BIMP-EAGA is a likely region to further help the world in understanding Shariah bank risk-sharing principles, since Malaysia is the world leader in this type of 21st century equity-conscious finance, while Indonesia, the Philippines and Brunei have large Muslim populations that can benefit from such financing.

An attractive magnet for this is the size of the global halal market, estimated at \$581 billion, serving a population of 2.1 billion Muslims

plus others attracted to the benefits of high quality, safe and ethical products that adhere to values promoted by halal markets - social responsibility, stewardship of the earth, economic and social justice (risk-sharing banking & finance), animal welfare and ethical investment (fair trade) - all beyond religious compliance issues.

Interestingly, CJ Cheiljedang won halal certifications for its 30 food items including microwavable rice, seaweed dried laver, and packaged kimchi⁷ from the Malaysian Department of Islamic Development - which are among the most difficult to get as these are the strictest.

Finally, consider moving to the right from where the two Korean cases are. The large circle in Exhibit 4 containing AGPPS, Jollibee, etc., are also impact investing models but only at the limited replicability rather than system-wide application level. Here, profits from activities in SME-large firm linkages can be directed toward investments in activities generating specific public or social goods, like training for higher level skills or adopting global environment standards, improving financing terms, linkages with other suppliers in poor or remote towns.

Korea may choose to move in this direction also, especially as its people movement in ASEAN enables entrepreneurs to see potential businesses the way other migrant communities have infused dynamism in countries hosting their presence. For the Hallyu soft-power diplomacy the impact on particular communities can be connected into local value chains, e.g., training of certain workers in agriculture cooperatives, including application of electronic technologies, including drone development for surveying farmers' fields for productivity purposes, and later financing of canning operations of other firms using food technologies developed in Korea in partnership with local groups in ASEAN.

2.3 Equity and Efficiency

A third major concern in the Whole-of-ASEAN Community view is how ASEAN as a group sees Korea in terms of economic cooperation. Is Korea a market or a donor (ODA) which is underpinned by efficiency vs. equity issues?

Early in the economic relations, Korea's development assistance helped in the traditional areas of producing public goods like skills and training, and area development useful for trade and investment – and it learned, and continues to learn from the experience of other donors in the design and execution of such programs. By the late 20th century, ASEAN participants in the GVC, including Korea, saw market-oriented, arms-length relations. It was largely motivated by private profits driven by efficiency and productivity, but there shows up some people who throw concerns into the picture driven by some large corporations, following global trends. However, there did not seem to be any coordinated public and private policy views on overall development until the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were pushed by the UN especially during the tenure of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon.

Indeed, in the 21st century, ASEAN and Korea face the changed world of economic relations with two forces at work: (1) growing sentiment for equity in economic arrangements within and across national boundaries – be that private sector production and distribution systems, or government regulations or inter-governmental policies as shaped more and more by social profits, diversified people and planet considerations and; (2) the changing environment of regional economic integration. Global rules-based arrangements of the World Tourism Organization (WTO) before digital commerce became pervasive are increasingly challenged by technological disruption that reshapes boundaries of industries horizontally and vertically.⁸

In the 21st century, equity issues have become a main focus of ASEAN as it further pushes the integration of SMEs into regional and global markets. The ASEAN Vision 2025 (Kuala Lumpur Declaration on ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead Together) faces these equity concerns by stressing that “the ASEAN Economic Community by 2025 shall be highly integrated and cohesive; competitive, innovative and dynamic; with enhanced connectivity and sectoral cooperation; and a more resilient, inclusive, and people-oriented, people-centred community, integrated with the global economy.”

At the same time efficiency issues have not been neglected; various ASEAN fora are engaged in implementing tariff and non-tariff barriers directly impacting on revenues and costs of enterprises. Bilateral trade arrangements focused on 20th century issues of tariff barriers; new generation trade agreements like RCEP and TPP focus additionally on issues that traditional trade negotiators need help on – for environmental issues, intellectual property, labour, and human rights concerns – this help may come from other agencies of governments, and other private sector experts from academe and industry. RCEP and TPP have economic-technical cooperation built into the agreement, although RCEP builds on *existing* cooperation agreements between ASEAN and dialogue partners, and focuses on development gaps to maximise mutual benefits”, while TPP focuses on needs of developing member economies in implementing *high standard* provisions.

Today, the challenge to ASEAN-Korea economic relations is the creation of an ecosystem for government-industry-people collaboration to realise further integration of the Northeast Asian with Southeast Asian economies. This is basic in creating the foundations for more lasting peace and stability for the 21st Pax Asia-Pacific Century, or even as suggested by Australia to be extended to Pax Asia-Indo-Pacific as India will rival Chinese economic growth and development by mid-21st century.

3. SHARING KOREAN INNOVATION WITH ASEAN

3.1 Technological Innovation for Efficiency

Innovation in 21st century education: Korea ranks high in both the global innovation index (2016 efficiency rating better than all of ASEAN) and ranking among top universities of the world.⁹ There can be more education exchanges directed at areas where ASEAN can move forward together. It could be as broad as further assisting the move towards an EU Bologna Accord-type harmonisation of education across ASEAN memberstates and related upgrading at various levels. This idea, for example, was supported for by ASEAN+3 Educators Ministers meeting of 2011 in Bali resulting in an action plan through 2017. It could be as specific as training in particular fields for youth interested in digital start-ups, to help solve problems in farms, fisheries, or forest communities for food security. This can be the people-to-people exchange envisioned in ASEAN 2025.

Innovation and economic development: A view from Korea suggests that ASEAN will experience difficulty in the AEC facilitating economic development because of the FDI-led development model that has not emphasised its own technological capabilities. ASEAN also has not helped indigenous enterprises to develop itself except in the low-tech assembled manufacturing sector, such as food, tobacco, and wood processing, as well as in service sectors that are heavily protected by government, such as retail, finance, and real estate (which can be appreciated from GVC transformation from United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) based on movement to various stages of production).

In the 21st century, the direction for high-tech industries such as electronics is to be applied to many other industries. The East Asian production system is suggested as the international network that ASEAN should link within more deeply since its market size is not large




Figure 5. Korea in ASEAN + 3 Economic Complexity Index

enough for this industry to help pull up its overall growth trajectory. Indeed, the technology solution to ASEAN’s domestic growth is for it to be part of the electronics GVC. Professor Park Bun Soon in fact suggested that the East Asia Comprehensive Technology Research Institute, a think tank proposed by Second East Asian Vision Group (EAVG II), be located in a middle-income country like the Philippines in order to serve as a bridge between the developed and the less developed countries in ASEAN.¹⁰

The technology solution is already being addressed by the rising economic complexity of ASEAN economies as suggested by the export tree generated from the Economic Complexity Index of Harvard and MIT.¹¹ Countries that move up the complexity chain add more value and achieve higher GDP than those lagging in complexity. Those economies that wish to improve productive capabilities are advised to trade with

partners whose technologies raise the complexity of their own export products. Digital monolithic integrated circuits account for 40% of the Philippines export tree map, 20% for Singapore, and 5% for Thailand, respectively, while electronic microcircuits comprise 12% of Malaysia's exports. In fact, the economic complexity index improved dramatically between 1998 to 2008, two periods of financial crisis, for both Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia, while it fell for the western industrial economies. (See Figure 5 showing Economic Complexity Index (ECI) levels for 2008 and 2015, plotted vs changes in two periods 1998-2008, and 2008-2015, respectively). Dramatically, these figures show that most ASEAN remain in the dynamic northeast quadrant where Korea leads, albeit Japan is still the highest ranked, most economically complex country. The Philippines had the highest global increase in ECI in 2016 over 2015.

Indeed, long-term economic growth will be affected by both the reform of the world's financial system and the real economic sector adopting technology by domestic entrepreneurs, not merely relying on FDI to transfer such technologies.¹²

3.2 Social Innovation

Many lessons on social innovation can be learned from Korea's *Saemaul Undong* as below.¹³ (a) creating the rural development foundations – education and health programs; capacity for local governance; agricultural research and extension services; institutions to support rural economy like financing, storage, processing, transport and communication: (b) cultivating strong leadership skills – in national champions, village-level change agents, empowered women and study trips abroad : (c) developing national policies that favour the rural sector – rural development as a national high priority, pricing mechanisms that incentivise inputs marketing and product procurement and decentralised

development for non-farm employment: (d) inculcating the *Saemaul Undong* Spirit – farmers at the centre of national development, village level participation in planning and execution of projects, rewarding successful communities with investments and village selection of officials.

4. OTHER IMPLICATIONS FOR KOREA

4.1 Public-Private Partnership in ODA + OFDI

Following the successful Korea-Mekong Cooperation, there can be a powerful impact if Korean investments and ODA efforts are coordinated in BIMP-EAGA, e.g., in preparing the environment for which specific industries choose to locate, as in transport now that the roll-on/roll-off maritime plan has been launched, a boon to the Korean shipbuilding industry as connectivity of the non-land linked countries of ASEAN is emphasised. Korean investments in shipbuilding in the Philippines, among others, propelled the latter to the fourth largest shipbuilding nation in the world just behind Korea, China and Japan – surpassing its European rivals. POSCO, with its steel industry strategy in Indonesia, and ICTSI of the Philippines, a major ASEAN maritime terminal industry player that is one of the top 5 in the global logistics and transport sectors, are players relevant to this shipbuilding industry linkages.¹⁴

This coordinated ODA+OFDI of Korea in ASEAN and its sub-regions holds the same rationale for moving the comprehensive partnerships with Korea in some ASEAN countries (namely, Vietnam) to strategic bilateral engagements, and eventually to regional and global public goods addressing on such issues as anti-piracy, climate change, cybercrimes, forestry cooperation, green growth (as in Thailand's global green automobile production base plans), natural disaster management, new epidemics, terrorism, and water resources.¹⁵ It is in the very spirit of the Whole-of-ASEAN Community view.

An example of a successful ODA + OFDI is the project management office set up by Cheiljedang and KOICA that works directly with the local community. The private CJ's agricultural experts and a *Saemaul Undong* team have set up a self-sufficient cooperative that liaises with other local farmers for farming contracts with CJ for chili farming¹⁶.

4.2 Completion of the RCEP Negotiations

Early in 2017, Trade Ministers of Korea and the Philippines as Chair of ASEAN 2017 agreed that they would work together in the ASEAN-led conclusion of RCEP negotiations agreed to in the Busan Summit. In April, consultations with the Philippine private sector were conducted by the Chair; in May, the Philippines proposed a compromise to expedite the negotiations by allowing any of the 16 participating countries of the regional agreement to opt out initially on certain items of the deal which were not amenable or ready to implement yet.¹⁷

By early August, the Philippines' Trade and Industry Secretary Ramon Lopez said that the biggest concern for the participating countries was reaching agreement on a common number for the goods that will be granted duty free access. He said that while most of the 16 nations involved had already agreed for the inclusion of 90% of their products for liberalisation, however, at most two had declined to commit, setting their target at 92% for their respective products.¹⁸

5. CONCLUSION

The major points raised in this presentation can now be summed up as follows. First, 21st century ASEAN-Korea economic relations should be approached from a Whole-of-ASEAN Community view for the implementation of AEC 2025 Blueprint and its Consolidated Strategic Action Plan. ASEAN 2025 emphasises systems-wide, cross-

pillar, people-centred relationships within and across member states and dialogue partners. So it implies that Korea must see ASEAN more for the single production base view of AEC and ASEAN Community in general. At the same time, value chains in international production systems are impacted by non-economic forces of globalisation, technology disruption, populism, millennial sentiments, etc. The implication is that ASEAN and Korea must improve intra-ASEAN linkages in production of inputs for final products of Korean firms anywhere they are located (e.g., ASEAN+3) and for Korean SME participation in ASEAN economies at the local level. In addition, equity issues, in relation to efficiency concerns, are gaining in importance especially with the ASEAN 2017 focus on how SMEs can relate to large enterprises in global production and distribution markets. The implication is to treat CLMV, BIMP-EAGA, Indonesia–Malaysia–Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT) differently for synergy in public ODA and private investment decisions, e.g., application of *Saemaul Undong* principles.

Second, ASEAN looks at the strengths of Korea in a mutually beneficial partnership in a chaotic world. Korean innovation must be shared with ASEAN economic sectors recognising comparative advantages in each other. The implication is to strengthen S&T cooperation in key areas, especially in education for technology innovation and for production of more economically complex value-adding inputs for final goods and services. (Consolidated Strategic Action Plan for AEC 2025 Blueprint).

There are some other implications for Korea such as: (a) closer Korean public (e.g. ODA) and private sector cooperation where they can foster ASEAN's collective move towards regional prosperity through efficient/productive systems and effective practices and policies especially for SMEs sectors, such as education for technology innovation in the

digital age; (b) review of mega-FTAs such as the TPP and RCEP with emphasis on the impact the US withdrawal will have on the AEC in terms of (i) role of ASEAN centrality as a convenor, (ii) review of ASEAN consensus not as a majority wins proposition but in the spirit of Indonesia's Musyawarah Mufakat decision making practices or continuous deliberation until all significantly affected parties arrive at happy compromise on key issues, and (iii) ASEAN+3 as building block to RCEP (now being pushed through with Korea for final conclusion of negotiations by November 2017 ASEAN Summit in Manila with Dialogue Partners) or a new TPP if remaining countries can strategise its long term consideration along the broader cooperation in Free Trade Area for Asia-Pacific being discussed in APEC, the forum where ASEAN+3 can have a more significant voice for the Asia-Pacific Century which former Korean Foreign Minister Han Sung-Joo asserted that must "bring(ing) the people, the sub-region, the pan-region, and the world together."

APPENDIX A.

CHINA'S ROLE IN ASEAN-KOREA ECONOMIC RELATIONS

A-1.

Trade interdependence in ASEAN+3 pivots largely on China's role as the largest trading nation through ASEAN 2025 in gross terms as reported in traditional customs data for balance of payments accounting. It is already the largest trading partner for more than 120 countries in the world. What matters in globally interdependent economic relations however are not the gross terms but TiVA.¹⁹

For example, in global trade, China's gross exports to any country are the sum of its own value added on top of what they buy *from the rest of the world*. It is the value added of China that should worry leaders who think that 100% of gross exports are unfairly prejudicing bilateral trade relations. As explained in an earlier slide on TiVA, it is the TiVA concept that should be used for explaining what some world leaders mistake for jobs "stolen" by one country when they see gross trade data. In China as in other cases, the data that explains what creates jobs for Chinese workers is the TiVA concept; the purchases of inputs or goods and services for production of the exports create jobs in other countries is neglected by protectionist leaders who do not understand the deepening and broadening global interdependence post the 2008 financial crisis.

A-2.

Figure A suggests the following two striking conclusions: First, China's value added is highest for its exports to the US (black line) which rose to over 25% through 2005 but declined thereafter to under 25% (TiVA data have been collected only for limited number of years). The same trend is evident in China's value added in its exports to Japan where the data show a decrease from 20% to around 10%. The implication here is that China's exports to the US and Japan have increasingly been more

Figure A. Top Chinese Export Destinations





Figure B. Top Chinese Import Sources



* Source: IMF, Direction of Trade data base, IMF Website

dependent on China's purchase of inputs of goods and services from the rest of the world – around 75% of the value of China's exports to US and 90% of China's exports to Japan. China's value added to its exports to Korea is much lower at a stable average of around 5%, suggesting that China buys more inputs from the rest of the world to sell goods to Korea. China in essence gets more domestic growth impetus from trade with the US, Japan, Korea, Germany and India than with other trade partners.

Second, ASEAN does not figure high in China's export destination if ASEAN is not considered as a group but only as individual countries. Seen collectively therefore, an integrated ASEAN is more meaningful for China's growth – and Korea can play a role in this regard by making sure the ASEAN economic integration hastens the search for peaceful solutions to geopolitical problems.

A-3.

Indeed, ASEAN as a group becomes quite important in China's imports based on trade in value added (see China's imports sources in Figure B). ASEAN and Korea, together with Japan, are China's largest import partners.

In future ASEAN-Korea economic relations therefore, China must be considered in the picture and ASEAN must be treated also as a group, not only as individual states by its economic partners. In a similar way, there may be synergies in long-term ASEAN+3 relations.

Since ASEAN and Korea are likely to continue to increase their participation in global value chains, they should factor in the Chinese economic clout – in markets for a variety of goods and services including those shaped by cultural forces, or as source of funds especially as the renminbi has become an international reserve and a currency for trade and capital market issues, and a major global digital commerce player, among others. International production networks are likely to evolve with more interdependent ASEAN-Korea-China markets – e.g.,

geographical proximity allows for closer research and development collaboration (e.g., rice and other agricultural products which enter into more sophisticated food production systems such as Cheiljedang, and the Rice science for a better world research by International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) on improving global demand side management of the ASEAN rice industry), or for lower costs of shipment of parts and components for final goods production destined for world markets (including the Korean ship building industry).

The relevant question is how does bilateral ASEAN-Korea agreement complement an ASEAN+3 arrangement in the 21st century when GVCs will deepen relationships.

The largest importer of Chinese goods and services is the US, but indigenous Chinese inputs count only 21.01% of China's gross exports to the US in 2011. This puts into question the rationale for US President Trump's populist approach to more inward-looking economic policies. However, as seen in Figure A, US imports of Chinese products in TiVA terms have been declining since 2000, and while the trend is still visible, it has slowed down in the recent years.

Following the US is Japan, with 10.28% of Chinese gross exports. Similar to the trend of Chinese exports to the US, Japanese gross imports of Chinese goods and services exhibit a declining trend as well.

Three countries (Korea, Germany, and India) all exhibit a slow upward trend in their gross Chinese imports, though the volume of the Chinese exports to these countries is much smaller than the first two countries (US and Japan) (See Figure A and B). When disaggregating these exports into industries, much of the exports that these countries acquire from China are manufactured items. (Source: ongoing research of F. M. Macaranas on Trade in Value Added Data Analysis of ASEAN in Global Value Chains.)

Among the countries in the TiVA database sample, China is one of the least export oriented countries, meaning much of the benefit

from the exports of China is distributed among the countries of China's international production chain.

China's export-orientedness, measured by this share of its value added by domestic production factors, rather than by imported inputs, is generally lower than many advanced industrial economies like USA and Japan. However, if it disaggregated, these shares of domestic value added in China's exports are higher for the sale of goods and services to the US, Germany, France, UK, and Canada, when compared to China's exports to ASEAN, Korea, Russia, and Chinese Taipei, largely on account of its lower cost of domestic factors of production.

ASEAN if counted as a group is already the second largest TiVA trading partner of China, surpassing Korea in 2011. Imports from the top 5 countries have declined post 2008 Global Financial Crisis with the exception of the ASEAN while imports from other countries not shown here have been growing steadily, possibly as a result of the decline in imports from the larger economies.

Treating ASEAN as a group will position ASEAN as even a more meaningful value-adding partner of Korea in international trade; at the same time, ASEAN as a group can be effectively assisted by Korean development donors in a Regional Aid for Trade model – which has been neglected in this region despite its demonstrated success in other parts of the world (OECD, Regional Aid for Trade, 2012, esp. the chapter on Southeast Asia written by F.M. Macaranas).

The following are findings based on TiVA in ASEAN+3. First, similar to the case of Japan, China largely imports only from the manufacturing industry and business sector services of Korea. Chinese imports from Korea have shifted from the basic metals industry to the electrical and optical equipment industry over the sample period 1995 - 2015. The textiles industry still maintains a sizeable share of Chinese imports from Korea.

Second, unlike Japan and Korea, Chinese imports from ASEAN are much more diverse, shifting through the years from textiles and chemicals to electrical and optical equipment, although the textiles industry has maintained its share of Chinese imports. The decline in the share of imports of the basic metals and chemicals sector indicates that China either sources these from other countries or has found domestic sources. The electrical and optical equipment imports of China from ASEAN is significant to China; that some of these are from Korean firms invested in ASEAN underscores the need to see ASEAN+3 as the relevant grouping in an interdependent world in this side of the global economy. This should convince regional and global leaders to understand that our collective desire for prosperity for all our people rests on the stability of geopolitical and socio-cultural relations in the entire Asia-Pacific.

Third, the industry with the largest share of Foreign Value Added (FVA) in gross exports is the manufacturing sector, indicating that much of the inputs used in this sector has been imported by China from some other country. Most of the FVA in China's gross exports in the manufacturing sector can be attributed to the electrical and optical equipment industry. All subsectors in the manufacturing industry experienced a decline on 2008 onwards due to the Global Financial Crisis.

In contrast to the size of gross exports of China by industry, in terms of value-added, the electrical and optical equipment industry is the largest but the subsector that follows is not as far behind. Chinese textiles play a significant role for the benefit of the domestic economy almost as much as the electrical and optical equipment industry. China imports products from two distinct groups: Japan, ASEAN, Korea, and Chinese Taipei, which contain more foreign inputs than Chinese imports from the second group, which includes the US, Australia, Saudi Arabia, Brazil and Russia.

From these investigations, we may reach conclusion 1: the first group

is more reliant on international trade for transacting with China; this is fundamental to peace and security in the region.

Given the low domestic value added in its exports, China sells more exports goods containing higher domestic inputs to the US, Germany, France, the UK, Canada than China exports to ASEAN, Korea, Russia and Chinese Taipei which contain lower domestic Chinese inputs.

Next, we may get conclusion 2: China also relies on imported inputs from Asia to sell export goods to more geographically distant regions than its Asian trading partners.

Combining the two conclusions, the political-security dimensions of trade should underscore the importance of the GVCs, especially in systems approach. ASEAN+3 relies more on TiVA in its trade with China. This is the rationale for the suggestion that Korea, Japan, and China should consider RAfT that benefits ASEAN as a group. The Consolidated Strategic Action Plan (CSAP) for the AEC 2025 Blueprint is a good document to review for planning the GVC transformation in ASEAN+3 as well as the ASEAN-Korea economic relations.

APPENDIX B. CHRONOLOGY OF ASEAN-KOREA RELATIONS

Milestone: ASEAN-Korea Relations	
2017	ASEAN-ROK Cultural Exchange Year
September	Inauguration of the ASEAN Culture House in Busan
2015 August	ASEAN-Korea Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity (2016-2020)
2014 December	ASEAN-Korea Commemorative Summit (Busan, Korea)
2012 September	Establishment of the Mission to the Republic of Korea to ASEAN (Jakarta, Indonesia)
2011 October	First Mekong-Korea Foreign Ministers' Meeting (Seoul, Korea)
2010 October	Adoption of the Joint Declaration and its Action Plan on the ASEAN-Korea Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity
2009 May – September	Entry into force of ASEAN-Korea FTA on Service and on Investment
June	ASEAN-Korea Commemorative Summit (Jeju, Korea)
March	Inauguration of the ASEAN-Korea Centre
2008 December	Entry into force of the MOU on the Establishment of the ASEAN-Korea Centre
2007 November	Signing of the MOU on the Establishment of the ASEAN-Korea Centre
June	Entry Into force of ASEAN-Korea FTA on Trade in Goods
2006	The ASEAN+3 Work Plan on Cooperation in Combating Transnational Crime was adopted in 2006.
2005 December	Adoption of the ASEAN-Korea Plan of Action/Signing of the ASEAN-Korea Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation
2004 November	Signing of the Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Cooperation Partnership between the ASEAN and Korea
1999	Implementation of the Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation at the Manila Summit re ASEAN+3 finance ministers' periodic consultations ASEAN+3 established the Chiang Mai Initiative ²⁰
1997 December	First ASEAN-Korea Summit, First ASEAN+3 Summit ²¹
1991 July	ASEAN-Korea Full Dialogue Partnership
1989 November	ASEAN-Korea Sectoral Partnership

* Source: http://www.aseankorea.org/eng/ASEAN/ak_chronology.asp

ASEAN-Korea Economic Relationship: A Road to More Active Future Cooperation

LEE CHOONG LYOL

ABSTRACT

The economic relations between ASEAN and Korea have continuously improved since the establishment of formal diplomatic relations in 1989, almost three decades ago. Most statistical indicators such as trade and financial transactions and the number of travelers have substantially increased over this period. This chapter attempts to explain why the economic relation flourished over these years and to predict how it will be in the future. In addition, it investigates whether the recent change of economic environments in the region will have any substantial impact on this trend. This research shows that cooperation has provided benefits to both sides by way of the regional value chain. It also indicates that cooperation in the service industry in sectors such as finance, medical, beauty and Information and Communications Technology (ICT) service, etc., is very promising in the future, and market participants on both sides and governments should prepare for it. More specifically, on the future of economic cooperation for the ten member countries with Korea, a comprehensive plan and strategy related with regional value chain and FTA should be prepared covering many items such as trade, investment, service and official development aid. In addition, more human and cultural exchange and related studies are required to enhance mutual understanding between ASEAN and Korea.

* **Key words:** Economic relations, Regional value chain, FTA, Service industry

1. INTRODUCTION

The economic relations between ASEAN and Korea have continuously improved for the past 25 years. They have become very important trade, investment and development partners to each other and recently their financial cooperation has been closer. One out of nine Koreans visit ASEAN member states every year.

For example, ASEAN is the second largest trade partner for Korea behind China and the third largest investment partner and a good labour source. It is one of Korea's major travel destination and major recipient of Korea's Official Development Assistance (ODA). To ASEAN, Korea is the 5th largest trade partner as well as an important investment partner. It is also one of the ODA donors and a good development partner, too.

When Korea for the first time established formal diplomatic relations with ASEAN in 1989, their economic relation was very limited. Most of Korea's trade and service exchange were focused on the US and Japan and cultural exchange with ASEAN was almost negligible.¹

As a result, it is quite natural to ask why has their economic relation become so close over these years? What kinds of economic incentives brought ASEAN and Korea to do it? How much did the governments of both parties contribute to it? Are there any important milestones for it?

Another question is whether it will continue in the future or what governments of ASEAN member states and Korea have to do for it? Furthermore, it may be asked, will the recent change of political and economic environments in the region as well as the world make any substantial impact on this relation?

This chapter attempts to provide the answers for these questions. For this purpose, we take the following four steps. First, we examine the statistical indicators representing the economic relation between ASEAN and Korea. The trend of number of travelers and the amount

of ODA as well as trade and investment statistics are shown. Second, we extensively investigate why ASEAN and Korea actively cooperated with each other for decades and how the pattern of cooperation has changed. We show that the establishment of regional value with ASEAN and Korea helps both parties accelerate economic growths and investment. We check if the institutional and policy cooperation among governments also contributed to improvement of their economic cooperation. Third, we look at the future regional and global economic conditions including risk and challenge, and then finally we suggest policy recommendations.

2. THE ECONOMIC RELATION OF THE PAST 30 YEARS ²

2.1 Trade and Investment


When we look at the major statistics representing the economic relation between ASEAN and Korea, several interesting facts are shown. First, most trade and investment statistics have substantially increased in the past three decades. As seen in Figure 1, trade has risen from \$10.2 billion in 1990 to \$38.3 billion in 2000 and \$119.3 billion in 2016, respectively. Korea's exports to ASEAN increased from \$5.1 billion in 1990 to \$20.1 billion in 2000 and \$75.2 billion in 2016; while ASEAN's exports to Korea grew from \$5.1 billion in 1990 to \$18.2 billion in 2000 and \$44.1 billion in 2016.

Second, Korea has experienced a trade balance surplus for almost the entire thirty years. In the earlier days of cooperation, the trade balance was in equilibrium but as time went by, Korea's trade surplus almost continuously increased. Especially true after the recovery from the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 when it suddenly rose. In 2016, Korea's trade surplus was recorded at \$31.1 billion.

Third, Korea's trade with ASEAN is mainly concentrated on few

Figure 1. Trade Between ASEAN and Korea


(Unit: Billion USD)



* Source: IMF, *Direction of Trade Statistics* as at July 30, 2017.

Figure 2. Trade Between ASEAN and Korea by Country from 2014 to 2016

(Unit: %)



* Source: IMF, *Direction of Trade Statistics* as at July 30, 2017.


countries such as Vietnam, Indonesia and Singapore. As seen in Figure 2, Vietnam (30%), Singapore (20.5%) and Indonesia (14.6%) accounted for almost 65% of total trade between ASEAN and Korea for the period of 2014 to 2016. In contrast, for the same period, trade between Korea and three low income ASEAN member states of Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar collectively only accounted for less than 3%.

Fourth, foreign direct investment (FDI) between ASEAN and Korea has also increased very much, and since the mid-2000s; the investments from Korea to ASEAN substantially surpassed the investment from ASEAN to Korea. As seen in Figure 3, FDI from Korea to ASEAN increased from \$270 million in 1990 to \$530 million in 2000, and \$5.1 billion in 2016; while FDI from ASEAN to Korea rose from \$10 million in 1990 to only \$2.4 billion in 2016.

Fifth, bilateral portfolio investment flows also show a similar trend to that of FDI flows as in Figure 4, in a sense that Korea's outward portfolio investment dominated ASEAN's outward portfolio investment.

Figure 3. Direct Investments between ASEAN and Korea


(Unit: Billion USD)



* Source: IMF, *Coordinated Direct Investment Survey* as at July 30, 2017

Figure 4. Portfolio Investment between ASEAN and Korea

(Unit: Billion USD)



* Source: IMF, *Coordinated Direct Investment Survey* as at July 30, 2017

The total assets of portfolio investment from Korea to ASEAN increased from \$3.78 billion in 2001 to \$93.77 billion at the end of 2015, while that of ASEAN to Korea only increased from \$1 billion in 2001 to \$10.5 billion at the end of 2016.

2.2 The Number of Travelers and ODA


For the past three decades, the human interaction and other economic development programs such as ODA have also increased very much. To examine these facts, we examine the number of travelers of ASEAN and Korea and amounts of ODA programs.

The number of travelers between ASEAN and Korea also increased very much. As seen in Figure 5, ASEAN is the most attractive travel destination for Koreans such that almost one out of nine Koreans visited one of the ASEAN member states in 2016. It is quite common to see a Korean TV commercial advertising short-term travel package deals targeting ASEAN member states or to come across Korean group travelers in major ASEAN sightseeing sites.

On average, this flow has increased by 9.8% every year since 2014. The number of ASEAN visitors to Korea also increased from 0.6 million in 2000 to 2.2 million in 2016.

Figure 5. Number of Visitors

(Unit: Thousands)




* Source: ASEAN, ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2015, 2016

The economic development cooperation between ASEAN and Korea has substantially improved during these years. When ASEAN and Korea established formal diplomatic relations in 1989, Korea was one of the fast growing developing countries. However, as time went by, Korea's GDP increased very fast and finally, Korea joined the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1995 and was elevated to the Group of Twenty (G20) membership in 2009. During this period, Korea launched many official development aid programs in which the most important partners were low income ASEAN member states such as Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam. As seen in Figure 6, Korea's total ODA expenditure and net ODA expenditure increased from the respective amounts of \$85.6 million and \$75.8 million in 2006, to the respective amounts of \$446.2 million and \$418.9 million in 2016.

Korea's ODA is very unique in terms that it focuses on the sharing of Korea's development experience and knowledge. Korea is the only country to succeed in both: raising its income level from one of the lowest-income countries in the world to a high-income country, and achieving political development in terms of good governance and democracy. So sharing its development experience may contribute to the development of low-income countries of ASEAN as well as other developing countries.³

Figure 6. Korea's ODA to ASEAN

(Unit: Million USD)



* Source: Korea Export-Import Bank, *Korea ODA Database*

2.3 Establishment of Regional Value Chain and Investment Circle.

The major economic statistics show that economic cooperation between ASEAN and Korea substantially improved during the past few decades. Furthermore, a careful examination indicates that there has been a change on the trade and investment patterns for the past decade. It can be explained by the establishment of the regional value chain in ASEAN and Korea.

Since the 1990s, 90% of Korea’s exports to ASEAN and Korea’s imports from ASEAN were made of raw materials and capital goods.⁴ Especially, ratios of Korea’s exports of semi-finished goods and capital goods over total exports have substantially increased, while those of parts and components have fallen for the past decade. In addition, all shipments from ASEAN were for domestic use in 1990 but later the ratio of imported products used to produce the export commodity has substantially increased and finally reached up to 37% of total import in 2010. All these changes happened because of the establishment of a regional value chain with the industrialisation of ASEAN.

They suggested that there were large differences in terms of endowment of both parties and in the stage of development, and by active economic cooperation, both parties can take benefits from each other.⁵ For example, some ASEAN member states are abundant in raw materials and cheap labour force, while other member states have good quality of infrastructure. In this context, many Korean companies equipped with capital and technology can work with the resources of ASEAN.

Figure 7. Typical Value Chain between ASEAN and Korea





Figure 7 shows the typical regional value chain composition between ASEAN and Korea for the past ten years. First it begins with the raw material produced in ASEAN such as petroleum, natural gas, rubber, wood etc. Since Korea does not have such natural resources, it has to import them from ASEAN and other countries. Second, Korean firms transform these raw materials into intermediate goods and then export them to the ASEAN member states. Third, ASEAN firms complete the final products with intermediate goods imported from Korea and finally, they sell them to consumers around the world. This is one of the important explanations in how Korea achieves a trade surplus against ASEAN, and how ASEAN achieves a trade surplus against advanced western countries such as the US and the region of most EU member states.

One good example of this regional value chain can be illustrated in the textile industry in Vietnam and Cambodia. Many Korean textile companies in Phnom Penh, Cambodia import fabrics from Korea and produce shirts and pants, and finally export them to the rest of the world. Another example is a Samsung mobile phone company in Bac Ninh, Vietnam. It is an assembly company which takes core parts, such as CPU and LCD from Korea, and other locally produced secondary parts to assemble the most advanced mobile phone.⁶ It exports these mobile phones to the rest of the world.

It seems that the engagement of Korean companies in this value chain began in the early 2000s and accelerated with the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between ASEAN and Korea taking effect in 2007. With more confidence in the economic and political investment environment of ASEAN, Korean firms finally took very active action.

To enhance this regional value chain between ASEAN and Korea, a regional financial flow structure was also built. Figure 8 shows the typical financial flows between ASEAN and Korea. In the first stage, Korean firms receive large amount of revenue by selling their products

Figure 8. Financial Flow between ASEAN and Korea

to ASEAN. Second, they deposit their extra revenues and profits in accounts held with financial institutions in Korea as deposits or types of investment fund. Third, Korean institutional investors acquire assets from ASEAN financial institutions as portfolio investment. Capital outflow from Korea into ASEAN is realised. Finally, ASEAN financial institutions utilise these resources to provide credit for firms in ASEAN. Or Korean financial institutions provide the financial resource to Korean firms which in turn make direct investment in ASEAN. In conclusion, Korea's trade surplus with ASEAN is offset by Korea's direct investment and portfolio investment into ASEAN.

3. WHY THEIR RELATION IMPROVED SO FAST?

3.1 Restructuring of Industry in Korea

For the past decades, Korea continuously tried to restructure and upgrade its industry by raising economic openness. As worker's wage and living cost continuously rose, many Korean firms especially in labour intensive industries had difficulty in competing with these industries

from countries such as China and other developing countries. As a result, Korean firms had incentives to relocate some of the old and less efficient domestic production facilities into foreign countries.

China and ASEAN were the best candidates for them because they are relatively close to Korea in terms of geography and cultural familiarity rather than western countries or Africa; and the quality of labour and its cost were relatively competitive.⁷ Good examples illustrating this were the textile and garment or shoes producing companies which actually moved their major manufacturing factories into Vietnam and Indonesia.

Table 1. Manufacturing Structure of Korea (Unit: %)

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2016
Manufacturing	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
1. Food, beverages and tobacco	36.5	19.6	10.7	7.2	6.1	4.2	4.7
2. Textiles, leather and fur products	25.2	28.0	23.2	13.4	7.9	4.8	4.7
3. Wood, paper, printing and reproduction	9.2	8.9	4.8	5.0	4.2	2.8	2.7
4. Petroleum, coal and chemicals	9.7	14.1	19.9	14.3	15.3	15.4	17.0
5. Non-metallic mineral products	4.9	6.3	6.4	6.5	4.0	3.1	3.0
6. Metal products		2.7	10.3	14.4	13.3	16.0	14.9
7. General machinery		2.9	4.5	7.1	8.1	8.2	8.7
8. Electric machinery	13.0	4.3	10.6	15.9	24.9	26.3	26.0
9. Precision instrument		0.9	1.7	1.5	1.4	1.7	1.9
10. Transport equipment		8.5	5.3	12.1	13.1	16.0	14.7
11. Furniture and other manufacturing	1.5	3.7	2.6	2.7	1.8	1.4	1.6

* Source: Bank of Korea, *BOK Data Base*, www.ecos.bok.or.kr

As seen in Table 1, Korea's manufacturing structure was dominated by labour intensive manufacturing sectors such as food processing or textiles manufacturing during the 1970s and the 1980s, and advanced into


capital intensive and technology intensive sectors such as machinery and transport equipment since the 2000s. For example, the ratios of textiles, leather and fur products, and wood, paper, printing and reproduction of the total manufacturing products had fallen respectively from 19.6% and 28% in 1970, to 10.7% and 23.2% in 1980, to 4.7% for both in 2016. On the contrary, the ratios of Electric machinery and Metal products rose respectively from 4.3% and 2.7% in 1970 to 26% and 14.9% in 2016.

The upgrading of Korea's industrial structure was carried out in two stages. The first one is to upgrade their domestic production facility applying more advance technology and the second one is to relocate their outdated one into foreign countries. So, some of ASEAN member states such as Vietnam and Indonesia became major places for these Korean firms to relocate into.

With these restructuring activities, Korea continuously pursued its market opening policy. Especially, it opened its domestic financial market and liberalised the financial system more to overcome the financial crisis of 1997-1998. It allowed more foreign banks and financial institutions to work in Korea and encouraged more Korean financial institutions to

Figure 9. GDP per Capita of Korea


(Unit: USD)



* Source: Bank of Korea, *BOK Data Base*, www.ecos.bok.or.kr

Figure 10. Openness of Economy

(Unit: %)



* Source: Bank of Korea, *BOK Data Base*, www.ecos.bok.or.kr

participate in overseas business activities. As a result, the openness ratio rose from 60% in 1989 to 100% in the early 2010s, as seen in Figure 10.⁸


3.2 Building the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC)

ASEAN announced its intention to establish an economic community in 2003 and actually accomplished it at the end of 2015. Despite of many obstacles and defects, the AEC was officially established in December of 2015 and with expectations for internal economic cooperation to accelerate in the future. As a result, the ASEAN average tariff rate fell from 2.58% in 2007 to 0.23% in 2015 as seen in Figure 11, which in turn encouraged trade within ASEAN. Since 2010, the internal tariff rates among six ASEAN member states of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand were eliminated. Furthermore, Korean firms recognised the necessity to build their own subsidiaries within ASEAN member states in order to enjoy this no-tariff or less tariff advantage on their products.

During these years, ASEAN had been a very stable and fast growing region in the world with a more open and integrated economy. As seen in Figure 12, the average growth rates of ASEAN were the highest


among the regions of the world. While the world economic growth rates were recorded at about 3-4% from 1990 to 2012, the respective rates for ASEAN were record at 5-6%. At the same time, the growth rate of

Figure 11. ASEAN Tariff Rates



* Note: ASEAN means average tariff rate of ASEAN while ASEAN 6 means that of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. CLMV mean the average tariff rate of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam.
 * Source: ASEAN, ASEAN Economic Community Chart book 2015, 2016

Figure 12. Economic Growth Rate by Region (%)



* Note: MENA stands for Middle East and North Africa.
 * Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Date Base at July 30, 2017.

ASEAN had been less volatile than those of any other regions in the world.

As a result, Korean companies view the prospects for economic and political stability in ASEAN with strong confidence and positivity. This is demonstrated by many new investment projects launched during the past decade. It is no wonder that Korean direct investment to this region substantially increased for this period.

3.3 The Active Role of Leaders and Governments

Both leaders and government officials of ASEAN member states and Korea recognised the importance of mutual cooperation since the 1990s and succeeded in building an institutional framework of cooperation. Under the frameworks of ASEAN, ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3 and East Asia Summit (EAS), they regularly and irregularly met and were able to build mutual trust within the region.

Especially, the experience of the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis extensively made them cooperate more aggressively. They recognised that their economies were largely integrated and that they had to cooperate further to accelerate their economic growth. In addition, the rise of the Chinese economy made them extensively cooperate with each other because of potential securities threat China's rise could pose to most of Southeast Asian countries.

After the Asian Financial Crisis, Korea decided to upgrade its economy by way of restructuring and accelerating openness. The Korean government actively encouraged Korean companies to change their accounting and governance systems to converge with the established advanced country standards. It also liberalised and opened of its domestic market and then got ready to reach out to foreign countries.

For example, Korea initiated discussions towards an FTA with many foreign countries since 2000 and finally it reached FTA with ASEAN in 2006. The FTA between ASEAN and Korea helped accelerate the

economic cooperation between the two sides. As seen in Figure 1 and Figure 3, both trade and direct investment rapidly increased right after the implementation of the FTA agreement. Not only it helped trading companies by reducing the tariff on the exports and imports but also it helped build business confidence for Korean investors and traders working on ASEAN.

Another example is the ASEAN+3 economic cooperation framework. The bilateral currency swap agreement among the ASEAN+3 countries called the Chiang Mai Initiative was extended to the multilateral framework in 2010 and the independent institute called The ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) was established in 2010.⁹ It helped enhance the financial stability and eventually improved the confidence of Korean investors to engage with ASEAN. All these achievements provided more confidence to businessmen in the private sector.

4. RISK, OPPORTUNITIES AND A PLAN FOR THE FUTURE

4.1 More Economic Cooperation or Less?

Korea has to accelerate its cooperation with ASEAN for the next several years. Currently its regional values chain is working very successfully and high wage of Chinese workers will relocate more Korean production facilities from China to ASEAN.

ASEAN also has many incentives to cooperate with Korea for the next decade. It has to cooperate with Korea to upgrade its industrial structure or to get out of the middle-income trap. Still, ASEAN low-income countries should have more FDI from Korea to raise their production and to solve their employment problem. ASEAN's regional values chain with Korea is still very effective in maintaining the region's high economic growth rate. Information and Communications Technology (ICT)

development and improvement of ASEAN connectivity will enhance the cooperation by reducing the coordination cost.

Will the change of global economic and political conditions such as Brexit, the North Korean nuclear problem, the rise of China and current US protectionism change the current trend of economic cooperation between ASEAN and Korea? Temporarily 'Yes', but in the long term 'No'. The development of information and communication technology (ICT) and improvement of logistics across the world will accelerate the international economic cooperation such as commodity, service and financial transactions. The competition among companies based upon the global value chain will become more tense and piercing. To survive in the global world, both Korean and ASEAN companies need to actively cooperate with each other.

4.2 Risk and Challenges

For the past decades, there has been a change in terms of cooperation types. Formerly, there was a cooperation type focusing on trade of two difference companies located in two countries, but currently it is a cooperation across a number of countries composing one regional value chain.

While there are many incentives for Korea to take up economic cooperation with ASEAN, it is not certain whether Korean firms or people are ready for this new way of cooperation. Once we think that both ASEAN and Korea belong to one value chain, then we should consider not only economic growth of Korean economy but also that of the regional economy. It may be technically impossible to separate the economic growth of Korea from that of the region. Similarly, a slump or crisis in the ASEAN economy may substantially transmit in the Korean economy.

Furthermore, Koreans may not be ready for living with other people

of other cultures. Traditionally, Korean have only lived in the Korean peninsula and there has been less than one hundred years of active foreign contact experience. In the context of business, if Korean firms strive to work with ASEAN partners within the regional value chain, the concern is: will the limited understanding of ASEAN cultures, traditions and customs seriously inhibit progress?

Currently, not many studies and education programmes are available to the Korean people on the topics of ASEAN or Southeast Asia. Most Korean people have not had the opportunity to study Southeast Asian culture at primary or secondary level of education, and only small proportion of students have studied courses on society and economy of Southeast Asia at university, undergraduate or graduate level. The number of faculty members and experts is very small. There is a substantial mismatch between academic research on society and culture on ASEAN and economic cooperation. So it is very difficult to accelerate the cooperation between the two regions. For this reason, Korean firms only focus on a few countries in terms of investment and trade such as Vietnam and Indonesia.

The other risk is that ASEAN may overestimate the role and power of Korea in the region. The size of Korean economy is far smaller than those of neighbouring countries of China and Japan and so its role and amount in terms of regional economic cooperation should be far less than those two countries. So it is highly recommended for ASEAN low-income member states not to expect too much assistance in term of volume from Korea. It may be true that what Korea can do to ASEAN is far less than what ASEAN expects Korea to do. For example, it is not rational that Korea provide financial assistance to build up major regional hardware infrastructure. Instead, it is more plausible for ASEAN to learn and benefit from Korea's development model and experience. For example, industrial policy, small and medium sized company promotion

policy and their practicing experience may contain some important and relevant lessons for some ASEAN member states.

4.3 Policy Recommendations

It is true that the economic relation between ASEAN and Korea has improved very much over the past three decades and it will further consolidate in the future. The regional value chain will extend from a few industries such as textile and garment to other industries such as automobile and electronics. As indicated in the above section, there will be some risks and obstacles too.

To improve the efficiency of cooperation and reduce costs, we may propose several policy recommendations explained below.

The most important and urgent thing is that Korea should have a very comprehensive master plan for the future economic cooperation or regional value chain with ASEAN. Formerly, there was no comprehensive plan to cover the overall economic relation with ASEAN. Most of the economic cooperation activities were made in terms of the bilateral economic cooperation activity.

A comprehensive plan means a plan covering ten ASEAN member states in the field of many items such as trade, investment, services, ODA, etc. It should clearly define the objects and goals, instruments and strategies of the cooperation. It should include many sectors in both manufacturing and service industry. It should indicate the way Korea has to work with each ASEAN member state based upon an analysis on the regional value chain or global value chain. For example, cooperation with some countries should be focused upon labour intensive sectors such as textiles, garments, shoes, food processing, etc.; and for other countries should focus upon capital intensive sectors such as electronics, chemicals and machinery. In some countries, the construction industry may be emphasised.

The plan should provide answers to the questions: what kind of economic cooperation should be made? Should the focus be on horizontal cooperation or vertical cooperation? In addition, what plans for sub-regions should be included? For example, Mekong river area and island areas of ASEAN are quite different from each other. So different plans should be made.

Second, a policy to promote the regional value chain should be made and implemented. Formerly, the Korean government regarded a foreign country not as a production partner within a same regional value chain but as a final destination for Korea's exports. The relationship between Korean firms and foreign firms was perceived not in the context of a partnership but in competition. So most of government subsidies were made in favour of domestic companies running a factory or business unit in Korea. Korean companies running subsidiaries or branches in a foreign country were not eligible for or had limited access to many subsidies or economic assistance programmes.

Within this argument, an answer should be given to the question as to whether Korean government should assist domestic companies willing to relocate their production facilities into foreign countries. If Korea plans to upgrade its industrial structure and intends to utilise the regional value chain, it may provide both financial and non-financial assistance to such domestic companies.

Third, more FTAs should be pursued individually with the ASEAN member states. While ASEAN and Korea signed an FTA in 2007, its utilisation rate and effectiveness on trade and other cooperation matters have not been as high as both partners expected. One of the important reasons is because the FTA is too comprehensive and not specific enough, and as a result, exporters and importers have been having difficulties to apply it in practice. One way to solve this problem is to make FTAs with individual member states independently. Korea's

FTAs with Singapore (2005) and with Vietnam (2015) are two good such examples already implemented. They are more useful because they extensively cover more relevant elements for the sides than the more generic coverage of Korea's FTA with ASEAN.

Fourth, formerly Korea's economic cooperation was focused mostly in the manufactory sector, while the service sector cooperation remained very limited. For example, Korean companies active in the service industry in sectors such as ICT or finance, have had only limited engagement in the markets of ASEAN member states. As the income levels of ASEAN member states and their demand for these services increase, it is time for them to prepare.

Fifth, Korea's sharing of the knowledge and experience of economic development should be extensively utilised to enhance cooperation. Korea's experience on economic development achieved in the past century can be a very important asset for addressing regional development. As we all know, Korea rose from being one of the lowest-income countries in the world to a member of advanced countries in less than a half century. Although not all of Korea development experiences are directly applicable to all ASEAN member states, they can provide some important lessons and help avoid costly mistakes for those ASEAN member states that explore paths in economic development.

The last important point is that most Koreans have limited understanding of ASEAN cultures. These kinds of new ways of cooperation cannot be achieved without a deep understanding on each other's culture. As a result, very diverse and comprehensive ASEAN and Korean culture and social understanding programmes should be provided, especially for the businessmen as well as the general public.

For this purpose, it is highly recommended for more academic research on ASEAN and Korea to be pursued. More reports and books on ASEAN, cultural things as well as political and economic affairs

should be published; and more programmes should be promoted in mass media such as TV and radio. More public and private cultural activities should be introduced on ASEAN and Korea, and exchange programmes of young students and scholars from these regions should be much encouraged. The roles of international institutions such as the ASEAN-Korea Centre and the ASEAN Culture House should be emphasised.

5. CONCLUSION

Economic cooperation between ASEAN and Korea has remarkably improved in the past three decades. All the indicators representing the economic relation between the two sides such as the value of trade, services and financial transactions, the number of tourists and the amount of ODA have increased very much. Economic cooperation has produced benefits to both ASEAN and Korea in terms of trade, investment and finally economic development.

There are several reasons that help explain these economic outcomes. On the process of restructuring the industry, Korea needed to have a partner to make a regional value chain and the establishment of AEC make ASEAN be a very attractive trade and investment region for Korean firms. At the same time, the institutional frameworks such as ASEAN-Korea FTA and ASEAN+3 economic cooperation accelerate them.

Currently, a more active economic cooperation between ASEAN and Korea is expected to continue in the next decade. Both sides recognise that regional value chain between ASEAN and Korea will yield benefits to both and these benefits will be extended in the future. However, to improve effectiveness and usefulness, both sides and their governments should prepare for it. Several recommendations are suggested.

First, a more comprehensive plan for future economic cooperation between ASEAN and Korea should be made. Such plan should include

a cooperation plan for each industry based upon an extensive analysis on the regional economy and individual countries. Currently, Korean business people and policy makers do not clearly know the differences and characteristics of each ASEAN member state. So both, region-wide and country specific plans for the both sides should be considered.

Second, the policy to promote the regional value chain should be made and implemented. Formerly, the relation between Korean firms and foreign firms was perceived not in the context of a partnership but in competition. So most government subsidies were directed in favour of domestic companies running their factory operations or business units in Korea. But in the future, efforts should focus on promoting the regional value chain.

Third, FTAs should be pursued individually with the ASEAN member states. The current FTA with ASEAN is too comprehensive and not specific enough, and as a result, exporters and importers are faced with difficulties in taking advantage of trading opportunities. One way to solve this problem is to pursue FTAs with individual member states, independently of ASEAN. Korea's respective FTAs with Singapore (2005) and Vietnam (2015) are two such examples already in place.

Fourth, a plan to promote cooperation in the service industry in categories such as finance, medicine, cosmetology, ICT, etc. should be emphasised. Previously, it has been generally overlooked and paid less attention, but it holds a lot of promise for the future.

Fifth, Korea's sharing of knowledge and experience of economic development should be extensively utilised. Korea's experience on economic development achieved over the second half of the past century can be a very important asset in drafting advice for regional development. Although not all of Korea's development experiences are directly applicable to all ASEAN member states, they can provide some important lessons to those ASEAN member states who are striving for

economic development.

Finally, plans for more human and cultural exchange should be discussed. Mutual understanding is a must for future cooperation. For this purpose, it is highly recommended for more academic research on ASEAN and Korea to be completed. More public and private cultural activities should take place on ASEAN and Korea and the roles of international institutes such as the ASEAN-Korea Centre and the ASEAN Culture House should be emphasised.

Discussion Paper

OH YOON AH

Lee Choong Lyol and Federico Macaranas provide a fairly comprehensive review of ASEAN-Korea economic relations over the last few decades. I would like to highlight one of the common themes that both speakers are offering, which is global value chains, also known as GVCs.

GVCs or regional value chains, as Lee states, characterises one of the most important aspects of ASEAN-Korea economic relations at the moment. Korean firms are establishing and expanding extensive production networks in ASEAN. And sectors and activities they engage in these networks are not only expanding but also diversifying. This also means that ASEAN's participation in Korea's GVCs is also intensifying. Focusing on GVCs as a theme helps us address three main agendas of ASEAN integration, they are: (1) narrowing development gaps among member states, (2) fostering SME development, and (3) industrial upgrading.

Different levels of economic development among member states constitute one of the main obstacles to ASEAN integration. The challenge here is to lift those lower-income countries to a level where most member states can coordinate integration activities with minimal conflicts in interests and preferences. GVCs offer good opportunities

for lower-income countries to catch up. It benefits especially firms in these countries to engage in global markets without having to develop complete products and new markets from scratch. This is possible because GVCs are unbundling tasks and activities; they break up production process into different steps so that different steps can be carried out in different countries. Therefore, encouraging and facilitating the participation of more ASEAN firms into GVCs is an important policy priority.

This point of bringing in more countries into GVCs brings us to the next agenda: SME development. SMEs in developing countries, but it is actually the case everywhere, are at a disadvantage in terms of access to finance, knowledge of international markets, managerial and workforce skills and others. These challenges often of course affect their domestic market performance, but from GVC perspective, they prevent them from supplying to GVCs, either they lack the right product or they cannot offer internationally competitive prices. In GVCs, the actors are firms. Yet governments create an enabling business environment. Governments can maintain open trade policy and encourage and reward innovation in production. For ASEAN-Korea cooperation, one area I want to highlight is quality and product certification. ASEAN and Korea should continue its multilateral efforts for international standards harmonisation. But on an ASEAN-Korea basis, bilateral cooperation in areas of product standards and certifications will help ASEAN SMEs to supply to Korea's GVCs. And subsequently ASEAN SMEs' enhanced capacity will help them participate in and move up other supply chains.

The third point related to GVCs is upgrading. There are various types of upgrading in value chains. What is most relevant here is functioning upgrading, which means that you move to higher-value-part activities of the production process. This is strongly linked to industrial upgrading in a wider sense which you escape the so-called

middle-income trap. And this part is hard. Here what is needed differs from what made you successful in participating in GVCs. You need technology and innovative capacity as well as entrepreneurship that can manage these more complex and risky activities. ASEAN's GVC upgrading is important not only for ASEAN's own growth but also as it benefits Korean firms because it will expand their production bases and achieve efficiency in global operations.

The focus on GVCs does not mean that ASEAN-Korea cooperation should be limited to trade and investment of goods. Services should not be left out. It is true that Korea's economic engagement with ASEAN has been concentrated in manufacturing, but it needs to expand into services. Services include a wide range of industries. So here we can take a two-pronged approach. First, we can continue to promote cooperation in services as we have been doing, meaning we try to expand cooperation in all sectors. The other way, however, is to take advantage of GVCs in goods already in place. Some services are more relevant to GVCs, these are so-called GVC-enabling-services, such as transportation, logistics, finance and ICT that smooths out transactions within value chains. Since ASEAN and Korea have established solid value chains in goods, we can seek cooperation in services that are related to GVCs. Cooperation in services is more challenging than reducing tariffs for merchandise trade but it is the next frontier for ASEAN-Korea cooperation.

Part 3

SOCIO–CULTURAL PARTNERSHIP

Managing Movements of People between ASEAN and Korea: Partnerships and Processes

MOE THUZAR

ABSTRACT

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has gradually expanded its regional institutions and cooperation mechanisms over the five decades since it was first established in August 1967. These institutions and mechanisms have been increasingly confronted with the need, especially in recent years, to address interlinked imperatives stemming from peoples' concerns and needs. The topic of migration and mobility is a prime example of the political, economic and social aspects requiring a coordinated response regionally and nationally. ASEAN's regional responses in this sphere has also benefitted from its external partnerships, including those with Korea. Regional arrangements have also had the attendant outcome of facilitating bilateral arrangements that are in support of, or are relevant to, the regional objectives. To complement the chapter assessing people mobility between ASEAN and Korea for marriage and education, this chapter assesses ASEAN's responses to managing movements of people, including initiatives under the ASEAN-Korea dialogue, with a focus on tourism and labour mobility.

* **Key words:** People Mobility, Marriage, Education, Tourism

1. INTRODUCTION

Movements of people were first placed on ASEAN's regional agenda at the 9th ASEAN Summit held in Bali, in 2003 where the ASEAN leaders signed the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, underscoring their commitment to realise an ASEAN Community built on three key pillars of political-security, economic and socio-cultural cooperation amongst the ASEAN member states. The end-goal of ASEAN economic integration envisaged "a free flow of goods, services, investment and a freer flow of capital, equitable economic development and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities" to be realised through several economic initiatives, including the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS), which included measures to "*facilitate movement of business persons, skilled labour and talents.*" The vision for an ASEAN socio-cultural community also emphasised that "*ASEAN shall continue existing efforts to promote regional mobility and mutual recognition of professional credentials, talents, and skills development.*"

These high-level commitments were already being preceded by practical measures on the ground to facilitate people movements in areas such as tourism and education. The ASEAN Directors-General on Immigration and Consular Matters provide the regional framework for discussing a regional patchwork of bilateral agreements between the different ASEAN member states on reciprocal visa-free travel. At the time of writing, ASEAN is visa-free for nationals from ASEAN member states holding all types of passports (diplomatic, official and ordinary) with the exception of ordinary passport holders of Malaysia and Myanmar.

There is more political will on the part of ASEAN governments to move ahead on liberalisation of skilled manpower movement across national borders, followed by a phased liberalisation of semi-skilled and

finally unskilled workers. This agreement is based on a recommendation to “facilitate movement of business persons and skilled labour and talents by 2005” as a first phase. Obvious sensitivities to the movement of unskilled workers gave rise to the recommendation for a phased implementation, to avoid social costs of displaced domestic labour even though the largest national economic gains may well come from movement in semi- and unskilled labour.¹

The plight of semi- or low-skilled migrant workers, who are the main source of cheap and commoditised labour, and their social protection needs, prompted the 2007 Declaration on the Promotion and Protection of Migrant Workers in ASEAN, and the move for a regional instrument to give effect to the Declaration. The annual ASEAN Forum on Migrant Labour has emerged as a good practice; it provides a platform for open discussion among representatives of government, international agencies, workers’ and employers’ organisations and civil society stakeholders in the form of the Task Force on ASEAN Migrant Workers.

The internal displacement of persons within an ASEAN member state, usually as a result of internal conflict, and any spill-over to neighbouring countries, are still within the realm of what is termed “internal affairs” of a member state and attempts for regional or bilateral responses are subject to ASEAN’s non-interference principle.

ASEAN pursues the implementation of its regional goals via several plans of action and programmes in each key sector of ASEAN cooperation, as well as under various collaboration activities with each of its ten Dialogue Partners, including Korea.

2. ASEAN AND KOREA: THE STORY SO FAR

2.1 ASEAN Dialogue System²

The genesis of ASEAN’s dialogue relations lies in the role of external

economic relations and technical cooperation for ASEAN's development. ASEAN's Dialogue Partners are mostly developed economies, and (except New Zealand) have established cooperation funds under each Dialogue to support joint projects. The Dialogue Partners also commit additional funding and technical support for specific ASEAN initiatives.

ASEAN's early rationale for seeking linkages with developed countries was for the ASEAN member states to pursue their goals for economic growth and cooperation with external aid and investment. Informal dialogues started in 1972 between ASEAN member states and the European Economic Community (EEC), and Japan, but Australia became ASEAN's first formal Dialogue Partner in 1974.

To date, ASEAN has ten Dialogue Partners and several sectoral or development partners. Table 1 summarises the different partners and the years that dialogue relations were established with ASEAN. The sectoral partnerships were devised with a view to maintain close working relationships on a regional basis with several countries without relaxing the strict moratorium placed since 1999 on dialogue partner applications. The sectoral or development partnerships focus on specific areas where the partner's expertise or strengths can assist ASEAN's community-building goals. The full dialogue partnerships cover a wider range of areas under all three community pillars of the ASEAN Community, as well as the Work Plan of the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI), which was devised to boost the newer members' participation in ASEAN, and the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC).

In addition to the Dialogue System, ASEAN has entered into special collaboration programmes with its Northeast Asian partners China, Japan and Korea, also collectively referred to as the "Plus Three" partners. This dates from 1998 when the ASEAN+3 mechanism was formally established, after an informal meeting in 1997, and followed by the institutionalisation of the ASEAN+3 Summit in 1999. The sectors

of cooperation between ASEAN+3 partners steadily increased across political-security, economic and socio-cultural areas, totalling over 20 areas to date, governed by some 67 mechanisms.³ The modus operandi of the ASEAN+3 mechanism broadly consists of ASEAN+3 countries discussing relevant areas of cooperation for a particular sector, usually the day after ASEAN member states have convened their own regular meeting for that sector.

Table 1. ASEAN's External Relations

Dialogue Partners	Sectoral Partners	Development Partner	Observer
Australia (1974)	Pakistan (1993)	Germany (2016)	Papua New Guinea (1976)
New Zealand (1975)	Norway (2015)		
Canada (1975)	Switzerland (2016)		
EU (1977)			
Japan (1977)			
UNDP (now United Nations) (1977)			
United States (1977)			
Republic of Korea (1991)			
India (1995)			
China (1995)			
Russia (1996)			

* Source: Author's compilation from ASEAN Secretariat and ASEAN Member State sources.

2.2 ASEAN and Korea

The partnership between ASEAN and Korea can be traced back to as early as 1977 when Korea sought “economic and technical cooperation” with ASEAN,⁴ followed by Korea’s indication of interest in 1982 to become a Dialogue Partner of ASEAN. ASEAN and Korea established sectoral dialogue relations in 1989, with a pragmatic focus on the

practical side of collaboration: boosting trade, investments and tourism in the context of the respective trade and development priorities. It was a unique relationship at the time, since Korea was then a developing country, the first such country to join the ASEAN Dialogue system which up to then had comprised only developed countries with whom ASEAN member states wished to have knowledge and technology-sharing relationships. But Korea demonstrated the seriousness it attached to relations with ASEAN by announcing a Special Cooperation Fund at the first ASEAN-Korea Dialogue, held in 1990, followed by the organising of an ASEAN Week in Seoul.

Collaborative projects between ASEAN and Korea have expanded since then. Korea became a full Dialogue Partner in 1991, and augmented the Special Cooperation Fund with an ASEAN segment of its future-oriented cooperation projects. The scope of collaborative activities also expanded to encompass people-to-people exchanges, including youth, media, cultural and academic exchanges. The elevation of ASEAN-Korea Dialogue to Summit-level in 1997, one year after Korea formally joined the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), brought cooperation between ASEAN and Korea to a new level. This further deepened with Korea's signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) and the announcement of the Comprehensive Cooperation Partnership in November 2004, followed by the conclusion of a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation agreement in 2005 providing the framework for the ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Area which was realised in January 2010. Also in 2010, after 20 years of partnership, ASEAN and Korea agreed to elevate relations from comprehensive cooperation to strategic partnership. The Action Plan for this Strategic Partnership has entered the second phase of implementation covering the period 2016 to 2020.⁵

ASEAN-Korea relations thus have undergone a dramatic change


from the early days of the bilateral relationship. Former ASEAN Secretary-General Rodolfo Severino has observed that among ASEAN's Dialogue Partners, Korea was "one of the easiest to deal with" as it focused on "small practical projects" and expeditiously delivered on its commitments.⁶

This chapter serves as the ASEAN complementary to the next chapter by Kim Jeehun, discussing people mobility between ASEAN and Korea in socio-cultural spheres such as marriage and education, and looks at the trends and issues in labour mobility and tourism between ASEAN and Korea. It is neither a historical account nor an empirical study, but rather a practical tracing of the trajectory of ASEAN-Korea relations to assess how the overall framework of ASEAN-Korea relations affects or influences tourism and labour migration flows. It begins with dealing broadly with the evolution of ASEAN-Korea interactions in the political-security and economic spheres, examining the linkages with tourism and labour mobility. Then, the chapter delves deeper into the contours of ASEAN-Korea cooperation in tourism and labour mobility, by first situating the ASEAN context within which cooperation with Korea evolved in these areas, then noting emerging trends and issues. It then looks at future directions for bilateral (i.e. ASEAN and Korea) cooperation from the perspective of the ASEAN-led mechanisms, and highlights some approaches for future collaborative activities to consider.

2.3 Practical Focus of the Partnership


Through the years of dialogue partnership, ASEAN-Korea relations have not wavered from their practical focus mentioned above. Korea's cooperation activities with ASEAN over the past two decades have assisted ASEAN's growth in a broad range of fields that support and complement ASEAN's regional integration goals. Korea has been a staunch supporter of ASEAN's efforts for regional peace and security, and

Figure 1. Percentage Share of Foreign Direct Investment Inflow by Source



* Source: ASEAN Secretariat, 2016. ASEAN Community in Figures 2016.

Figure 2. Percentage Share of Total Trade with Dialogue Partners by Source



* Source: ASEAN Secretariat, 2016. ASEAN Community in Figures 2016.

is committed to further strengthening political and security engagement with ASEAN. Korea also recognises and supports the value of ASEAN and ASEAN-led mechanisms in building confidence and strengthening dialogue on different issues and concerns related to regional security and stability. The successful meeting between officials of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Korea on the side lines of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in July 2011 is one example. Korea has also been a driving force behind the ASEAN+3 process, particularly in conceptualising the rationale for ASEAN's collaborative activities with East Asian partners. The East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) and the studies and recommendations emanating from its discussions are the legacy of former Korea's President Kim Dae-jung.

Trade between ASEAN and Korea has remained robust despite the turmoil in global financial markets. Two-way trade between ASEAN and Korea stood at \$122.5 billion (2015 preliminary figures), more than double of 2010's \$98 billion, and constituting about 5.4% of ASEAN's total trade with the world. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from Korea to ASEAN increased from \$4.3 billion in 2010 to \$5.7 billion in 2015, constituting 4.7% of total FDI inflows into ASEAN. This is probably due to the higher rates of utilisation of the ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA) arrangements by several ASEAN economies, particularly Vietnam,⁷ which created more opportunities for Korea's trade and investment relationships with the ASEAN member states. In fact, Korea was among the top 5 ASEAN Dialogue Partners that increased their investments in ASEAN in 2014.⁸ Figures 1 and 2 show Korea's economic footprint in ASEAN, compared to other Dialogue Partners, including the two other Northeast Asian countries of China and Japan.

Analysts have recently observed that much more can be done for the economic relationship under the leadership of newly elected

President Moon Jae-in, citing ASEAN's expanding consumer class which already counts 67 million households, and the opportunities for engaging in more infrastructure development projects.⁹ Linked to the recommendations for closer economic and business ties, boosting people mobility between ASEAN member states and Korea in the area of tourism was also highlighted.

The ASEAN-Korea Centre (AKC), established in Seoul in 2009, takes on an important role in promoting greater awareness and understanding among Korean citizens of ASEAN's diversity and unique features, and at the same time forging collaborative partnerships through the Centre's activities and outreach focused on supporting the broad objectives of people-to-people connectivity between ASEAN member states and Korea. A key area where mutual understanding and awareness can support the ongoing efforts is the area of human resources development (HRD), and learning from Korea's experience to transition from a labour-exporting to a labour-importing economy. Governments, businesses and workers all stand to benefit from any collaborative activity that helps to foster greater understanding and awareness of cultural differences among Koreans and Southeast Asians, in ASEAN and Korea, whether for labour mobility or in other spheres of people mobility such as tourism and education. Deepening cultural understanding and linkages will pave the way towards deeper economic relationships that benefit both sides. The AKC has taken some strides in this respect. It designated May and June 2017 as "ASEAN Month" and launched the HelloASEAN@50 to commemorate both ASEAN's 50th anniversary as well as ASEAN-ROK Cultural Exchange Year.¹⁰

To this end, it is worth examining the existing regional framework in ASEAN for facilitating people mobility in these two broad spheres.

3. ASEAN COMMITMENTS FOR PEOPLE MOBILITY

Apart from tourism, which ASEAN placed on its regional agenda since 1976, labour mobility's first high-level mention occurred only at the 9th ASEAN Summit held in Bali in 2003. Prior to this, and even in the present-day context, the regional forums provide broad policy-level guidelines and principles for the ASEAN member states to adapt nationally, according to the circumstances and existing systems of each country. Specific discussions on people mobility between ASEAN member states are taken up on a bilateral basis.

Education mobility falls somewhat in between; under the remit of the ASEAN University Network (AUN), which was established in 1995 and which today has a network of 30 universities across the ten ASEAN member states, there is an increasing number of scholarships and student exchange programmes for ASEAN students interested in studying in other ASEAN member states, as well as student and faculty exchange programmes with institutes of higher learning in ASEAN's Dialogue Partners. With Korea, the AUN has carried out various collaborative activities with the Korean Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (KISEAS) as well as in student exchange programmes with Daejeon University since the turn of the 21st century. The AUN has also entered into three Memoranda of Understanding with institutes of higher learning in Korea: the first with the Gwangju Institute of Science and Technology, under which the Institute offers scholarships for ASEAN students¹¹; the second with Seoul Cyber University of Korea for the ASEAN Cyber University Project,¹² and the third with Hankuk University for academic exchanges.¹³ As of 2015, ASEAN students studying in Korea accounted for about 13% of total foreign students in Korea (12,176 out of a total of 96,357).¹⁴

The AUN pursues higher-education cooperation with the Plus Three countries (China, Japan and Korea) along separate tracks, but there are also

joint activities undertaken collectively. Starting 2011, the AUN's annual Educational Forum was expanded into the ASEAN+3 Educational Forum, inviting students from the Plus Three countries to meet and interact with their ASEAN peers. In 2012, the ASEAN+3 University Network was established to provide a larger regional framework for the AUN to facilitate scholarship opportunities for ASEAN students to study in the Plus Three countries. Similarly, the ASEAN Youth Cultural Forum added an ASEAN+3 component in 2012.¹⁵

There is clearer political will of ASEAN governments on skilled manpower movement, under negotiated packages of Mutual Recognition Arrangements (MRAs) for skilled professionals to work in any ASEAN member state of their choice. To date, requirements for mobility across ASEAN have been freed up for several professions: doctors, nurses, dental professionals, architects, surveyors, engineers, accountants, and tourism professionals.¹⁶ As highlighted in the introduction section of this chapter, the arrangements for mobility of skilled professionals are the first step in the phased approach towards liberalising movement of semi-skilled and, finally, unskilled workers. The MRAs provide the guarantee of not only skill portability but also of equal treatment (in remuneration and social protection) with the skilled professionals who are nationals of the host country. For the semi-skilled workers, the ASEAN Labour Ministers have agreed on a set of regional guidelines on skills standards and certification to ensure a similar equivalency.

The social protection needs of migrant workers (semi- and lower-skilled) will be addressed under the regional instrument for the 2007 Declaration on the Promotion and Protection of Migrant Workers in ASEAN. The work that started in 2009 to discuss the contours and content of the regional instrument gave birth to the ASEAN Committee on Migrant Workers (ACMW) at the senior officials' level among the ASEAN ministries of manpower or labour and employment, as well

as the annual ASEAN Forum on Migrant Labour. This forum has emerged as a good practice, as it provides a platform for open discussion among representatives of government, international agencies dealing with migration issues such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), as well as workers' and employers' organisations and civil society stakeholders in the region. The Task Force on ASEAN Migrant Workers provides civil society input at the regional level. After a long and winding journey of negotiating the scope and commitments of national governments to guarantee social protection of migrant workers in ASEAN, there is now hope that the regional instrument to implement the 2007 Declaration will be adopted at the forthcoming 31st ASEAN Summit in the Philippines. However, the implementation of the regional instrument's commitments at the national-level will not immediately replace the existing bilateral and sub-regional arrangements, but rather complement and build on them.

On the tourism front, the roadmap is clearly defined. ASEAN Tourism Ministers have met annually since 1996 (such meetings having been formally institutionalised in 1998), while the heads of national tourism organisations had been meeting much earlier. The ASEAN Tourism Forum has been in action since 1981. Having gone through successive attempts to promote ASEAN as a single tourist destination since 1992, a policy framework emerged in 2002 with the signing of the ASEAN Tourism Agreement by the ASEAN Leaders at the 8th ASEAN Summit in 2002 in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Measures to give effect to this agreement were adopted as a "Roadmap for Integration of the Tourism Sector" by the ASEAN Economic Ministers in 2004. More recently, ASEAN kicked off the *VisitASEAN@50* campaign at the ASEAN Tourism Forum, held in Singapore in January 2017. Speaking at the launch of the *VisitASEAN@50* campaign, Singapore's Prime

Minister Lee Hsien Loong highlighted the importance of the tourism sector for the ASEAN member states to “grow their economies, create jobs and bring their populations closer.”¹⁷ To this end, he provided three suggestions for the future of ASEAN tourism cooperation: strengthening air links, building up cruise tourism, and continuing to invest in developing talent for tourism occupations.

These priorities set by ASEAN’s leaders provide the leverage for new and creative strategies for ASEAN-Korea cooperation in facilitating people movements for closer interactions towards deeper understanding and appreciation on both sides.

4. TOURISM AND LABOUR MOBILITY BETWEEN ASEAN AND KOREA


4.1 Tourism

Under ASEAN’s various regional framework and arrangements to facilitate people mobility in these two sectors, Korea has been more of a source of tourists to ASEAN member states, while the reverse is true for the inflow of labour from ASEAN member states.

Figure 3 highlights the percentage share of tourist arrivals in ASEAN by country of origin, where the largest share of tourist arrivals is still from within ASEAN (42.2%), and from the single origin countries among the ASEAN Dialogue Partners, China comes first at 17.1%. At 5.4%, Korean visitors to ASEAN number more than Japanese visitors. ASEAN visitors to Korea are almost half the number of the visitors from Korea to ASEAN. ASEAN visitors to Korea number 2.2 million, compared to the close to 6 million (5.9 million) Korean visitors to various ASEAN member states.¹⁸ Table 1 in the next chapter of this volume highlights the exponential increase of “short-term visits” between ASEAN member states and Korea from the 1960s to date.


Figure 3. Tourist Arrival in ASEAN by Country-of-Origin at 2015

(unit: percent)



* Source: ASEAN Secretariat 2016. *ASEAN Community in Figures 2016*.

Figure 4. Total Visit and Count of Year by Origin Country and Destination Country



* Source: ASEAN Tourism Dashboard
<http://www.aseanstats.org/publication/tourism-dashboard/> (accessed June 30, 2017).

However, ASEAN is not yet the collective tourism destination that it aspires to be. Tourist arrivals from Korea to different ASEAN destinations, compiled in the dedicated ASEAN Tourism Dashboard of the ASEAN Statistics Portal (Fig.4), show that Indonesia and Thailand are the most popular destinations among the ASEAN-6 member states, while Cambodia and Vietnam are more popular among the CLMV countries.

The ASEAN+3 Tourism Ministers Meeting provides the venue for discussing directions and priorities for joint collaboration. While the joint objectives and activities are discussed together, implementation takes place individually. The Plus Three country offering to take lead of a certain regional activity or initiative would support or facilitate the participation of ASEAN member states in the activity, while the other two Plus Three countries would be welcome to join the activity at their own cost. For example, if Korea were to take the lead to implement a tourism-related project under the ASEAN+3 joint action plan, the participation of ASEAN member states would be supported under ASEAN-Korea Dialogue, but participants from China and Japan would bear their own cost of participation. China has established its own bilateral ASEAN-China mechanisms in different sectors of ASEAN cooperation, in addition to the ASEAN+3 activities.

ASEAN-Korea tourism cooperation is part of the ASEAN+3 Tourism Ministers framework, which held its first meeting in the same year(2002) that ASEAN Leaders signed the ASEAN Tourism Agreement. The ASEAN+3 countries recently signed a Memorandum of Cooperation on ASEAN+3 Tourism cooperation in January 2016. This Memorandum commits the ASEAN+3 countries to “enhance facilitation of travel and tourist visits, development of quality tourism and strengthening linkages and cooperation among education and training institutions.”¹⁹ This provides the overall mandate for focused ASEAN-Korea activities on tourism.

In addition, Korea took the lead in establishing the East Asia Inter-Regional Tourism Forum (EATOF) in 2000 to foster greater collaboration among the local governments of the ASEAN+3 countries in tourism activities.²⁰

Under these overlapping regional frameworks for cooperation in boosting tourism, the AKC has been active in organising and convening programmes to promote greater tourism exchanges between Southeast Asian countries and Korea. It has carried out HRD programmes for ASEAN tourism professionals. It is also supporting ASEAN's VisitASEAN@50 campaign, to "introduce Koreans to all things ASEAN from food to business and socio-cultural aspects."²¹

4.2 Labour

A survey of foreigner employment in 2016 published by Korea's office of statistics showed that the number of foreigners working in Korea has increased steadily every year since 2012. The survey found that overseas workers in Korea are generally young and employed in low-paying, unskilled jobs.²² ASEAN is a key source of these workers. Latest available figures compiled by the AKC (2015) show that 64% of the total number of E-9 visa holders in Korea is from ASEAN member states and that this percentage has been fairly stable since 2013.²³ The E-9 visa is one among ten types of visas for work purposes, and E-9 visa holders are non-professional workers.

Similar to the tourism sector, labour cooperation between ASEAN and Korea will first find expression at the regular meetings of the ASEAN+3 Labour Ministers and their senior officials. These meetings have been held in conjunction with the ASEAN Labour Ministers and senior officials meetings since 2001 when ASEAN+3 cooperation in labour was first established. Over the years, cooperation activities have expanded, but with each Plus Three partner electing to work with

ASEAN member states on different concerns related to labour and employment issues. China has focused on linking employment and social security concerns, with high-level symposia, study-visits and fellowship programmes on related topics under these broad themes, as well as assisting ASEAN's newer members such as Cambodia and Laos with their labour market information systems. Japan has expanded its initial support for ASEAN's industrial relations programme to broader concerns of income and employment security as well as a focused programme on strengthening the HRD bases in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. Similar to China, Japan has also linked its cooperation with ASEAN in social welfare and development to labour and employment. Annual high-level officials' meetings between ASEAN and Japan on the topic of caring societies span the spectrum of social and manpower-related concerns.

HRD has also been a main topic for the initial ASEAN-Korea labour cooperation activities. In fact, Korea's HRD Programme for Officials of ASEAN member states is one of the longest enduring initiatives under ASEAN-Korea dialogue to be brought under the labour framework. Introduced in 1998, the programme has adjusted its focus and delivery to support the priorities of the ASEAN Labour Ministers Work Programme over the years. Korea also partners with ASEAN member states on topics including decent work, and technical and vocational education to equip workers with necessary skills to compete in the regional job market. Korea was the first among the Plus Three countries to discuss labour migration issues with ASEAN member states, and to formally place it on the ASEAN-Korea cooperation agenda with the inauguration of the ASEAN-Korea Migration Network in 2016.²⁴

This latter initiative may have been motivated from the steady increase in foreign workers in Korea since 2012, which is now nearing the 1 million mark. Additionally, since the ASEAN-Korea FTA does

not have labour provisions in the same manner that Korea's FTAs with the United States, the European Union (EU), Australia and Canada,²⁵ the migration network between ASEAN and Korea provides a timely venue to discuss labour migration issues and concerns between the sending ASEAN member states and Korea as a receiving country. Korea's Industrial Trainee System (ITS) and the Employment Permit System (EPS) constitute the legal framework for migrant workers to reside and work in Korea, but some analysts have observed the need for "fair conditions" for migrant workers, including fair pay and treatment.²⁶

There is thus an emerging need to level the (im)balance in the two sectors discussed above. For tourism, current statistics show that there are more Koreans visiting ASEAN member states than ASEAN tourists visiting Korea. Even among the destinations in ASEAN, the ASEAN founding member states are the most popular destinations for Korean visitors, although Cambodia and Vietnam are emerging as popular destinations. The promotion of ASEAN as a single tourism destination continues to be challenged by the competing nature of national tourism campaigns. There are also challenges in marketing the regional campaign within and beyond the region effectively. Most of the ASEAN visitors to Korea are also from the ASEAN founding members rather than the newer members, although Korea is making efforts to ease entry visa restrictions for tourism purposes. At the same time, ASEAN residents in Korea are steadily increasing, with marriage migration an emerging phenomenon and ASEAN workers constituting two-thirds of the total foreign workers holding E-9 employment visas in Korea. In fact, nationals of Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia are listed as 2nd, 4th and 5th respectively in the top five foreigner populations resident in Korea. As discussed in the earlier sections, the social issues arising from these increases in populations warrant monitoring and requiring a sensitive response where appropriate.

5. FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR PEOPLE MOBILITY BETWEEN ASEAN AND KOREA

The ASEAN-Korea Plan of Action 2016-2020 aims to further deepen the ASEAN-Korea strategic partnership. Earlier, in December 2014, the Commemorative Summit on the 25th Anniversary of ASEAN-Korea Dialogue had indicated three “shared” destinies for the ASEAN-Korea relations: political-security cooperation towards shared peace, economic cooperation for shared prosperity, and socio-cultural cooperation for shared progress, the last one highlighting greater people-to-people contacts to deepen mutual understanding and friendship.²⁷ The practical dimension of ASEAN-Korea relations have kept cooperation on an even keel, and this bodes well for the future.

But there are also shared challenges for people-to-people initiatives, which highlight the following questions or concerns for policy officials, business practitioners and academics involved in different aspects of ASEAN-Korea cooperation: (1) How to make better use of the existing opportunities to accelerate growth and development? (2) How to deepen knowledge and understanding of ASEAN in Korea and Korea in ASEAN beyond current perceptions? (3) How can people movements contribute positively to emerging trends and needs in ASEAN and Korea?

These questions will shape the future of how ASEAN-Korea cooperation tackles its people movement priorities and, more immediately, in giving effect to the ASEAN-ROK Cultural Exchange Year.

There are other shared challenges. Emerging and resurging non-security challenges in health and environment are affecting people’s well-being, and will in turn influence how the populace view governments’ ability to respond to challenges of a transboundary nature that affect

people's economic and emotional well-being. ASEAN's collaborative activities with dialogue partners under various action plans and programmes can help to mitigate some of the adverse effects. This dimension of soft power (the other dimensions being education and people-to-people exchanges in various fields) can also serve as a positive influence on how citizens of ASEAN member states perceive Koreans. Currently, there is an uneven awareness of Korea in ASEAN and of ASEAN in Korea, although the youth in ASEAN have largely positive attitudes towards Korea. This is largely due to Korea's soft power influence in Southeast Asia manifested through "the Korean Wave" of pop culture, television drama series, and the beauty industry.

In 2014-15, the ASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute and the Sociology Department of the National University of Singapore carried out a survey among young undergraduates from 22 universities across the ten ASEAN member states, to gauge their attitudes and awareness towards ASEAN. This survey also included an opportunistic survey of the ASEAN youth's perceptions of ASEAN's partners. Compared to the other Northeast Asian (or Plus Three) countries, the ASEAN respondents described Korea's soft power influence mainly through the K-pop culture and Korean dramas, as well as in the beauty industry (cosmetic products as well as surgery), although Korean food also registered strongly. Compared to the other Plus Three countries, ASEAN youths' attitudes towards Korea were positive. China had mostly negative descriptions of its economic power in the region. The reverse was true for Japan, which had largely positive associations regarding its technological advancement, discipline and tourist attractions. Japan and Korea were often similarly described. Both Japanese and Korean food registered strongly.

6. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

The longer-term context of the ASEAN-Korea dialogue partner narrative and future directions for this narrative can be examined in three “keys” to each phase or stage of the dialogue partnership’s evolution.

The first two decades of early discussions before and after ASEAN’s decision to accept Korea as a dialogue partner were characterised by debating and defining ASEAN-Korea dialogue cooperation. Discussions then were influenced by the different worldviews of the ASEAN and Korean officials, shaped by different experiences and culture, as well as the sense of geographical location and place in history. Nevertheless, ASEAN and Korea reached an agreement to enter into sectoral partnership in 1989 while Korea was still undergoing the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule, and attempting also to transition from a labour-sending to labour-receiving economy. Korea eventually reached developed economy status, but not long after, the ASEAN economies and Korea were both buffeted strongly by the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis that brought several newly industrialised economies to their knees. Nevertheless, Korea joined ASEAN+3 countries in the establishment of the Chiang Mai Initiative in 2000, which stands testimony to the dedicated effort to strengthen regional economic governance in East Asia. At the same time, the EAVG (1998) and East Asia Study Group (EASG)(2000) started to look and plan ahead, in studying and recommending the future course of cooperation for not just ASEAN-Korea relations, but the larger vision for East Asia cooperation.

This laid the foundations for the next phase of ASEAN-Korea relations, which this chapter terms the “Development and Expansion” Narrative. The years 2000 to 2016 saw the strengthening of economic fundamentals towards the current aspiration to form an economic powerhouse together. The ASEAN-Korea FTA relevant to trade in

goods, trade in services and investment first entered into force in June 2007, May 2009 and June 2009, respectively,²⁸ while the ASEAN-Korea FTA in its entirety came into effect on 1 January 2010. Although the FTA utilisation rate was low in the beginning, it has been progressively maximised since 2014 when ASEAN and Korea commemorated 25 years of Dialogue Partnership. Protocols to amend the FTAs are currently being negotiated, and ASEAN and Korea have embarked on boosting closer connectivity. The AKC was established in 2009 and its activities in expanding role and reach of Korea's ASEAN activities at home and abroad have had a crucial impact on boosting Korea's image among communities of practitioners.

The present moment in ASEAN-Korea relations points to the development and evolution of a people-centred narrative for the foreseeable future up to ASEAN's Vision 2025 milestone. The coming decades will thus see a greater focus on socio-cultural priorities in the implementation period of the Plan of Action to implement the ASEAN-Korea Strategic Partnership. Efforts for greater connectedness and cooperation among the socio-cultural sectors will need to leverage on existing academic and policy analysis networks in identifying areas for joint or collaborative research.

To this end, some broad recommendations are proposed for building on the existing potential for deeper cooperation and mutual understanding between ASEAN and Korea:

First, a structure focused academic exchanges between ASEAN and Korean institutes of higher learning, building on the existing networks and agreements with Korean universities under the AUN framework, or the broader ASEAN+3 networks should be established. Ideally, these academic exchanges between ASEAN and Korea should focus on collaborative research to generate academic inputs and recommendations to ASEAN-Korea dialogue cooperation, on topics in the three broad

spheres of the ASEAN Community as well as on how ASEAN-Korea cooperation can support ASEAN Centrality for regional stability.

Second, the people-centred narrative for both ASEAN and Korea should be made to guide the way forward. This narrative should highlight or support the following: (1) Boosting the spirit of volunteerism among ASEAN and Korean youths, building on the initiatives by Korean youth to assist in the humanitarian response efforts after natural disasters in ASEAN member states, as well as ongoing similar disaster and humanitarian response work coordinated by the ASEAN Youth Volunteers Network based in Malaysia; (2) Involving more youth participation in promoting ASEAN-Korea awareness. The AKC's initiatives to invite more ASEAN youth bloggers to contribute to writing about the various activities to boost ASEAN-Korea youth interactions is a commendable example. The 2017 ASEAN-Korea Youth Forum, Youth Short Film Festival, and academic essay competitions all appeal to the young peoples' sense of participation and inclusion; (3) Establishing a Korea Centre in ASEAN (sited in an ASEAN member state with a wide reach to different ASEAN communities or representatives) to promote greater awareness and appreciation of Korea's various contributions to ASEAN Community-building among the ASEAN populations; (4) ASEAN+6 and Korea working together to bridge capacity-gaps in the CLMV countries. In this regard, the ASEAN-Korea programme on HRD can be adapted to support emerging needs and concerns. The programme has already proved itself ready to adapt to the dynamic changes of ASEAN's HRD, and also serves as a bridge for discussion of bilateral programmes between the different ASEAN member states and Korea. It is an example of how synergies can be found for Korea's overseas development assistance to ASEAN member states, either collectively or individually.

Movement of People between ASEAN and Korea: An Overview of Trends of the Flow from ASEAN to Korea

KIM JEEHUN

ABSTRACT

This chapter reviews and highlights trends and emerging issues in movement of people between ASEAN and Korea with a focus on short-term visitors and long-term migrants. The movement of people has dramatically increased and been sustained over the past several decades, especially since the early 1990s. There is little doubt that this change is accelerated by deepening economic and sociocultural relationships between ASEAN and Korea. Apart from tourists and other types of short-term visitors, long-term migrants including migrant workers, international students and marriage migrants as well as their family members are increasingly becoming important constituents of foreign residents in Korea. In particular, as many of these permanent migrants and their family members are facing different sets of mobility issues such as intergenerational or social mobility, the study into their current and future challenges should take into account newly emerging aspects on 'second generation' issues. Anecdotal findings of ongoing research on this area suggest that more research grounded on emerging issues of these migrants at family and local levels are much needed. The policies informed by such grounded research may ease practical challenges embedded in emerging issues of human mobility between ASEAN and Korea.

* **Key words:** People Mobility, Marriage, Education, Tourism

1. INTRODUCTION: INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE BETWEEN ASEAN AND KOREA

The movement of people between ASEAN and Korea has dramatically increased and has been sustained over the past several decades, especially since the early 1990s. There is little doubt that this change is accelerated by deepening economic and sociocultural relationships between ASEAN and Korea. Apart from tourists and other types of short-term visitors, long-term migrants including migrant workers, international students and marriage migrants as well as their family members are increasingly becoming important constituents of human mobility.

This chapter reviews and highlights trends and emerging issues in movement of people from ASEAN member states to Korea, with a focus on short-term visitors and long-term migrants, by using publicly available data published by the Korean government. Conventionally, a migrant is defined by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), a United Nations agency as “any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence.”¹ Long-term migrants are also defined as those who have stayed or are departing to take up residence abroad for more than one year.²

Over the past three decades, Korea has become an immigrant-receiving country from an immigrant-sending country. Although the then President Roh Moo-Hyun announced in 2006 that the country was moving towards a multicultural country and recognised that both immigrants and foreigners were important parts of the society, the implemented policies were centred on dealing with shortages of labour and marriageable spouses, by utilising ethnic Koreans overseas initially and primarily.³ As there are limited number of ethnic Koreans abroad, ethnocentric policy measures cannot be sustainable in the long-term.

At the same time, it is important to note that the immigration policies in Korea have often been seen as not gearing towards promoting immigration into Korea but, to the contrary, controlling or minimising permanent settlement. It was particularly so for migrant workers as Korean government adopted a dual tier system for them (see Section III), favouring ethnic Koreans overseas. However, as we will review in the following sections, we are witnessing a much more accelerated and elevated presence of people from ASEAN in Korea over the past decades: ASEAN has become the most significant region of origin for many subgroups of migrants, particularly since the mid-2000s. Considering that, the changes so far seem to be shaped more by the forces ‘from the below’ rather than those ‘from the above’ such as governmental and or intergovernmental policies. Although official programs between ASEAN and Korea provided meaningful and important backgrounds and it might be particularly so for short-term visitors, we may need to carefully examine what has been happening. Despite increasing importance and presence of people from ASEAN in Korea, there is surprisingly limited research on this field. Also, the data available by large-scale national surveys, many of which started since the late 2000s or very recent years, are conducted mostly at aggregate level, not providing detailed information that scholars may use to understand mobility of people from ASEAN member states. Therefore, the scope of this chapter is constrained by this limitation but can provide some descriptive statistics at broader level. This chapter aims to lay a foundation for future research by reviewing the overall trend and emerging issues of movement of people between ASEAN and Korea by focusing on the flow from ASEAN into Korea.

After discussing the visitors group briefly, this chapter focuses on three subgroups of long-term migrants from ASEAN to Korea: migrant workers, international students and marriage migrants. As many of

marriage migrants and their family members are facing different sets of mobility issues such as intergenerational or social mobility, it will also discuss characteristics of marriage migrant families in detail. Recognising these issues, this chapter will argue that the study into their current and future challenges should take into account newly emerging aspects on 'second generation' issues and why these emerging issues will likely be future issues, too. These issues will be discussed further by focusing on the changing composition and increasing relevance of future generations. The final section will show anecdotal findings of ongoing research on this area and suggest that much more grounded research is needed, on emerging issues of these migrants at family and local levels. This chapter will end with a conclusion arguing that the policies informed by such grounded research may ease practical challenges embedded in emerging issues of human mobility between ASEAN and Korea.

2. SHORT-TERM VISITORS BETWEEN ASEAN AND KOREA

Although historical records of movement of people between Korea and Southeast Asian countries go back to as early as the seventh century and significant movement of people in the modern era were made during the two important wars in the mid-20th century,⁴ several thousand Koreans were dispatched to Southeast Asia during World War II by the Japanese colonial government, and tens of thousands of Filipino and Thai troops were dispatched to the Korean peninsula during the Korean War.⁵ The slow postwar recovery in Korea and a vacuum in diplomatic relations between some ASEAN member states and Korea during some years of the mid-20th century posed a temporary but virtual absence of human mobility between ASEAN and Korea up until the 1960s.

If we take a quick overview of movement of people between ASEAN and Korea by focusing on visitors, the figures for the past 55

years suggest exponential increases (see Table 1). The first Korean official data show that there were 202 visitors from ASEAN member states to Korea and 174 visitors from Korea to ASEAN member states in 1960. Therefore, there were merely 376 visitors between the two in 1960. Since then, the total number of visitors between ASEAN and Korea reached important marks, almost growing exponentially year by year. In 1971, there were 14,641 visitors, reaching a four-digit figure for the first time, and in 1985, there were 104,592 visitors, reaching a five-digit figure. In 1992, there were more than half a million visitors (541,939) and the visitors reached over 1 million (1,042,353) in 1995. The speed fastened as the visitors reached 2 million (2,376,322) in 2004, 4 million (4,053,326) in 2006, 5 million (5,110,618) in 2011, 6 million (6,433,617) in 2013, 7 million (7,483,415) in 2015 and 8 million (8,330,619) in 2016. Considering the rapidly increasing speed of the number of visitors, it will not be too long in the future that the number of visitors will reach a nine-digit figure.

During the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and, in fact, up until 1993, visitors from ASEAN to Korea outnumbered those from Korea to ASEAN. This was partly because international travel for Koreans was restricted as issuance of passports were limited in Korea until the mid-1980s. This trend has changed since 1994 when more than half a million (518,746) Koreans visited ASEAN, whereas 336,461 ASEAN nationals visited Korea. The trend that ASEAN nationals visit Korea has increased almost persistently with a few exceptional years until today. Also, except for a few years including subsequent years of the Asian Crisis in 1997 and of the global financial turmoil in the late 2000s, Koreans visited ASEAN in increasing number year by year; reaching 105,819 in 1989, 1 million (1,045,409) in 2001, 3 million (3,343,591) in 2006 and 4 million (4,453,939) in 2012. There were close to 5 million (4,978,663) Korean visitors in 2014 and over 6 million visitors in 2016 (6,114,583).

Visitors from ASEAN member states are notable in terms of both

Table 1. Visitors between ASEAN and Korea, 1960-2016

Year	Visitors from ASEAN to Korea	Visitors from Korea to ASEAN	Visitors between ASEAN and Korea
1960	202	174	376
1965	843	903	1,746
1970	2,970	2,935	5,905
1975	7,761	3,624	11,385
1980	34,320	13,303	47,623
1985	75,514	29,078	104,592
1990	202,872	154,392	357,264
1995	379,912	662,441	1,042,353
2000	599,024	853,535	1,452,559
2005	658,568	1,891,812	2,550,380
2010	1,038,529	3,298,640	4,337,169
2015	1,608,381	5,875,034	7,483,415
2016	2,216,036	6,114,583	8,330,619

* Source: Author's calculations from data by the Korea Immigration Service (data from 1960 to 1983) and Korea Tourism Organization (data from 1984 to 2016).

Table 2. Arrivals from Major Origin Countries to Korea, 1985 - 2016

	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2016
China	308	42,516	178,359	442,794	710,243	1,875,157	5,984,170	8,067,722
Japan	638,941	146,0291	1,667,203	2472,054	2,440,139	3,023,009	1,837,782	2,297,893
USA	239,423	325,388	358,872	458,617	530,633	652,889	767,613	866,186
Taiwan	99,622	211,052	130,147	127,120	351,438	406,352	518,190	833,465
Hong Kong	47,110	70,569	100,407	200,874	166,206	228,582	523,427	650,676
Philippines	10,350	86,623	163,228	248,737	222,655	297,452	403,622	556,745
Thailand	10,527	29,367	73,770	87,885	112,724	260,718	371,769	470,107
Malaysia	30,307	24,753	31,145	59,933	96,583	113,675	223,350	311,254
Indonesia	10,753	20,996	37,723	59,085	62,294	95,239	193,590	295,461
Vietnam	23	4,049	16,720	21,483	45,455	90,213	162,765	251,402
Others	338,681	683,235	995,623	1,143,210	1,284,382	1,754,372	2,245,373	2,640,912
Total	1,426,045	2,958,839	3,753,197	5,321,792	6,022,752	8,797,658	13,231,651	17,241,823

* Source: Korea Tourism Organization.

increase in their numbers and relative share to the total, both taking place over several decades. About thirty years ago, in 1985, only two ASEAN member states, Malaysia and Singapore, were listed among the top 10 origin countries of arrivals to Korea; Malaysia was ranked fifth with 30,323 (2.4%) and Singapore was ranked tenth with 12,984 (1%) visitors, respectively. Considering the share of visitors from ASEAN member states to the total visitors to Korea, ASEAN member states were not major origin countries at that time; Japanese, American and Taiwanese visitors accounted for about 70 % of the total visitors to Korea. However, the latest arrival statistics by Korean Immigration Office suggest that five ASEAN member states (namely, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia) were listed among the top ten origin countries and their share to the total accounted for over 10% (10.9%) of the total visitors, 17.24 million visitors, in 2016.⁶

In short, short-term visitors from ASEAN to Korea have increased in terms of their numbers and share to the total visitors to Korea. Over the recent decades, diversification of origin and destination countries is also notable in both directions of visits between ASEAN and Korea. This suggests there is a firm foundational basis of movement of people between ASEAN and Korea.

3. FOREIGN RESIDENTS AND LONG-TERM MIGRANTS FROM ASEAN IN KOREA

The size and relative share of foreign residents in a country and the flow of migrants are important indicators in recognising the state of immigrants.⁷ Over the past three decades, Korea has become an immigrant-receiving country from an immigrant-sending country. Increasing numbers of long-term migrants from ASEAN member states have played a key role in this important transformation. Also, importantly,

this transformation was made even though immigration policies in Korea in themselves did not particularly favour ASEAN member states but ethnic Koreans overseas, particularly migrant workers. It is important to note that the immigration policies in Korea often have been seen to control or minimise permanent settlement. That being said, this section will firstly look into the overall picture of foreign residents (who are mostly long-term migrants) and then, the three sub-groups of long-term migrants, namely, migrant workers, international students and marriage migrants, focusing on those originating from ASEAN member states.

3.1. Overview of Foreign Residents and Long-term Migrants

A key noticeable point of the overall trend and changing composition of foreign residents and long-term migrants in Korea is that long-term migrants from ASEAN have taken up an increasingly large share, becoming one of the most important groups, and the trend will likely be continued in the future. It is particularly important to note that there were no specific policies targeting to attract long-term migrants from ASEAN member states into Korea.

Table 3. Foreign Residents in Korea, 1990-2016

	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015
Foreign Residents	49,507	269,641	491,324	747,467	1,261,415	1,899,519	2,049,441
Ratio to Population	0.11%	0.60%	1.07%	1.55%	2.50%	3.69%	3.96%

*Source: Korean Immigration Service, Ministry of Justice (various years). *Annual Statistical Reports*.

A significant presence of foreign residents, especially long-term migrants from ASEAN, is a relatively recent phenomenon. Until the 1990s, foreign residents comprised less than 1% of the total population in Korea. For example, the ratio of foreign residents was only 0.11% in 1990 (with 49,507 foreign residents). Since then, the number has expanded

Table 4. Changing Composition of Foreign Residents by Countries, 1993, 2005 and 2016

1993			2005			2016		
Country	Number	Ratio	Country	Number	Ratio	Country	Number	Ratio
USA	43,237	25.5%	China	282,030	37.7%	China	1,016,607	49.6%
China	27,990	16.5%	(Korean) Chinese	(167,589)	(22.4%)	(Korean) Chinese	(627,004)	(30.6%)
(Korean) Chinese	(23,997)	(14.1%)	USA	103,029	13.8%	Vietnam	149,384	7.3%
Taiwan	26,043	15.3%	Japan	39,410	5.3%	USA	140,222	6.8%
Japan	24,064	14.2%	Vietnam	38,902	5.2%	Thailand	100,860	4.9%
Philippines	11,977	7.1%	Philippines	38,057	5.1%	Philippines	56,980	2.8%
Bangladesh	6,166	3.6%	Thailand	34,188	4.6%	Uzbekistan	54,490	2.7%
Nepal	2,944	1.7%	Indonesia	25,599	3.4%	Japan	51,297	2.5%
Thailand	2,823	1.7%	Taiwan	25,121	3.4%	Indonesia	47,606	2.3%
Hong Kong	2,058	1.2%	Mongolia	22,475	3.0%	Cambodia	45,832	2.2%
Pakistan	1,967	1.2%	Bangladesh	15,116	2.0%	Mongolia	35,206	1.7%
Other ASEAN (not listed)	3,260	1.9%	Other ASEAN (not listed)	9,187	1.2%	Other ASEAN (not listed)	38,233	1.9%
ASEAN subtotal	18,060	10.6%	ASEAN subtotal	145,933	19.5%	ASEAN subtotal	438,895	21.4%
Others	17,220	10.1%	Others	114,353	15.3%	Others	274,491	13.4%
Total	169,749	100.0%	Total	747,467	100.0%	Total	2,049,441	100.0%

* Source: Author's calculation from data by Korea Immigration Service.

exponentially and the ratio has increased noticeably too. As of 2016, there were 2,049,441 foreign residents in Korea, which amounted close to 4% (3.96%) of the total population, having achieved an annual average increasing rate of 9.2% over the last five years. (Korea Immigration Service, 2017: 38). The figure of foreign residents has more than doubled over

the past decade, as there were about 910,149 foreign residents that constituted 1.88% of the total population back in 2006.

To understand the past trend, however, it is noteworthy that in examining the trends and details of foreign residents in Korea and its relevance requires us to look carefully into the early 1990s and mid-2000s, as these periods were important in shaping the overall trends of foreign residents in Korea and international migration in Korea. Since the early 1990s, Korea has become an immigrant-receiving country, notably incorporating migrant workers into its economy. Another notable change is the rise of marriage migrants as a significant migrant group.

Firstly, let us examine more closely the current state of residents from ASEAN member states in Korea. In 2016, five ASEAN member states were among the top ten origin countries in Korea and the residents from ASEAN as a whole amounted to 438,895, taking up 21.4% of the total foreign population. In particular, Vietnam has become the second largest origin country with 149,384 foreign residents, following the largest group from China (1,016,607 with 49.6%) and ahead of the fourth group from Thailand with 100,860 foreign residents; Vietnam and Thailand groups represented 7.3% and 4.9% of the total foreign residents, respectively. The Philippines (2.8%, with 56,980), Indonesia and Cambodia were ranked fifth, eighth and ninth largest origin countries, respectively.

The increasing presence of long-term migrants from ASEAN has been accelerated by two migrant groups over the past decades; those from ASEAN was just one of many important groups during the initial periods but their contribution has become a key group since the mid-2000s. On the one hand, since the early 1990s, facing labour shortage and increasing labour cost in the country especially in the low skill sectors, Korea started to recruit international migrant workers for its labour force. On the other hand, marriage migration became a noticeable social phenomenon amongst marriages in Korea at the same time. Initially,

marriage migrants, especially females, were seen as a solution to solve the shortage of marriageable brides, especially in rural Korea. Also, Korean government policies for these two migrant groups in the 1990s were centred around ethnic Koreans overseas, particularly in China, who could speak Korean and share Korean cultural traditions.

Then, what have been the noticeable trends of migrants from ASEAN in the past two decades? With the influx of these two groups of international migrants, there were 169,749 foreign residents in Korea in 1993 as seen in Table 4. In the same year, only two ASEAN member states, the Philippines and Thailand, were among the top ten origin countries. There were 11,977 foreign residents from the Philippines (the fifth largest origin country with 7.1% share) and 2,823 foreign residents from Thailand (the eighth largest origin country with 1.7% share). There were 3,260 residents from other ASEAN member states. Overall the number and share of foreign residents from ASEAN member states in 1993 were 18,060 and 10.6%, respectively. The Philippines and Thailand were the two most important origin countries for both marriage migrants and migrant workers from ASEAN during the 1990s. One reason why the share of ASEAN member states among migrant workers and marriage migrants was relatively lower in the 1990s compared to the current state is that, facing the labour and bride shortage, Korea initially adopted policies to attract ethnic Koreans from China.

During the 2000s and onwards, the size of long-term migrants from ASEAN expanded further, as many ASEAN member states became important origin countries for migrant workers and marriage migrants. For example, in 2005, four ASEAN member states, namely, Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia, were listed among the ten major origin countries of foreign residents in Korea. Among the total of 747,467 foreign residents, 145,933 were from ASEAN member states; the share of ASEAN member states to the total almost doubled to 19.5%

in 2005 from 10.6% in 1993. As seen in Table 4, Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia ranked the fourth, the fifth, the sixth and the seventh largest origin country of foreign residents of Korea.

A notable trend from the 2000s onwards is that in addition to migrant workers and marriage migrants, international students from ASEAN also become an important migrant group. Universities in Korea started to attract students from abroad, partly as part of globalisation efforts. The Korean government also contributed to such globalisation drive by implementing the “Study Korea Project” since the early 2000s.⁸ In 2015, there were 91,332 international students in Korean universities.⁹ Although the presence of ASEAN in this category is relatively less significant than that of migrant workers and marriage migrants, many ASEAN member states are now among the top 20 origin countries of the international student population in Korea.¹⁰

In short, ASEAN member states are increasingly becoming important origin countries in all of these three subgroups. The following sections will look into the three groups of foreign residents, namely, migrant workers, international students and marriage migrants, who are the major groups of foreign residents in Korea.

3.2 Migrant Workers

Although Korea started to recruit foreign workers from abroad since the early 1990s, its related policies have been complex and dualistic ones that require our careful examination, especially to find out the size and composition of ASEAN input to the overall migrant workers in Korea. For low-skilled migrant workers, the Korean government initially adopted two-tier policies. The first one focused on recruiting low-skill manual workers from countries with which intergovernmental agreements had been reached. For that purpose, the Korean government adopted the Industrial Trainee System (ITS) in the early 1990s, which

was later replaced by the Employment Permit System (EPS). Both systems were intended to control the foreign labour more easily based on the mutual agreements of governments involved, to fill the labour shortage experienced mainly in the industrial and agricultural sectors.¹¹ ITS received surmounted criticism about the unfair treatment of industrial trainees, who were actually workers but were not legally treated as workers but as trainees. Although EPS introduced in 2004 was an improved scheme as it recognised some of workers' rights and human rights, it continued to be criticised as problematic for migrant workers as it still limited mobility of workers. Under the EPS, migrant workers were allowed to change their workplace only in limited circumstances, and they were still unprotected from unfair treatment by employers.

The second tier of migrant worker policies by Korean government was targeting ethnic Koreans overseas, mostly from China and Central Asia to enter Korea with specific visas, granted to them to only work in broader sectors than that of ITS or EPS. These visas included work-visit visa (H-2) and overseas compatriot visa (F-4).

Considering the above migrant worker policies, estimating the migrant worker numbers only from other work-related visas without considering the other two (H-2 and F-4) visas, which only few ASEAN nationals were able to qualify, may not provide accurate figures, especially in order to understand ASEAN's contribution to, and overall changing landscapes of migrant workers in Korea. However, what is notable is that the contribution of ASEAN nationals is significant in work-related migration schemes. Let's examine this issue by looking into the ESP scheme first and the composition of workers from ASEAN who have other types of visa statuses.

In terms of number of foreign workers under the EPS scheme who receive non-professional employment visa (E-9), ASEAN member states have been the most important origin countries. ASEAN member

Table 5. Composition of Overall Foreign Residents and ASEAN Citizens by Visa Types, 2016

	Total	Short-term visit	Overseas Compatriot	Work-visit	Non-professional	Permanent Resident
Total Foreigners	2,049,441	421,332	372,533	254,950	279,187	130,237
Share	100.0%	20.6%	18.2%	12.4%	13.6%	6.4%
ASEAN subtotal	440,681	108,837	254	1	181,257	3,063
Share	100.0%	24.7%	0.1%	0.0%	41.1%	0.7%
Vietnam	149,384	8,345	0	1	40,415	1,497
Thailand	100,860	70,410	4	0	24,695	608
Philippines	56,980	8,546	13	0	26,347	607
Indonesia	47,606	6,957	169	0	32,161	151
Cambodia	45,832	581	5	0	37,745	86
Myanmar	22,455	636	0	0	19,894	7
Malaysia	9,484	7,015	1	0	0	65
Singapore	6,709	5,641	61	0	0	27
Laos	1,146	581	0	0	0	15
Brunei	225	125	1	0	0	0

* Source: Author's calculation based on data by the Korea Immigration Service (2017), *Korea Immigration Service Statistics 2016*.

* Note: Short-term visit (B-1, B-2, C-3 visas), Overseas compatriot (F-4 visa, issued only to Korean descendants for non-manual work), Work-visit (H-2 visa, issued only to Korean descendants for manual work), Non-professional (E-9 visa), Permanent Resident (F-5 visa), Study (Degree) (D-2 visa only include students at university degree programs; exchange students or language students are given other visas), Visit to Live (F-1 visa is given to family members or domestic workers of other eligible visa-holders), Residency (F-2 visa holders are mostly dependent (minors and spouses) of F-5 and other visa holders. Importantly, this visa-holders also includes marriage migrants), Professional Workers (E-1~E6 visas), Marriage Migrants (F-6 visa) and Expatriate/Investment/Trade (D-7, D-8, D-9 visas). Others includes many other visa types not indicated in the table.

* Source: Korea Immigration Service (2017).

Study (Degree)	Visit to Live	Residency	Professional	Marriage Migrant	Expatriate /Investment /Trade	Others
76,040	103,826	39,681	47,740	121,332	13,327	189,256
3.7%	5.1%	1.9%	2.3%	5.9%	0.7%	9.2%
9,169	38,202	3,304	6,493	57,573	897	31,631
2.1%	8.7%	0.7%	1.5%	13.1%	0.2%	7.2%
4,692	32,285	2,376	1,535	38,866	43	19,329
451	228	99	658	2544	75	1,088
548	3,278	490	3,269	10,789	238	2,855
1,367	89	46	567	545	74	5,480
337	2,231	17	40	4,182	7	601
370	26	220	44	135	10	1,113
873	14	30	284	120	343	739
376	9	19	80	63	103	330
93	41	7	15	328	2	64
62	1	0	1	1	2	32

states account for more than two-thirds (67.8%) of the accumulated total number of foreign workers under the EPS for the period between 2004 and 2015. Vietnam, the Philippines and Thailand were the top three origin countries for the period overall. Until mid-2000s, recruitment of foreign workers under the EPS took place from these three ASEAN member states as well as Indonesia and Sri Lanka. In recent years, recruitment of foreign workers draws from pools of workers from other developing ASEAN member states such as Cambodia and Myanmar as well as other South and Central Asian countries, where labour costs are relatively cheaper.

Considering the dual tier of low-skill migrant work visas and complexity of other work-related visa system in Korea, estimating migrant workers from ASEAN by examining foreign resident composition by visa types might be helpful (see Table 5). A recent national survey on foreign labour suggests that among about 2 million foreign residents in 2016, 1.425 million were 15 years old or older, about 1 million were economically active population and 962 thousand were actually working.¹² Among the working foreign population, there were about 307 thousand people who held non-professional employment visas (E-9) or professional work visas (E1-E7). This means that more than two thirds of those who were working held various other types of visas. In particular, there were 231 thousand work-visit visa-holders (H-2) and 214 thousand overseas Korean compatriot visa-holders (F-4), who were working.¹³ As these two visa types could be granted only to ethnic Korean descent overseas who held foreign citizenship, there were only 255 such visa-holders from ASEAN in 2016. In addition, international student visa holders were also allowed to work part-time or in temporary positions, and 12.7% of them were working. Also, about half, 49.8%, of marriage migrant visa-holders were working.

In 2016, among the approximate 440 thousand foreign residents from ASEAN, the majority of them had either non-professional work visas (41.1%) or marriage migrant/family related visas (23.2% including marriage migrant visas, visit-to-live, permanent resident and residency visas). There were 7,390 individuals who had professional work visas (the combined visas total for professional employment, expatriates, investors and traders). Therefore, as a whole, considering the compositions of foreign residents and their ratio of employment participation, ASEAN nationals take up the majority of low-skilled foreign labour. Also, a sizable number of marriage migrants from ASEAN is estimated to work. There is also a relatively small but notable number of professional migrants from ASEAN.

Table 6. International Students from ASEAN and Other Major Origin Countries, 2016

	Under-graduate	Masters	PhD	Language Studies	Others	Total	Share
Vietnam	1,469	1,139	858	3,816	177	7,459	7.20%
Indonesia	422	361	169	180	221	1,353	1.30%
Malaysia	560	78	45	237	168	1,088	1.00%
Thailand	104	136	65	194	78	577	0.60%
Philippines	110	269	122	100	81	682	0.70%
Cambodia	95	168	35	64	30	392	0.40%
Singapore	60	21	5	85	246	417	0.40%
Myanmar	103	172	51	89	3	418	0.40%
Laos	21	50	11	20	6	108	0.10%
Brunei	5	1	1	5	73	85	0.10%
ASEAN subtotal	2,949	2,395	1,362	4,790	1,083	12,579	12.10%
China	27,708	8,738	2,512	14,594	6,584	60,136	57.70%
Mongolia	1,077	989	213	2,086	91	4,456	4.30%
Japan	1,279	201	88	1,226	882	3,676	3.50%
USA	748	613	230	397	838	2,826	2.70%
Taiwan	866	134	32	457	535	2,024	1.90%
Uzbekistan	701	329	53	459	46	1,588	1.50%
France	46	44	11	125	862	1,088	1.00%
Russia	249	142	37	259	286	973	0.90%
Pakistan	76	49	219	610	8	962	0.90%
Canada	409	247	72	55	149	932	0.90%
Others	2,836	3,401	2,049	1,918	2,818	13,022	12.50%
Total	38,944	17,282	6,878	26,976	14,182	104,262	100%

* Source: Ministry of Education.

Table 7. Trend of International Students from ASEAN and Other Countries in Korea, 2003-2016

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Vietnam	367	457	705	1,179	2,242	1,817	1,787
Indonesia	101	113	129	170	229	325	412
Malaysia	156	270	291	377	425	501	560
Thailand	46	66	85	99	153	241	349
Philippines	90	116	122	178	263	353	350
Cambodia	24	38	48	61	90	134	177
Singapore	26	39	21	18	50	67	164
Myanmar	38	87	92	79	107	107	157
Laos	10	20	21	32	45	52	49
Brunei	0	0	4	0	1	11	8
ASEAN subtotal	858	1,206	1,518	2,193	3,605	3,608	4,013
China	5607	8,677	12,312	19,160	31,829	44,746	53,461
Mongolia	208	356	510	809	1,309	2,022	2,724
Japan	2486	2,232	2,638	3,621	3,531	3,324	3,931
USA	575	586	766	1,216	1,173	1,481	1,898
Taiwan	631	688	807	936	1,037	1,158	1,256
Others	1,949	3,087	3,975	4,622	6,786	7,613	8,567
Total	12,314	16,832	22,526	32,557	49,270	63,952	75,850

3.3 International Students

ASEAN nationals have become increasingly significant among international students in Korean universities in recent years. In 2016, ASEAN nationals as a whole in this group took up 12.1% of the total international students recorded at 12,579 students; this is more than ten-fold from the year 2003 when there were only 858 students from ASEAN. There has been almost a consistent increase of students from all countries of ASEAN over the past decade. What is notable is that

* Source: Ministry of Education.

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Vietnam	1,914	2,325	2,447	2,998	3,181	4,451	7,459
Indonesia	433	629	729	916	1,101	1,175	1,353
Malaysia	604	606	735	771	890	991	1,088
Thailand	397	576	524	575	647	464	577
Philippines	446	503	543	601	641	653	682
Cambodia	247	285	347	371	338	368	392
Singapore	244	236	461	611	310	340	417
Myanmar	187	232	244	242	290	324	418
Laos	63	94	108	99	96	97	108
Brunei	9	18	29	74	86	83	85
ASEAN subtotal	4,544	5,504	6,167	7,258	7,580	8,946	12,579
China	57,783	59,317	55,427	50,343	50,336	54,214	60,136
Mongolia	3,333	3,699	3,797	3,902	3,126	3,138	4,456
Japan	3,876	4,520	4,093	4,344	3,958	3,492	3,676
USA	2,193	2,707	2,665	2,668	3,104	2,968	2,826
Taiwan	1,419	1,574	1,510	1,690	1,873	1,994	2,024
Others	10,694	12,216	13,219	15,718	14,914	16,580	18,565
Total	83,842	89,537	86,878	85,923	84,891	91,332	104,262

Vietnam has become the second largest origin country since 2015. Vietnam sent 7,459 students in 2016. Indonesia and Malaysia were also among the top ten origin countries in the same year.

A key feature among ASEAN students in Korea is that developing ASEAN member states had a higher ratio of graduate students than other categories, whereas more developed ASEAN member states, particularly, Singapore and Brunei, had more students in 'language studies' and 'others' category which is mostly exchange students. However,

the recent increase of Vietnamese students includes a large number of candidates for both undergraduate and graduate degree programs and language programs.

Despite the increasing significance of ASEAN students in Korea, research focusing on international students from ASEAN has been very rare; most studies on international students in Korea were conducted with a focus on Chinese students, which have been the largest international student group in Korea since the late 1990s. It was understandable in the past that Chinese students were the dominant majority among international students in Korean universities, particularly until the early 2010s. Kim's study on experiences of Southeast Asian students in a university in Seoul is an exception.¹⁴ He suggested that many of ASEAN students, particularly those from non-English speaking countries, were positioned in a doubly marginalised status in their university life. They were not only part of an ethnic minority as foreign students in Korean universities but also a linguistic minority with limited social networks. International students from English-speaking countries or western countries, and Chinese students who make up the largest international student group, have established their own social and academic support networks as a major group with a significant size among the international students, fare better than those from Southeast Asia. As the size of students from ASEAN expands, especially in countries where their official languages do not include English, Korean universities recently have started to provide international students with institutional support for academic and other matters.

3.4 Marriage Migrants and Their Families in Korea

Marriage migrants in Korea have also increased dramatically over the past few decades and ASEAN member states have become important origin countries.

During the 1990s and early 2000s, ASEAN member states were just some of many origin countries but ASEAN member states have now become key origin countries. Marriage migrants from ASEAN member states have increased steadily over the last fifteen years, taking up more than 40% of the total marriage migrants in 2016 as seen in Table 8. In 2001, ASEAN member states' share to the total marriage migrants was merely 15.5% with 3,862 out of the total of 24,949 migrants. In the same year, the Philippines was the third largest origin country with 3,041 migrants (with the share of 12.2% to the total), while the majority of marriage migrants came from China and Japan, which took up 50.7% and 23.3% of the total, respectively.

Table 8. Marriage Migrants by Origin Countries, 2001-2016

	2001	2005	2010	2015	2016
China	12,651	45,788	66,687	58,788	56,930
Vietnam	264	7,463	35,355	40,847	41,803
Japan	5,811	7,741	10,451	12,861	13,110
Philippines	3,041	3,932	7,476	11,367	11,606
Cambodia	5	206	4,195	4,555	4,473
USA	683	1,642	2,177	3,192	3,354
Thailand	552	1,157	2,533	2,821	3,182
Mongolia	191	1,295	2,421	2,384	2,381
Uzbekistan	134	917	1,725	2,244	2,302
Russia	243	955	1,161	1,305	1,182
Others	1374	3,915	7,473	11,244	12,051
Total	24,949	75,011	141,654	151,608	152,374
4 ASEAN countries Subtotal	3,862	12,758	49,559	59,590	61,064
4 ASEAN countries Total	15.5%	17.0%	35.0%	39.3%	40.1%

* Source: Korean Immigration Service, *Annual Statistical Reports*.

Also, importantly, over the last decade, in addition to the Philippines, other ASEAN member states such as Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand have become new important origin countries. Among the total of 152,374 marriage migrants in 2016, the Vietnamese took up 27.4% (with 41,803), ranking the second largest country, following the Chinese (56,930 with 37.4% share). The Filipinos/as was the fourth largest group with 7.6% and 11,606 persons, while Cambodians and Thai were the fifth and the sixth largest groups with the shares to the total of 2.9% and 2.1% respectively.

On top of the overall number of marriage migration, there are a few important characteristics of marriage migration especially involving nationals of ASEAN member states. Firstly, marriage migration from ASEAN is especially notable for marriage between a Korean male and a foreign female as the gender ratio of marriage migrants from these origin countries were about 97% or more (see Table 9). In other words, a typical picture of marriage migration in Korea, which is often seen as marriage between a Korean male and a foreign female, is most vividly evident in the marriage migration from ASEAN member states than other countries.

Secondly, another important feature of marriage migration in Korea is the important share of second marriage to the overall marriage migration.¹⁵ As Table 10 shows, second marriage has taken up about 30% from the total of marriage migration for the period overall. This feature, particularly for those who have underaged children from their previous marriage, complicates the family ecology as many of these newly formed families are composed of family members of diverse ethnic, linguistic and migration backgrounds, particularly among the second generation members of these families.¹⁶ This issue has rarely been examined by scholars.

Thirdly, related to the above issues, unions between Korean males and female nationals from ASEAN, their age gap is much greater than those in other marriage migration groups.¹⁷

Table 9. Marriage Migrants by Gender and Origin Countries, 2016

	Total	Share	Male	Ratio	Female	Ratio
China	56,930	37.4%	11,629	20.4%	45,301	79.6%
Vietnam	41,803	27.4%	1,324	3.2%	40,479	96.8%
Japan	13,110	8.6%	1,218	9.3%	11,892	90.7%
Philippines	11,606	7.6%	334	2.9%	11,272	97.1%
Cambodia	4,473	2.9%	61	1.4%	4,412	98.6%
USA	3,354	2.2%	2,537	75.6%	817	24.4%
Thailand	3,182	2.1%	77	2.4%	3,105	97.6%
Mongolia	2,381	1.6%	117	4.9%	2,264	95.1%
Uzbekistan	2,302	1.5%	87	3.8%	2,215	96.2%
Russia	1,182	0.8%	84	7.1%	1,098	92.9%
Others	12,051	7.9%	6,388	26.8%	5,663	4.4%
Total	152,374	100.0%	23,856	15.7%	128,518	84.3%

* Source: Korean Immigration Service (2017: 52).

Table 10. Marriage Migration by Marriage Types, 1993-2016

	1993	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2016
First-marriage	4,588	8,680	8,135	21,853	22,068	14,858	14,169
Second-marriage	1,538	4,244	3,405	19,920	12,167	6,412	6,422
Unknown	419	569	65	583	0	0	0
Total	6,545	13,493	11,605	42,356	34,235	21,274	20,591
Ratio of second marriage	23.5%	31.5%	29.3%	47.0%	35.5%	30.1%	31.2%

Source: Korean Immigration Service (2017: 52).

The rest of this chapter will examine why second generational children of marriage migration are an important issue by considering the characteristics of marriage migrants in Korea and the increasing share of families formed by such marriage migrants from ASEAN member states.

4. EMERGING ISSUES OF MARRIAGE MIGRATION FROM ASEAN TO KOREA: SECOND GENERATION OF MARRIAGE MIGRANT FAMILIES

This section will examine emerging issues of migration from ASEAN to Korea by focusing on marriage migration, as this type of migration is one of the few that allow permanent settlement in Korea under current immigration policies. In fact, the second generation of marriage migrants has received attention as an important issue in Korean society, particularly at schools. However, the assumption was often made at both policy and practice levels that they are the bi-ethnic children from couples with one Korean and one foreign parent, or first generational foreign origin marriage migrants themselves, who inevitably have to undergo difficult adaptation process in a new land. The issues that this section will discuss are not confined to families formed by marriage migration from ASEAN. Instead, they will consider the significant involvement of ASEAN origin migrants among marriage migrant families in Korea. Brief discussion on these emerging issues will provide backgrounds for future research and public policies on human mobility issues between ASEAN and Korea.

Since 2009 when the first comprehensive national survey on all multicultural families was made, two points were newly recognised for the landscape of marriage migration in Korea. First was that there are various forms of 'multicultural' families: there are not only children born to couples with one Korean and one foreign parent but also children of these parents' previous marriage whose number is also significant.¹⁸ In particular, foreign born children of marriage migrant families, who are mostly children from foreign spouses' previous marriage, may need extra attention and support during their schooling as they are also first-generational (or 1.5 generational) migrants.

Second, with a high level of divorce of the marriage migrant couples and/or their subsequent re-union, there are a number of children whose both parents are foreign origin even though they may be borne by couples with one Korean and one foreign parent or raised by a foreign-born single (often marriage migrant mother) parent. They may grow up under difficult family context either without a Korean native family member or parent who may play a supportive role. How they will fare in Korean schools and society is a concern, which should receive both academic and public attention in the future.

Table 11. Underaged Children (0-18 years old) of Foreign Residents in Korea by Age Groups, 2009-2015

	0-6 years old	7-12 years old	13-15 years old	16-18 years old	Total
2009	64,040	28,922	8,082	6,465	107,689
2010	75,776	30,587	8,688	6,884	121,935
2011	Not available by age groups				151,154
2012	104,694	40,235	15,038	8,616	168,583
2013	116,696	45,156	18,395	11,081	191,328
2014	121,310	49,929	19,499	13,499	202,404
2015	117,877	56,108	18,827	14,881	207,693

* Source: Ministry of the Interior and Safety 2009-2015.

Partly dealing with this specific population, many studies on foreign-born students at Korean primary and secondary schools indicate that these foreign-born school children face much more difficult adaptational issues than bi-ethnic children of so-called multicultural families. A useful indicator is that they have a high level of school drop-out rate. A key problem in this type of research so far is that most studies have not paid attention on complex backgrounds of family or migration. Therefore, future research on this second generation should pay attention on family,

migration path and other social backgrounds.

It might sound odd but despite the significant size of ASEAN origin marriage migrants in Korea, limited research has focused on them. Therefore, to understand characteristics of marriage migrants from ASEAN, research on them should be done.

Table 12. Underaged Children (0-18 years old) of Foreign Residents in Korea by Countries (ASEAN member states), 2009-2015

Year	Vietnam	Philippines	Cambodia	Thailand	Indonesia	Other ASEAN	ASEAN subtotal	ASEAN ratio/total
2009	22,491	10,687	See note1	1,563	499	2,307	37,547	34.9%
2010	27,517	11,926	2,554	1,711	505	147	44,360	36.4%
2011	34,256	13,937	3,565	2,082	576	329	54,745	36.2%
2012	41,238	15,820	4,690	2,427	624	215	65,014	38.6%
2013	49,458	18,020	5,961	2,663	700	281	77,083	40.3%
2014	54,737	19,568	6,777	2,767	755	372	84,976	41.6%
2015	57,856	20,584	7,343	2,810	760	439	89,792	43.2%

* Source: Ministry of the Interior and Safety 2009-2015.

Note 1: Cambodia was included in 'Other ASEAN' in 2009.

Table 13. Multicultural Children at Primary and Secondary Schools in Korea, 2011-2016

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Total (Korea born and foreign born)	38,678	46,954	55,780	67,806	82,536	99,186
Jungdoipgugja (foreign born children)	2,540	4,288	4,922	5,602	6,261	7,418
Ratio to the total	6.6%	9.1%	8.8%	8.3%	7.6%	7.5%
Children of Foreign Parents	2139	2626	5044	4706	8176	12634
Ratio to the total	5.5%	5.6%	9.0%	6.9%	9.9%	12.7%

* Source: Ministry of Education.

Then, let us briefly examine what would be the potential issues for the second-generation children of marriage migrant couples by looking into two cases involving marriage migrants from ASEAN. This might be helpful for us to review policies involved and to draw implications for future mobility between ASEAN and Korea.

Let's examine Sanghyun's (16 years old) and Jerry's (12 years old) family who are now stepbrothers as one each of their own biological parents (Korean (step-)father, Mr. Sung, 50 years old) and Filipino (step-)mother, Caroline, 27 years old) married three years ago and currently live in Incheon. Sanghyun and his father went to the Philippines partly for the purpose of Sanghyun's education to learn English and partly for the purpose of looking for a new opportunity for Sanghyun's father as he divorced and quit his job in Korea. While they were in the Philippines, Sanghyun's father met and married Caroline, who was a Filipino single mother raising on her own, Jerry, the child she had with her Australian partner. Sanghyun, his father and stepmother lived in the Philippines for about three years and recently came to Korea. After marriage between Sanghyun's father and stepmother Caroline, Jerry repeated living with and apart from them while in the Philippines. When Jerry lived apart from Sanghyun, Jerry lived with his Filipino grandparents. Since all of them came to Korea, they live together in Incheon. Caroline works as an English teacher at a hagwon (private cram school) and as a part-time private tutor. Jerry attends a public school, where he is registered as a so-called 'multicultural student.' Because of Caroline's status as a marriage migrant and Jerry's status as 'multicultural student' (and especially as a *jungdoipgugja*, meaning a foreign-born student who enters Korea during their school age) in Korea, I was able to be introduced to the family by a local level multicultural centre.

Sanghyun and Jerry's case illustrates one of many types of step-families formed by marriage migration in Korea. It also illustrates one of

the typical cases where marriage migrant families have a foreign-born child, Jerry, who may similarly undergo adaptational experience as a first generational migrant like his mother. How these children establish family relationships and fare in Korean society will be a concern, as many studies on these foreign-born school children so far suggest negative results of their school adjustment and performance.

Let's take another typical case that involves stepfamilies formed by marriage migration in Korea. Ayoung (16 years old), who was born to Korean parents, lives with a newborn half-sister, Dayoung (1-year-old), who was born to a Korean father (44 years old) and a Vietnamese mother (26 years old). In 2009, there were about 15,000 Korean children born to both biological parents being Korean but have a foreign step-parent, like Ayoung or Sanghyun, who became part of a family formed by marriage migration.¹⁹ Ayoung's father works as an excavator operator and her Vietnamese step-mother is a housewife, taking care of the newly born baby. Ayoung's biological parents divorced when Ayoung was two years old and her father married his current wife two years ago. Ayoung calls her step-mother just as 'mother.' Her Vietnamese step-grandmother visits Korea sometimes after the marriage between Ayoung's father and step-mother. She works in Korea and visits Ayoung's house every other week. Ayoung said that her new step-grandmother took good care of her when they met, although they could hardly communicate well in Korean or Vietnamese languages. It was not uncommon among marriage migrant families that I interviewed that the natal family members of marriage migrants come to Korea to work, utilising visas allowing them to enter the country.

Ayoung's family case illustrates that marriage migration is often linked to other types of migration such as family migration and labour migration, as well as international visits, all of which involves movement of people. In fact, within the migration family literature, extended family

visits involving both care and work has received increasing academic attention, as an important part of transnational family experience.²⁰ What is notable in the Korean context is that, unlike the US or other immigrant states which have family-related permanent immigration schemes, these family members' stay and work is constrained by current immigration policies. The research in this area of research remains largely an understudied field in both literatures: on the international migration between ASEAN and Korea, and, marriage migration in Korea as a whole. Considering the dearth of research but its significance on the marriage migrant families, as I illustrate with the two cases above, I call for further research on this field. These are particularly important issues for the movement of people between ASEAN and Korea, as a significant number of families formed by marriage migration in Korea involves such movement so far.

5. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

When we reviewed the trends on movement of people from ASEAN to Korea over the recent decades, we concluded an increasing presence of people from ASEAN in Korea, in both short-term visit and long-term migration. ASEAN's presence has been particularly strengthened in recent decades.

Short-term visitors from ASEAN member states are notable in terms of their number and relative share to the total. In addition, the number of ASEAN member states listed among the top 10 origin countries of arrival to Korea. Five ASEAN member states were listed among the top 10 origin countries and their share to the total accounted for over 10% (10.9%) of the total visitors, 17.24 million visitors, in 2016.

Similar but a much stronger presence of ASEAN origin residents in Korea is notable among long-term migrants. In fact, a significant presence

of foreign residents itself is a relatively recent phenomenon as there were less than 50 thousand foreign residents in 1990. With substantial influx of migrant workers since the early 1990s, marriage migrants especially since the mid-2000s and international students in recent years, residents from ASEAN as a whole amounted to 438,895 persons, taking up 21.4% of the total foreign population in 2016. ASEAN member states account for more than two-thirds of the accumulated total number of foreign workers under the EPS between 2004 and 2015. Students from ASEAN, as a whole, took up 12.1% of the total international students in 2016. Marriage migrants from ASEAN member states constituted more than 40% of the total marriage migrants in 2016. This change has been made under the context of minimising immigration and preferring ethnic Korean overseas for migrant workers and marriage migrants. Considering that, the changes so far seem to be shaped more by the forces 'from the below' rather than those 'from the above'. In short, the increasing number of long-term migrants from ASEAN member states has played a key role in the so-called migration transition in Korea: becoming an immigrant-receiving country from an immigrant-sending country.

There are some policy implications and suggestions on the areas that this chapter has reviewed.

First, immigration policies for nonprofessional migrants need to be changed to provide fairer and more favourable conditions for migrant workers. ITS was abolished as it received criticisms including that it was often used by employers to exploit foreign workers. Although the current nonprofessional migrant worker scheme, EPS, which is applicable to the majority of migrant workers from ASEAN is an improved one, there are still many restrictions and limitations which are highly favouring employers rather than employees. An example is that under the current EPS, changing their workplace (i.e. employers) is largely limited even when employees are not paid or other serious violation of workers' rights. It is

important to provide fair treatment for migrant workers.

In addressing social policies for long-term foreign residents and the new immigrant population in Korea, the Korean government has emphasised the development of multiculturalism in the society and has used a substantial amount of its budget since the mid-2000s. Despite this endeavour, there are some areas and issues to improve policies, especially addressing and targeting vulnerable population groups among marriage migrants and their family members (including their second generational children). Such areas and issues may be applicable to individuals or families living in Korea, with origins from ASEAN member states.

Firstly, there is a coordination issue in implementing policies for the immigrant population. Simply put, there is no single control tower that is overseeing the immigration policies in Korea. The establishment of an immigration authority is a feasible idea. Currently, immigration related issues are involved by too many government ministries. Partly because of that, more than often than not, coordination issues arise. Let me give a very simple example. For the second generational children's educational needs, five different ministries (Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Health and Welfare, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, and the Ministry of the Interior and Safety) are involved and these different ministries have different definitions about who are so-called 'multicultural children.'²¹ This leads to not only convertibility issues of the basic database for the relevant population groups collected separately by these ministries, but more importantly also to loopholes or gray areas in social welfare policies striving to accommodate the needs of the vulnerable population among the young generation. Data convertibility issues are just the tip of the iceberg of the issues and problems beneath the immigration policies and social policies that involve long-term foreign residents and immigrants in general.

Secondly, to improve the quality of government services and welfare

for the migrant population in Korea, more involvement of ASEAN specialists and consideration of characteristics of the ASEAN population in Korea are critically needed for ongoing national level studies. There are a few recently introduced national longitudinal surveys on migrant population conducted by research institutes under several government ministries. In addition, more research specifically targeting the ASEAN population in Korea needs to be done. Despite the increasing importance and presence of people from ASEAN in Korea, there is surprisingly little research focusing on them and we know little about them, although it is highly likely that many people from ASEAN may be included in vulnerable population groups among immigrant population in Korea. Attention is called, especially, for marriage migrants from ASEAN and their second generational children; their overall socio-economic positions and family contexts, as aggregate data currently available indicate, place them potentially in vulnerable populations. This is particularly so for foreign-born children (esp. children of previous marriage of marriage migrants) as they face much more difficult adaptational issues than other types of multicultural families in the Korean society, as well as their new family context. Considering the significance of education and family in today's social mobility, the policies informed by grounded research may ease practical challenges for them.

Last but not least, there are critical societal needs for improving public understanding of ASEAN among the general public in Korea. Despite the Korean government's multicultural policies and multicultural education at primary and secondary schools, public understanding is still limited and/or biased. Without such improvement, immigrant population may live under unfavourable societal environment. One example is that many second generational children from marriage migration families at secondary schools try to hide their identity or even avoid receiving social welfare benefits readily available to them; they need

to reveal their background during the application process to receive such welfare benefits and they avoid a possible revelation of their identity to their peers. As many studies on second generation from such families in the West show, having confidence and pride for their identity and heritage is an important foundation for successful social incorporation. As the social mirroring theory of immigration studies suggests, the display of confidence and pride by younger generation mirrors public image on them. Otherwise, there is a possibility that second generational children with immigration background may become a disadvantaged minority in the society. As there is a high ratio of and a large number of children by families formed through marriages between Korean and ASEAN citizens, especially among the younger cohorts of the second generation, policies to elevate public understanding of ASEAN will be critically important for them and eventually for Korean society and the better future relationship between ASEAN and Korea, as these second generational children may play a bridging role between the two sides.

Discussion Paper

KIM HYUNG-JUN

Relations between ASEAN and Korea have recently witnessed a new phase of development. People-to-people exchanges have dramatically increased to the extent that millions of Koreans and Southeast Asians annually visit one another. Hundreds of thousands of Southeast Asians have grabbed opportunities of work and education in Korea, actions being followed by Korean expatriates in ASEAN member states.

The intensification of the people-to-people exchanges has been facilitated by development of information technology which allowed a formation of mutual interest and curiosity. It is easy to see ASEAN youngsters enjoying Korean pop music and dramas. It is also easy to find Korean travellers and bloggers reviewing local restaurants and tourist attractions in ASEAN such as Chiang Mai, Hanoi etc.

It is time to contemplate and discuss ways of transforming initial interest and curiosity into commitment and engagement, which will be the basis for friendship and prosperity for the future. New areas for intensive exchanges should be explored and ways of achieving a maximum of outcome at a minimum of costs should be investigated. Through these efforts, a more balanced, reciprocal, mutually beneficial socio-cultural relations between ASEAN and Korea would be realised.

More specifically, I would like to propose the importance of educational exchange. The historical relations between ASEAN and Korea had not been noticeable until the 1990s when the contacts between the two were restricted to economic and political fields. Only after this period, massive people-to-people exchanges have taken place and socio-cultural interests in one another have grown rapidly. This suggests that recent surge of interests and interactions can be appreciated and utilised the most by younger generation. Education can provide the opportunities for ASEAN and Korean students to know one another, to embrace cultural and social diversity of the regions and to set the basis for a participative and inclusive community.

In order to facilitate educational exchanges, attention should be paid to short-term student exchange programmes and long-term study-abroad programmes. Returning home after schooling, Korean students in ASEAN will become agents to spread their knowledge, experiences and understanding of ASEAN to the Korean public, and vice versa. ASEAN students studying in Korea will seek their future career in the fields related to Korea and vice versa.

Existing educational programmes in ASEAN and Korea should be transformed into key medium to promote mutual understandings. Until now, only a handful of lectures has been provided in universities, dealing with ASEAN in Korea and Korea in ASEAN. History, society and culture, and politics and economy of ASEAN and Korea have rarely been incorporated into school textbooks. With initiatives from both sides to incorporate more contents in lectures and school textbooks, interests, knowledge and understanding of one another can be upgraded, which will further promote people-to-people exchanges in the region.

People-to-people exchanges may not automatically promote socio-cultural cooperation between ASEAN and Korea. These, however, are the basis for promoting cooperation and efforts in the field of education.

When equipped with desires and aspirations to know and to visit one another, the young generation of ASEAN and Korea will play the key role in embracing the diversity and achieving a participative and inclusive community.

Linking Hearts, Opening up Minds: Strengthening the Social Architecture to Build a Sustainable and Resilient ASEAN Community

ABDUL RAHMAN EMBONG

ABSTRACT

ASEAN has progressed beyond being an association of nation-states to become a community, following the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015, and its commitment to realise its other pillars, namely the political-security community, and the socio-cultural community. However, based on findings of a number of studies, while there is an 'ASEAN enthusiasm,' this is not matched by the level of knowledge and understanding of ASEAN among its peoples, including students, businesses and members of the public. This chapter seeks to examine this issue in light of the need to build a "sustainable and resilient ASEAN Community" and a People's ASEAN, through the role of education and the raising of people's awareness and understanding of ASEAN. It is argued here that we need to strengthen and consolidate the social architecture, such as the universities, schools, families, media, etc. as key players to promote such understanding and awareness, thus linking hearts and opening up minds among peoples in the region for this endeavour. This is necessary in order to transform the 'top down' elite-centred ASEAN to become a People's ASEAN with a life and meaning of its own, that is, from being an 'imagined community' in the minds of leaders to a shared, imagined and living community 'from below' among its peoples.

* **Key words:** ASEAN Community, Awareness, People's ASEAN, Elite-centred ASEAN

1. INTRODUCTION

August 8th, 2017 marks the 50th anniversary of ASEAN, while the ASEAN-Korea partnership in the form of dialogue relations which was formalised in November 1989 enters its 28th year. While an auspicious occasion such as ASEAN's golden jubilee obviously calls for joyous celebrations, it also calls for serious reflections and rethinking on what ASEAN has achieved, and to work out the road map for the future. In this regard, it is noteworthy and necessary to do some stock-taking to assess what ASEAN has achieved (and has not achieved) within these last fifty years in terms of its impact upon the peoples of ASEAN in order to prepare for the next fifty years.

To be sure, at various stages during these five decades, ASEAN has made important strides. Very importantly, it has reached out beyond the state-centred institution it used to be by establishing 'a community' – the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) – as jointly declared by the ASEAN leaders in December 2015 in Kuala Lumpur. This is the first pillar being formalised, a prelude to the formation of ASEAN's two other pillars – the political-security community and the socio-cultural community which are contained in the ASEAN Community Blueprint 2025.

In the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint 2025, ASEAN has announced its commitment "to lift the quality of life of its peoples through cooperative activities that are people-oriented, people-centred, environmentally-friendly, and geared towards the promotion of sustainable development."¹ The intent is obviously to connect with the peoples of the region. ASEAN has also established partnerships through the ASEAN Plus mechanism, and ASEAN-Korea partnership is one such model. Indeed, following the establishment of the dialogue relations in 1989, Korea was accorded full Dialogue Partner status by

ASEAN at the 24th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Kuala Lumpur in 1991, and Summit Level status in 1997. In the field of education namely coordination and exchange at the tertiary level, the ASEAN University Network (AUN) was set up in 1995. These are but a few of the important plans and programmes ASEAN has undertaken to forge itself as a community.

The establishment of the AEC mentioned above is very significant and historic, more so with the centre of the global economic gravity shifting or having shifted from the West to Asia, with China at the forefront. As the literature shows, the AEC has the necessary wherewithal to be a single market and production base, allowing the free flow of goods, services, investments, and skilled labour, and the freer movement of capital across the region. With a population of 626 million and a combined GDP of over \$2.4 trillion in 2014, the AEC is the third largest economy in Asia (after China and India), the seventh largest in the world, and it would be the world's fourth largest economy by 2050 if the present growth trends continue.²

Nevertheless, to move forward to become a resilient and sustainable community, there should be a strategic shift in the thinking about the future of ASEAN. In this regard, it is proposed that ASEAN and its three community pillars of Economic, Political-security, and Socio-cultural communities be transformed into a People's ASEAN.³

What does a People's ASEAN mean? As suggested in an earlier paper of Abdul Rahman, a People's ASEAN is a metaphor to underline the fact that it is more than a community that is "people-centred or people-oriented" that has been pronounced in various ASEAN documents. A People's ASEAN is a community "of the people, by the people, and for the people." In other words, "it starts with the people's interests at heart, consultative and participatory in its approaches, and it contributes towards the people's well-being. It is inclusive in terms of

means as well as end”.⁴ The shift in such thinking is important. It serves as a conceptual reminder in any future strategic direction that the people is at the core of the ASEAN Community. And its actual implementation and transformation into a People’s ASEAN will ensure ASEAN’s closer connectivity to the public as a whole in which peoples – the citizens of the ASEAN member states – not only have a sense of enthusiasm about ASEAN, but very importantly, they have a strong awareness, understanding and knowledge, together with a sense of ownership of this entity, and that they feel an integral part of it, thus ensuring that the ASEAN Community becomes a resilient and sustainable community. The lessons from the Brexit experience whereby Britain pulled out of the European Union (EU) in 2016 – and the consequences of such a drastic pull out – are a painful reminder that ASEAN must give priority to building a resilient and sustainable community – a People’s ASEAN that is organically linked – to ensure its viability and to make ASEAN a living model of regionalism and regional integration.

With these challenging tasks and perspective in mind, this chapter is a modest attempt to examine two issues, namely the challenges of building a “sustainable and resilient community” for ASEAN, and the deepening of the ASEAN-Korea partnership. To address these two issues, the paper will first examine the connectedness (or otherwise) of ASEAN with the peoples it seeks to represent, to identify the strengths and gaps. It also seeks to identify briefly the strengths and gaps in the ASEAN-Korea partnership; and in the conclusions and recommendations, to discuss the role of education to promote awareness, understanding and commitment to ASEAN and its regional cooperation, and to work towards a People’s ASEAN.

2. CHALLENGES IN BUILDING A RESILIENT AND SUSTAINABLE ASEAN COMMUNITY

The principal challenge in building a resilient and sustainable ASEAN Community – a People’s ASEAN – for the future is how connected is ASEAN with the peoples, and the attempts it makes to ensure such connectivity and closeness. In this regard, we raise such questions as: (1) What is the state of awareness, attitude, understanding and commitment towards ASEAN among the peoples of the region? (2) Is there a disconnect or gap between the peoples and the ASEAN leaders on the question of the ASEAN Community, and how can we bridge the disconnect or gap?

The answers to these questions link directly to the key concerns here, that is, how to “link hearts” and “open up minds” of the peoples of various classes and backgrounds towards ASEAN and its vision of a resilient and sustainable community. Put in another way, we need to examine the people’s knowledge and understanding of ASEAN⁵ and to see whether they feel part of the ASEAN Community.⁶ The contention here is that, once the ‘top down’ conception of ASEAN has eventually changed and transformed from being an ‘imagined community’ in the minds of the elite/leaders, to become accepted and integrated in the minds of the peoples and become their ‘imagined community,’ the disconnect or the gap between ASEAN and the public could gradually be bridged, and we would be on the right track in our quest to build a resilient and sustainable ASEAN Community.

We need to track them especially among the future generation of leaders, namely the students and youth, and also assess the understanding and knowledge of ASEAN among members of the public, and business leaders as well. In this way, we can be on a stronger footing when we make suggestions or recommendation for the future.

What kind of evidence do we have on the matter of Awareness, Knowledge and Understanding of ASEAN: Several key findings on ASEAN and ASEAN Community? Let us look at some key findings of several studies so far. Most of the studies were focused on university students because they are regarded as “the most successful products of the modern educational systems and media environments of each nation,” and that “their ideas reflect those sources on which they draw to think about the region they live in,”⁷ but there are also studies focusing on the general public and business leaders. We will look at both types of studies and assess the significance of their findings that can contribute towards ASEAN Community building.

In a ten-nation survey among 2,170 students on their attitudes, awareness and understanding of ASEAN – a baseline study conducted 10 years ago for the ASEAN Foundation – Eric C. Thompson and Chulanee Thianthai found some interesting findings.⁸ The students’ attitudes and perceptions exhibited “great complexity,” ranging from highly enthusiasm on the one hand to that of ambivalence and scepticism on the other. The study shows that while there was “ASEAN enthusiasm,” such an enthusiasm was not evenly spread across the region. It was strongest among students from the newest and least affluent of the ASEAN member states (namely Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam), “generally positive” among students from Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, and weakest among students in the most affluent countries namely Singapore and Brunei whose attitudes can be described as “ambivalent.” Among students from Myanmar, it was characterised by attitudes of “scepticism.”

As regards to the general knowledge of ASEAN (i.e., about its members, history and symbols), the survey found that they were generally knowledgeable. Students from Vietnam and Laos again indicated “strong showing,”⁹ while those from the Philippines and Myanmar were the

least knowledgeable. However, those from other ASEAN member states of Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and Brunei demonstrated “substantial knowledge of ASEAN, at least regarding its members, history and symbols.” Their sources of knowledge and information were television, schooling, newspapers, books, the internet as well as radio. Besides these, sports namely Southeast Asia Games (SEA Games), advertising and friends also feature as sources of information. The investigators also point out that while many students may be quite happy to identify with ASEAN, it is quite natural that “national belonging remains far more salient” than “regional belonging.”¹⁰ What is important is that there were strong trends of commonality in the responses across the region, namely the importance of economic cooperation and addressing poverty and development needs. There was also a desire to know more about the region.

A subsequent study, albeit a smaller one was undertaken in 2010 by a team of three researchers – Guido Benny, Tham Siew Yean and Rashila Ramli from Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia¹¹ – focused on both students and non-students.¹² This study surveyed 1,256 respondents, this time in three key ASEAN member states.¹³ As indicated, unlike the 2007 study by Thomson and Thianthai, the respondents in this latter study were slightly more diverse, whereby university students made up 46.2%, lecturers 21.9% and private sector employees 15.1%, respectively. The study attempted to gauge the perceptions towards the proposed AEC, and not just on ASEAN per se. The vast majority of respondents (81%) were supportive of the AEC’s formation, together with its features such as the free flow of goods and services, the free flow of skilled/professional ASEAN workers, and the freedom of ASEAN businesses to be set up anywhere in ASEAN. The highest support for such a move not unexpectedly came from Malaysia (85%), followed by Indonesia (83%), and Singapore, the lowest at 73%.

With regard to the respondents' commitment towards ASEAN, it was found that the majority were committed to supporting it. For example, they gave priority to purchasing ASEAN goods and also would welcome investments from ASEAN investors more than those from outside the region. A sizeable majority (75%) also perceived that the AEC would give benefits to their country and people. They were generally positive regarding the perceived benefits to their country, people and local businesses that would be brought about by greater economic integration. They expected that the AEC would enhance competitiveness in the region and accelerate the development of the less developed member states.¹⁴ However, while they were enthusiastic about the idea of economic integration, their idea of ASEAN integration was different from the European integration. The findings show that while 70% of the respondents aspired for regional integration like the EU model, they rejected the idea of a single ASEAN currency, and insisted that passports are still needed for peoples of ASEAN to visit other ASEAN member states. On the subject of governance, views of the respondents were mixed. While the majority of Malaysian respondents accepted the idea of an ASEAN Parliament, ASEAN Commission and the ASEAN Court of Justice, it was rejected by the Indonesian as well as the Singaporean respondents.¹⁵

As the deadline for the formation of the ASEAN Community drew closer, a series of new studies after 2010 were undertaken. Here, we will cite three such studies – two focusing on the general public and business leaders, while one on university students. What we can underline here is that their findings reveal almost similar results of previous studies regarding awareness, knowledge and understanding of ASEAN, and the respondents' connectivity to it.

The study commissioned by the ASEAN Secretariat in 2012 was focused on the general public and business leaders. The study surveyed

2,200 respondents drawn from the general public, while in-depth interviews were held with 261 business leaders from capital cities of 10 ASEAN member states. The findings indicate that 81% were familiar with or have heard of ASEAN meaning that they were in the main aware of it, while their overall perception and attitude towards the ASEAN Community were positive. However, their understanding of ASEAN was low, with less than one-fifth having an understanding, while 76% lacked in basic understanding of what ASEAN is and what it tries to do, with Singapore manifesting the most detached attitude towards ASEAN.

Compared to the general public, business leaders had a better understanding of ASEAN because of their frequent contacts with various sectors in ASEAN member states in the course of their business dealings and their participation in activities for the promotion of ASEAN integration. But even then, only 55% of business respondents had a “basic understanding” of what ASEAN is, while 30% lack any basic knowledge of ASEAN. The report notes that “The overall level of understanding for both businesses and general public was still low because of a general lack of interest alongside an ineffective use of communication channels.”

Findings of this study are reaffirmed by the 4th Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) conducted in 2014-2016 which surveyed members of the public in eight ASEAN member states regarding the question of how close they felt towards ASEAN.¹⁶ The response was rather telling of the disconnect between ASEAN and the people. While 11% of the respondents said that they were “very close” and 40% “close,” the others said they were not, meaning ASEAN was quite distant apart in terms of their connectedness. Such a situation is well captured by the headline in the ASEAN Briefs published by the Habibie Center, that the peoples in the ASEAN region are “So close, but yet so far” with ASEAN

expressing a disconnect between ASEAN and the public core in the region.¹⁷ Asserting that ASEAN has a long history of 50 years, the ABS Report opines that “there is serious deficit in building public support for ASEAN.”

However, university students seem to be more positive and knowledgeable about ASEAN than members of the public. In the latest ASEAN Foundation commissioned survey done in 2014, the same two key investigators — Eric Thompson and Chulanee Thianthai — attempted to update the findings of the 2007 baseline study.¹⁸ The 2014 survey replicates what was done in 2007 by addressing awareness, knowledge and attitudes, and adds two new questions to gauge how students think about ASEAN and its members, and their perceptions of similarities and differences among ASEAN member states. It also expands the scope to include 22 universities across ASEAN with a bigger sample size of 4,623 students compared to only 10 universities of the survey done a decade earlier.

Some of the key findings of the 2014 survey show similarities with the 2007 survey, whereby they were overall positive towards ASEAN, a consistent attitude since 2007, while there was some increase in awareness and knowledge of ASEAN. The report says that overall, the 2014 survey shows that students displayed better knowledge of and positive attitudes towards ASEAN; and showed more identification with ASEAN by considering themselves “ASEAN citizens” (over 80%). As in the 2007 survey, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam continued to top the list in terms of having the strongest ASEAN-enthusiasm. While Singapore continued to show ambivalence towards ASEAN, Myanmar became less sceptical and more enthusiastic. The students generally were familiar and could recognise the ASEAN flag, and continued to see ASEAN member states as culturally similar but economically and politically different. However, such perceptions varied accordingly, with Indonesia, Vietnam,

and Myanmar seeing the greatest similarities, while respondents from Singapore saw more dissimilarities. Overall, we can say that there are positive trends emerging among the students that could strengthen the ASEAN Community.

Another important dimension to highlight is the sources of information about ASEAN that have shaped the respondents' perceptions and knowledge. In 2007, the sources were primarily television, schools, newspapers, and books while the Internet and radio were secondary sources. However, in the 2014 study, it was found that the internet had become more important as a primary source of information, moving up to the third place after television, schools, newspapers and books. Secondary sources include friends, advertising and sports, in addition to radio, the latter declining in importance.

Some main differences from the 2007 findings are found in the responses from Myanmar and Thailand, and in terms of their aspirations for ASEAN integration. Myanmar respondents showed more positive attitudes towards ASEAN, just like the others, and, in some places, their enthusiasm was close to that of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. On the other hand, Thai respondents exhibited ambivalence while having better knowledge about ASEAN as compared to 2007.

The findings from the various studies above will help in the recommendations to be made at the end of this chapter.

3. STRENGTHENING ASEAN-KOREA PARTNERSHIP

Besides consolidating itself internally at different stages of its development and the establishment of the AEC, ASEAN has also been concerned with strengthening partnerships with countries and peoples beyond the region through the ASEAN Plus mechanism. As mentioned earlier, the ASEAN-Korea partnership is one such model, and the

dialogue relations have been elevated to the summit level status since 1997 less than ten years after its formalisation in 1989, indicating the value attached by ASEAN to such relations.

The question that can be posed: is there is a conception of community between ASEAN and its partners such partner as the Republic of Korea? A straight-forward answer is there is no such conception of community. What has been built is a dialogue or a forum to deliberate on areas of cooperation for mutual benefit, their implementation, problems, challenges, progress, etc. But, can the ASEAN-Korea relations – which has been formally elevated to the summit level – be more than a dialogue? The direction the relations have been evolving into is of interest here, as these relations are more than a dialogue among top leaders and officials, given the concrete programmes that have been put in place, especially in the fields of education, culture, sports, etc., besides politics, economics and security.

In this chapter, we will discuss briefly some of these important education programmes in the ASEAN-Korea partnership and assess in what way these can contribute towards strengthening not only the ASEAN-Korea relations but also community building. We will focus on various aspects of the education programmes that we consider can contribute more directly to strengthening the relations and promote awareness, understanding and the connectedness of ASEAN and Korea.

Scholarly interest in Southeast Asian Studies (or ASEAN societies) in Korea has started since the early 1960s. However, its development especially in terms of research was somewhat slow and inconsistent in those early decades, but it picked up since the 1980s and 1990s. Since entering the 21st century, developments have been rather dramatic. As argued by Park Seung Wu and Lee Sang Kook, although it may be premature to consider the first decade of the 21st century as “the most fertile period,” it nevertheless saw a “very productive, progressive, (and)

promising” era of the production of academic work in terms of both quantity and quality, as younger scholars with PhDs entered the field of Southeast Asian studies in Korea.¹⁹ Given that Southeast Asian Studies have been downsized considerably in the US and Europe, the two Korean authors are of the view that arguably, Korea has emerged as one of the leading countries at this time to promote Southeast Asian Studies.²⁰

What about the case of Korean Studies in ASEAN member states? Do students and members of the public in ASEAN know and study about Korea? A cursory survey of the spread of Korean Studies indicates that besides being extensively introduced in Korea itself, Korean Studies have featured more prominently in universities in the US, the UK, Australia, and China, compared to those in ASEAN member states. However, this does not mean that universities in ASEAN do not teach Korean Studies; in fact, Korean language is one of the foreign languages taught in the language centres in many universities in the region. Besides, Korean studies also often come under the rubric of Asian studies, or East Asian studies that are taught or researched in various universities in the region.

The other programme is the ASEAN-Korea Academic Exchange Program facilitated by the AUN on the ASEAN side and the Korean Association of Southeast Asian Studies (KASEAS). AUN is a key institution established in 1995 to facilitate coordination between universities in the ASEAN region, while KASEAS is the leading association promoting Southeast Asian Studies in Korea. The ASEAN-Korea Academic Exchange Program is the first programme between the AUN and KASEAS with the express objective to establish an “epistemic community” of regional intellectuals, particularly for those in ASEAN and Korea. This exchange programme, which was set up in 1999 is “to promote a new regional identity and solidarity of East Asia by

establishing the academic communities of ASEAN and Korea, thereby providing opportunities for mutual communication and collaboration,” with its outcome being “an enhancement of ASEAN-Korea academic communities.” This is definitely a noble endeavour with a clear intent of establishing a ‘community’ of peoples from the region working in various fields of knowledge. Between 2004 and 2011, more than 30 scholars from ASEAN member states were awarded fellowship to conduct research and related activities in areas essential for the construction of ASEAN-Korea mutual understanding and solidarity, and to share their findings with fellow academia and students in the region.

However, while various programmes have been undertaken, we still do not possess sufficient evidence about their impact upon strengthening the ASEAN-Korea relations, thus we can only assume that they positively contribute towards it.

4. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter will make some brief conclusions based on the discussions above, and make several recommendations related to the field of education and raising awareness about ASEAN and the ASEAN Community, as well as about ASEAN-Korea relations.

Most of all, ASEAN should establish a resilient and sustainable ASEAN Community. ASEAN has made good progress over the last fifty years in community building and has become a model in regionalism and economic integration. However, to move towards the next fifty years, more should be done, especially in terms of building a resilient and sustainable community.

As has been shown above, in terms of awareness, knowledge and understanding of ASEAN and the ASEAN Community, there is high enthusiasm and awareness for ASEAN among the students,

business leaders and the public, and that their perception of the AEC and ASEAN integration is positive, maintaining that this would bring benefits to them. However, this is not complemented by their knowledge and understanding of ASEAN, and the ASEAN Community. There is a relatively low level of knowledge and understanding about ASEAN although they seem to have improved in terms of their basic knowledge lately. However, such knowledge should be broader and deeper. This shows a knowledge gap even among the educated population. At the same time, on the question of ‘closeness’ or ‘connectedness’ towards ASEAN, there seems to be a disconnection between ASEAN and the core public in the region. In other words, we can assume they are mainly connected to their own nation-states, while ASEAN is quite distant.

For a community such as ASEAN to be resilient and sustainable, it has to exist in the hearts and also be understood in the minds of peoples. Peoples need to understand and feel close and connected to it; they also need to feel they ‘own’ it and that they are an integral part of it. Given such a situation is still in the making, there is a need to focus on the ‘opening up of people’s minds’ through improving knowledge and understanding, and ‘to link their hearts,’ i.e. by strengthening their feeling towards ASEAN and identification with it so as to enhance their sense of connectedness and ownership, thus making it gradually a People’s ASEAN. In this regard, four broad recommendations are made as follows:

First, in order to address the above challenges, and to contribute towards building a resilient and sustainable ASEAN Community, it is important to strengthen the role of the social architecture in ASEAN. The social architecture here includes education institutions such as schools and universities, as well as the civil society, media and the families. To start with, schools and universities have to reflect on their educational contents and review them in terms of how much knowledge

about ASEAN is and should be included in their curriculum. How it is taught to students is a pedagogical problem, but having an ASEAN-wide content is necessary. Of course, in introducing more ASEAN content in the curriculum, care should be taken not to over-burden the students.

One of the challenges in broadening the knowledge about ASEAN is the attachment to nation-states and not seeing beyond to the region. To address this, the curriculum should be more flexible to take into account the ASEAN Community and not be rigidified by methodological nationalism.

The other institutions, namely the media, civil society and family perform the function of providing general knowledge and information about the ASEAN Community and also to nurture positive sentiments and affectivity towards them. Conscious efforts along this line should be made to make this a reality.

Second, repositories of knowledge about ASEAN and beyond need to be strengthened and enriched. While every country and every university has its own library, we need repositories that are more complete and inclusive of ASEAN as a whole, and accessible to potential users. In this regard, three institutions should be mentioned, viz.: (a) The ASEAN Digital Library. This digital library — already set up with Open Access facilities — is a regional project to aggregate and connect the digital resources of National Libraries in the ASEAN region and make them accessible through a single search facility; (b) Libraries of ASEAN University Network (AUNIL) promote knowledge and understanding of ASEAN, or the ASEAN University Network Inter-Library Online) was set up in 2002 as an initiative by AUN. This repository collects research and writings on ASEAN or ASEAN-related topics for use by universities and the general public; (c) ASEAN Thesis Repository (ATR) set up in early 2017 with 13 founding universities in the region is working closely with The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) in Singapore.

Unlike the first two repositories, the ATR serves as a common platform to house theses and dissertations in the field of social sciences and humanities as they relate to Southeast Asia for the purpose of making them accessible to the public. All these repositories are notable endeavours, and should be supported fully especially in terms of finance, materials, expert staffing, technological upgrading, etc., and their services should be publicised more widely to the region and beyond.

Third, the AUN has done a good job since its formation more than two decades ago in coordinating cooperation with universities in ASEAN and beyond. To continue into the coming decades, more thinking and planning need to be given to implement the AUN blueprint, namely to strengthen the existing network of cooperation among universities in ASEAN and beyond; and facilitate regional cooperation in developing Southeast Asian Studies. More conscious efforts need to be made to organise conferences and other events in the name of AUN and its partners.

Fourth, a number of scholarships have been created as part of the on-going effort not only to develop human resource and capacity building, but also to promote knowledge and understanding of ASEAN through interaction and mingling with students from other ASEAN member states. Such efforts can also contribute towards addressing the socio-economic inequalities in the region. A case in point is the “The ASEAN Scholarships” award, a programme offered by the Singapore government to students from all the other nine ASEAN member countries. Taglined as “Nurturing young minds, Broadening horizons,” these scholarships are given to successful students to study in Singapore schools from the primary to secondary and pre-university levels with the promise to make them “Be[come] part of the ASEAN Community studying in Singapore.”

Another noteworthy scholarship, this time targeted at the university

level students, was introduced by ASEAN with the assistance of its partner, the EU. This scholarship scheme, which is part of the work of the “EU Support to Higher Education in the ASEAN Region” (or SHARE) was launched in 2015 by ASEAN and the EU to strengthen regional cooperation and to enhance the “quality, regional competitiveness and internationalisation of ASEAN Higher Education Institutions.”

Programs such as these should be supported, continued and expanded to accommodate deserving applications from the less affluent ASEAN member states. Also, thought should be given to introduce prestigious scholarships that carry the ASEAN’s name along the lines of such prestigious scholarships introduced under the Colombo Plan, Fulbright Hays, etc.

As for the ASEAN-Korea relations, it has to have a very reliable and good relations. First, ASEAN and Korea have together built a strong footing in terms of their relations which is more than a dialogue or a forum between top leaders and officials. Although it is not a ‘community’ as such, there is envisioning for some kind of a community. Indeed, it can be said that ASEAN and Korea have moved beyond mere dialogue relations to something deeper that relates to strengthening human resource development and understanding each other’s societies. However, knowledge and understanding about such relations and about each other’s societies is still limited. Indeed, while there is mobility between ASEAN and Korea through education exchanges including fellowship for scholars and graduate students, not much is known about these programmes and activities in ASEAN among the public, including among academia and students. More publicity and sharing of their experience and research findings is therefore necessary. At the same time, what happened to the ‘epistemic community’ that has emerged through the programme should be tracked, and how the region-wide common perspective among regional intellectuals can be disseminated to and

shared by academia and students, and by the public should be assessed. Currently, evidence on the impact of these programs is still anecdotal, and systematic studies need to be undertaken to have an idea of their performance and how to move forward.

Second, the Republic of Korea Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity (2016-2020) is an important document that indicates the education programmes on the table for ASEAN and Korea. Such programmes under this Joint Declaration should be studied carefully and implemented effectively, while their impacts should be assessed. These include among others, E-learning in higher education in ASEAN; joint research and training, exchange of fellowships, exchange of teachers and students with the AUN through the existing ASEAN-Korea Academic Exchange Programme as well as among ASEAN and Korean academic institutions; the promotion of ASEAN studies in Korea and Korean studies in ASEAN universities – the latter is less developed. Another programme is the provision of scholarships for ASEAN students through the existing International College Student Exchange Programme; and the promotion of greater exchanges of students and teachers to facilitate the sharing of experiences for further cross-cultural understanding between ASEAN and Korea.

One of the main concerns in promoting awareness, knowledge and understanding of ASEAN or for that matter ASEAN-Korea relations is the effective use of communication channels. As indicated in the findings of the 2014 study above, the Internet now has become more important together with the schools, television, books and newspapers. Hence, more use of the internet including the social media should be made for purposes of education and awareness promotion. In terms of content, focus should not be merely on history, demography and cultures of the region, but the concept of ASEAN Community itself and what it means

to peoples of ASEAN.

As noted in various reports, despite ASEAN's commitment to be people-centred, etc., the elitist nature in communicating with the public is still very pronounced. The perception of ASEAN is still defined from the capital cities of the region, with not much effort being made to see it especially from the least developed and least educated periphery. Indeed, suitable language and appropriate terminologies should be used to convey messages across the region. This communication problem and strategic shift in attitudes and thinking require special attention, given the diversities of ASEAN population in terms of education levels, languages, geographies, levels of development, etc.

The studies quoted above on attitudes, knowledge and perceptions were those conducted before the formation of the AEC. Such studies need updating so as to provide the latest findings and cutting-edge knowledge on them. While conducting research on the impact of the formation of the ASEAN Community on the students, business leaders and the public in ASEAN, studies on the ASEAN-Korea relations should also be carried out. All these can also take into account China's "One Belt One Road" policy and programmes which are affecting the whole region.

The significance of these studies – which are continuously being updated and rigorously analysed – is beyond question. Any government policy to be effective and deliverable must be based on solid evidence. The role of the ASEAN Foundation in commissioning these studies is praise-worthy and more support should be given to it so that it can play its role more effectively in the future. The ASEAN leaders and ASEAN partners should put their heads and assets together in further research in this field.

ASEAN-Korea Higher Educational Cooperation: Partnership for Development and Community

KIM HYUNG JONG

ABSTRACT

Higher education has been a focus area of bilateral cooperation between ASEAN and Korea, which has particularly contributed to developing their bilateral relations since the establishment of their sectoral dialogue partnership in 1989. This chapter reviews, from a Korean perspective, the state of higher education cooperation between ASEAN and Korea and ASEAN/Southeast Asian studies in Korea to draw possible implications for enhancing mutual understanding. This chapter tries to answer the following questions: what are the factors of international student mobility between ASEAN and Korea? What are the characteristics of ASEAN-Korea cooperation for higher education? How can higher education further enhance ASEAN-Korea partnership? It is found that internationalisation of higher education in ASEAN and Korea, with the rapid increase in student mobility, has been driven by the educational market force, while Korean government initiatives have been pursued as a means of expanding national interests. After reviewing current higher education cooperation programs, this study argues that ASEAN-Korea cooperation needs to develop a sustainable partnership beyond a purchaser-provider or a donor-recipient relationship, which could contribute to human resource development and community building in ASEAN.

* **Key words:** Higher education cooperation, Sustainable partnership, Human resource development

1. INTRODUCTION

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Korea have forged a close alliance since the establishment of sectorial dialogue partnership in 1989. The economic relations have become stronger with considerable growth. People-to-people exchanges have also increased in various sectors including business, tourism and education. Growing interactions create a possibility for further cooperation between the two entities.

In more specific terms, educational cooperation has been a focal point in seeking mutual understanding in a long-term perspective. There have been some improvements in education, as all ASEAN member states have achieved nearly 100% enrolment rate at the level of primary education. There is, however, a huge gap among the ASEAN member states in higher education. Higher education has increasingly become an essential condition not only to increase self-worth, but also to develop human resources at the national level. At the regional level, ASEAN is envisaging human development and common identity to build the ASEAN Community. Higher education has also become a main concern in enhancing bilateral ties between ASEAN and Korea with a growing number of students involved in various academic exchange programmes.

This chapter tries to answer the following questions: what is the role of higher education in ASEAN member states and in forming the ASEAN Community? What are the push and pull factors for studying abroad, especially in Korea? What are the characteristics of ASEAN-Korea higher education cooperation? How can higher education enhance the ASEAN-Korea partnership? The chapter will pay particular attention to the characteristics and roles of higher education in developing human resources and its implications for the ASEAN Community by reviewing specific ASEAN cases. From a Korean perspective, it will review the

state of ASEAN-Korea higher education cooperation and ASEAN/Southeast Asia related studies in Korea to draw possible implications for higher education cooperation for mutual recognition. It also tries to provide policy recommendations for higher education cooperation, which can be a hub for linking and nurturing capable partnership based on mutual understanding.

2. HIGHER EDUCATION IN ASEAN

Historical legacy is embedded in modern educational systems in the ASEAN member states. To a large extent, the modern higher educational institutions in ASEAN member states were founded by colonial powers. During the colonial era, access to education was generally limited to basic education – only a small number of selected local elites were able to get higher education. The traditional educational system in the colonies was no longer able to fulfil its role of educating the relevant individuals. For instance, under the British rule, *Pondok*, a traditional religious school in Malay villages became an unofficial school. However, French colonial power did not allow traditional schooling in Vietnam as part of its assimilation policy. Instead, western education was introduced into the colonies and became a prominent path for social mobility, as only educated individuals were recruited as servants for the colonial governments. The purpose of introducing a western education system was to strengthen the crumbling local political and social systems. Thus, the questions of who should be taught, why, and how were inherently political, moral and religious rather than educational.¹

In the process of decolonisation, paradoxically enough, many leaders of independent movements were educated in the western education system. However, the struggle for independence took various forms, from guerrilla warfare to diplomatic negotiations. For newly independent

countries, there were immediate challenges related to nation and state-building. Current territorial borders among the countries in Southeast Asia were direct consequences of colonial rules which resulted in new sets of ethnic compositions. Thus, national education policy was implemented to form a national identity and education has helped to promote nationalistic agendas.

Meanwhile, education also contributed to regional cooperation in Southeast Asia even before the establishment of ASEAN. During 1965, the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO) was established by six Southeast Asian countries. The organisation advanced much faster than ASEAN itself in terms of membership expansion as Cambodia (then Khmer Republic) joined in 1971. The current membership of SEAMEO includes all ASEAN member states and Timor-Leste, which has not joined ASEAN yet. The SEAMEO Charter was adopted in 1968 with the goal of providing better regional integration. It also promoted cooperation with non-regional countries through associate membership. Since 1971 when France became the first associate member, SEAMEO increased its associate membership to eight countries.² The harmonisation of higher education institutions had been a priority agenda which led to the establishment of the Regional Centre for Higher Education and Development (RIHED) in 1993.³

The focus of ASEAN on higher education cooperation has reflected its needs for human resource development. ASEAN has promoted greater regional cooperation in higher education field. At the 4th ASEAN Summit in 1992, the leaders agreed that “ASEAN should help hasten the development of a regional identity and solidarity, and promote human resource development by considering ways to further strengthen the existing network of the leading universities and institutions of higher learning in the ASEAN region with a view to ultimately establishing an ASEAN University based on this expanded

network.”⁴ As a result of the summit, the ASEAN University Network (AUN) was established in 1995, and has evolved into a key institution in higher education cooperation in ASEAN.

In addition, the first ASEAN Education Ministers Meeting (ASEM) was held in Singapore in 2006. The ASEAN Charter reiterates the significance of the development of “human resources through closer cooperation in education and life-long learning, and in science and technology, for the empowerment of the peoples of ASEAN and for the strengthening of the ASEAN Community.”⁵ To highlight the role of education in forming the ASEAN Community, the Cha-Am Hua Hin Declaration on Strengthening Cooperation on Education to Achieve an ASEAN Caring and Sharing Community was adopted in 2009. Education, especially higher education was viewed as a strategic avenue to achieve crucial goals. In this regard, mutual trust and common identity among the people in the region, which are the backbone of stronger political-security cooperation, can be further strengthened through education. In economic terms, higher education is a key to develop human resources. Indeed, higher education is highlighted mainly in socio-cultural aspects.

As a result, a series of work plans have been adopted, which include the ASEAN 5-Year Work Plan on Education (2011-2015), the Education Work Plans with Plus Three Countries and East Asia Summit (EAS), and the SEAMEO-ASEAN Priorities and Activities/Programs in Education (2012-2013).

By the end of 2015, ASEAN had evolved into a community working to achieve three key objectives: political-security, economic growth, and socio-cultural development, which needs stronger common identity based on better mutual understanding. The ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint 2025 stated the needs for “enhance the competitiveness of ASEAN human resources” and “encourage

regional cooperation in the areas of education, training and research, and strengthen ASEAN's role in regional and global research network by promoting initiatives and providing incentives and support for research and development, including research publications." ASEAN also aims to be "a centre for human resource development and training" and needs to "strengthen regional and global cooperation in enhancing the quality and competitiveness of higher education institutions."⁶

3. PUSH AND PULL FACTORS OF ASEAN STUDENTS AND KOREA

There has been a great tendency towards enhanced international ASEAN student mobility in higher education at national, regional, and international levels. Higher student mobility is viewed as a necessary step towards higher quality human resources at the national level. At the regional level, student mobility has been encouraged as a means of regional cooperation for the benefit of mutual understanding. Along with traditional academic interactions with western countries, international programmes for student mobility increased with globalisation. A number of pull and push factors have somewhat contributed to student mobility in the region which reflect the changing political economic circumstances. Internationalisation of higher education, as a push factor, has contributed to the increase in the level of student mobility in ASEAN. For the pull factors, we will consider the regional cooperation schemes and strategic needs of Korea.

3.1 Internationalisation of Higher Education in ASEAN

The higher educational institutions in ASEAN member states have relied heavily on the support from national governments. For the most part, governments have been strong stakeholders in running higher

education institutions. Nationalism has long been a dominant feature of “nationalised” universities. Access to higher education was yet limited and highly competitive in most Southeast Asian nations under authoritarian political regimes. However, since the 1990s, the demand for higher education has steadily increased, in particular, in Malaysia and Singapore. This can be largely attributed to the rise of the middle class with continued economic growth. The expansion of higher education was an initial response to the growing demand in the two countries but took different forms.

In Malaysia, special socio-political privileges for *Bumiputra* (referring to Malay and other indigenous ethnic groups) have been offered to rebalance the distribution of wealth along ethnic lines. Ethnic quota for a limited number of national universities was imposed for many decades which has yet to be fully removed. This *Bumiputra* policy inevitably marginalised other ethnic groups like the Chinese and Indian minorities, as it reduced their educational and career opportunities. However, it could not deter them from pursuing higher education. In order to accommodate the growing demand mainly from Chinese and Indian ethnic groups, the Malaysian government eased the regulation of higher education, thus making it easier for private universities to spring up more rapidly. In contrast to Malaysia, the Singaporean government did not expand the space for private higher education institutions but increased the number of students in national universities and later established more state-run universities.

With increased globalisation, knowledge-based economy through innovation has become a contemporary challenge. In response to these changing circumstances, the Malaysian and Singaporean governments aim to be regional forces for higher learning. Since the late 1990s, higher education policy has been internationalised, which allowed foreign universities to set up their branches in Malaysia and Singapore. Indeed,

various international programmes were introduced, such as degree transfer systems which allow students to finish their studies abroad after studying for one or two years in their home universities.

Internationalisation is related to marketisation and privatisation. Growing demand for higher education has expanded the education market since the supply of public universities in nature is constrained. Marketisation has not been pursued in a uniform way in Malaysia and Singapore. In Malaysia, marketisation accompanied by privatisation of higher education were initially intended to meet the increasing domestic demand.⁷ New private universities were established by major companies: Multimedia University by Telekom Malaysia; Universiti Tenaga National by Tenaga National; Sunway University by Sunway Group and so on. Meanwhile, the Singaporean government has continued to play the important role of expanding public universities.⁸

Since the early 2000s, marketisation and privatisation turned to internationalisation under the government strategy to develop domestic education market as a regional and international higher education hub. One form of internationalisation was the establishment of foreign university campuses to enhance the competence of local universities and more importantly to attract students from abroad.⁹ There are currently 11 and 15 international universities with branch campuses in Malaysia and Singapore, respectively. Malaysia has experienced, since 9/11, a considerable inflow of students from the Middle East. Singapore and Malaysia have become popular destinations for Chinese students from China. Over 52,959 students from abroad were studying in Singapore during 2012, which accounted for 21.7% of the inbound mobility ratio, while Malaysia accommodated over 60,000 foreign students with 6.1% of inbound mobility ratio in 2010. For inbound mobility ratio, other ASEAN member states, except Brunei (4.2%), recorded less than 1% as in 2011.

The number of ASEAN students studying away from their home country shows great variation between them. Malaysia had the highest number of individuals studying abroad (over 54,000), followed by Vietnam (about 52,000), which accounts 0.6% of the gross outbound enrolment ratio during 2011. Indonesia, Thailand, and Singapore have over 20,000 students studying abroad. The US, the UK and Australia are popular foreign study destinations for individuals from the ASEAN region. It is an interesting fact that some ASEAN member states attract students from the neighbouring countries. For instance, Malaysia is the second most popular study abroad destination for Indonesian students, while Indonesia is the fifth for Malaysian students. Thailand is also a popular destination for those students from Myanmar (2nd), Cambodia (1st), and Laos (2nd). A larger number of students from Laos choose Vietnam for their studies as in Table 1.

The net flow of students measured by the number of inbound minus outbound indicates that most of ASEAN member states recorded net outflow. Vietnam recorded the largest deficit (-48,860), while Singapore and Malaysia are the only countries with net inflow student mobility of 26,843 and 10,115, respectively.

The great diversity in higher education among the ASEAN member states is a leading factor for international student mobility. There are only thirteen universities in ASEAN that made it to the top 100 universities in Asia according to the international recognition criteria given by the 2016 QS University Rankings for Asia. Only five ASEAN member states including Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia ranked among the top 100 Asian universities.¹⁰ Although the ranking system is not without controversy, nonetheless, it indicates broader weakness in the educational infrastructure and quality. Continuous meaningful investment is an absolute requirement for improving the quality of higher education. The limited capacity of

Table 1. International Student Mobility in ASEAN and Korea

Country or Territory	Students from abroad studying in given country			Top five destinations for outbound mobile students (the number of students from a given country studying in the host countries is shown in brackets)	Students from abroad studying in given country	Net flow of mobile students	
	MF	Outbound Mobility ratio (%)	Gross outbound enrolment ratio			MF	Net flow ratio (%)
Brunei	3,305 **	49.9 **	9.8 **	UK (2,046), Australia (675), Malaysia (310) ⁻¹ , New Zealand (74), US (65)	354 +1	-2,933	355 +1
Cambodia	4,194 **	1.9 **	0.3 **	Thailand (944), France (636), Viet Nam (482), Australia (467), US (334)	-	-	-
Indonesia	33,905 **	0.6 **	0.2 **	Australia (9,702), Malaysia (8,955) ⁻¹ , US (6,809), Japan (2,176), Germany (1,359)	6,437 -1	28,053 ⁻¹	6,437 -2
Lao PDR	4,122 **	3.3 **	0.6 **	Viet Nam (1,936), Thailand (1,311), Japan (268), Australia (170), France (112)	786	-3336	-7458
Malaysia	54,899 **	5.3 **	1.9 **	Australia (18,312), UK (12,175), US (6,606), Russia (2,671) ⁻² , Indonesia (2,516) ⁻¹	64,749 -1	10,115 -1	64,749 -2
Myanmar	6,815 **	1.0 **	0.1 **	Russia (1,627) ⁻² , Thailand (1,310), Japan (1,115), US (781), Australia (655)	65	-6,750	-13565
Philippines	11,457 **	0.4 ** ⁻²	0.1 ** ⁻²	US (3,535), Australia (2,098), UK (1,738), Japan (635), New Zealand (426)	2,665 -3	-6027	2,665 -4
Singapore	21,072 **	8.9 **	...	Australia (9,767), UK (4,370), US (4,234), Malaysia (840), Canada (384) ⁻¹	52,959 +1	26,843	52,959 +2
Thailand	25,195 **	1.0 **	0.5 **	US (8,079), UK (5,760), Australia (3,694), Japan (2,476), Malaysia (1,316) ⁻¹	20,309 +1	-5,040	20,309 +2
Viet Nam	52,577	2.4	0.6	US (14,603), Australia (10,591), France (6,194), Japan (3,672), UK (3,192)	3,996 +1	-48860	3,996 +2
Timor-Leste	3,671 **	20.0 ** ⁻¹	-1 3.5 ** ⁻¹	Indonesia (2,675) ⁻¹ , Cuba (685), Australia (128), US (47), Portugal (37) ⁻¹
Korea	128,122 **	3.8 **	3.8 **	US (71,949), Japan (25,961), Australia (7,900), UK (4,527), Canada (4,320) ⁻¹	62,675	-65,447	-193,569

* Note: No data available, * National estimation, ** For country data: UIS estimation, – Magnitude nil or negligible. Not applicable, x(y) Data are included in column (y) of the table, +ⁿ Data refer to the school or financial year n years after the reference year, -ⁿ Data refer to the school or financial year n years prior to the reference year.
* Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, *Higher Education in Asia: Expanding Out, Expanding Up*, (2014): 154-155.

both public and private sectors in the field of higher education in most ASEAN member states do not meet the growing demands.

3.2 The Increasing Needs of International Student Mobility in Korea

The enthusiasm for education has been a distinctive socio-cultural feature in Korea. The country's remarkable economic growth over the decades would not have been possible without developed human resource. Due to the government's policy, the market for higher education has rapidly expanded since the 1980s. The number of universities increased from 85 to 107 between 1980 and 1990, while the number of university students grew 2.5-fold during the same period. The expansion trend continued during the 1990s as the number of tertiary education institutions reached 258 with about 1.5 million students.¹¹

It is worth indicating that, there has been a decline in demand for higher education due to demographic change and economic downturn. Korea has rapidly turned into an aging society. The population growth rate of Korea was 0.5% between 2010 and 2015, which was below half of the world population growth rate. It is estimated that during 2030-2035, the world population growth rate will be 0.7%, while that of Korea will be -0.1%.¹² The Ministry of Education of Korea revealed a plan to restructure the relevant universities by reducing the entrance quota by 160,000 between 2014 and 2022.¹³ The growing economic uncertainty in the country has had a negative impact on the higher education market. For instance, 72% of South Korean high school students went on to university in 2012, which fell from 84% in 2008. The decreasing number of new intakes as a result of shrinking population will challenge the management and may also threaten the survival of higher educational institutions, especially the ones located far from Seoul. Therefore, international students have become increasingly important to many higher educational institutions in Korea as they seek

alternative sources of income.

There are other reasons why Korea is keen to look for inbound student mobility, particularly from Southeast Asian nations – education has become a significant pillar in Korea's Official Development Assistance (ODA) programmes. Korea became a member of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which symbolised a change in its position from a recipient state to a donor country in 2010. The value of Korea's bilateral ODA has constantly increased, from \$900.63 million in 2010 to \$1,468.79 million in 2015, while the budget for multilateral ODA increased from \$273.15 million to \$446.6 million for the same period. At the regional level, Asia has been a major space for Korea's ODA programmes. The value of ODA to Asia in 2015 was \$774.47 million. Also, the share of Korea's total bilateral ODA was 52.69%, which constituted the largest share. In Asia, Vietnam was an outstanding recipient among the Southeast Asian countries followed by Laos, Cambodia, the Philippines, and Indonesia etc. Among the 24 priority partner countries selected by the government of Korea in 2015 (out of 134 countries), 6 were ASEAN member states including Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Myanmar.

This feature suggests that Korea's ODA could be seen as a means of paying back international assistance received. Such ideology conflicts with the practice of ODA, which avoids seeking national interests. For instance, the selection of priority counterparts cannot be fully explained without considering Korea's national interest. The gap in the amount allocated to the relevant countries indicates that Korea's particular preference are somewhat hinged on economic relations. Vietnam has received the largest amount of ODA from Korea since 2009. It is worthy to note that Vietnam is the third biggest export market for Korea after China and the US, while South Korea is Vietnam's fourth largest export market and second largest import source. Korea

Table 2. Korea's ODA to Southeast Asian Nations

(2006–2015, Million USD)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Total
Vietnam	10.08	24.67	53.22	57.53	96.04	139.49	200.32	234.56	178.84	217.16	1211.91
Laos	13.55	17.9	11.57	25.14	27.75	33.48	23.52	27.07	28.98	87.63	296.59
Cambodia	13.83	35.28	34.66	17.05	37.33	62.23	56.15	60.54	68.62	65.85	451.54
Philippines	7.06	28.16	21.16	22.07	29.54	35.69	31.33	42.74	60.93	44.04	322.72
Indonesia	18.9	28.78	18.94	27.76	24.44	24.29	37.23	31.5	21.49	39.55	272.88
Myanmar	8.53	0.5	4.37	1.95	3.25	4.81	6.04	11.72	17.29	21.23	79.69
Timor-Leste	0.57	1.36	2.18	1.77	1.82	7.02	7.55	3.6	4.02	9.01	38.9
Thailand	2.22	2.15	1.85	2.32	2.49	4.47	2.89	3.34	3.44	4.73	29.9

* Source: https://www.odakorea.go.kr/eng.result.RegionCountry_Asia.do

is also the fourth largest investor to Vietnam. Korea invested \$1,133 million in Vietnam which accounted for 38% of the total foreign direct investment (FDI) to ASEAN in 2014.¹⁴ This strong economic tie with Vietnam seems to suggest Korea's strategic consideration to Vietnam in allocating its ODA budget.

Korea's ODA programmes are often characterised by knowledge sharing on development experience rather than giving physical support.¹⁵ The previous government promoted the *Saemaul Undong*, also known as the New Community Movement, as a development model. It should be noted that it was used as a means to mobilise rural villagers to support Park Chung Hee's regime at the expense of communal spirit and tradition. Given the current problems faced by Korean farmers, it shows that a one-size-fit-all approach can hardly prove to be applicable and relevant to other developing countries. Domestic and international conditions for development generally differ from one place to another in terms of culture, political economic structure, historical legacy, level of

education etc., which change with the times.

Given the limited size of Korea's ODA budget, education for human resource development is probably one of the least disputed areas of international development cooperation. Human resource development is a necessary condition not only for successful management in private companies but also for successful planning and implementing a national development strategy. Higher education is the most crucial factor and means for developing human resource.¹⁶ Higher education cooperation is therefore considered by ASEAN to be an effective tool for human resource development and community building. It is also viewed by Korea as a strategic means for its ODA operation, especially with the growing requests for international students in higher education market. In the following section, we shall turn to the state and characteristics of higher education cooperation between ASEAN and Korea, focusing on internationalisation and international cooperation.

Regionalism in East Asia through the ASEAN+3 is an added pulling factor for student mobility in the region. The following objectives are stated in the ASEAN+3 Action Plan 2007-2017: "Promote higher education cooperation, increase linkages between universities through the AUN and encourage credit transfers between universities in ASEAN+3 countries."¹⁷

4. THE STATE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF HIGHER EDUCATION COOPERATION BETWEEN ASEAN AND KOREA

4.1 ODA and Higher Education

Education was the fourth largest area in Korea's ODA budget allocation during 2012 which amounted to \$127 million, with a share of 7.3% of the total budget behind the corresponding shares in the budget allocation for transportation, logistics, and agriculture. Of the ODA on education,

higher education was the largest category accounting for 38.8%, followed by education (education facilities and special training), with a share of 31.2%.

Table 3. Korea's ODA in Higher Education

(2011-2016, Million USD)

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Laos	1.31	1.40	1.30	1.37	0.65	1.21
Malaysia	1.20	0.14	-	-	-	0.00
Vietnam	5.43	0.73	3.06	5.81	3.07	14.92
Indonesia	1.92	0.66	0.77	0.20	0.24	0.74
Cambodia	1.85	2.18	2.27	1.59	1.42	1.80
Thailand	1.06	0.11	0.67	0.07	0.04	0.04
Philippines	0.92	0.28	0.63	0.45	0.36	0.65
Myanmar	2.05	1.12	1.23	0.73	1.15	0.58
Timor-Leste	0.25	0.17	0.03	0.07	-	0.03
sub total	15.99	6.78	9.95	10.30	6.93	19.97
ASEAN share%	34.42	13.01	14.19	17.56	12.75	28.00
Total	46.46	52.12	70.14	58.66	54.34	71.33

* Source: ODA Korea.

The total amount of ODA from Korea for higher education has increased from \$46.4 million in 2011 to \$71.33 million in 2016, with exception for 2014 and 2015. The higher education ODA to the ASEAN member states rose from \$15.99 million in 2011 to \$19.97 million in 2016. However, the share of ASEAN member states as a whole has somewhat fluctuated. A close observation reveals that there is potential concentration on certain nations. Since 2012, Malaysia has no longer been considered a destination for higher education ODA. Vietnam is a constant recipient of this ODA, which increased nearly five times in 2016 from the previous year. In terms of share of total ODA

in higher education, only Laos and Vietnam out of all the ASEAN member states have recorded an upward trend, respectively from 2.82% and 11.69% in 2011 to 6.06% and 20.92% in 2016. The other ASEAN member states experienced a rapid decline of inward ODA from Korea during the same period.

There is a clear trend that Korean ODA in supporting foreign studies and training of Southeast Asian countries has diminished in size. The ODA from Korea for studying and training abroad in ASEAN member states has decreased from \$11.51 million in 2011 to \$0.08 million in 2016, and its share of the total Korean ODA for this category fell from 28.8% in 2011 to 0.23% in 2016. Given the increasing demand for higher education and foreign studies in the ASEAN member states, this

Table 4. Korea's ODA in Supporting Abroad Studying and Training (2011-2016, Million USD)

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Laos	0.93	0.16	0.23	0.03	0.01	-
Malaysia	1.24	0.18	0.02	-	-	-
Vietnam	2.16	0.45	0.27	1.29	0.06	0.04
Indonesia	1.90	0.53	0.47	0.12	0.03	0.01
Cambodia	1.44	0.69	0.62	0.12	0.01	-
Thailand	1.06	0.11	0.06	0.03	-	0.02
Philippines	0.91	0.26	0.24	0.10	-	0.01
Myanmar	1.60	3.00	0.26	-	0.02	-
Timor-Leste	0.25	0.17	0.03	0.05	-	-
sub total	11.51	5.54	2.21	1.74	0.14	0.08
Share of ASEAN (%)	28.80	12.79	4.64	4.68	0.42	0.23
total	39.96	43.32	47.62	37.20	33.57	35.52

* Source: ODA Korea.

decreasing ODA would indicate the marketisation of higher education in Korea.

4.2 Mutual Understanding through Higher Education

Institutionalisation of higher education cooperation among ASEAN member states and Korea is crucial for better mutual understanding. Some 360 departments mainly focus on area studies at the undergraduate level in Korea. More specifically, about 197 departments are specialised in Chinese studies, and 130 in Japanese studies. In contrast, there are only 10 departments for Southeast Asian studies, and 19 for Asian studies. Out of the 10 departments, only Busan University of Foreign Studies provides integrated programmes for Southeast Asian studies. The others consist of country-based departments mainly focused on languages and literature. At the graduate school, the Institute for East Asian Studies at Sogang University and Busan University of Foreign Studies have developed some master's degree programmes. It is worth noting that, over the last decade, the specialised programs of these two universities have largely been sponsored by the Ministry of Education.

Table 5. The Number of Department of Area Studies in Korea

	Public Univ. / College	Private Univ./ College	Total
Northeast/East Asia/Asia Pacific (Degree)	2	8	10
Chinese Studies (Degree/Diploma)	29/0	168/43	197/43
Japanese Studies(Degree/Diploma)	21/0	109/50	130/50
Southeast Asian Studies (Degree)	0	10	10
Other Asia studies (Degree)	1	18	19
Total Degree/Diploma	53/0	313/93	366/93
Western studies (Degree/Diploma)	73/2	350/72	423/74

* Source: Park Sa-Myung (2017).

Given the growing economic interdependency between ASEAN and Korea, this gap in education programmes in higher educational institutions can hardly be explained. The lack of Southeast Asia related programmes at the undergraduate and postgraduate level could limit further academic resources and understanding of the region.

The Korea Foundation (KF), as a government agent for public diplomacy under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has provided financial assistance for student exchange programmes. Youth exchange programmes have long been a main feature of its activities. It tends to prioritise major powers including China, Japan, and the US rather than developing countries which may need more financial support. China had the largest number of participants with 2,652 between 2009 and 2016 among this programme, while there were 717 ones from Japan based on study exchange. Vietnam was the only Southeast Asian country among the top seven counterparts with the number of 123 between 2014 and 2016.

Table 6. Korea Foundation's Youth Exchange Programs (2005-2016)

Countries	Year	No of participants	Remarks
Japan	2005~2016	717	Visit to Japan and Korea
China	2009-2016	2,652	Visit to China and Korea
US	2009-2013	717	Visit to Korea
Vietnam	2014-2016	123	Visit to Korea
Saudi Arabia	2012	45	Visit to Korea
Senegal	2014-2015	35	Visit to Korea
Caribbean	2014	19	Visit to Korea

* Source: www.kf.or.kr

In contrast, the number of Koreans who obtained PhDs from ASEAN member states remains very limited. According to the database of the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF), the accumulated number of Koreans who have completed PhD studies in the ASEAN member states is only 211. The Philippines has been the most popular destination among the ASEAN member states for Koreans to earn a PhD with a number at 151. Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia attracted a limited number of Korean students for foreign studies with those having earned a PhD at around 5 to 19 individuals. In terms of discipline, a great majority of Korean students went to ASEAN to study the region in the field of humanities and social sciences, with the several exceptional cases such as to study in the field of engineering in Singapore.

The trend of Korean government's support for foreign studies also shows imbalanced allocation in destinations. Some 2,358 students were selected for government foreign scholarships between 1977 and

Table 7. Accumulated Number of Koreans who Earned PhD from ASEAN member states

	Total	humanity	social science	agriculture -aqua	engineering
Laos	0	0	0	0	
Malaysia	5	4	1	0	
Vietnam	10	6	4	0	
Indonesia	16	6	8	2	
Thailand	9	1	6	2	
Cambodia	1	1			
Philippines	151	0			
Singapore	19	3	7	0	9

* Source: calculated by author from data source in <https://dr.nrf.re.kr/stats/country>

2015. Indonesia is the only Southeast Asian country among the top ten destinations (ranks 7th out of 49 countries), and its share is 0.3% of the total recipients,¹⁸ while the US is the most popular destination with a share of 67%. The limited number of Southeast Asian countries could be attributed to the low demand and applications. As earlier mentioned, very limited number of universities offer undergraduate programmes on Southeast Asian studies, which inevitably limits the number of potential students from abroad. However, the underlying issue is that western education, especially from American universities, is highly regarded in Korean academic circles. This educational propensity not only caused the dominant position of the western-trained PhDs especially from the US, but also produced epistemic problems. Even in the area studies, local intellectual traditions and local knowledge and its value in understanding the region have been underestimated if not ignored. For most Korean scholars, Southeast Asia is by no means a place for study but only a field of research for a brief period.

This view is also shared by private scholarship foundations in Korea which have selected beneficiaries studying in the US, China, and European countries. The case of POSCO TJ Foundation is worth noting, especially the scholarship foundation of POSCO, the world's third largest steel manufacturer. The POSCO foundation has offered scholarship to promote student mobility in Asia including those Koreans studying in Asian countries and Asian students in their home countries as well as in Korea. In all, some 354 beneficiaries studied in Korea from 25 Asian countries between 2005 and 2017. Of this number, 88 are currently working as senior government officers, academic staff, and journalists in their country of origin. The Foundation has also provided scholarship to Asian students in their home countries covering 23 universities in 23 countries. Some 10 universities from Southeast Asia are partners in this programme.

To develop domain expertise, the POSCO TJ Foundation supported those pursuing post-graduate degrees in 20 Asian countries during the last 12 years. Of the 99 total beneficiaries, 31 went to Southeast Asian countries for their higher degrees including 9 to Vietnam, 7 to Thailand, 6 to Malaysia, 5 to Indonesia, 2 to Singapore and the Philippines respectively. As of April 2017, 43 candidates (19 PhDs and 24 MAs) received their higher degrees from the local universities in Asia. Many recipients are working in related fields including universities, research institutions, media, corporations, embassies, and government offices.

International cooperation in higher education has been forged through the ASEAN-Korea Cooperation Fund. The AUN and the Korean Association of Southeast Asian Studies (KASEAS) have provided financial support for fieldwork of postgraduate students and scholars. Some 122 individuals have received research grants since 2006 including 61 from ASEAN member states. Indeed, AUN and KASEAS have co-organised the ASEAN-ROK Academic Conference and Workshop biannually since 2002, covering a wide range of issues such a regionalism, ASEAN Community, non-traditional security, transnationalism and so on. The result of the workshop and conference has been published in a book form.

In this vein, the Korean Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (KISEAS) has organised a series of programmes in collaboration with its ASEAN counterparts. Since 2005, KISEAS has organised ASEAN Forum and Korea Forum, which aims to promote ASEAN in Korea and vice versa. To promote networking among postgraduate students, an international works called 'Advanced Seminars' have been organised annually in ASEAN member states in collaboration with counterpart institutions in the host country. The Advanced Seminar has elaborated to the ASEAN-Korea Young Scholars Workshop when it was held at the Asia-Europe Institute, University of Malaya in July 2016. Of the

100 workshop participants, 20 were from Korea and 80 from various ASEAN member states. The workshop provided room for interaction and mutual understanding among the young scholars from ASEAN and Korea. It was an exceptional event with over 100 graduate students or young scholars from ASEAN and Korea who spent nearly two weeks studying and discussing relevant Southeast Asian issues. It is expected to not only deepen their knowledge on Southeast Asian studies but also extend the connection among ASEAN and Korean young scholars.

International student mobility has increasingly become a dominant feature in the Korean higher education sector. The number of inflow student mobility has increased from 32,557 in 2006 to 104,262 in 2016. The largest number of students came from China with a share of 57.7% followed by Vietnam, accounting for 7.2% of the total number of foreign students in Korea. As of 2016, over 12,000 ASEAN students were enrolled in various higher education programs including language training. Of this number, about 4,700 students attended language programmes and about 3,700 students were pursuing higher degree studies, including 1,363 ones seeking PhD degrees. The number of students from Vietnam far outnumbered those from other ASEAN member states. There were over 1,000 students from Indonesia and Malaysia, respectively.

The underlying perception of the ASEAN students in Korea is that science and engineering are the fields in great demand in their home countries, given the lack of technology and industrial development. Such view is also shared by the Korean government in promoting higher education cooperation. For instance, the Korean government has provided scholarship for ASEAN students majoring in Science and Engineering. These are not full scholarships for regular courses, instead, support is limited to 6 weeks, covering 120 undergraduate students in total. It is interesting to note that the number of students majoring in

humanities and social sciences are larger than engineering students at various programmes, except at PhD level. At the undergraduate and MA level, 1,792 and 1,351 ASEAN students are studying humanities and social sciences respectively, while 897 and 662 ones are engineering, respectively. Meanwhile engineering attracted 746 PhD candidates, while humanities and social sciences attracted 154 candidates.

Table 8. ASEAN students in Korea by programme (2016)

Country	Language Training	Degree and Diploma	Postgraduate		Other programs	Total
			Master's	PhD		
Malaysia	237	560	78	45	168	1,088
Myanmar	89	103	172	51	3	418
Vietnam	3,816	1,469	1,139	858	171	7,459
Brunei	5	5	1	1	73	85
Singapore	85	60	21	5	246	417
Indonesia	180	422	361	169	221	1,353
Cambodia	64	95	168	35	30	392
Thailand	194	104	136	65	78	577
Philippines	100	110	269	122	81	682
Laos	20	21	50	11	6	108
Timor Leste	6	7	15	1	0	29
Total	4,796	2,956	2,410	1,363	1,077	12,608

* Source: calculated by author from data source in Ministry of Education, Korea, retrieved from <https://www.moe.go.kr/boardCnts/view.do?boardID=350&boardSeq=64729&lev=0&searchType=S&statusYN=W&page=1&s=moe&m=040103&opType=>

5. CONCLUSION

Higher education has been a focal point of bilateral cooperation between ASEAN and Korea. For the most part, higher education

cooperation has been driven not only by individuals' desire for education but also strategic concerns of the governments and economic interest of the agents in education market. The role of education has changed in ASEAN member states from serving as a means of nation-building to human resource development. At the regional level, forming and sharing a common identity through enhanced people-to-people orientation is crucial to building the ASEAN Community, in particular under the pillar of a socio-cultural community. Investment in education is also a key factor for improving the human development index, which is a significant pillar of socio-cultural and economic integration. Internationalisation with a certain level of privatisation of higher education has increasingly become a common feature among the ASEAN member states despite the considerable gaps among them. Marketisation of higher education with the changing demography in Korea has put some pressure on higher education institutions to get more international students.

The enhanced ASEAN-Korea relations and East Asian regionalism have somewhat increased international student mobility and academic exchanges between the two entities. Higher education can be viewed as a useful channel for ODA to developing countries. ASEAN-Korea higher education cooperation, however, appears to be imbalanced. Few countries, particularly so for Vietnam, have been overrepresented in ASEAN-Korea academic interactions and student mobility. This cannot be fully explained without considering its special strategic and economic relations with Korea. Human resources development through education ODA would also provide a better skilled labour force for foreign investors.

The state of ASEAN/Southeast Asia studies in Korea remains far behind other area studies, in particular Chinese and Japanese studies. ASEAN students in Korea have gradually increased, and their fields of study have been diversified including greater numbers in humanities and

social sciences. Korean students, however, in higher education institutions in ASEAN remain marginal in number. This was partly attributed to the limited acknowledgement by local intellectuals and academic institutions in Southeast Asia.

In order to utilise the potential of higher education to enhance mutual understanding between ASEAN and Korea, considerable cooperation efforts are needed from the Korean side. First, more active engagement is required from the government to encourage student mobility. Financial support for ASEAN students in the form of ODA needs to go beyond narrow nationalist goals aimed at gaining economic and political advantages. There should be greater support for the wide range of studies which are necessary to meet their own needs of human resource development rather than cultivating pro-Korean local elites through Korea-related studies. Second, cooperation programmes can be pursued in a way to promote regional integration in the ASEAN Community.

Given the limited chance of getting involved in people-to-people exchanges among the ASEAN member states, ASEAN-Korea cooperation programmes can be a useful channel for dialogue among ASEAN students. Third, there should be increased attention and support for building ASEAN/Southeast Asian studies at universities in Korea and encouraging academic exchanges including studies in ASEAN. Also, we cannot overemphasise the importance of organising seminars and workshops for graduate students and young scholars to prepare them for future regional cooperation.

APPENDIX A.**Chronological events of higher educational cooperation
between ASEAN and Korea**

1998-Present	ASEAN-Korea Higher Education Cooperation Programmes
2009	The ASEAN+3 Higher Education Policy Dialogue in Phuket, Thailand
2009	The Cha-am Hua Hin Declaration on the Roadmap for the ASEAN Community (2009–2015)
2008	SEAMEO RIHED and the Malaysian Qualifications Agency (MQA) have been coordinating to establish the ASEAN Quality Assurance Network (AQAN) from early 2008
2007	The 11th ASEAN+3 Summit adopted the Second Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation entitled “Building on the Foundations of ASEAN+3 Cooperation” and the ASEAN+3 Cooperation Work Plan (2007-2017).
1995	The establishment of the ASEAN University Network
1993	The establishment of the SEAMEO Regional Centre for Higher Education (SEAMEO RIHED)
1967	The establishment of SEAMEO Regional Centre for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture
1965	The establishment of the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO)

APPENDIX B.

**List of Educational Cooperation Programmes
between ASEAN and Korea**

- ASEAN-Korea Youth Exchange and Cultural Community Building Programme
- ASEAN-Korea Youth Square
- ASEAN-Korea Forum and Advanced Seminar
- Korea-ASEAN Cooperation Project on Education and Exchange Program for Young Scholars in Women's Studies
- ASEAN-ROK Scholarship for Korean Studies Programme coordinated by the ASEAN University Network (AUN) through the ASEAN-ROK Future Oriented Cooperation Fund (FOCF)
- Implementation of the Master's Degree Programme for ASEAN Specialists on Saemaul Community Development
- Establishment of the ASEAN-Korea Cyber University.

Discussion Paper

YOON JIN PYO

The ASEAN Community is composed of three pillars, which are the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). The success of the ASEAN Community will be ultimately determined by the completion of the ASCC. The realisation of a socio-cultural community will be a difficult and time-consuming process. Socio-cultural cooperation between ASEAN and Korea will also need much time. It is the most meaningful cooperation from the bottom up for the future of ASEAN-Korea relations.

Abdul Rahman Embong addresses how to build a sustainable ASEAN Community and how to strengthen the relations between ASEAN and Korea. He showed several survey findings on Southeast Asian people's perception of ASEAN. Enthusiasm for and awareness of ASEAN is high and perception of ASEAN integration is positive, but there is a relative lack of understanding and knowledge about the ASEAN Community among ASEAN people, especially university students. He mentioned the ASEAN-Korea forum is noteworthy, however, more efforts are necessary to deepen the people-to-people relations and strengthen the social architecture between schools, univer-

sities and media. Education, sports and communication channels are helpful to promote awareness and understanding of ASEAN and ASEAN-Korea relations.

Kim Hyung Jong presents the role of higher education in forming the ASEAN Community and driving factors of ASEAN students' abroad studies in Korea. He addresses the characteristics of ASEAN-Korea higher education cooperation and suggests a higher education cooperation policy. Many interesting statistics about the ASEAN-Korea education exchange are given which helps to understand the current situation of higher education between ASEAN and Korea. He makes policy suggestions for the future of ASEAN-Korea education cooperation. The Korean government should support ASEAN in developing human resources and building the ASEAN Community. The Korean government should care about the ASEAN student perception of Korea through winning hearts rather than buying loyalty. International education development cooperation should be encouraged through more public-oriented approach rather than market-oriented approach.

Kim mentions more efforts are necessary for outbound mobility of Korean students studying in ASEAN. The Korean government should promote ASEAN studies in higher education and research in Korea and academic cooperation programmes. Dr. Kim emphasises the importance of higher education for a resilient and sustainable ASEAN community building and a constructive future of ASEAN and Korea relations.

Embong and Kim provide us with a diagnosis and prescription on the ASEAN Community and ASEAN-Korea relations in terms of education and socio-cultural cooperation. Their ideas should be properly reflected in the ASEAN member states' and Korean government's policies.

In connection with the two speakers' presentations, a recently

completed survey is introduced, which is part of the ASEAN-Korea Centre's ASEAN Awareness Programmes, implemented by the Korea Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. The survey titles are "Survey on ASEAN Youth's Perception of Korea" and "Survey on Korean Youth's Perception of ASEAN" respectively. The purpose of these surveys is to build a better understanding and strengthen the people-to-people exchange, especially focusing on the young generation of ASEAN and Korea. The surveys and the focus group interviews were carried out during the first half of 2017 and delivered many interesting findings about youth's perception of each other. The final report will be published by the AKC in November 2017.

In relation to the session's topic "higher education," some key findings of the surveys are introduced here. Through the surveys and the interviews, questions about the experience and image of each other, perceptions of current and future ASEAN-Korean relations and suggestions to the government and AKC were asked. A sample of over 1,000 Korean youth and a sample of 300 ASEAN youth (in Korea) were collected.

On the question of where they usually get information about ASEAN or Korea, the results show that 46% of ASEAN youth and 37% of Korean youth depend on the internet and social media. We can recognise the influence of social media among the young generation. On the question of how their perception of Korea changed after their study abroad experience in Korea, 46% of ASEAN students answer that it got better, 20% students answer that it got worse. Almost half of ASEAN students are satisfied with their life in Korea. ASEAN students who got positive images exemplify 'Korean public culture', 'education system', 'free life style', and 'efficient transportation system'. On the other hand, when Korean students are asked to describe the images of ASEAN, their answers provide examples such as 'developing countries', 'hot weather',

‘tourism’, ‘smiling face’, ‘immigrant workers’ and ‘international marriage’.

On the question of whether ASEAN students perceive Korea as a reliable country, 94% of them answer positively. To the question of Korea’s contribution to their own countries’ development, 90% of ASEAN students answer Korea would be helpful to their countries. When Korean youth are asked which ASEAN member state is the most favourable, Singapore gets 25%, Thailand 18%, Vietnam 16%, Laos and the Philippines 10%, and Indonesia 6%. On the question of which ASEAN member state is the most helpful to Korea, 38% of Korean students choose Singapore, 23% Vietnam and 10% Indonesia. On the question of which ASEAN member state Korea should help, 25% of Korean students choose Vietnam, then Myanmar 16%, Cambodia 16% and Laos 8%. It is interesting that Vietnam is chosen as one of the helpful ASEAN member states to Korea as well as one of the countries Korea should help.

On the question of the most attractive aspects of Korea to ASEAN people, 32% of ASEAN students pick ‘Korean Wave’ (K-pop, K-drama, K-beauty), 20% economic development, 17% IT sector (smart phone, home appliance), 11% tourism and 9% education. On the question of the most attractive aspects of ASEAN to Korean people, 19% of students choose natural resources, 17% investment, 14% labour force, 13% study abroad, 12% cultural heritage and 10% commodity market. On the other hand, on the question of the most attractive aspects of Korea to ASEAN people, 41% of Korean youth pick ‘Korean Wave’, 19% economic development, 16% IT sector and 10% medical and health care.

On the question of what they think about the current relations between ASEAN and Korea, 32% of Korean youth choose the good current relations and 62% say neither bad nor good. Then when they are asked about future relations, 64% of Korean young people expect better future relations. 76% of ASEAN students answer that the

current relations of ASEAN and Korea is good or very good. 82% of them expect that the future of ASEAN-Korea relations will be good or very good. This result is a very healthy and hopeful sign for ASEAN and Korea. Both ASEAN and Korean students frequently mention economic cooperation, educational exchange, tourism as the most important issues in ASEAN-Korea relations. On the question of ASEAN's contribution to the improvement of inter-Korea relations, 79% of Korean students express sceptical and neutral perceptions. Almost half of ASEAN students perceive that inter-Korea relations have neutral implication to ASEAN. More detailed findings will be provided in the report by the AKC in November.

Korea will be able to make a great contribution to the education of ASEAN. Investment in education is the most obvious and fruitful investment. The importance of education cannot be emphasised too much. Good education is the fundamental means of achieving any constructive goal. The educational experience and system in Korea will be a good resource to build the next generation education that ASEAN wants. In this respect, ASEAN and Korea should cooperate in many educational fields.

In terms of socio-cultural cooperation and education, two suggestions might be added. First, socio-cultural cooperation should be basically led by civil society. The government should focus on providing the civil society with adequate institutional support of promotion and regulation. Civil society should strive to expand physical and human resources in the socio-cultural area. Strengthening of civil society capacity is the indicator to show the level of socio-cultural cooperation. The government should make use of policy instruments such as ODA and financial aid to provide various education-related public goods.

Second, the most accurate way to see if the level of socio-cultural cooperation improves is to regularly survey and compare perceptions

of both people. Through this, we can grasp the effectiveness of the efforts of both sides toward a sustainable and resilient community. In particular, by measuring changes in perceptions of the ASEAN and Korean people, we can identify the extent of change and make new efforts to fill the gap. To continue surveying perceptions in ASEAN and Korea is very important to check the socio-cultural cooperation between ASEAN and Korea.

Korean Media Industries and the ASEAN-Korea Cultural Cooperation

SHIM DOOBO

ABSTRACT

The first part of this chapter discusses the past, present and future of the Korean Wave, the phenomenon whereby Korean culture has become popular across the ASEAN region. After tracing its historical and structural origins, it then examines its impact on Korea's political, cultural and economic realities. Particularly, it argues that the relations between ASEAN and Korea have improved for the past two decades since ASEAN-Korea cultural exchange has become more active and vibrant. Subsequently, it examines the roles of the government and market forces in the operation of the media. The current commercial media situation calls for the civil society to more rigorously review the publicness which is (un-)identified in the increasingly inter-connected ASEAN media environment. For example, in the media representation of other ASEAN member states, no one should be marginalised or excluded from the public sphere. In the end, the message that this globalisation era teaches us is not to limit the solutions for societal problems to the national boundaries. Numerous issues and problems are transnational and deterritorialised. Governments, media industries, academics and citizens in ASEAN and Korea should continue to communicate and participate in discussions to promote the public role of the media.

* **Key words:** Korean wave, Cultural exchange, Media, Popular culture

1. INTRODUCTION

The relations between ASEAN member states and Korea have become closer in the recent decades. Economically they are inextricably linked and politically deeply trusted. Further, what makes them “old and true friends” are cultural relations that are frequent and passionate. Particularly, the popularity of Korean culture overseas, or the Korean Wave, is strong in Southeast Asia; and Southeast Asia is the most beloved destination for Korean tourists.

There are two parts in this chapter. Firstly, this chapter shall explain why and how the Korean Wave, which has made the relations between the two sides culturally closer, has developed. For this, this chapter examines the trajectory of Korean popular culture industries linking them to global and local political economic relations. Because of time and space constraints, this chapter focuses on film and television drama development among others. Secondly, this chapter shall extract some lessons from the current state of ASEAN-Korea cultural relations which is unbalanced, and make some suggestions to build more interactive and balanced cultural relations.

Next, we shall discuss the government policies and domestic conglomerates’ business moves that helped transform the Korean film industry, taking account of the global political economic context.

2. THE KOREAN FILM INDUSTRY IN THE 1990s

The period of the late 1980s and early 1990s was an important juncture for the Korean film industry because of the market opening to foreign distributors. Under US pressure, in 1988 the Korean government allowed foreign film companies to distribute their films without passing through local distributors in Korea, which the domestic film industry

fiercely opposed in vain. After this measure came into effect, homemade flicks performed poorly marking a record low of 15.9% domestic market share in 1993. While the annual number of local film production was decreasing, that of foreign film imports was increasing. For example, in 1984, the numbers of the locally produced films and the foreign film imports were 81 and 25, respectively. However, they changed respectively to 87 and 175 in 1988, and 63 and 347 in 1993 (Korean Film Council, 2006). In this situation, commentators predicted the demise of Korean film industry in the near future.

At around that time, the Uruguay Round (UR) trade negotiation, started in 1986, eventually concluded in 1994 transforming the system of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) into that of the World Trade Organization (WTO) beginning in 1995. It meant that all member countries of GATT, including Korea, were soon obliged to open their markets in media and cultural sectors. These sectors had been protected from foreign competition, being considered as “exceptional categories” to the free trade principle since the early days of GATT, which came into force in 1948. The Korean press began to write that while culture was emerging as a new sector for the global economic competition, Korea was in danger of its indigenous culture being debased by foreign media, and also of the dollar drain. On the other hand, the press also echoed Peter Drucker, Alvin Toffler and their ilk’s futurological discourses on the cultural industry’s contribution to the national economies in the coming 21st century.

For Koreans, there was nothing that illustrated the importance of cultural industry to the national economy better than what I would call the “*Jurassic Park* factor.” In 1994, the Presidential Advisory Board on Science and Technology proposed to President Kim Young-Sam that Korea should develop film and other media content production as a national strategic industry. What the proposal highlighted was a

fact that a Hollywood movie *Jurassic Park*'s total revenue came up to the equivalent value of exporting 1.5 million Hyundai cars, and this "unlikely" anecdote made the headlines the next morning in Korea. This press report led to a "paradigm shift" for the Koreans who had long strongly believed that the heavy and chemical industries, including automobile, chemical, construction and electronics industries, and not culture, would lead their country through to a more prosperous future.

In this social environment of awakening to the economic importance of culture, the National Assembly enacted the Motion Picture Promotion Law in 1995 to replace the Motion Picture Law that had long straitjacketed the film industry. By the new law, the government would provide tax incentives to film production, attracting corporate capital into the film industry. In fact, major domestic conglomerates, or *chaebol*, including Samsung, Daewoo and Hyundai, which had home electronics interests, had already been planning for cultural content production. Based on the concept of "hardware-software synergy," these companies attempted to synchronise connections between electronic device production and areas of entertainment. In relation to this, Samsung and Daewoo started film financing or video production in the late 1980s. In addition, Samsung, Daewoo and Hyundai secured their interests in cable television service in 1995, as programme providers (PPs).

Following the initiatives of them, other Korean *chaebol* companies advanced into cultural industries ranging from video production, film import, financing and production, and theatre operation to music production. A newspaper reported on the trend of *chaebol*'s rushing at the cultural industry: "The *youngsang san-eop* (loosely translated into "visual industry" or "image industry") is rising to the surface as a new field for *chaebol* competition."²

After several years of operation, however, many of *chaebol*'s ventures in cultural industries did not make a decent profit, but actually suffered

loss. In addition, Korea in the mid-1990s began to show signs of an economic downturn. Therefore, many *chaebols* were looking for the opportunity to make a graceful exit from the cultural industry. In a sense, the financial crisis in late 1997 gave them apposite excuses to fold their cultural industry businesses. In January 1998, *chaebol* SK drastically reduced its video and film businesses and later that year Daewoo abandoned its film interests. In particular, the January 1999 breakup of Samsung Entertainment Group, which was launched in September 1995 as an integrated organisation by bringing all cultural industry-related ventures within Samsung under its umbrella, marked the ending of the *chaebol* age of Korean film industry in the 1990s.

The *chaebol* age of Korean film industry, however, did not simply end up as a passing fad but actually laid the foundation for Korean film industry renaissance to come. By holding independent film festivals and film scenario contests with considerable cash prizes, *chaebol*-run film companies recruited fresh talent, who infused new sensibility into Korean film. In particular, *chaebol* supported young directors, equipped with diplomas from prestigious film schools from all over the world, who would otherwise have to wait for many years for their debut film. During this period, many competent staff members from diverse lines of business within *chaebol* were put into the film business. By this, *chaebol* transplanted their advanced business expertise, including systematic planning and marketing and transparent accounting, to the Korean film industry which had long been caught by “mom-and-pop,” “pre-modern” business practices. After *chaebol* folded their film businesses, quite a large number of those people remained in the film industry. In particular, after Samsung Entertainment Group was disbanded in 1999, 30 out of 45 staff members in its film business team went to other film companies instead of returning to their original positions in Samsung Electronics or elsewhere. In fact, many successful Korean films in the early 2000s

were planned, financed or marketed by those ex-members of Samsung Entertainment Group.

3. THE KOREAN FILM INDUSTRY ON THE RISE

Chaebol's business rationalisation of the local film industry facilitated new players' entrance to the sector. When asked, "What do you think is Samsung's contribution to the Korean film industry?" Choi Wan, Samsung Entertainment Group's film business team leader later promoted to CEO of IM Pictures, made his answer short and clear: "Samsung made the film business transparent, making way for new form of capital."³

The Korean film industry found a new funding source in the post-*chaebol* age. When *chaebols* were leaving the film industry in the late 1990s, venture capitalists and investment firms were entering the sector, looking for fast profits. Right after the Samsung Entertainment Group officially announced its breakup, an action thriller, *Shiri*, which Samsung had planned and funded for its final project, ironically was a big hit. By attracting 5.8 million theatregoers nationwide, it set a new box-office record in Korea. That *Shiri* was also partly funded by a venture capitalist gave many venture capital and investment firms cues to finance film production. This new trend in film funding must be understood in relation to the revision of the Motion Picture Promotion Law in 1999 which facilitated venture capital's funding the film production. Venture capitalists funded (partly or exclusively) 23 out of 58 Korean films produced in 2000. With the influx of new forms of capital, during 2016 the average cost of production per film amounted to 2.4 billion won, a considerable increase from 0.09 billion won in 1995 (Korean Film Council, 2017).⁴

The revision of the Motion Picture Promotion Law in 1999 noted

above also made it possible for individuals to finance film production. What turned out was the so-called *netizen fund*. Taking advantage of Korea's developed broadband facilities, a film studio, Bom raised a \$85,000 fund from online film buffs. It attracted 200 investors for \$425 each, later paying 200% return to them.⁵ After this, many film projects employed "netizen" funds not only as a source of investment but also a means of online marketing. In the 2000s, even the banking sector financed the film sector. Hana Bank's launching of \$7.8 million "Hana Film Trust Fund No.1" meant that the Korean film industry secured a stable source of funding.⁶

In this favourable environment, the Korean film industry churned out blockbusters. In 2001, *Joint Security Area*, a film about North-South Korea relations broke *Shiri*'s box-office record. Then, a few months later *Friends* again set a new record with 8.2 million admission tickets in Korea. 2004 saw two movies that set new box-office records by hitting 11.08 million and 11.74 million in viewership, respectively. *Silmido* revisited the North-South Korean relations in the 1970s and *TaeGukGi: The Brotherhood of War* was a movie about two brothers' experiences during the Korean War. In March 2006, *King and the Clown*, a fiction that a king during the Joseon (or, Choson) period (1392-1910) fell in love with a pretty male clown, set a new Korean record by taking in more than 12 million audiences. Upheld by these and other well-performing local flicks later on, the Korean films' domestic market share has continuously increased from 15.9% in 1993 to 35.5% in 2000, and even recorded over 50% in 2001. From 2003 to 2016, Korean films' market share has recorded over 50% except for the period of 2008-2010.⁷

The influx of capital into the film industry has facilitated not only film production but also its consumption. For one, more comfortable viewing condition introduced by multiplex theaters, largely begun to be built in the late 1990s by some *chaebol*, is the case in point. Located in

major shopping malls in big cities in Korea, multiplexes enticed consumers back to theaters. According to director/producer Kang Woo-suk, multiplexes have become a “playground” for the youth where they can spend time eating, drinking and enjoying movies.⁸ The multiplex building boom—the number of screens nationwide increased from 497 in 1997 through 1,132 in 2003 and to 2,575 in 2016—further facilitated film production. Simply put, in order to use those increasing screens, multiplexes, many of which were linked to production companies, funded Korean film productions. At that time, Korean films won audience acclaim as showing signs of quality improvement.

In the 2000s, the Korean film industry experienced consolidation and concentration processes. In this regard, observers noted that those Korean blockbusters were made possible because they were productions of local film majors which controlled theater chains. In the mid-2000s, Cinema Service, CJ Entertainment, Showbox Inc., and Lotte Cinema had formed an oligopoly on the Korean film industry ranging from production and investment to distribution and theaters. While Cinema Service was founded on traditional Korean film industry resources, the other three were subsidiaries of relatively mid-sized *chaebol*. CJ Entertainment, originally started its film business in 1995, has extended its business since 1999, and Showbox Inc., and Lotte Cinema advanced into the sector in 1999. As of August 2017, the Korean film industry has been realigned with four major distributors (CJ E&M, Lotte Cinema, NEW, and Showbox), all of which, except for Showbox, have theatre chains.

Based on its domestic success, Korean films even attracted larger audiences overseas. The blockbuster *Shiri* was sold to several Asian countries and received both critical acclaim and commercial success. In particular, it earned \$14 million at the Japanese box office for 1.2 million theatergoers and topped the Hong Kong box office, a rare overseas achievement for a Korean film at that time.⁹ Since then, many Korean

films have been released for commercial run in foreign theaters and won prizes at such prestigious film festivals as Cannes, Berlin and Venice. In 2016, a total of 679 Korean films were exported and earned about \$43.89 million, in marked contrast to 1995's export figure of 15 films with earnings of \$208,679 (refer to Table 1). Such Korean films achievement overseas is understood against the backdrop of the Korean Wave that had been led by the popularity of Korean television drama.

Table 1. The Amount of Korean Film Exports

(unit: Million USD)

YEAR	1995	1999	2007	2012	2016
Amount	0.20	5.96	24.39	20.17	43.89

* Source: Korean Film Council (2017).

4. THE COMMERCIALISATION OF KOREAN TELEVISION

As noted, the globally flourished “information society” discourse, upheld by advances in IT (information technology) and digital development, and citizens’ demands for more liberal communication environment led to the media liberalisation in Korea beginning in the late 1980s. In 1989, the government-assigned Commission for Broadcasting System Research suggested an idea to launch cable television in 1995 as the mainstay of digitised, integrated communication infrastructure in the coming Information Age. In 1990, the National Assembly enacted the new Broadcasting Law, by which the government granted a commercial license to Seoul Broadcasting System (SBS) to begin operation from 1991. SBS was the first commercial television station to operate since 1980 when the Chun Doo-whan regime forcibly reshuffled 29 broadcasters into an oligopoly of two public broadcasters, i.e., Korea Broadcasting System (KBS) and Munhwa Broadcasting Company (MBC).

In December 1991, the National Assembly passed the Cable Television Act. Based on the Act, in August 1993 the Ministry of Information selected 20 applicants to become cable television programme providers (PPs) who would run their own channels. As planned, in March 1995 cable television services started across the country. In addition, four new regional commercial terrestrial television stations started operation in the same year. In 1997, another set of four regional channels started to cover their respective provinces. In 2002, satellite channels were added to these television platforms, and the digital multimedia broadcasting (DMB) started in 2005. In a nutshell, since the 1990s Korea has entered a multi-channel television era, marked by intense competition for audience attention.

SBS, the new commercial broadcaster, was spearheading the competition. Although technically a regional broadcaster covering Seoul and its vicinity, such coverage accounted for almost half of the Korean population. In addition, by providing its programmes to other regional stations newly launched in the 1990s, SBS practically functioned as a national network like KBS and MBC. The advent of SBS was “threatening” to KBS and MBC which, although tagged as “public” broadcasters, had relied on advertising for their finances, in addition to reception fees. In the early 1990s, KBS relied more on advertising revenue than on the reception fee by 61% to 39%. In the same period, 98% of MBC’s revenue came from the advertisement.¹⁰ Indeed, SBS publicly announced that it would compete with the established broadcasters for audience ratings in television dramas, in particular.

Television drama has always been the centrepiece of television watching among Korean audiences. For example, in the annual lists of ten television programmes with the highest audience ratings, 5 or 6 of which are usually television dramas. Spurred by SBS’s “television drama offensive”, characterised by the increased number and content diversity

of television dramas, broadcasters engaged in the “drama war.”¹¹ They extended into previously untouched topics, shot on locations including foreign countries, sped up the flow of stories with better scripts and pictures. In this process, the overall entertainment quality of television drama has also improved while often being chastised for its low taste from the elitist press.

Different from other countries, many Korean television dramas recorded ratings of more than 20% share in a market where the three terrestrial networks aired as many as 30 television dramas per week. Fans’ enthusiasm for television dramas is such that they often form cult-like Internet fan clubs of their favourite television dramas and provide feedback—often in the form of “pressure” to alter storylines—to television producers, and produce parodies on the dramas in the form of magazines, newspapers and posters. Because these ardent fans are opinion leaders about the programmes, and they form the guaranteed market for the dramas’ sales of video-on-demand, DVD and other spin-off products, networks cannot disregard their fandom. Networks and other television drama producers often invite fan club members to locations, arrange meeting sessions with their stars and even allow them to play minor roles in television dramas. Indeed, Korean television producers have made every effort to gratify audiences.

In the late 2000s, Korean television drama industry entered into another era with the advent of social media and mobile entertainment. Television gradually became one of the legacy media (newspapers, magazines, books, TV networks). In the past, TV dramas with audience ratings over 50% were deemed popular; nowadays, it is difficult to go over 20%. Audiences do not stick to television sets, and watch their favourite shows on diverse forms of platforms at whatever time that is good for them. Nevertheless, mega-stardom in the Korean Wave continues to emerge from television drama, as this genre has a strength in capturing

audience attention more than any other forms of entertainment.

5. KOREAN TELEVISION DRAMA EXPORTS

It was around the turn of the 1990s when Korean television industry began to export television dramas. According to Bak Jaebok, the head of International Exchange Department at MBC, it was not until 1992 that MBC first put up its own booth at the TV Festival de Cannes.¹² At that time, MBC sold *Eyes of the Dawn* to Türkiye Radyo Televizyon (TRT), Turkey's national broadcaster, marking the first Korean television drama to be exported to a European country, and *What is Love All About* to Hong Kong's Asia Television Ltd (ATV). With the media liberalisation sweeping across Asia, the scale of Korean television programme exports gradually increased.

Most observers argue that the Korean Wave started in China and Taiwan with the broadcast of *What is Love All About* in 1997-98. However, Korean television dramas already accounted for 56% of all foreign programming imports to Vietnam in 1998.¹³ According to Chae Jiyoung, senior researcher at the Korea Culture and Tourism Policy Institute, the Korean Wave was possible not because the government or broadcasters in Korea had certain visions or strategies for popular cultural exports. Rather, the international market condition worked favourably for the exports of Korean television dramas of which commercial quality was gradually improving spurred by their domestic competition.¹⁴ In the late 1990s, Japanese television dramas' popularity began to weaken in Taiwan. At this juncture, Taiwanese importers began to import cheaper Korean television dramas to fill this opening. As middlemen, they also helped Korean television dramas' penetration into markets in Hong Kong, China, Vietnam, and other Southeast Asian countries where there existed large overseas Chinese communities. In addition, the

economic downturn in Asia in the late 1990s made the cheaper Korean programming a popular alternative in these media markets. Korean television dramas were a quarter of the price of Japanese ones, and a tenth of the price of Hong Kong television dramas at that period.

The structural context of media liberalisation in East and Southeast Asia should be further taken into account. Asia was not a region in which television programming trade was active up until the 1980s. According to Waterman and Rogers, “countries of the Asian region as a whole has a relatively low dependence on imported programming, and a relatively very low dependence on intra-regional program trade” before the 1990s.¹⁵ Many Asian governments had for a long time been on the defensive against cultural influences from foreign countries. They began, however, to open their television programming markets in the 1990s following the global trend. At the same time, economic development among many Asian countries afforded their citizens leisure and facilities to consume more cultural artefacts. Even the previously tightly controlled television markets in Vietnam and China loosened their television programming import policies. For example, as of the early 1970s imported programmes occupied less than 1% of total airtime in CCTV of China. In the late 1990s, the percentage rose to a range of 20%-30% across different regions in China.¹⁶

Since its initial popular reception within the pan-Chinese pop sphere (comprising China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Chinese communities in Southeast Asia) and Vietnam, Korean television drama gradually expanded its reach. A tear-jerker *Winter Sonata* was first broadcast on the Japanese NHK BS Satellite in April 2003, and was re-aired on the NHK BS in December of the same year. On popular demand, NHK aired it for the third time, this time on its terrestrial network in summer 2004. Although it was a third run, and despite the fact of it being aired on Saturdays at 11:10 pm, *Winter Sonata*, nicknamed *Fuyusona* in

Japanese, commanded an average of 16%-17% share of audience rating. In late 2004, the Korean television drama made a fourth run, a record for a foreign programming on the Japanese public broadcasting network. This time, *Winter Sonata* was aired with subtitles instead of dubbing (which is conventional for imported programmes), in compliance with the local fans' demand to enjoy the drama with a "genuine Korean feel."¹⁷ In particular, actor Bae Yong Jun's fandom in Japan was such that when he visited the country in April 2004, about 5,000 female fans gathered at Tokyo's Haneda airport to greet him.¹⁸ Such an airport scene was just a beginning. These days, from Singapore to Paris and Lima (Peru), airports are filled with thousands of screaming fans who are waiting for Korean celebrities.

When the popularity of Korean television dramas was gradually weakening in the early 2000s, *Dae Jang Geum* ("Jewel in the palace") ignited a bigger craze for Korean popular culture. *Dae Jang Geum* is an epic drama about the real life story of a woman who rose from a lower class to the master chef in the royal palace during King Jungjong (1506-1544) in Joseon dynasty. In May 2005, the show's final episode became the most-watched television show in Hong Kong history with more than 40% audience rating. Thanks to *Dae Jang Geum*, even the middle-aged male audiences in Southeast Asia began to watch more Korean dramas. Since then, *Dae Jang Geum* has been used as a name for Korean restaurant all across Southeast Asia. Later on, Korean dramas such as *Boys over Flowers*(2009), *My Love from the Star*(2013-14), *Descendants of the Sun*(2016), and *Goblin*(2016-17) have captured hearts of many Asians.

One may wonder why Korean television drama is popular among Southeast Asian audiences. I would argue that the cultural consumption is a negotiation process between consumers and cultural artefacts. In this process, consumers invest their time, money, energy and emotional allowances in cultural commodities in order to acquire pleasure and

make meaning. It was noted that Korean television dramas touch the right chord of Asian sentiments, such as family values and respect for elders. For audiences in developing economies such as Laos and Vietnam, Korean television dramas are more acceptable than Japanese or American ones because the former retain traditional values while having achieved the technical sophistication comparable to that of the latter. Therefore, Korea is “viewed as a prominent model to follow or catch up, both culturally and economically.”¹⁹ In this sense, we can propose that Korean television dramas have provided audiences with better terms of negotiation for pleasure than other national productions. According to the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, the total amount of Korean television programme exports dramatically increased from \$5.5 million in 1995 to \$320.43 million in 2015 (refer to Table 2).

Table 2. Korean Television Programme Exports and Imports

(unit: Million USD)

YEAR	1995	1999	2003	2007	2015
Exports	5.5	12.7	42.1	150.95	320.43
Imports	42.2	28.7	18.0	64.93	146.29

* Source: Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism (2008), Korea Creative Content Agency (2017).

The growing popularity of Korean pop culture has more implications than simply earning foreign currency. The Vietnamese adults over the age 40 still vividly remember that Korean soldiers fought against their Liberation Army during the Vietnam War. In this vein, Korean pop stars have contributed to improving Korea’s foreign relations. In 2001, then Korean President, Kim Dae-jung, invited Korean actor Jang Dong-gun and actress Kim Nam-ju to the dinner he hosted for Vietnamese President Tran Duc Luong on the Vietnamese President’s demand. The following newspaper report on the happening in 2003 provides an interesting picture of the Korean Wave.

When President Roh Moo-hyun invited Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan Van Khai and his delegation for a luncheon meeting last September, something unexpected happened. After a moment of calm, the Vietnamese officials stood up one by one and started to line up in front of a woman, asking her to sign their menus. The woman was actress Kim Hyun-joo, heroine of the SBS TV drama *Glass Shoes* (*Yuri gudu*), which had been shown on Vietnamese television in May 2003. The actress had become well-known in Vietnam after the drama became a big hit there. The commotion settled down only after a Korean general made available the actress's autograph for everyone after lunch. The centre of attention during the luncheon apparently was not President Roh or Prime Minister Khai, but the actress, Kim, showing that perhaps the "Korean Wave" is stronger than diplomacy.

A *New York Times* article also takes note of the contribution of the Korean Wave to the improved images of Korea: "The booming South Korean presence on television and in the movies has spurred Asians to buy up South Korean goods and to travel to South Korea, traditionally not a popular tourist destination. The images that Asians traditionally have associated with the country—violent student marches, the Demilitarized Zone, and division—have given way to trendy entertainers and cutting-edge technology."

As arguably the centre of Asian popular culture, Korean pop culture is leading a new trend among the audiences in Asia. While it were Asian women who had desires to look like Song Hye-kyo or Lee Young-ae, the famous Korean actresses, it is that nowadays Asian men want to look like Song Joong-ki by having plastic surgeries. Song, the star in *Descendants of the Sun* (2016), represents the "pan-Asian soft masculinity." Different from the traditional "tough" masculinity, the idealised Asian manhood is undergoing a transformation following the new trend represented in Korean popular culture.

6. THE KOREAN WAVE AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE

What political-cultural meaning can we elicit from the Korean Wave phenomenon on the international level? The US historian Meredith Woo-Cumings once said that Asia is “an area without an identity, a region incapable of imagining itself as a community.” For most Asians, other locales of Asia have long been the unknown. As US communications scholars Waterman and Rogers called American culture “the common denominator” of popular culture in Asia, most Asians have long referred to the West for cultural consumption as well as for modernisation. In the 2000s, we were consuming images that had originated from other countries, irrespective of national borders. These changes are meaningful for regional cultural exchanges that had long been denied their prosperity or existence by the dominance of hegemonic US culture. For many decades in the 20th century, the concept of “cultural exchange” was closely connected to a debate on American cultural imperialism and its opposition. Against this backdrop, the rise of Asian popular culture is in itself a successful leap.

According to anthropologist Benedict Anderson, national identity is constructed through daily rituals of media consumption by which the readers/audiences imagine the media’s co-readers/audiences to be a part of the same commonality, although they will never know most of the other members. If we twist this idea, we may suppose that a growing number of audiences of pan-Asian popular culture may develop regional subjectivities and communal consciousness and even regard themselves as sharing in a fraternity with other Asian audiences. In fact, imagination precedes reality. Today’s pop culture fans are already engaged in fantasising about community on a global scale where national borders no longer determine one’s chances for pleasure and connectedness. It is reminded that the Eurovision, the programme the European

broadcasting network launched in 1954 to encourage broadcasting programming exchanges between European countries, is said to have laid the foundation for today's European Union (EU).

However, the following problems are recognised as factors that impede cultural exchange in Asia:

- Lack of understanding of the importance of cultural exchange
- Lack of appreciation of the cultural diversity in the region
- Lack of institutional and collaborative efforts of both public and private sectors to enhance cultural exchange
- Low priority given to the area of culture in national/international agendas
- The unidirectional mode of cultural flow in the region in which the cultures of bigger and stronger nations are usually transmitted to smaller and weaker nations, and not in a bidirectional way
- The flow of popular culture is largely market-mediated and market-driven, serving primarily the commercial needs. In the end, there are many cases that mediated information of a certain society is often limited and flawed, leading to a misunderstanding between cultures.

These are the problems that call for more serious research on cultural exchange and cooperation between ASEAN and Korea. The importance of “cultural exchange” in the building of a “community spirit” within East and Southeast had been recognised by political leaders in the region. For example, in order to discuss and find more practicable and specific action programmes and activities in enhancing cultural exchange, the Network of East Asian Think-tanks (NEAT) decided to assemble a Working Group on the Enhancement of Cultural Exchange in 2007. Then, ASEAN+3 member states had been holding a series of annual meetings in the period of 2008 and 2012 with the media, popular culture and cultural festivities, education, people-to-people exchange, and cultural archives as main discussion topics. However, that working group is now defunct because of a lack of political will and adequate funding.

For a healthy and sustainable cultural flow in Asia, international cultural traffic should be in the forms of two-way. The Korean Wave phenomenon is a case of important attention. While it has promoted outbound cultural flow from Korea, it also brought about a phenomenon called “discovery of Southeast Asia” in Korea. As a by-product of the Korean Wave phenomenon, more and more people have become interested in culture, politics and the economy of Southeast Asia, which in return stimulated Koreans to participate in activities ranging from travel, investment to study in Southeast Asia. Nonetheless, cultural exchanges between Korea and Southeast Asia are still largely one-way. There is a growing need to promote bilateral exchanges for a sustainable relationship between the two sides. The multiculturalism, whose aim is to recognise other cultures, should evolve into inter-culturalism, whose aim is communication and interpenetration between different cultures.

For balanced exchanges, Korea should contribute to the development of cultural industries in Southeast Asia by providing the expertise of Korea’s cultural industry development to Southeast Asia. While there can be many schemes to that end, one plausible scheme is to start a new media platform in Korea, which is devoted to showing the whole gamut of Southeast Asia including the cultural, political and economic issues and scientific development of the region. The platform can be a new television channel or pages on YouTube or SNS (Facebook, Twitter, or KakaoTalk and Line Messenger). While it is impossible to force an audience to watch a certain platform or content in this democratic age, it is still possible to set up a platform for a specific purpose so that audiences may choose to watch it.

The establishment of the Southeast Asian television channel or a “platform” will also have the effect of providing Korea’s advanced expertise in cultural production to Southeast Asia. When broadcasters in Southeast Asian countries come to Korea for the operation of this

broadcasting station, cultural production know-how will be circulated among the broadcasting crews. When they go back to their home countries after a few months or years of stint in Korea, they will apply their newly acquired knowledge towards media development in their home countries. The Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs should find ways to support the cost of their stay in Korea.

The continuous media exchange activities will result in the revitalisation of international co-productions. Various forms of co-production including shooting location, manpower, capital, etc. will be promoted and a related human network will be formed. For this “Made in Asia” collaboration to be successful, such practical support schemes as tax benefit provision should be sought. There are many successful cases of international co-productions that have been accumulated over the years in the film industry. For example, Eurimages, which is the European Cinema Support Fund, and the Asian Film Industry Network, which has been promoted by the Busan International Film Festival and the Korea Film Council, are good starting points for references. After all, Korea needs to further develop and train regional experts on Southeast Asia. For this, student exchange programmes are important. In addition, cultural internship programmes should be created, through which interns will grow into cultural experts by learning expertise from cultural content planning to cultural production and international distribution.

After all, political leaders, policymakers, scholars, media and cultural sector practitioners altogether need to make further efforts to promote a more balanced and reciprocal cultural exchange in the region. While the Korean Wave laid a small portion of the foundation for more communication and dialogue between the two sides, the end is still far to see. The following quote, however, enheartens us: “Difficult roads often lead to the most beautiful destinations.”

A Neo-Developmental Virtuous Circle of the Korean Wave and its Implications for the ASEAN-Korea Cultural Exchange¹

CHUNG JONG-EUN

ABSTRACT

The Korean Wave, which has been the flagship phenomenon of Korea's international cultural exchange since the late 1990s, has become something that both the people of ASEAN and Korea know very well and experience in their daily lives. This chapter argues that the Korean Wave was not an accident or coincidence, but a result of a state transformation project which drove the rise of a new policy regime, that is, neo-developmental cultural (industries) policy. In making this argument, the chapter will provide the history and concept of the neo-developmental cultural policy, after which it will explain how this new policy trend was a direct contribution to the virtuous circle through which the Korean Wave could launch and secure its sustainable development. Based on these findings, the chapter will also give implications on how to further improve the cultural exchange between ASEAN and Korea.

* **Key words:** Korean wave, Neo-developmental cultural policy, Neo-developmental virtuous circle, Cultural industry, Creative industry, ASEAN-Korea cultural cooperation

1. INTRODUCTION

The Korean Wave has been the flagship phenomenon of Korea's international cultural exchange since the late 1990s. As a result, the Korean Wave became *something* that both ASEAN and Korean people know very well and experience in everyday life. In other words, it is a good starting point in thinking about the issues and future of ASEAN-Korea cultural exchange. Throughout this paper, I will be arguing that the Korean Wave was not an accident or coincidence, but a result of a state transformation project which drove the rise of a new policy regime, that is, the *neo-developmental* cultural (industries) policy. In doing so, I will first explain the history and concept of the *neo-developmental* cultural policy, and then how this new policy trend directly contributed to the virtuous circle through which the Korean Wave could launch and secure its sustainable development.² This observation of the early age of the Korean Wave would have a realistic appeal to policymakers and researchers in ASEAN member states, because they seem to share not only the memories and traces of developmentalism but also the expectations and aspirations for a more creative future. In this vein, on the basis of the findings, I will make some suggestions about how to improve the ASEAN-Korea cultural exchange.

2. THE RISE OF NEO-DEVELOPMENTAL CULTURAL POLICY IN KOREA (1998-2008)

As is well known, Korea achieved galloping industrialisation over an extremely compressed period. In the process, Korea deployed a model called the 'developmental state,'³ which is poised between the Anglo-American and Stalinist models, and achieved an average annual growth rate of 8.1% between 1965 and 1999.⁴ This 'outstanding,'⁵ 'impressive,'⁶

or ‘extremely rapid’⁷ growth performance was shared by neighbouring countries, including Japan (the first runner), Taiwan and Singapore in the period following the Second World War. In a nutshell, eclecticism (or the being poised between) has been the essential characteristic of the states since the beginning of their industrialisation. It should be also noted that the cultural policy of the Korean developmental state can be summarised by two concepts: culture as an add-on and as an ideological catalyst for mass manipulation. These two characteristics of Korean cultural policy changed completely with the rise of new cultural/creative industries (hereafter, CI) policy under the two centre-left governments between 1998 and 2008.

I have to stress here that the cultural (industries) policy shift would not have been possible were it not for two unprecedented events in 1997. The first event was the Asian Financial Crisis which may be thought of as ‘the Great Depression’ for the Asian region. This great economic crisis was deemed to be the ‘Second National Shame’ in Korea. As such, it decisively challenged the developmental state model, and gave Kim Dae-jung (hereafter, DJ) the opportunity to win that year’s presidential election. In the midst of the great crisis he had inherited, there were two big issues facing the new president: ‘who was to blame for the crisis’ and how extensively should the country plug itself into ‘international finance and trans-border capital flows.’⁸ As the representative of the Korean ‘distributional allies,’ DJ lost no time in laying the blame for the crisis squarely at the feet of crony capitalism and the state-chaebol collusion that had been at the core of the developmental state. This allowed DJ to emphasise his cherished desire for the ‘parallel development of democracy and the market economy.’⁹

To be concise, the post-crisis CI policy shift in Korea that brought about expansion of the Korean Wave later was obviously influenced and driven by this broader state transformation. The discursive practices,

devised from the perspective of a ‘Second National Building’ to overcome the ‘Second National Shame,’ primarily aimed to overcome the limitations of the developmental state model. For this purpose, some elements of the regulatory state model (e.g. arm’s length principle, abolishment of censorship) were intentionally introduced and thoroughly implemented. Nevertheless, such appropriations did not prevent the new regime from perpetuating some key features of the former developmental state (i.e. charismatic President’s role of vision provider, setting some industries strategically as national basic industries). This is why I believe the shift was a *neo-developmental* transformation rather than neo-liberal, which sought an eclectic position somewhere between the *old developmental state* and the *contemporary regulatory state*.

The table below is the Korean neo-developmental cultural industries policy framework resulted from the policy transformation during President Kim Dae-jung’s and Roh Moo-hyun’s presidencies.

Table 1. The Korean Neo-developmental CI Policy Framework

Category	Building the National Innovation System for CI			
Strategies	Cooperative governance strategy	Comprehensive <i>infrastructures</i> strategy		Symbolic intervention strategy
Contents	Introducing a new style of governance system over the CI policy field	Building new kinds of <i>infrastructures</i> which cover not only the environment, but various inputs of CI		Initiating a new mode of intervention into the value chain of CI
Activities	1. Empowering and networking the CI policy community in a much more democratic and thus creative way	2.1 Building environment <i>infrastructures</i> (i.e. legal and taxation system, copyright and policy research)	2.2 Nurturing input <i>infrastructures</i> (i.e. human, technology, financial, physical and information ones)	3. Implementing active and strategic intervention into the creation-distribution-domestic market-overseas markets of Korean CI.
Foundations	The Third Way: Parallel development thesis		The Third Wave: Informational evolution thesis	
Logics	Social capital logic: negative consolidation of creativity		Creative capital logic: positive consolidation of creativity	
Mottos	Arm’s length principle		CI as a national basic industry	

3. A NEO-DEVELOPMENTAL VIRTUOUS CIRCLE OF THE KOREAN WAVE


Under Kim's and Roh's presidencies, the Korean CI sector achieved striking growth in both the domestic and overseas markets. With the exception of the first year for which data is not available, the 16.7% average annual growth rate for CI sales was almost three times greater than the average growth rate of the Korean GDP over the period, which stood at 5.6%.¹⁰ During these ten years, the overseas expansion of Korean CI was as impressive as the growth of the domestic market. The total export volume of Korean CI soared by 277% from \$412.8 million in 1998 to \$1,555.4 million in 2007.¹¹ However, it does not necessarily follow from this observation that the new Korean CI policy was the crucial factor in this economic success.

So, in this section I will show how the new CI policy framework directly drove this growth of the domestic and overseas market.¹² In doing so, I have to introduce a neo-developmental *virtuous circle* due to the close cooperation between 'official' and 'unofficial' participants in the policy community. The figure below illustrates the virtuous circle composed of key turning points in Korean CI development, which also explains how the Korean Wave got into shape. The three blue boxes (i.e. 1, 4, 6) signify the points where official participants played the decisive role. Each box needs to be touched upon to explain the whole mechanism of the circle.

3.1 Neo-Developmental Alliance, Creative Contents and Domestic Perception Change

As the 'cooperative governance' (see Table 1) strategy directly reveals, the partnership between the official and the unofficial participants in the CI policy field was not only the starting point of the virtuous circle, but also

Figure 1. The Virtuous Circle of Korean CI Development



the control tower for its development. This unprecedented partnership, which may be called a *neo-developmental alliance* between the two parties, was constructed by DJ.

On the one hand, there were a group of progressive cultural activists, most conspicuous in the film industry, who had not only supported DJ consistently since the 1987 democratisation movement, but who also played a key role in preparing DJ's election pledges for the cultural sector. Together with DJ, they once comprised the opposition 'distributional alliance' that struggled against the then official 'development alliance.'¹³ It was then the longstanding president-centred 'unipolar system'¹⁴ of Korean politics that enabled the progressive pledges that DJ and the progressive group had developed together to suddenly become the prime objective of the official policy participants after DJ's election victory in December 1997. Mediated by the President and his powerful staff,

those who had been enemies in the past became close allies, the most significant example being the activists in the film industry and the civil servants who staffed the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MCT). In accordance with the civil servants' change of identity from 'spearhead' to 'yard sweeping brush' (Yoo, former Chief of the CI Bureau), the judges and the National Assembly members also changed their roles significantly. The judges made a series of judgments in favour of the freedom of expression, especially at the Constitutional Court, and the National Assembly not only passed many key acts for CI promotion, but also helped the cultural activists surmount various obstacles.¹⁵

The cultural industries were instantly stimulated by these significant changes. The new CI policy community brought about the rise of the neo-developmental alliance and in turn the birth of 'creative contents armed with a new representation style'. The key factor here was the expansion of the freedom of expression. As a result of these new freedoms, new types of contents emerged not just from the film industry, but also from all the other genres of Korean CI. The secret lay in the liberation of 'creativity and imagination' that had been straightjacketed under the developmental state and the transitional period.

Clearly, freedom of expression was central to the enhancement of Korean CI. However, such expression also had to be recognised by the audience. Just as Korean CI responded rapidly to the rise of the neo-developmental alliance in the CI policy field, Korean audiences also responded quickly to the concomitant enhancement of creative contents in the domestic market. This 'change in the perception of the potential of Korean cultural contents' operated at two levels. Firstly, Korean people started to abandon previously fixed ideas about the low or 'childish' quality of Korean contents, as they started to see their own social contexts and everyday problems being represented in Korean cultural products freed from the constraints of strong censorship. They therefore

began to discover in Korean cultural products empathetic pleasures not afforded them by the foreign products that had formerly dominated the market. This can be considered to be the most important reason why the miraculous growth in domestic sales was possible during DJ's and Roh's presidencies, which witnessed a 568% increase in the domestically produced music sales, and similar increases of 465% and 317% in the local film and broadcasting industries, respectively. The other change in perception is related to the value of Korean CI as an industry.

At the outset, it was extremely difficult for the MCT to persuade even other Ministries that the cultural sector could be an industry of not only 'consumption', but also of 'production' (Kim, DJ's last Culture Minister). Even though DJ could *force* the perception change at this level (for example, in his first meeting with high-ranking civil servants across the Ministries), it was impossible for the President to change public perception in the same way, since it was still influenced by arguments about the negative influence that vulgar/popular culture had on youth. However, as the noticeably different new cultural products emerged and achieved a series of huge commercial successes in some genres of CI, both the Korean media and Korean audiences started to recognise the enhanced creativity of Korean cultural contents and then the economic value of the sector.

3.2 New Quangos and New *Infrastructures* Built through Voluntary Participation

In order to keep pace with these turning points, the neo-developmental alliance proceeded to transform existing quangos or establish new quangos according to the arm's length principle. Major quangos such as KOFIC (Korean Film Council) and KOCCA (Korea Culture & Content Agency) were either completely restructured or newly established. These quangos were indeed a new species in the Korean cultural field

because the Culture Ministry recruited industry experts and gave them the power and autonomy necessary to manage the quangos and to formulate related policy. In a break from conventional bureaucratic approaches, then, the civilian experts who knew the ins and outs of the related industries were able to relate the quangos organically with the real situation in the industries, and thus to prepare and implement 'new and relevant policies' directly beneficial to the industries.¹⁶ The Ministry trusted and supported these new organisations wholeheartedly. Of course, this was possible because the Ministry agreed with DJ's philosophy of democratic governance. On another level, however, the MCT gave its quangos autonomy because it was surely a better and quicker way to foster growth in the industries and therefore also to expand the Ministry's territory and status in the government.

As former Minister Kim explained, the civil servants were recruited from the best and brightest in the country and, armed with 'embedded autonomy,'¹⁷ they had been able to turn the ambitious plans of the developmental state into reality. However, faced with a new era, they found that the best way to ensure their legitimacy was no longer to dominate the policy field and their industries. Rather it was to give them autonomy and support. As leading figures suggested, the Ministry was to 'let [the industries] be and then give support when and where it was desperately needed' (Oh, DJ's first CI Bureau Chief) or to 'not become an obstacle' while 'getting rid of other obstacles quickly' (Yoo, DJ's third CI Bureau Chief). This was a major reason why the MCT shared the space and authority of CI policy making with the new quangos.

Just as civil experts voluntarily took part in the space that the MCT prepared in the policy field, so too did the Korean talent, and investment spontaneously flocked into the space in the industries that the MCT and its quangos had opened through the new and relevant policies. To understand the latter mechanism, it is useful to pay attention to a

particular characteristic of Korean society.

In this context of ‘industrialisation after democratisation’, it can be argued what DJ sought to achieve with his famous slogans, the ‘arm’s length principle’ and ‘CI as a national basic industry’, was to give the collective energy of Korean society a form or a goal. The abolition of censorship liberated the repressed creativity and imagination of the creators; and then the ensuing performance of the CI sector stimulated Korean society to accept this new trend as its new consensus. To be short, the ‘pot spirit’ was ignited in a positive sense.

More concretely, the MCT was encouraged to see that the change in the public perception of Korean CI was sustained for quite a while and therefore, together with its quangos, formulated and implemented more aggressive and diverse policies to ensure the environment and input *infrastructures*. Taking these signs from both the market and the government as unprecedented opportunities, Korean financial and human capital started to pour into the emergent ‘national basic industry’. Meanwhile, the MCT and its quangos initiated numerous programmes and projects in order to ‘nurture core talent’, such as providing intensive support to educational institutions, establishing a prestigious graduate school, and developing the Contents Academy; while also working to ‘ensure stable financing’ for businesses by launching various matching funds for each CI genre, and introducing new institutions such as the Special Purpose Company. Without this strategic or symbolic support from the government, no doubt it would have been difficult to attract Korean human and financial resources into the CI sector.

3.3 Cooperation for Exports Expansion, International Perception Change, and Increased Interest in Korean CI

Due to the particular history of Korea’s export-oriented industrialisation, state intervention into the CI value chain focused on the penetration

and expansion of overseas markets from the outset. For example, the first long-term Korean CI plan, *The Five-Year Plan for CI development*, devoted the middle two years of its five-year span to the objective of ‘strengthening international competitiveness’.¹⁸ Since then, developing strategic products for overseas markets has never ceased being a major policy objective. Therefore, it was natural that the Ministry and the quangos came to pay increasing attention to Korean CI exports, as the domestic market experienced further growth. Government intervention to expand exports was based on the principle of ‘focus-and-select’, and brought about two instant results. It increased competition between the exporting companies, and led to close cooperation between the policymakers and ‘high potential’ businesses. The government provided promising businesses with the necessary information about overseas markets, helped them fundraise for the production and distribution of ‘star’ contents both directly and indirectly, and also praised their achievements with various awards and citations. This is quite a similar picture to the export expansion strategy of the developmental state. The key difference was, however, that this time there were no *sticks*.

‘When most enterprises in Korean CI were very small’ at the early stage of the take-off, close cooperation between the businesses and the Ministry/quangos played a significant role (Suh, the first Chief of KOCCA). Although the Korean Wave was initiated spontaneously by foreign audiences rather than intentionally incited by the Korean government, its continuation and growth would not have been so impressive without the role of Korean government. Indeed, the same mechanisms that underlay the growth of the domestic CI market were also applied to the penetration of overseas markets; the enhancement of creative contents and a change in the audience’s perception of Korean products.

In other words, at the time when the lack of freedom of expression in Korea was ‘only second to that in communist autocracies’, it was

almost unthinkable that Korean businesses could have made meaningful and entertaining cultural contents for foreign audiences. How could they have exported contents that were regarded as ‘childish’ even in the domestic market? However, as new creative contents began to be produced, Korean CI exports also started to get on track. From this stage, increasingly keen competition between the businesses became more important than government intervention. In the process of competition for overseas markets, Korean firms motivated themselves to experiment and thus accumulated essential knowledge that allowed them to slowly build up their brands among international audiences. As a result, it was no longer optional but essential for Korean CI businesses to plan and produce ‘content aimed not just at the domestic market but also at overseas markets from the outset’ (Lee, former Secretary General of KOCCA). Big hit films, such as *Shiri* (1999) and *JSA* (2000), marked the symbolic turning point in the domestic audiences’ perception of Korean films, and they were followed by big hit TV dramas, such as *Winter Sonata* (2002) and *DaeJangGeum* (2003), which marked a similar turning point internationally. Along with Korean TV dramas, K-pop and Korean films also stimulated changing perceptions of Korean contents among foreign audiences.

The final stage of the virtuous circle captures the moment when the feedback came full circle and overseas reactions impacted back on Korea. This occurred when the strong rise of the Korean Wave in the Asian region correspondingly increased the Korean people’s interest in their CI sector. Korean firms, particularly the *chaebols*, started to recognise the economic value of Korean contents, in terms of marketing, promotion, and the brand value of their products. The Foreign Ministry started to believe in their diplomatic value, and the Education Ministry started to note their value in attracting foreign students to Korea or for promoting Korean language education abroad. Consequently, the Korean Wave

became a subject way beyond the authority of the MCT. To take an example, on 21 December 2004, the Korean Premier Lee Hae-Chan convened a cabinet meeting to order the Ministries to ‘prepare strategies to make the Korean Wave not a temporary event, but as something which could ensure sustainable cultural exchange and economic effects.’¹⁹ This kind of government effort increased year by year. For instance, in the cabinet meeting held about a year later, Premier Lee got reports from 16 Ministries on how they were supporting the Korean Wave and then asked the Ministers to think about how to expand the Korean Wave beyond Asia.²⁰ The MCT took this enhanced confidence and interest in Korean cultural contents to be decisive evidence of the success of the policy shift, and this strengthened the neo-developmental alliance between official and unofficial policy participants. This is how the virtuous circle of Korean CI development was established and put into effect during DJ and Roh’s presidencies.

4. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ASEAN-KOREA CULTURAL EXCHANGE

The Asian developmental state was undoubtedly a third-world variant of the European national industrial state.²¹ However, as even one of the stark critics of the ‘Asia’s miracle acknowledged,²² its first runner, Japan grew into a country which could threaten western developed countries by the late 1900s. Then, Korea has closely pursued the developed countries to become ‘Asia’s next giant.’²³ However, despite its remarkable development over the last half century, Korea has never abandoned its *catch-up ideology*, thereby distinguishing itself from Japan. Defining the developmental state as the ‘prime vehicle for catching up’, Richard Hill puts Japan in the category of the post-developmental state where the passion for catching up has been ‘exhausted’; Taiwan and Korea

in that of neo-developmental states which ‘have yet to catch up with’ advanced economies; and Thailand in that of a developmental state with ‘commitment’ to the catching-up creed.²⁴ As I have traced, this observation can be precisely applied to the Korean CI policy shift that took place under the Kim and Roh governments. As the CI grew larger, the policymakers and industries continually set higher targets vis-à-vis catching up with the ‘advanced’ countries, and aimed to become the ‘fifth strongest’ producer of CI.²⁵

However, one should go beyond the single criterion of the categorisation, the catch-up ideology, in order to rightly understand East Asian CI policy. The Korean case shows that the degree of *democratisation of governance* among policy actors and industries should be included as a key barometer for the categorisation of East Asian developmental/neo-developmental/post-developmental states. To stress one last time, the most important factor for the ‘success of South Korean creative industries’²⁶ or Korea’s status as the ‘dominant force’²⁷ in the Asian cultural market was the introduction of democratic governance rather than the catch-up ideology.

Figure 2. A Map of the East Asian Cultural Policy Arena

		Democratic Governance	
		NO	YES
Catching-up Creed	NO	Pre-developmental (?)	Post-developmental (Japan)
	YES	Developmental (China, Thailand)	Neo-developmental (South Korea, Taiwan)

Then, what are the major implications of this observation on the virtuous circle of the Korean Wave development for the ASEAN-Korea cultural exchange? To conclude this chapter, at least four points need to be made.

Firstly, as the phased development of democratic governance (motto of arm's length principle/the factor from regulatory states) and catching-up creed (motto of making CI as a national basic industry, the factor from developmental states) was the secret of the Korean Wave, so the phased development of democratic cooperation and industrial performance should be the secret of the two parties' cultural exchange. Without assuring democratic relationship and thus free, unlimited and creative exchange, it is unrealistic to expect very meaningful performance in terms of inter-cultural production, distribution and consumption.

Secondly, as analysed in this chapter, the Korean neo-development cultural policy faced challenges under the previous governments in Korea. However, politics should not be an obstacle to cultural development. With the new Korean government established in May 2017, which is the direct successor of the governments that initiated the Korean Wave, I expect there would be some monumental changes in the modes of the Korean Wave for the next five years, including mutual cultural exchange, rather than one-way export expansion, and diversification of forms and matters rather than just K-pop and K-dramas.

Thirdly, it is worth remembering that among the virtuous circle, the audiences' perception change was the key moment. In cultural fields, turning points cannot appear without audiences' change. Therefore, cultural exchange between public sectors is never enough. The enhanced relationship and understanding between ASEAN-Korea governments or public institutions is a good starting point, but without the next stages they are meaningless. As a professional cultural policy researcher,

I regret that I have little knowledge of ASEAN member states' cultural history or trends. But, then, how about Korean people in general? All that matters is whether the general public will get opportunities to meet the other party's best works, producers, or talents. More investment is needed for *direct* cultural exchange between supply and demand sides or simply between private sectors in ASEAN member states and Korea.

Finally, many practical research projects need to be done in order to accumulate the necessary data and thus compose long-term and short-term strategies and action plans of ASEAN-Korea cultural exchange. Without this kind of initiatives, cultural exchange projects fit for the current context of the two parties cannot be produced. For example, case studies conducted by the corresponding quangos charged with promoting arts in Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam and Indonesia, would help researchers grasp a more proper understanding of the cultural sector in East Asia and design a more effective cultural exchange policy. As the saying goes, planning and implementing a variety of research projects in a systematic and sustainable way is the first-step for more serious and substantial action.

The Culture of Democracy and the Democratisation of Culture

RAHIMAH ABDULRAHIM

ABSTRACT

Promotion of democracy can be done by changing the culture – not just a political ideology or system. The social media and the popular culture may promote democracy and political participation and information sharing of the society. For example, promoting the role that cultural understanding and tolerance can play in conflict prevention and peace-building. For this purpose, consolidating each country's culture and identity and preserving each country's uniqueness amidst the wave of cultures should be proposed. Furthermore, turning or fusing cultural activities into socio-economic development opportunities should be suggested.

* **Key words:** Promotion of Democracy, Social Media, Promoting Cultures

1. INTRODUCTION

The ten ASEAN member states together with Korea have long cooperated across the three pillars of politics-security, economics, and socio-culture since dialogue relations were established in 1989. While in many of these dialogue partnerships much attention is usually attached to the former two pillars, it could be argued that when it comes to

ASEAN-Korea relations, an equal amount of attention is given to the cultural aspects of this relationship. This is in part due to the prominence of Korean popular culture in Southeast Asia, as well their shared experience in the wave of democracy that hit both Korea and some ASEAN member states.

This chapter will argue that the wave of democracy that hit Southeast Asia not only brought a change in politics, but also in many other aspects of society. In particular, the change it brought made it more evident that democracy is not only a political ideology, it is also a culture.

The second part of this chapter will highlight the importance of democracy to be promoted as a culture, in particular recognising the diversity of cultures - which include diversity of traditions, religious practices, ethnic traditions - of the peoples of ASEAN. The role of social media in promoting cultures as well in the exchange of cultures is vital to be examined in particular as there are both positive and negative aspects of social media.

Lastly, the paper will look at recommendations on ways forward to ensure that there is a move beyond tolerance and a move into understanding these diversities and finding ways to celebrate those diversities and also be able to develop collaborations that use these diversities as strengths and as ways to strengthen democracy.

2. DEMOCRACY AS A CULTURE

Culture encompasses many issues and takes many forms. They can be from the arts, music, films, and performance, to developments in technology and the rise of the millennials, etc. However, for the purpose of this paper, culture shall be examined through the lens of politics. Through this lens, it can be argued that culture has evolved in different ways. In particular, in the past two decades we have witnessed

a democratic wave sweep through Southeast Asia and Korea. Beginning with the momentous events of 1987 in Korea that resulted in the first directly-elected President, to the *Reformasi* movement of Indonesia in 1998 that saw the downfall of the strongman rule of Suharto, to more recently in Myanmar that saw a civilian government taking power for the first time. This democratic wave not only changed the political structures and actors in those countries, but also their interactions with one another and the wider public, which in turn shaped various other stakeholders.

The change it brought made it more evident that democracy is not only a political ideology, but also a culture. Many of the values of democracy, such as freedom of speech and freedom of expression, have had a large impact in how culture and politics are shaped. Having citizens become more aware of the importance of political participation has seen a great merge of politics and popular culture, as well as clashes of cultures.

For example, in places such as Indonesia and Korea, a 'protest culture' has developed. Many will recall the political situation that engulfed Korea from late 2016 to early 2017 where protests were taking place on a weekly basis, and yet crucially these protests were peaceful. Indeed, it was said that the three characteristics of a good protest in Korea are: good food, good entertainment, and good toilets. Meanwhile in Indonesia, the people are free to demonstrate with the police facilitating them to ensure that there are no disruptions to traffic. If the 'protest culture' in Korea is marked by the aforementioned three characteristics, in Indonesia a good protest is one that does not disrupt traffic and where people disperse themselves peacefully at the end of it.

In this sense, the initial argument for this paper is that democracy itself is a culture and should be promoted as such. In particular, democracy is a cultural phenomenon in the way it fosters and recognises

the diversity of cultures—which include the diversity of traditions, religious practices, ethnic traditions—of the peoples of ASEAN. Following on from this standpoint, this paper argues that the promotion of democracy as a culture is something that must take place in ASEAN to have good relations with other countries as we open and embrace each other's culture. On the one hand, ASEAN has already started to do this, enshrining the concept of its democracy in the ASEAN Charter—no mean achievement in a region where the term 'democracy' was for a long time considered taboo—and with member states like Indonesia promoting democracy in the region and beyond through activities such as the Bali Democracy Forum. However, clearly more can and should be done, and democracy should not only be promoted as a political concept but also a cultural one as well.

It should also be noted the way each of the country leaders are being portrayed—and attempting to shape that portrayal themselves—through social media. These are indicative of how politics is becoming a culture. While people used to chat about music and arts at gatherings, now much of the discussions are on politics. President Joko Widodo's vlogs have attracted wide viewership and regularly become a topic of public discussion. Meanwhile Malaysia's Prime Minister Najib Razak is an active user of Twitter, whilst Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen is active on Facebook.

Mention should be made of Indonesia's 2014 Presidential elections. Dubbed the 'social media elections', the race to elect Indonesia's seventh president saw digital activism increase at a scale unprecedented in the country's history with Facebook recording over 200 million election-related interactions, whilst there was reported 95 million election-related tweets posted on Twitter. The same was also seen during the more recent 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial elections.

Democracy also brought forth a growth in the way culture is

discussed, how culture is promoted, and how culture is used. As we see more countries becoming more democratic and the space opening up more, we see a development of culture. In Indonesia for example, the thriving of democracy also saw a corresponding thrive in the culture and the arts. There has been a growth in movies and films being produced in Indonesia tackling more difficult and controversial issues that would never have been allowed to occur in the New Order days. Of course, this is not the case with all of the ASEAN member states, but the developments in many have been equally interesting and noteworthy.

3. PROMOTING DEMOCRACY AS A CULTURE

The role of social media in promoting cultures as well in the exchange of cultures is vital to be examined in particular as there are both positive and negative aspects of social media. Issues of intolerance, discrimination, and radical perspectives being propagated as an alternative culture are currently the most growing concern in the region. Social media in most recent developments have been seen not only as a blessing for promoting culture but also as a bane. For example, in Myanmar much anti-Rohingya sentiment has been spreading online, whipping up hatred against the minority group, and fuelling the current problem going on in the country. The same can be said of Indonesia where a 'red scare' against the supposed return of the banned Indonesian Communist Party (PKI or *Partai Komunis Indonesia*) has been provoked amongst the public. This ties in also with other hoax stories spreading through social media such as the huge influx of Chinese workers into the country, or the mysterious importation of weapons by a state agency other than the military. It is a sad truth that far too many in Indonesia have tunnel vision who think that a flow of foreign culture into the country will diminish their own. There are also those who seek to impose their own culture and beliefs on

others, based on their narrow interpretation of what they consider their beliefs. The rise of religious conservatism not only in Indonesia but also in Malaysia is one example.

Yet social media can be a tool for good, serving as the main source of information for many. With social media literacy, such a tool can instead help reinforce and complement each other. In the same vein, it can thus be said that the benefits of cultural exchange enrich our own cultures as opposed it to be. As we learn from one another, we also learn more about ourselves especially from the perspectives of how others see us. Such introspection is vital for any country in order to advance itself. However, we have carried out many cultural exchanges and yet the world remains divided. Here it should be noted that the business community, civil society and media must be involved in the cultural exchange, not only scholars. In this sense, recommendations on ways forward must ensure that there is a move beyond tolerance and move into understanding these diversities, and finding ways to celebrate those diversities, and also be able to develop collaborations that use these diversities as strengths and as ways to strengthen democracy.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS

Taking into consideration all of the above, how do we move forward to ensure them? We may provide several suggestions as below.

Firstly, ASEAN needs to promote more of its ASEAN branding to Korea and export more cultural products (such as movies, television programmes, and songs). The objective is to raise awareness about Southeast Asia, not only on the individual countries that constitute it but on the region as a whole along with ASEAN as the established regional organisation, as well as establish mutual understanding. Currently, however, the flow of culture is rather in one direction. Reference has

been made to the importance of Korean culture in the lives of Southeast Asians. They can be observed from the youths of the region singing and dancing to K-Pop, from the preponderance of Korean cosmetic products in the malls of Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok etc., and from the popularity of smartphones from Korea.

Unfortunately, ASEAN member states do not yet enjoy the soft cultural power/influence that Korea has. Even within Southeast Asia, the level of ASEAN awareness is still pretty low. It is acknowledged that “Southeast Asian culture has been gaining popularity in Korea as well” (ASEAN-Korea Centre), however, does this mean the culture from all Southeast Asian countries or just some dominant ones?

Also, it could be questioned whether Koreans are more well-informed of just some Southeast Asian countries or are they also updated on the news from the region and on ASEAN as an organisation? Nichkhun’s membership in the famous Korean boyband “2PM” has generated more interest towards Thailand among Koreans and Sandara Park’s previous work in the Philippines has also raised people’s awareness about the Philippines. However, whether Koreans are also aware of Lao PDR or Cambodia or the works of ASEAN remains to be proven.

It is therefore ASEAN’s opportunity and responsibility to firstly increase ASEAN awareness within the region, and then promote Southeast Asia and ASEAN in Korea through various events and cultural showcases, as well as more student/professional exchanges. Hopefully then, there will be additional increase in trade between ASEAN and Korea, as well as better understanding among the people of ASEAN and Korea, which is a very important foundation for a mutually beneficial partnership.

Finally, in all of these endeavours we must make sure that we involve the business community, civil society and media in the cultural exchange, not only scholars.

5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In sum, it should be acknowledged that democracy is not only a political ideology, but it is also a culture. Many values can be found within it including the freedom of speech and expression that relate closely with issues of culture. The promotion of democracy as a culture is therefore something that must take place in ASEAN to have good relations with other countries.

Secondly, the role of social media is particularly worth observing as a tool to promote democracy as a culture. Promoting democracy as a culture will help serve as a stimulus to create greater understanding and appreciation of cultures, tackling those who would use social media to serve their narrow agenda.

Lastly, there is a need to move from cultural exchange to meaningful collaboration and cooperation that if done correctly will serve as a platform for greater ASEAN-Korea relations in the future.

Discussion Paper

VANNARITH CHHEANG

Two major topics in the role of Korea in enhancing the relations between ASEAN and Korea will be emphasised, such as narrowing development gaps of ASEAN and labour migration governance within and from ASEAN.

For the past decade, the Dialogue Partners of ASEAN, including Korea, have played a significant role in promoting ASEAN Community building. ASEAN does not have sufficient institutional and material resources to realise its vision. For instance, to narrow the development gaps, ASEAN needs support from Dialogue Partners. People-oriented, people-centred ASEAN can be expanded to a wider region, particularly in promoting a people-oriented, people-centred East Asian community. ASEAN-Korea partnership is an essential force in connecting Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, which in turn leads to a gradual realisation of a prosperous, inclusive, sustainable, and resilient East Asian region.

ASEAN-Korea relations have dynamically evolved over the past three decades, moving from a sectoral dialogue in 1989 to full dialogue in 1991 and strategic partnership in 2010. Korea is one of the key dialogue partners of ASEAN in promoting an inclusive and open regionalism in East Asia, consisting of Southeast Asian and

Northeast Asian countries. For example, the volume of bilateral trade between ASEAN and Korea reached \$119.3 billion in 2016. Vietnam and Singapore are the two major trading partners of Korea. Korea's investment in ASEAN increased from \$530 million in 2000 to \$5.1 billion in 2016, while its official development assistance to ASEAN rose from \$85.6 million in 2006 to \$418.9 million in 2016.

People mobility is remarkable. About six million Korean tourists visited ASEAN and 2.2 million ASEAN tourists visited Korea in 2016. There are about half a million ASEAN migrant workers in Korea, 41.1% of which is for non-professional work. About 13,000 ASEAN students are pursuing their studies in Korea, accounting for about 12% of the total international students.

The ASEAN Culture House was inaugurated September 2017 in Busan, a coastal city in Korea, to further promote cultural exchanges and people bonds between the two regions. Cultural diversity is the strength of East Asia. Promoting awareness and understanding of ASEAN cultures to Korean people is critical to having more balanced, interactive cultural exchanges and dialogues. Busan Mayor Suh Byung-soo said: "I hope the ASEAN Culture House will become an important hub that will facilitate communication and cultural exchanges between Busan and the ASEAN region."

ASEAN has been one the foreign policy priorities, especially under President Moon Jae-in's administration. Upon his inauguration, President Moon sent a Special Envoy to ASEAN to beef up the bilateral partnership. Korea is committed to strengthening its partnership with ASEAN in all fields at all levels. Complex interdependence between ASEAN and Northeast Asia pushes these two regions to further consolidate their partnership and collaborations. Korea is expected to play a more critical role in promoting East Asian community.

Korea should develop a comprehensive engagement with ASEAN in

narrowing the development gaps based on its strengths and comparative advantages. It should also promote development programmes to strengthen institutional capacity of the state, good governance, rule of law, democracy, innovation, capacity of SMEs, and human resources development. Furthermore, it should develop bilateral cooperation schemes with ASEAN on social innovation and knowledge connectivity. Knowledge and experience sharing on social innovation would further enhance heart-to-heart partnership between ASEAN and Korea.

Social innovation is a continuing process, which involves developing and implementing transformative, novel, and sustainable ideas to meet pressing social needs, resolve complex social issues, and create a new framework to build a more inclusive and better society. The widespread implementation of social innovation leads to the realisation of a sustainable and resilient society in which people support one another. It argues that social innovation is the key to resolving pressing social issues and realising a people-centred ASEAN.

The second topic is migration governance. Labour migration within and from ASEAN has been increasing over the years in scale, complexity, and dimensionality. It generates significant population redistribution with economic, social, cultural, and political implications. Migration is one of the key political, economic, and social phenomena in Asia. ASEAN in particular serves as both an outbound and inbound source of migration, and the number of people crossing local and national borders is on the rise.

This trend is mainly driven by demographic differences, development gaps, and regional integration. As ASEAN is moving toward becoming a people-based community in which people are the key benefactors of the regional community building. It needs to integrate and concretise different aspects of social and economic policies to realise the interests of the people of ASEAN.

The mismatch between the origin country's labour supply and its economic capacity to absorb them pushes the governments to export their labour forces in order to avoid social and economic difficulties at home. In addition, the need on the part of the receiving countries to provide labour-intensive services and production opens up opportunities for migrant workers from the region to fill in these sectors as well.

State policy on migration and development planning, formal and informal institutions and mechanisms in facilitating international migration, social networks, and the immigration industry including labour brokers, contractors, and transporters, all contribute to increasing the flow of migrant workers both legally and illegally.

Korea has become one of the key destinations for migrant workers from ASEAN. In 2016, there were about half a million ASEAN migrant workers in Korea, accounting for more than 20% of total foreign migrants in Korea. Most ASEAN migrants are involved in low-skill and labour-intensive economic sectors. Migration is going to increase as regional economic integration is dynamically evolving. Regional integration and community building induce further migration (skilled, low-skilled and unskilled labour).

Bilateral cooperation between ASEAN and Korea on migration governance is crucial to ensure that the people from both sides benefit from the migration flow. Both sides need to develop a strategy to transform international migration into a source for an inclusive society and sustainable development in the region. A holistic approach (multi-layered and multi-stakeholders' cooperation, and cross-sectoral partnerships) is needed to develop a migration governance given that migration is a complex economic, social, cultural, and political issue.

Capacity building, especially on-the-job training, enables migrants to be more productive and adaptive to a changing labour market, which is being influenced by automation technology. Skill development assists

migrants to better prepare for the job market after they return to their home countries.

Connecting and converging health with migration policy contribute to better social protection of migrant workers and their families. Studies on health and migration, including the social and economic costs of migrants' help, are needed in order to craft a policy on migration that is more people-oriented. Promoting cooperation on migrants' health will further contribute to ASEAN-Korea partnership as well as to East Asian regional integration.

In conclusion, ASEAN and East Asian regional integration are the core driving forces against protectionism and "de-globalisation". An inclusive and open regionalism has served and will continue to serve the interests of East Asian peoples. The flow of capital, goods, and people between ASEAN and Korea will continue to increase in the coming years and decades due to shared wisdom and commitment of both sides.

While economic exchanges and human mobility are rising, we do need to craft a holistic policy and cooperation mechanism to address these issues, especially unintended social consequences caused by the high intensity of interactions between ASEAN and Korea. Some of the issues that Korea can help ASEAN address are narrowing the development gaps among the ASEAN member states and transforming international migration into a source of sustainable development and inclusive society.

NOTES

PART I

**The ASEAN-Korea Strategic Partnership:
Where Is Security Cooperation Heading?**

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PART II

ASEAN-Korea Economic Relations Through 2025

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20 ASEAN+3 established the Chiang Mai Initiative and has been credited as forming the basis for financial stability in Asia, the lack of such stability having contributed to the Asian Financial Crisis. The Asian Currency Unit (ACU) is a proposed weighted index of currencies for ASEAN+3. The Asian Currency Unit's purpose is to help stabilize the region's financial markets. The ACU as it is proposed is a currency basket and not a real currency, i.e., a weighted index of East Asian currencies that will function as a benchmark for regional currency movements.

21 ASEAN+3 cooperation has broadened and deepened its focus to subjects other than finance in discussions such as the areas of food and energy security, financial co-operation, trade facilitation, disaster management, people-to-people contacts, narrowing the development gap, rural development and poverty alleviation, human trafficking, labour movement, communicable diseases, environment and sustainable development, and transnational crime, including counter-terrorism. ASEAN_3 co-operation in the area of political and security co-operation has been deepened by regular dialogue and exchange of views through existing ASEAN+3 mechanisms, such as the ASEAN+3 Summit, ASEAN+3 Foreign Ministers' Meeting, ASEAN+3 Senior Officials' Meeting (SOM) and as well as through track 1.5 and track two dialogue, including the East Asia Forum and Network of East Asia Think-tanks.

ASEAN-Korea Economic Relation: A Road to More Active Future Cooperation

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7 Some central American countries such as Honduras and Guatemala were important candidates too. They were chosen because they are very close to the US which is the final destination of the product and are eligible for the U.S. trade preference programs such as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).

8 The openness ratio is shown as a percentage of Trade (sum of export and import) over GDP.

9 A more detailed explanation on AMRO and the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization is found in the AMRO website: <http://www.amro-asia.org/about-amro/>.

PART III

Managing Movements of People between ASEAN Member States and Korea: Partnerships and Processes

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Movement of People between ASEAN and Korea: An Overview of Trends of the Flow from ASEAN to Korea

1 In this definition, a person is a migrant regardless of "(1) the person's legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is." (IOM. <https://www.iom.int/who-is-a-migrant>).

2 International students, who often stay over a year, and professional expatriates are long-term migrants in this regard and will be discussed in this paper. The United Nations defines long-term migrants as comprising: "long-term emigrants" are residents or persons who have resided continuously in the country for more than one year, who are departing to take up residence abroad for more than one year and 'long-term immigrants' are non-residents or persons who have arrived for a length of stay of more than one year but have not yet continuously lived in the country for more than one year." (Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration, Revision 1, Statistical Papers, Series M, No. 58, United Nations, New York, 1998, Glossary).

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Linking Hearts, Opening up Minds: Strengthening the Social Architecture to Build a Sustainable and Resilient ASEAN Community

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Korean Media Industries and the ASEAN-Korea Cultural Cooperation

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A Neo-Developmental Virtuous Circle of the Korean Wave and its implications for the ASEAN-Korea Cultural Exchange

- 1 This paper is a revised version of author's article, 'An Analysis of the Virtuous Circle in the Early Age of Korean Wave: from the Perspective of 'Neo-Developmental' Cultural Policy', *Journal of International Relations* 42 (2016): 31-63. (Published by National Chengchi University in Taiwan.)
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PART III: SOCIO-CULTURAL PARTNERSHIP

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ASEAN-KOREA CENTRE

The ASEAN-Korea Centre was established as an intergovernmental organisation mandated to promote economic and socio-cultural cooperation among the ASEAN Member States and Korea. The Centre was officially inaugurated on March 13, 2009, the year that marked the 20th anniversary of the Dialogue Partnership between ASEAN and Korea, in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding signed at the ASEAN-ROK Summit in November 2007.



The Korean Institute of Southeast Asian Studies is a regional research centre dedicated to the interdisciplinary studies of Language and Literature, History, Anthropology, Politics, Economics, Sociology, Communications, Geology and other various fields in Southeast Asia. As an independent private research institute based on prominent scholars from diverse specialisations, the institute centrally aims to promote academic studies, policy recommendations, social diffusion, international exchanges and etc.

“ASEAN and Korea are partners that need and want each other, and the partnership should be one that does not seek immediate profits, but that lasts for several hundreds of years.”

KIM YOUNG-SUN

Secretary General of ASEAN-Korea Centre

“The momentum of ASEAN-ROK cooperation continues as both sides are committed to further strengthening the Strategic Partnership and deepening multifaceted collaboration.”

LE LUONG MINH

Secretary-General of ASEAN

“With anti-globalization sentiments and protectionist threats, terrorism and violent extremism gaining more force in many parts of the world, we have particular hopes that ASEAN’s effort to realize its Community by 2025 will serve as a source of inspiration and lesson to other parts of the world.”

KANG KYUNG-WHA

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the ROK

“Tried and tested, ASEAN-ROK cooperation has encouraged confidence in the power of our abiding friendship to build a future of shared peace and prosperity.”

ALAN PETER CAYETANO

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