

YOUNG
PERSPECTIVES

The Future of ASEAN-Korea Partnership Vol.2

50 Years of ASEAN and the Prospect for
Multilateralism

ASEAN-Korea 4.0: Adapting Digital Economy

ASEAN-Korea Educational Cooperation for
Mutual Understanding

Champions of the ASEAN Miracle

The Future of ASEAN-Korea Partnership Vol.2

Young Perspectives

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The Future of ASEAN-Korea Partnership Vol.2



Kim Young-sun

Secretary General, ASEAN-Korea Centre

This year, 2017, has been a significant year for ASEAN and ASEAN-Korea partnership. ASEAN celebrated the 50th anniversary of its foundation. 2017 also marks the 10th anniversary of the ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Agreement, and it has also been designated as the ASEAN-ROK Cultural Exchange Year.

Since their dialogue partnership began in 1989, ASEAN-Korea relations has developed remarkably. From sectoral dialogue relations in 1989, the bilateral relations quickly jumped to become strategic partnership in 2010. In all aspects of political-security, economy, and socio-culture, ASEAN and Korea have been partnering together for peace and prosperity of the region. This partnership is to take another step forward, as the new Korean government proclaimed to upscale its relations with ASEAN.

The ASEAN-Korea Centre has been promoting this special partnership through our programmes, particularly focusing on the youth of ASEAN and Korea who are the future leaders of our region. Understanding the young perspectives of the youth is crucial in mapping out the future of our partnership. To hear the young perspectives of the youth and provide them with opportunities to express their ideas into academic writings, the ASEAN-Korea Centre launched the 1st ASEAN-Korea Academic Essay Contest in 2016. The contest successfully gained much attention from the

youth of ASEAN and Korea who eagerly expressed their creative thinking in academic essays.

Following the success of last year, the ASEAN-Korea Centre, in coordination with the Korean Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (KISEAS) and the ASEAN University Network (AUN), organised the 2nd Academic Essay Contest for undergraduate and graduate students of ASEAN and Korea. This year, students were given four themes to choose as their essay topics: (1) 50 Years of ASEAN and the Prospect for Multilateralism; (2) ASEAN-Korea 4.0: Adapting Digital Economy; (3) ASEAN-Korea Education Cooperation for Cultural Understanding; (4) Champions of the ASEAN Miracle. With over 160 submissions from students of 10 ASEAN member states and Korea, the evaluation committee selected 12 winning essays, which are included in this volume. I hope this book will serve as a scope to look into the young perspectives of our youth.

I would like to express my deep appreciation to the co-organisers and supporters of the contest, and extend my sincere appreciation to each member of the evaluation committee. Finally, I would also like to convey my gratitude to the Korea Herald for their cooperation for this publication.

Kim Hyung-Jun

Professor, Kangwon National University
Chair of the Evaluation Committee
of the 2nd ASEAN-Korea Academic Essay Contest

The 2nd ASEAN-Korea Academic Essay Contest was a stage for the students of ASEAN and Korea to express their perspectives through academic writings. The contest garnered much interest from the youth of ASEAN and Korea, receiving over 160 submissions from all ASEAN member states and Korea. This indicates that the youth have a high interest in not only academic competitions, but also in ASEAN-Korea relations.

The contest suggested three themes that branched off from the three pillars of the ASEAN Community, and one theme on the historic figures of ASEAN to commemorate 50th anniversary of ASEAN. From the ASEAN Political-Security Community, the suggested theme was focused on ASEAN and multilateralism. This was designed to commemorate ASEAN's Golden Jubilee and to stimulate the youth to understand the fundamental principles of ASEAN. Digital economy, which is driving the changes in the global economy was suggested in line with the ASEAN Economic Community. From the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, educational cooperation was suggested, as this is the area which directly involves students. It is notable that almost half of the participants wrote their papers on education. This is indeed a field that has a vast potential of cooperation between ASEAN and Korea which the youth can enjoy the fruit of cooperation.

As it was the second time running the contest, last year's submissions had set a bar for the evaluation committee. It is optimistic that the submissions have improved in general compared to the first contest. What surprised the evaluation committee was that many submissions were based on in-depth research. Many papers had extensive collection of resources and systematic analysis in attempt for interpretation. This illustrates that there definitely is an increased interest in ASEAN-Korea relations among the youth, and they are critically thinking about this partnership. The evaluation committee were assured that there is a bright future for ASEAN and ASEAN-Korea relations, as we were able to witness the potentials of the youth who will lead the future of ASEAN and Korea.

Reading through the essays, we learned of the young perspectives which are creative, analytical and insightful. This is the reason why contests of this kind are important for the youth. Through such opportunities, we can continue to draw interest of the youth and stimulate researches of high quality. Furthermore, the effect of the contest is not limited to the academic field. Ultimately, it will contribute to the mutual interest and understanding of ASEAN and Korea, which will be the foundation of future-oriented cooperation.

All submissions were highly credited, and we regret that we cannot award more essays. We hope to extend the opportunities for more students in the future. Finally, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to all participants for their great work.

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



Theme 1

50 Years of ASEAN and the Prospect for Multilateralism



Celebrating its 50th anniversary, ASEAN has been a successful model of regional integration and is at the heart of multilateralism. In the recent years, however, the international community has witnessed a trend against multilateralism through Brexit, America's withdrawals from TPP and Paris Climate Accord. How can we assess ASEAN's achievements and how will ASEAN navigate through the changing international dynamics?





Prospects of Multilateralism for ASEAN

Through the Lenses of Constructivism

— Kim Jiwon Seoul National University

Abstract

This paper examines the prospects of multilateralism for ASEAN under the constructivist perspective. More specifically, rather than examining the ‘what is’ of ASEAN – usually done from the perspective of realism – the paper seeks to explore ‘what ought to be’ for ASEAN by borrowing the general theoretical orientation of constructivism. Setting an exemplary case for regionalism, ASEAN marks its 50th anniversary in 2017. The organisation has come a long way, slowly strengthening its solidarity as a community by establishing the ASEAN Charter, Vision Statements, and various communities in security, economic, and socio-cultural fields. Despite the association’s grand achievements over the past 50 years however,

it faces new problems, as international affairs are dramatically changing. With the rise of China and the US grand strategy clashing with each other, the South China Sea has become a silent battleground for hegemony. ASEAN member states are stuck between China and the US, making it virtually impossible to pursue sound multilateralism with stakeholders in the region. Thoroughly examining constructivist theoretical framework, this paper carefully provides guidelines and suggestions as to how ASEAN can overcome its current difficult situation and pursue inclusive and cooperative multilateralism. The paper argues that ASEAN must formulate social practices in a way that creates intersubjective understanding among ASEAN and other states to create a shared sense of identity and interest in the region. This will allow ASEAN to pursue inclusive and cooperative multilateralism. It can even be argued that ASEAN is the key factor in creating harmonious multilateralism. The paper is mainly divided into three parts. First, the paper will briefly cover the status quo of ASEAN in political and security terms and discuss how difficult it is to pursue multilateralism. Second, a general overview of the constructivist theoretical framework will be provided. Lastly, the ways in which ASEAN can create inclusive and cooperative multilateralism using constructivism approach will be touched upon.

I. ASEAN's golden jubilee and difficulty in pursuing multilateralism

Introduction

ASEAN celebrated its Golden Jubilee in Manila, on August 8, 2017 – marking the 50th anniversary since its formation (ASEAN, 2017a). Considered as one of the most exemplary cases of regionalism, ASEAN has come a long way in strengthening its solidarity as a community. Founded on three community pillars, which are the ASEAN Political-Security Community, the ASEAN Economic Community, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, the ASEAN Charter well portrays how determined the regional organisation is to become integrated as one. The charter is especially important to ASEAN, since the organisation came into existence through the Bangkok Declaration. Because the charter legitimately outlines the organisation's principles, functions, and structures, it reflects member-states' hopes to deepen and legalise the ASEAN organisation (Acharya, 2005).

ASEAN's potential to grow as strong regional organisation can also be examined from its plans. Setting out ASEAN connectivity as an essential part of its community, three points are highlighted: Physical Connectivity, Institutional Connectivity, and People-to-People Connectivity. Physical connectivity deals with the improvement of infrastructure related to transportation, communications, and energy. While institutional connectivity highlights the regulatory framework in economic sectors, people-to-people connectivity emphasises transnational education opportunities and human resource development (ASEAN, 2015). Without doubt, these policies and initiatives guide ASEAN into a hopeful future with a stronger and more integrated regionalism.

Obstacles for ASEAN

Despite the regional organisation's bright prospects, there are obstacles it must overcome. The international landscape in the region is going through a dynamic transition, making it very difficult for ASEAN to pursue multilateralism. With the rise of China, it is becoming evident that China is exerting influence to strategically position itself as a regional hegemon. This is especially true in the South China Sea, as China is aggressively holding regular military exercises, as well as building artificial islands for military and fishery purposes (Valencia, 2017). On top of that, the US grand strategy is at work to prevent China from becoming a regional hegemon – a potential threat to the US position as a superpower in the international arena. The strategy can be observed in mainly two methods. First, it is in the US grand strategy's nature to pursue bilateral relations with ASEAN states. Whether it be political or economic, the US usually develops relations with other countries through bilateral means. This is so that the US has stronger influence over its counterparts, strategically positioning itself to utilise the relations in its favour. Acharya highlights this point well in his article. He mentions that America's post-war security strategy primarily focused on a regional network of bilateral alliances (Acharya, 1995). Second, the US regularly exercises a military presence in the South China Sea. Intended to address a series of maritime challenges, as well as to deal with China's growing assertiveness in the region, the US proposed a \$425 million project called the Maritime Security Initiative to Southeast Asian countries including Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and a few other countries. The initiative includes not only funding for ASEAN member states, but also involves periodic joint military exercises to raise maritime domain awareness (Parameswaran, 2016). This type of initiative partially emanates

from the US tendency to create bilateral relations mentioned in the first method. Although the initiative can be seen as inclusive to all ASEAN states in the South China Sea, it is structured in a way that creates exclusive relations with the US and its counterpart countries.

Due to the dynamic transition observed in the international political sphere, Southeast Asia has become a silent battleground for hegemony. This unstable political landscape has made it extremely difficult for ASEAN to form inclusive and cooperative multilateralism with stakeholders in the region. This is an obstacle ASEAN needs to overcome, if the organisation truly wishes to become an integrated regional organisation with the ability to actually influence the great powers. Furthermore, the author argues that it is only ASEAN that can maintain order and peace in the South China Sea. It is in ASEAN's hands to settle conflicts and lead to inclusive and cooperative multilateralism.

II. Understanding general theoretical orientation: Constructivism

Core ideas of constructivism

In this section, the paper will cover important key points in understanding constructivism. The purpose of this is to provide a theoretical framework in comprehending how ASEAN can formulate future practices to make multilateralism possible.

To begin with, it is important to understand that general theoretical orientation of constructivism focuses on 'what ought to be'. Unlike realism, which focuses on explaining 'what is', constructivism tries to understand

the process and structure of the world that we stand upon, as well as emphasising how we can alter process and structure to acquire a desired outcome. With his renowned proposition 'Anarchy is what states make of it', Wendt argues that fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is on the basis of meanings that actors give. This would lead one to conclude that actors do not have an inherent interest, but that interests form within the social context (Wendt, 1992). In this sense, institutionalisation is an imperative process where new identities and interests are created. In sum, a sensible constructivist would argue that nothing exists as it is in objective terms, but it is only a social configuration created through the interaction of two or more actors.

In simpler words, actors – ego and alter – will start with no basis about each other in the beginning. As ego tries to make the first social act towards alter, a tentative understanding between two actors will take place. With this limited knowledge, alter will make another social act, building onto small, but already existing understanding about each other. If the social practices are repeated long enough, these reciprocal typifications will create intersubjective understanding between those actors. The intersubjective understandings, in return, will create sense of shared identity and interest for the actors (Wendt, 1992).

The process of creating reality

With this simplified version of how social practices create intersubjective understandings and sets of identities and interests, a new question comes to mind: If identities and interests that define actors' thoughts and actions are socially constructed, can we change them to our favour? According to Gorbachev's *New Thinking*, it is argued that an intentional transformative

process can take place. The process is mainly divided into three parts. First, the previously existing consensus about identity commitments must break down. This seems pretty obvious, since it would be conflictual for actors to create new identities and interests without destroying those that already exist. Second, critical examinations of old ideas, and the intersubjective understanding by which those ideas have been sustained, must take place. After breaking down the existing identities and interests, ego and alter must look back and carefully analyse their previous identities and interests. They must also understand the social acts that they initially engaged in, for the purpose of realising how intersubjective understanding took place. Lastly, ego and alter must go through process of altercasting. Considered the most salient part of the process, altercasting allows actors to create a new intersubjective understanding. However, it is imperative for ego to practice altercasting to frame alter's social situation in ways that create an outcome which ego desires (Gorbachev, 1987).

With a broad understanding of the constructivist theoretical framework in mind, we can extend the argument from individual actors to ASEAN as a regional institution. In his paper, Wendt argues that an institution is another set of structures of identities and interests that are codified in formal rules and norms (Wendt, 1992). While this explanation accurately depicts ASEAN as a regional institution, it is a bit short in providing a satisfactory explanation of ASEAN as it is today. This is because over the last 50 years, ASEAN has successfully progressed in becoming a strong and integrated community. The regional organisation has become prominent to a point that it is not just a set of structures where identities and interests are gathered, but ASEAN has evolved to a point where it can be understood as a unitary actor in Southeast Asia. With this premise, we can make the

argument that, through the lens of constructivism, ASEAN must deteriorate the current consensus on identity commitments and engage in a new set of social acts to create intersubjective understandings among stakeholders in Southeast Asia. Newly established intersubjective understanding will give rise to identities and interests prone to proactive multilateralism in the region.

III. Inclusive and cooperative multilateralism for ASEAN under constructivism

The US-China tension and obstacles for ASEAN

The last section of the paper is mainly divided into three different subsections. First, analysis on ASEAN and its difficulty in pursuing multilateralism will be covered under constructivist theoretical framework. The case of maritime security issues in the South China Sea will be used for analysis, since it is a salient issue that illustrates the hegemonic war between China and the US. This is appropriate because the paper sets growing tension in the South China Sea due to US-China tension as a premise in explaining the difficulty of forming effective multilateralism for ASEAN. Second, recommendations on newly established identities, interests, and codes of conduct among ASEAN and other stakeholders in the region will be provided, as well as explanations of how it can be done. This will also be done under a constructivist theoretical framework. Lastly, limitations of constructivism in providing future pathway for ASEAN will be discussed.

To begin with, it is important to understand that ASEAN's difficulty in forming effective multilateralism emanates from the fact that the South

China Sea dispute is solely a problem between selective ASEAN member states and China. To provide extra information, ASEAN member states – Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines, and Brunei – are granted 200 nautical miles of EEZ [Exclusive Economic Zone](#) in accordance with the *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea*. According to Part 5 article 56 section 1 subsection (a), it is mentioned that in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal state has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing the natural resources, as well as freedom to conduct economic activities (UNCLOS, 1982). China's claim on the South China Sea, however, significantly overlaps with EEZs of the ASEAN member states. Going back to the important point, the South China Sea dispute is solely a geographical contention between ASEAN states and China. There is no room for the US.

Seeking international arbitration, Philippines took the South China Sea dispute to a UN tribunal at Hague. In July of 2016, the tribunal backed Philippines, saying that China had violated the Philippines' sovereign rights. China did not take the ruling well, calling it ill-founded (BBC, 2016). As expected, China's assertiveness in the South China Sea did not stop. From a constructivist perspective, it can be argued that this is where the notable social action began. In response to China's continued assertion, the US stepped in the region to pressure China (Doherty, 2017; Ross, 2017) even when it has no part in the geographical contention. More specifically, the US sent a warship – the USS Dewey – closely passing by artificial islands set up by China in the South China Sea (BBC, 2017). Also mentioned in the first part of the paper, the US engaged in maritime security initiatives with stakeholder countries in the region. Starting with the funding of more than \$250 million planned for two years, the US has various programs planned, such

as enhancing recipients' maritime security capabilities, building training and logistical bases, and expanding navy, coast guard, and air forces' ability to conduct operations within waters. The official statement from the White House specifically highlighted that bilateral training and exercises would be conducted as well (The White House, 2015). These acts from the US are in line with its grand strategy to deter China from gaining regional dominance. As Ross mentions in his paper, the current challenge for the balance-of-power for the US is in East Asia. To fulfil this balance-of-power, direct US strategic involvement is required (Ross, 2013).

Under constructivism, it can be argued that every set of the US security policies just mentioned is a responsive social practice following Chinese social acts. China's following acts can also be seen as social practices coming after those of the US. As enough interaction took place with ASEAN in the middle, an intersubjective understanding between China and the US has been formed. This intersubjective understanding led to creation of a rather hostile identities and interests for China and the US against each other. Accordingly, tension in Southeast Asia continued to increase as time passed, leading to the current situation in which ASEAN faces difficulty in formulating inclusive and cooperative multilateralism with not only China and the US, but also with other East Asian countries.

ASEAN's constructive role for multilateralism

This leads to next subsection of the paper where we discuss about possible actions ASEAN can take to resolve the problem. As mentioned in the first section, this paper argues that ASEAN, as a regional organisation, is the most important factor in creating harmonious multilateralism in Southeast Asia. I will use Gorbachev's intentional transformative process to suggest

guidelines for ASEAN.

To begin with, a breakdown of the consensus about identity commitments must take place. This means that ASEAN needs to discard identities and interests it previously had with China and the US. Furthermore, although not to a full extent, ASEAN must strive to act as a mediator to alleviate hostilities between China and the US, at least in Southeast Asia. The most effective method for ASEAN to realise this goal is by increasing its solidarity and integration as a regional organisation. By becoming a stronger, more integrated entity, ASEAN can not only decrease internal conflicts among member states but it can also exert a stronger influence and have more consistent foreign policies toward the great powers in the region – China and the US. Empirical evidence of current regional practices also seems to point in a similar direction, as the *Chairman's Statement of the 24th ASEAN Regional Forum* mentions, ASEAN will go through specific processes to build stronger regionalism and counter increasing security challenges. The statement also points out ASEAN's willingness to increase maritime cooperation regarding the problem of the South China Sea (ASEAN, 2017b).

After ASEAN successfully discards the previously existing identities and interests, it must go through a critical examination of old ideas about itself and the great powers. In this stage of the process, ASEAN must carefully examine the situation it is in. It must analyse what identities and interests existed among itself and the great powers, as well as understanding the identities and interests between China and the US in Southeast Asia. This process is likely to be future-oriented, aiming to achieve a specific goal – creating new identities and interests that can lead to inclusive and cooperative multilateralism.

Lastly, the process of altercasting must take place. This includes the performance of social acts to create new intersubjective understandings, which ultimately lead to the emergence of new identities and interests. For ASEAN, this process is crucial, since the social practices it engages in will potentially result in inclusive and cooperative multilateralism. To achieve this goal, ASEAN must proactively engage in social acts with China and the US. Furthermore, it is imperative for ASEAN as a Southeast Asian regional organisation to create opportunities for effective altercasting to take place between China and the US. In this regard, ASEAN already possesses an effective set of tools for altercasting. According to the *Chairman's Statement of the 24th ARF*, the ministers emphasised the importance of the ARF as the primary forum for constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of mutual interest and concern to the Asia-Pacific region (ASEAN, 2017b). In other words, forums like ARF can be used as an opportunity for ASEAN to pursue altercasting. The statement signifies how ASEAN is getting ready to emphasise strengthening regional practices to increase intersubjective understandings among stakeholder countries in the Southeast Asia region and lead to inclusive and cooperative multilateralism. The importance of the ARF is especially emphasised in Acharya's article, which states that the ARF is an important and unique regional security institution. Not only is it a multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia-Pacific region, but it is also the only regional security framework in which the great powers like China and the US are represented. Lastly, Acharya pinpoints to the fact that ARF is a security institution where the great power members conceded leadership and agenda-setting functions to less powerful countries – in this case, ASEAN (Acharya, 1995). Furthermore, the report on the 24th ARF mentioned that there is a need to strengthen international and regional

cooperation as well as constructive dialogue on maritime security, maritime safety, and other matters that concern the stakeholders in the region. They especially highlighted the point that these practices must be done through not only the ARF, but also other ASEAN-led mechanisms like the ASEAN Maritime Forum and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ASEAN, 2017b). As well as already having well-established tools for altercasting, the deliberate social practices from ASEAN are likely to continue. This is evident when we look at the *Chairman's Statement of the 11th East Asia Summit*. At the conference, member states underscored the importance of enhancing regional cooperation in promoting maritime safety and security. Also, the ASEAN member states affirmed that ASEAN would continue to become an open, inclusive, and outward-looking forum that will work in partnership with other participants of the summit, which includes not only Korea and Japan, but also China and the US (ASEAN, 2017c).

In sum, ASEAN must first discard the existing identities and interests they had with China and the US. Next, ASEAN must carefully analyse its old self and the relationship it had with the great powers, also giving some thought to intersubjective understanding of the previous identities and interests it stood upon. Lastly, ASEAN must go through process of altercasting – engaging in social acts to create new intersubjective understandings on which new identities and interests will be based. In this process, ASEAN must especially focus on using tools such as forums to pave the way for altercasting to take place. It also must not forget to strengthen solidarity and integration as a regional actor to exert stronger influence and have more consistent foreign policies to the great powers in Southeast Asia.

Limitations and discussions

However, like any other general theoretical orientation, constructivism is also not without its shortcomings. To begin with, constructivism can be quite a lengthy process. This is because the process of creating new sets of identities and interests through intersubjective understanding and social interaction is incremental and slow in nature. Although ASEAN is already deep in the process of strengthening its solidarity and integration as a regional organisation, it will take a long time for China and the US to break down their walls and create new sets of identities and interests in Southeast Asia region. Second, Wendt mentions in his paper that when setting new intersubjective understandings among states, actors must be primarily concerned with absolute gains, not relative gains (Wendt, 1992). This indeed, is part of a bigger problem, since the primary foundation of tension in Southeast Asia region between China and the US is that of gaining power – a matter that is more relatable to relative than absolute gains. From this point of view, some critics may argue that neorealism would provide better theoretical framework in explaining the status quo in Southeast Asia region. But I would like to make a counter-argument that this is exactly why constructivism is a better tool in not only giving an explanation of the current situation in the region, but also to providing a possible solution to the issue – what ought to be. This is because in explaining the power-relations of two superpowers in Southeast Asia, neorealists would often focus on the main actors with tangible capacity. What is missing in this picture is ASEAN and its potential as a powerful regional actor to guide its own destiny in the region. When and only when ASEAN is included in the picture, will we be able to provide a complete overview of what is, and what ought to be. In addition, Busse (2007) argues in his paper that although


realism has been a dominant theoretical framework in understanding the formation of regionalism in Southeast Asia, it is important to pay attention to how the actions of ASEAN changed. In this regard, the author argues that constructivism provides a better explanation of ASEAN's actions, which are centred on an established regional code of conduct. Lastly, this counter-argument paves the way for a discussion of the roles of other East Asian countries as well. As ASEAN tries to build inclusive and cooperative multilateralism in the region, its efforts would be reinforced by the inclusion of East Asian countries. Indeed, ASEAN is seeking to emphasise its integration with three East Asian countries. At the 14th East Asia Forum that took place in Siem Reap, Cambodia, in June 2016, the main agenda focused on 'Deepening East Asia Integration towards East Asia Economic Community'. During the 14th EAF, it suggested constructive recommendations such as: 1. Maintaining the momentum of East Asian regional cooperation, 2. Fostering an East Asian regional identity, and 3. Implementing the vision of realising an East Asia Economic Community by 2020 (ASEAN, 2016). Especially, Korea is to play a crucial role in ASEAN's creation of inclusive and cooperative multilateralism for a few reasons. First, ASEAN-Korea relations are already solid, having established connectivity in culture, education, economy, and diplomacy. This sturdy cornerstone will instigate harmonious cooperation in creating multilateralism. Second, Korea is strategically positioned – politically and economically – to work as an effective mediator among stakeholders in Southeast Asia. In other words, the dynamic US-Korean and Sino-Korean relations may provide more options in creating a new reality. Accordingly, Korea must also focus its policy direction in favour of fostering more integration and cooperation with ASEAN. This would not only lead to creation of more sound

multilateralism in the region, but it will also help increase Korea's voice in the region as an individual actor.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this paper borrows the general theoretical orientation of constructivism to provide future pathways for ASEAN to pursue inclusive and cooperative multilateralism in Southeast Asia. With silent tension between China and the US in the region, ASEAN as a strong regional actor must work to go through an intentional transformative process. After breaking down the consensus on identity commitments among the stakeholders, critical examinations of old ideas about itself, others, and the intersubjective understandings that the old identities and interests stood upon must take place. Then, ASEAN must go through altercasting, to engage in strategic social acts to create new intersubjective understandings, identities, and interests with China and the US in the region.

Fifty years ago, ASEAN member states gathered as weak nations hoping for a better tomorrow. Now, they have together become a powerful regional organisation that is often mentioned as an exemplary case for regionalism. Fifty years from now, I strongly believe ASEAN not only will stand firm as a powerful unitary actor, but will also enjoy inclusive and cooperative multilateralism with China and the US in a peaceful Southeast Asia.



ASEAN-centred Multilateral Institutions in the Changing World

— To Thi Minh Ngoc Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam

Abstract

After the Cold War, the world entered the era of multi-polarity in which ideologies no longer dominantly manipulate foreign policies while economic growth and demands to address non-traditional security issues are prioritised instead. Therefore, post-Cold War era has witnessed the development of multilateralism, which is indicated through both the increasing number of multilateral institutions and the expansion of existing cohorts. Southeast Asia, the hub of emerging mid-powers and booming economies, undoubtedly follows this trend, from the expansion of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to the establishment of ASEAN-

centred groups, such as the ARF [ASEAN Regional Forum](#), ASEAN+3 [ASEAN, China, Korea, and Japan](#), ASEAN+6 [ASEAN+3, India, Australia, and New Zealand](#), ADMM+ [ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus](#), and RCEP [Regional Economic Partnership](#). However, after Brexit and America's withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord, the TPP [Trans-Pacific Partnership](#) and UNESCO lately, there is a discourse that multilateralism is going downhill and whether ASEAN-centred mechanisms will be affected. This paper argues that multilateralism in Asia-Pacific in which ASEAN undertakes a central role will not follow the West's path due to differences in nature and values. ASEAN's multilateral offspring will sustain; nonetheless, this regional association is facing more challenges in navigating itself in multilateral blocs that also include major powers.

ASEAN and multilateralism after the Cold War

Multilateralism, as defined by Robert Keohane, is the act of arranging national policies in groups of three or more states, in the form of either temporary arrangements or persistent institutions (Keohane, 1990). In his theory, Keohane views multilateralism as “institutionalised collective action by an inclusively determined set of independent states”, emphasizing that nation states are main stakeholders in multilateralism and agreed rules are the prerequisite condition for the membership of states that satisfy particular requirements (Keohane, 2006). Multilateralism, then, is institutionalised rather than normative. According to realism and liberalism, world politics is an anarchy where states act rationally to achieve power and security, a set of persistent and specific rules unanimously agreed upon by members is more concrete than norms when it comes to creating interdependence, constraining behaviours and shaping expectations. Therefore, multilateral institutions – multilateral arrangements working on certain issues with specific rules that regulate member’s behaviours and determine their responsibilities – can reduce uncertainty and simultaneously increase interdependence among member states in a chaotic anarchy (Keohane, 1990).

Ruggie (1992) shares the idea that multilateralism means coordinating three or more states into a group, based on some “generalised principles of conduct” that specify appropriate behaviours of member states without particularism. He further develops the concept of multilateralism by arguing that the principles of multilateralism entail “indivisibility among the members of a collectivity with respect to the range of behaviour in question” as well as “diffuse reciprocity”. That is to say member states in a multilateral institution work towards interdependence and expect equivalent

yield of benefits aggregately. Instead of stressing the importance of rules and laws, Ruggie highlights states' perceptions and identities by pointing out that a sense of indivisibility and diffuse reciprocity are socially constructed rather than technically formed.

Multilateral institutions have developed significantly after the World War II to ensure that there would be no more bloody world wars in the future and to promote cooperation in post-war reconstruction. Post-War era saw the proliferation of multilateral institutions in both quantity and scope. For instance, while there were fewer than 100 multilateral intergovernmental organisations in 1945, the number rose to around 200 in 1960 and over 600 in 1980 (Jacobson, 1984). However, as the Cold War riveted multilateralism by ideological clashes, multilateralism only rose again after the Berlin Wall was torn down in 1989 and the Soviet Union officially collapsed in 1991. After the Cold War, the United Nations proved to be more active in preserving international peace, security, and development through its operations in Afghanistan in 1993 as well as the establishment of new programs or agencies, notably the World Trade Organization. The 1990s, without the shadow of ideological barriers, also witnessed the European Union's enlargement through its inclusion of new members from Eastern Europe, such as Bulgaria and Lithuania in 1995. In Asia-Pacific, a number of multilateral institutions were either further developed or newly formed, such as ASEAN's expansion and the East Asia Summit's foundation.

As a region of great strategic importance in Asia-Pacific architecture, Southeast Asia undoubtedly follows the trend of multilateralism after the Cold War. Of all sub-regions in Asia-Pacific, Southeast Asia is the only one that does not contain any major powers. In Northeast Asia, China, Taiwan, Korea and Japan are both regional and international economic pillars; and

notably, Japan and China are also the main players in regional security and politics. In South Asia, India, with dramatic economic growth and the “Look East Policy” that aims at expanding India’s influence on other developing Asian countries, is also considered as an emerging power. In terms of economic and political power, Southeast Asia – home to ASEAN – is obviously less prominent than other regional counterparts. Southeast Asia is not even recognised as a ‘pole’ in the multipolar era by China (Hughes, 2005). However, it is Southeast Asia’s location – surrounded by the one of the largest and most important waters to maritime trade and strategic studies – and less eminent power that make it a hub of numerous regional multilateral organisations in which ASEAN takes leading role (Simon, 2008).

About politics and security, along with ASEAN’s expansion process, the ARF was established as a regional dialogue for security issues in 1994 and soon attracted major powers’ attention, including China, Japan, Korea, the EU, Canada, Australia, and the United States. In 2006, ADMM – ASEAN’s highest cooperative mechanism in defence founded to promote mutual trust, confidence, transparency and openness – convened the first meeting in Malaysia. Just a year later, the concept for ADMM+ that engages ASEAN’s partners were initiated, and the first ADMM+ meeting took place shortly afterwards in 2010, with the participation of 10 ASEAN member states, Australia, China, Korea, Japan, India, New Zealand, Russia, and the United States (ASEAN, 2017a).

Regarding economics, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Free Trade Agreement [AFTA](#) was formed in 1993, right after the Cold War ended, marking ASEAN’s efforts in developing regional economies. Later, the ASEAN+3 process started in 1997 on the sidelines of the 2nd ASEAN Informal Summit in Malaysia to seek collective action for such issue as

the Asian economic crisis. ASEAN+3 was then institutionalised through the ratification of the *Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation* at the 3rd ASEAN+3 Summit in the Philippines. As cooperation develops, ASEAN+3 framework covers a wider range of issues, from free-trade and economic matters to political, security, social, and even environmental affairs (ASEAN, 2017b). At the East Asia Summit in 2005, ASEAN+6 took concrete shape with a mission to promote trade liberation and foreign investment among participants, namely ASEAN member states, China, Korea, Japan, India, Australia, and New Zealand (Urata, 2008). RCEP, an initiative by China with ASEAN holding the wheel, was officially launched at the ASEAN Summit and Related Summits 2012 in Cambodia, which includes all six ASEAN's cooperation partners in the ASEAN+6 scheme. RCEP is expected to promote free trade, facilitate investment, protect intellectual property rights, encourage competition, and resolve disputes through peaceful means (ASEAN, 2016a). Besides abovementioned mechanisms, ASEAN also plays an important role in the EAS [East Asia Summit](#) and the ASEM [Asia-Europe Meeting](#), as it is the only regional association in Asia-Pacific which has strategic significance to major powers.

Undeniably, since the Cold War ended, ASEAN has made efforts to enlarge its scope and capacity, indicated through its inclusion of new members, such as Vietnam, Cambodia, and Myanmar, as well as establishment of new institutions that cover a vast range of issues. What makes ASEAN's development in multilateralism significant is the fact that ASEAN-centred multilateral institutions can attract a lot of major powers, unlike those in other developing regions. This is because ASEAN enjoys a strategic location in Asia-Pacific and it has the potentials for political and economic development. Moreover, as Southeast Asia does not contain any

major powers, ASEAN-centred multilateral institutions are a promising area for great and upper-middle powers to wield their influence, which shows why those ASEAN-led blocs have been promoted recently. This trend on the one hand marks and enhances ASEAN's growth, and on the other hand indicates an emerging competition among major powers in Southeast Asia.

Assessing ASEAN-led multilateral institutions

Since the Cold War's collapse, ASEAN has successfully engaged great powers in multilateral organisations that evolve around ASEAN's centrality. Undoubtedly, on the one hand, ASEAN's attempts to build and develop its central role in regional multilateral mechanisms have brought about mutual benefits for ASEAN and its partners. ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 have effectively endorsed trade, investment, and exchange among member states, creating opportunities for developing economies in Southeast Asia. Through these cooperation blocs, Vietnam, for instance, got a chance to develop closer ties to Korea and Japan, resulting in the fact that those two major Asian economies are the biggest ODA [Official Development Assistance](#) donors to Vietnam (Phuong, 2016). Without such financial support, Vietnam could have faced extreme challenges in meeting the growing domestic demand for better infrastructure. In turn, developed economies, through free trade agreements with ASEAN, are able to enter the Southeast Asian market that occupies approximately 629 million people, around 8.8% of world's population. In 2016, GDP gained from ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6 schemes reached \$18.9 trillion and \$22.4 trillion respectively, accounting for 25.9% and 30.6% of world GDP (ASEAN, 2016b). Clearly, after years of operations, ASEAN-centred multilateral economic groups have generated a great amount of wealth among the members. Moreover, the multilateral

structure in which ASEAN is in the centre has significantly contributed to cooperation and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. As Keohane (1990) argues, multilateral institutions enhance interdependence among states, which lessens the possibility that states will use violence to settle disputes. That's why relations among ASEAN and its partners have been relatively stable, given existing territorial disputes, such as maritime disputes over the South China Sea and Senkaku Island. As the rivalry between China and Japan become intense as well as the competition for influence over Asia-Pacific between China and the United States escalate simultaneously, multilateral mechanisms that can be useful to restrain any aggressive emergence (Calder, 2006). For example, ARF serves as a platform for concerned ASEAN nations to "multilateralise" maritime disputes with China, using external forces to put pressure on China's recent assertiveness or at least convening to discuss mutual concerns. At the 2010 ARF Meeting in Hanoi, in the midst of rising tension between Beijing and Hanoi, the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton directly stated the United States' interests in keeping the South China Sea at peace and inexplicitly condemned China's intention to establish the ADIZ [Air Defence Identification Zone](#) (Bader, Libenthal, & McDevitt, 2014). For the less politically powerful ASEAN, the presence of the United States, Japan, and India is integral in containing the "China threat" in Southeast Asia in particular and in Asia-Pacific in general (Tiezzi, 2014).

On the other hand, ASEAN's centrality in regional multilateralism is not necessarily a bed of roses. Even though ASEAN has been attempting to institutionalise cooperation with its partners through various treaties, the basis of all regulations is norms and values rather than legal standards. As ASEAN itself praises norms and the supremacy of sovereignty, the core principle guiding all ASEAN's operations is the ASEAN Way, which is

non-legalistic, diplomatic, informal, non-interfering, and non-confronting (Acharya, 1997). What connects ASEAN and its partners is the ASEAN Treaty of Amity of Cooperation [TAC](#), which highlights peaceful measures to settle disputes and respects of national sovereignty. In the era when multinational businesses are booming and transitional issues are soaring, absolute respect of sovereignty impedes collective actions. What constitutes “multilateralism”? It’s “collective action”, according to Keohane (1990). Sadly, the ARF, though expected to discuss security issues, is just a forum where ministers convene and then leave. To pessimists, the ARF is nothing but a “talk shop” (Acharya, 2001). Undeniably, the ARF, to some extent, contributes to regional stability, yet it has never adopted, and will unlikely adopt in the near future, any legally binding resolutions to settle regional disputes, such as South China Sea disputes and nuclear threats on the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, it is critical to examine whether ASEAN’s central role in regional multilateralism is the result of ASEAN’s growing influence or a means for major powers to avoid direct confrontation while competing for power. While ASEAN is the driving force of RCEP, it is China that actively pushes the process. Under the BRI [Belt and Road Initiative](#), RCEP, once completed, would grant China’s preferential access to each country’s markets and help China solve several excess industrial capacities (Meltzer, 2017). What’s remarkable is that RCEP excludes the United States and TPP does not include China, though both of which are free trade agreements on quite the same region. For ASEAN member states that join both TPP and RCEP, they are stuck in the grouping game of great powers, not that ASEAN is really central to regional economic development. Recently, the AIIB [Asian Infrastructure Development Bank](#), chiefly sponsored by China, pledged to provide strong financial and technical support to ASEAN’s infrastructure development (Xin, 2017).

Meanwhile, ASEAN and the ADB [Asian Development Bank](#), another multilateral monetary institution dominated by the United States and Japan, have been maintaining strong relations as the ADB supports the building of the ASEAN Community (ADB, 2016). That ASEAN is in the spotlight of institutions dominated by competing powers does more harm than good. As an African proverb says, “When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers”, ASEAN-centred multilateral institutions are means for major powers to race –ASEAN is in the driving seat but major powers are the drivers.

Multilateral institutions that evolve around ASEAN’s centrality surely bring about opportunities for ASEAN to develop regional economies, practice its power, and form closer relationships with its partners, especially with major powers. However, ASEAN’s engagement with major powers in its multilateral groups is a double-edged sword. Apart from the abovementioned benefits, this may push ASEAN to confusion and further divert ASEAN’s members, because ASEAN has not developed a common foreign policy yet. Divergence in foreign policy towards regional issues among ASEAN member states, especially in South China Sea disputes, has already indicated how major powers can tarnish ASEAN’s solidarity, which is the glue that keeps ASEAN and ASEAN-led institutions strong.

Prospects for ASEAN-centred multilateral institutions in the changing world

Currently, there are changes in international dynamics that may challenge the fate of ASEAN-centred multilateralism in Asia-Pacific. In 2016, much to the international community’s surprise, Britain withdraw from the EU after 51.9% of voters voted to leave EU in a national referendum (Hunt & Wheeler, 2017). The fact that Britain, one of the founding fathers of the EU and

a pillar of European economy, left the most developed multilateral bloc raised concerns over the fate of multilateralism in Europe and other parts of the world. Later, the United States, under Donald Trump's administration, retreated from the Paris Climate Accord, TPP, and UNESCO, further strengthening fears over the collapse of multilateralism. As the international politics was initially set up and governed by Western rules of the game through Western powers' dominance in multilateral groupings, the current trend against multilateralism may evoke concerns about spillover effects to ASEAN's multilateralism. However, because ASEAN-centred multilateralism in Asia-Pacific holds different values and nature compared to that in the West, and in light of a power transition occurring, it will not experience the same fate as the West.

That ASEAN-centred multilateral institutions are rather loosely institutionalised and non-legally binding is one of the reasons why members of these groups have not yet drifted apart. The EU, unlike ASEAN and other regional associations, has the highest level of integration. The common currency, common law, and common foreign policy altogether strictly tie EU members into their own regulations. In fact, EU law is more powerful than national laws of its members, while law is considered as an aspect of sovereignty (Sources and Scope of European Union Law, 2016). This lays the legitimacy for debates on whether EU supersedes national sovereignty; notably, the Westphalia Treaty that respects the primacy of sovereignty was concluded in Europe. Moreover, when the unprecedented Syrian refugee crisis hit Europe in 2014, it is the strict institutionalisation of EU that forced its member to adopt a burden-sharing system under the Dublin Convention, even though not every EU member was happy with that (Schuck, 1997). The influx of immigrants triggered xenophobia, threats from lone-wolf terrorist attacks,

pressure on social welfare, and employment opportunities, making British people vote for 'leave'. On the contrary, ASEAN-centred multilateralism which is based on normative terms rather technical conditions, unlike that in Europe, convenes but not confines its members. Concerning the fact that all ASEAN member states are either small or middle powers and most of which suffered from colonisation and proxy wars in the last centuries, a low level of institutionalisation is more favourable to their cherished sovereignty as well as flexibility in engagements with major powers. To major powers, loosely institutionalised groupings bring them less burden of responsibilities while give them an opportunity to adjust the rules of game according to their will. That's why the ASEAN Way and ASEAN norms, despite their mentioned flaws, are still favoured in ASEAN-led groupings. ASEAN-centred multilateral blocs, ironically, will sustain because of one of its 'weaknesses'.

Furthermore, the region lacks a tension that is radical enough to ignite separatism from ASEAN-centred multilateral institutions. South China Sea disputes, despite being a hotly debated topic recently, have seen no more armed conflicts since the clash between Chinese and Vietnamese navies in 1988 (Mahbubani, 2016). As involved parties have been taking careful steps in solving conflicts and the United States still maintains its military presence in East Asia, the situation in the South China Sea at least has not got worse. Therefore, ASEAN-centred multilateralism remains quite intact.

In the context of a global power transition from West to East since China's and Asia's dramatic rise in the 21st century, multilateral institutions with ASEAN's centrality will continue to develop as they are means for ASEAN and its Asian partners to practice their own rules of game instead of heeding to those dominated by the West. Nowadays, China has been titled

as the second biggest economy in Gross Domestic Product and the biggest in Purchasing Power Parity with an annual growth rate of approximately 9% (Overview, 2017). India follows China with an economic growth rate of 8% per year. Southeast Asian ‘tigers’, namely Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand, have recovered from the 1997 Asian economic crisis and proceeded to go further. Asia’s impressive economic growth is even projected to outstrip that of major Western economies for the coming decades (Hoge, 2004). As Organski argues in his theory, power transition happens when great and/or middle powers are dissatisfied with the order created by the dominant power, explaining why a number of multilateral institutions were founded or developed in Asia-Pacific to shape an Asian order as Asian economies rose again (Kugler & Organski, 1989). China, under Xi’s leadership, has been favourably using multilateralism “as an effective way for Beijing to increase its regional power while avoiding confrontation with the United States or regional powers like India and Japan” (Hughes, 2005). More importantly, as the China threat theory still prevails, multilateral mechanisms that evolve around ASEAN are means for China to soothe regional states while attempting to shape a regional order. If China develops its economy too far and too fast, it would trigger vigilance that already exist in the region (Haacke, 2002). Therefore, China has gone through great lengths to support ASEAN-led multilateral projects (Hughes, 2005). Besides China, Asian rising powers, such as India, Korea, Japan, and of course ASEAN have been promoting multilateral cooperation to contribute their voice in formulating regional rules of game and thus increase interdependence. Therefore, it is unlikely that multilateral institutions in which ASEAN is the centre will cease to develop.

ASEAN’s centrality will keep its importance in the regional security and

economic structure. However, in the future, ASEAN will face numerous challenges in maintaining its multilateral institutions. First, there are more and more security risks in the region, calling for a more decisive ARF in settling disputes and protecting regional security. China is struggling with separatism in Xinjiang and Tibet. Korea and Japan are worried about North Korea's testing nuclear weapons. ASEAN is wrestling with terrorism in Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Asia-Pacific is the centre of conflicts in the 21st century. If the ARF proves to be useless, it will cease to exist. Yet, without the ARF's presence, Asia-Pacific will witness even more conflicts. Therefore, in the future, it is a challenge for ASEAN to adjust its ASEAN Way and ASEAN norms in operating the ARF as well as other multilateral institutions. In the era of multilateralism and indivisibility, it is almost impossible to strictly adhere to the absolute sovereignty and non-interference. Second, Asia-Pacific in the 21st century is the stage of rivalries among China, Japan and the United States which would push ASEAN into difficult situation – whether ASEAN should appease a particular major power or choose to “swing” among the powers (Frieberg, 1993). Tilting towards or against any powers is disastrous for institutions that ASEAN takes the central role. Rather, ASEAN should lead those multilateral institutions to follow the path between being supplicant and hostile to regional powers (Mabbubani & Nair, ASEAN and geopolitical rivalries, 2017). Most importantly, ASEAN should further promote its inner development so that ASEAN is growing both politically and economically, for only ASEAN's competence can retain its centrality in regional architecture. To that end, ASEAN should enhance its capability to solve its own regional issues, improve the ASEAN Community, enhance institutionalisation among members through more binding agreements, and seriously re-examine the


ASEAN Way as well as ASEAN norms.

Despite the trend against multilateralism, indicated through Trump's "America First" foreign policy that entails the United States' withdrawal from or decreasing interests in multilateral institutions as well as the Brexit incident, ASEAN-centred multilateral institutions will continue to sustain and develop. This is partly because these institutions are far less institutionalised compared to those in the West, which means member states can flexibly adjust themselves to the cohorts instead of having to sacrifice values that they are unwilling to let go of. Moreover, as the 21st century is the Asia's century and Southeast Asia is in the spotlight of many powers' foreign policies, namely India, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States, major powers will keep utilizing multilateral institutions that evolve around ASEAN to compete and balance each other. Given those prospects, it is critical for ASEAN to maintain balance with its strategic partners and to solve regional conflicts in peaceful manners. The South China Sea, Taiwan, and the Korean Peninsula are hot spots of security concerns in Asia-Pacific. If not addressed peacefully, these issues can possibly cause fragmentation of multilateral institutions in which ASEAN take up a central role.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that through multilateral institutions that ASEAN takes a central role, ASEAN has made significant achievements in promoting free trade, increasing prosperity and maintaining regional peace. However, there are a lot of challenges that ASEAN need to face while operating its multilateral groupings, notably the competition among major

powers and resolving conflicts in the region. Even though multilateralism in ASEAN-Pacific will unlikely repeat the West's history, ASEAN needs to go through great lengths in the future to keep ASEAN-centred multilateral mechanism balanced in the era of rivalries among Asian powers and the United States. That would require great efforts from each ASEAN member states to develop ASEAN from inside out, so that this regional bloc would be politically and economically competent and thus truly deserve the central position in regional architecture.



ASEAN Approach to Resolving Regional Problems

Case Study on the ASEAN Haze Agreement

—Park Jae Hyun National University of Singapore

Abstract

Countries in Southeast Asia have a well-known regional political community, ASEAN with 50 years of history. Nevertheless, there are continuing disputes on how to evaluate ASEAN's effectiveness. ASEAN, with five founding countries, enjoyed success during its early years and throughout the Cold War era by responding to external threats with unified responses. Having stood as a non-aligned group between two superpowers of the world, the United States and the Soviet Union, ASEAN was granted a space to project its independent voice thanks to concerted action among its member states. The transitional moment came in the 1990s, when

ASEAN issued five new full memberships, finalising the current list of 10 member states. Inclusion of all countries in the region except for East Timor was an astonishing achievement because this let ASEAN ascribe itself as a successful and single political community representing the region. Yet wider economic, political, and culture gaps among the member states are difficulties to be overcome. In the 2010s, the world entered into a multipolar political situation accompanied by the deteriorating standing of the US, the rise of China, the comeback of Russia, and the advent of emerging regional powers such as India and Indonesia, drawing a political landscape become unclear. Importantly, this prevents ASEAN member states from making concerted actions. This even raises suspicion about the solidarity of ASEAN. For instance, so far, there has been no unified ASEAN-level action against China's territorial claim over the South China Sea. These cases cast doubt in ASEAN's working capability. This paper will examine the solidarity of ASEAN and its working mechanism by looking at how ASEAN has responded to air pollution, a well-known regional issue.

I. Main Focus: Haze in Southeast Asia

Haze is a form of transboundary air pollution in Southeast Asia. Unlike other transnational issues in the region such as territorial disputes in the South China Sea, the haze issue is solely involves ASEAN member states. The South China Sea issue involves a strong external factor, China. Therefore, haze issue is an excellent example to evaluate the effectiveness of regional cooperation and response. Examining the responses by countries in the region to the haze issue can reveal the region's cooperation mechanism.

Haze originates from Indonesian forest fires and severely affects not only local communities, but also neighbouring countries, particularly Malaysia and Singapore. The damage involves severe health and economic costs, resulting in disputes between those countries. An important characteristic of the haze problem is that it is an annually recurring problem and a primary cause of the fires is man-made forest fires (David Glover and Timothy Jessup, 1999).

Who are setting forest fire in Indonesia?

The primary actors creating fires in Indonesia's forests are farmers in Indonesia. Slash and burn has been a traditional agricultural practice passed down over generations and is still a prevalent method for farmers. Fire is the cheapest and fastest method to clear land in preparation for planting (Caroko et al., 2011). Fire is used to flatten the stumps left over from logging and old crops, as well as to clear smaller vegetation (Dauvergne, 1998).

The secondary actors are plantation companies. The haze has become a serious concern when it was accompanied by the rapid growth of the commercial plantation industry for products such as palm oil. These

industries adopted burning as a forest clearing method because it was economically effective compared to other methods such as using bulldozers. According to Dauvergne's study in 1998, clearing land with machines such as bulldozers and chemicals can cost up to \$200 per hectare, while clearing land using fire costs a mere \$5. In addition, ash from burned vegetation functions as a natural fertiliser.

The third actor is climate change. When El Nino occurs, the sea temperature rises, resulting in less precipitation and drought in some areas. The haze has been exceptionally problematic when El Nino occurred. As the world shows more concern over the cause and effect of climate change than the past, the haze issue in Southeast Asia has become an international issue.

What efforts were made by ASEAN member states?

On a national level, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore are the three most directly involved countries who have serious concerns about the haze issue due to their geographical location. Other members of ASEAN have more moderate responses, as they are not directly affected by haze, although they still share the political ambition to stop forest fires. So far, Singapore has been the most hard-line country in trying to solve the issue. Singapore's parliament passed the unprecedented THPA [Transboundary Haze Pollution Act](#) in 2014. The essence of this law is imposing criminal and administrative penalties on any companies or persons who commit activities leading to haze pollution in Singapore without discerning nationality. The implication of this law is an alert to Singapore-linked agri-business companies working in

Indonesia (Tan, 2015). This symbolically demonstrates how seriously Singapore intends to handle the issue. Also, Malaysia is another active player in the issue. When forest fires occur in Sumatra, the Malaysian government often dispatches fire-fighting personnel and materials with the consent of the Indonesian government.

In contrast, Indonesia has a mixed stance on forest fires. On the one hand, there are many regulations such as the Forestry Law and Environment Law banning forest fires with the only exceptions being for indigenous and small farmers. There has been rhetoric from high-ranking officials, including the president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, labelling forest fires as a serious threat (Scott Adam and Felix Heiduk, 2015). On the other hand, palm oil and logging are important to Indonesia's state revenues. Besides, there are many lobbying groups such as the Indonesian Palm Oil Association GAPKI and the Indonesian Association of Forestry Concessionaires APhi. Also, Indonesian government is reluctant to receive assistance from Malaysia and Singapore. Indonesia often condemns such assistance as a breach of Indonesia's sovereignty. With patronage politics behind plantation companies, these companies systemically burn forests annually (Varkkey, H, 2013).


At an ASEAN level, ASEAN member states recognised the seriousness of the haze issue from early on. The 1992 ASEAN Summit in Singapore already identified transboundary pollution as one of ASEAN's biggest environmental concerns and it was addressed in its 1992 Singapore Resolution on Environment (S. Tahir Qadri, 2001). In addition, ASEAN developed a Regional Haze Action Plan in 1997 and convened many high-level meetings such as the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Haze. A recent significant milestone of the ASEAN-scale approach to haze is the ASEAN Haze Agreement which was initiated in 2002 and officially became a

unified ASEAN-level approach with the Indonesian parliament's ratification in 2014.¹

According to Tahir Qadri (2001), Southeast Asian region endured haze during 1982-1983, 1994, and 1997-1998. The areas affected respectively were 5 million hectares, 4.865 million hectares and 9.756 million hectares in Indonesia. Considering the Korea's Jeju Island is 184,800 hectares, the haze issue in Indonesia is a serious one. Severe haze has kept occurring even after multiple ASEAN and national-level statements and action plans, such as that of 2015.

The limitation of these actions is that their primary objectives were limited to prevention, mitigation and monitoring. No penalty clauses or other strong clauses that have a binding effect could be realised. Therefore,

Table 1. Indonesia (Sumatra, Kalimantan) Hotspot Count



• Source: ASEAN Specialised Meteorological Centre²

1 <http://haze.asean.org/asean-agreement-on-transboundary-haze-pollution-2/> Access date: 2017.10.14

2 <http://asmc.asean.org/asmc-haze-hotspot-annual> Access date: 2017.10.14

the content of ASEAN statements and treaties has so far been conceptual and vague.

The transitional moment of haze solution – ASEAN Haze Agreement

ASEAN member states first initiated the ASEAN Haze Agreement in 2002. The agreement adopted a fundamental change in approach. The agreement emphasises multilateral cooperation in mitigating haze, rather than positioning the issue as a responsibility of each nation. Based on the agreement, countries invented processes for receiving external help to mitigate forest fires to evade possible sovereignty issues. They agreed to establish the ASEAN Haze Fund, a special fund to implement this agreement, and developed a corresponding team in the ASEAN organisation responsible for haze.

Nevertheless, there was a significant delay until the agreement went into practical effect, notably it was only in 2014 when the Indonesian parliament had ratified the agreement. Unfortunately, the agreement did not show immediate results. Southeast Asia suffered from dreadful haze in 2015. This aroused internal and external criticism over the agreement. The Haze Agreement clearly showed ASEAN member states' political will to abandon forest fires, yet the systematic anti-forest fire measures and financial resources they were to put in place were unclear.

One achievement of this agreement is that this is a meaningful step for formalising the cooperation process between members to prevent fires. This can be understood as a change in Indonesia's stance, as it considered previous Malaysian and Singaporean appeals to act as intervening in the state affairs of Indonesia. The weakness of this agreement is that there are

no penalty clauses, which opens room for future fires. Also, the agreement set out that financial resources were to be collected voluntarily from each member. This reduces the agreement's binding power. Therefore, only based on the content, ASEAN Haze Agreement is not significantly different to previous actions such as the Regional Haze Action Plan in 1997, which is considered as the precursor to the ASEAN Haze agreement.

Research Question

Exclusively based on content, the series of haze agreements, including the ASEAN Haze Agreement does not sound rigid. Without any binding clauses, the agreement itself cannot be enough to tackle illegal forest fires. Why did it take so long for the Indonesian parliament to ratify the ASEAN Haze Agreement?

Theory

A two-level game theory by Putnam theorises the negotiation process between countries (Putnam, 1988). He disagrees with theories based on domestic causes and international effects or international causes and domestic effects, viewing them as inadequate in fully representing international relations. The essence of his theory is that an international treaty should consider domestic and foreign factors at the same time. He suggests two levels. Level one refers to negotiations between countries led by corresponding negotiation teams from each country. Level two refers to negotiations within each country, mainly ratification processes in parliament or any other form of political action required to accept a level one agreement.

At level two (the domestic level), domestic groups demand their interests by pushing government to adopt policies that are favourable to their interests.

At the level one (the international level), each government tries to compromise with counterparts in a way that best fulfils the demand of domestic interest groups. Level two negotiations influence level one negotiations and vice versa.

Putnam suggests the concept of a 'win-set'. A win-set in particular applies to level two or domestic negotiations as the set of all possible level one agreements that could win at level two. As a large win-set means broader acceptability among domestic groups, it is highly probable that an agreement would be made. Putnam argues level one negotiators show a strong tendency to bargain for what could be domestically acceptable. Therefore, an international agreement only can be made when the win-sets of corresponding countries overlaps.

A win-set determines the negotiation power of negotiators at level one. A larger win-set raises the acceptance probability of an agreement outcome, so that negotiators with larger win-sets are often pushed by opponents during the negotiation process at level one. With this in mind, level one negotiators try to convince their opponent that their win-set is small while enlarging opponents' win-sets. In order to enlarge opponents' win-sets, negotiators can directly appeal to the opponent country through multiple media in a way that redefines an issue. At the same time, in order to keep negotiating countries' win-set low, negotiators can deliberately politicise an issue and pledge to collaborate with hardliners of the issue.

II. Indonesia's win-set

In fact, it is well known that damage from haze is devastating to human health, more importantly not only people in neighbouring countries but most Indonesian people are severely affected by the haze. The environmental cost is tremendous, because new plantations are usually built on old forests with high biodiversity that have not been influenced by human intervention for a long time. Nevertheless, why did it take so long for the Indonesian government to take firm actions against the haze issue?


Palm oil production in Indonesia and Malaysia

Palm oil is currently one of the most popular commercial crops for industrial usage. It boasts a wide range of uses, from cooking oil, processed food such as chocolate, ice-cream, fries, instant noodles, to raw materials for cosmetic products. Demand for palm oil is on the rise due to rising demand from China and India in line with their rapid economic growth and westernising food styles. Also palm oil is suitable as a feedstock for biodiesel production. Palm oil is cheaper than other major oil seeds such as soybean and rapeseed. At the same time, it produces far more oil per planted area compared to other oil crops. This makes palm oil very efficient product for oil production.

At this moment, Indonesia is leading in palm oil production. According to estimates from the United States Department of Agriculture, Indonesia will produce 36 million metric tons in 2017, followed by Malaysia with 21 million metric tons. Other palm oil producing countries such as Nigeria, Brazil etc. cannot compete with these two countries simply because their palm oil production is far smaller. However, Indonesia was not always the

leader of the palm oil industry. Malaysia was the biggest palm oil producer until 2006 (See Table 2). Moreover, it was not until 2011 that Indonesia started to move ahead of Malaysia in palm oil exports (See Table 3).

Table 2. Malaysia, Indonesia Palm Oil Production by Year




• Source: United States Department of Agriculture³

Since 2011, Indonesia clearly surpassed Malaysia in the palm oil industry both in terms of production and exports, and Indonesia became the leader in the palm oil business. Similar to the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries](#) members, Indonesia is in a dominant position to manipulate the supply of palm oil.

³ Malaysia <http://www.indexmundi.com/agriculture/?country=my&commodity=palm-oil&graph=production>(Access date: 2017.10.14)

Indonesia <http://www.indexmundi.com/agriculture/?country=id&commodity=palm-oil&graph=production>(Access date: 2017.10.14)

Table 3. Malaysia, Indonesia Palm Oil Export by Year



• Source: United States Department of Agriculture⁴

Government of Indonesia promotes small holder farmers in rural area

The economic benefit from palm oil plantations is not only enjoyed by large plantation companies. According to the ownership profile of palm oil plantations, about 44% in 2016 are small holders, while the rest belong to commercial companies. Importantly, the portion of small holders is growing. Their share in terms of planted area increased from 28% in 2000 to 38% in 2010 and 44% in 2016 (Hawkins et al., 2016). The growing number of small farmers is reflected in Indonesia's government census. For instance, according to statistics from Kabupaten Bengkalis released in 2012, the number of plantation smallholders shows steady growth, from 30,572

⁴ Malaysia <http://www.indexmundi.com/agriculture/?country=my&commodity=palm-oil&graph=exports> (Access date: 2017.10.14)

Indonesia <http://www.indexmundi.com/agriculture/?country=id&commodity=palm-oil&graph=exports> (Access date: 2017.10.14)

in 2010, 30,502 in 2011 and 34,072 in 2012. (Forestry and Estates Service, Bengkulu, 2012) This is supported by the fact that palm plantation is so far the most profitable crop. According to statistics from Kabupaten Nunukan released in 2017, palms are the most profitable cash crops for farmers compared to coffee, pepper, and cacao (Forestry and Estates Service, Nunukan, 2017).

Having considered number of small holder farmers in rural areas of Indonesia, It may be assumed that such domestic circumstances had led to the delay in ratification of the Haze Agreement.^{HC13} These farmers presumably did not have enough capital to clear forests with machines such as bulldozers, so they had to slash and burn.

Indonesia's level one negotiation

At the ASEAN and UN-levels, delegations from Indonesia were criticised that its state authorities had not fully worked to stop the fires. The Indonesian delegations did not accept the definition of the haze issue as an environmental crisis. Rather, they proposed that haze was a development issue and underlined the eradication of poverty in rural areas. Indeed, palm oil plantations have generated many jobs in rural areas and constituted an important part of the Indonesian economy. In other words, the win-set at level two was not large enough for Indonesian negotiators to conclude haze agreements and take hard-line action against the issue.

It is probable that the level two win-set started to shrink when Indonesia became the biggest player in the palm oil industry. It can be assumed that Indonesia started to make use of its leading status by trying to limit the supply. In fact, the growth rate of its palm harvest area has dramatically slowed since 2006, before which the percentage growth was in double digits. Therefore, it may be assumed that ratification in the Indonesian

parliament could be related to the Indonesian government's intention to limit the expansion of palm oil plantations.

Indonesia's unprecedented actions after ratification in 2014

After the ratification of the Haze Agreement, Indonesian governments started to show unprecedented action to combat haze. The first action was the realisation of legal punishment against suspects engaged in illegal forest concessions. In 2014, KPK [Anti-corruption government agency in Indonesia](#) arrested the incumbent governor of Riau, Annas Mamum and the head of Riau's palm plantation farmer's association, Gulat Medali Emas Manurung. The court ruled that Gulat had bribed Annas to change the status of a forest, so that the forest could be cleared for plantation. Annas appealed to the Supreme Court in 2016. Nonetheless, he was jailed for 7 years and fined 200 million rupiah (Maharani, 2016). Gulat's case ended in district court. He received 3 years' imprisonment and a fine of 100 million rupiah (Movanita, 2015). This is the first case related to illegal forest concessions in Indonesia.

The second action is the growing 'plasma scheme' to palm oil plantations companies. An essence of this regulation is that a plantation company with a plantation business license for an area of 250 hectares or more must grant at least 20% of its new plantation area to local farmers. The plasma scheme is based on regulation of the Indonesian Minister of Agriculture No. 26/Permentan/OT.140/2/2007 concerning Plantation Business License Guidelines. It was first suggested in 2007. It was replaced by a new regulation in 2013. The law clearly stresses that companies which gained a license before 2007 should find ways to develop local communities, while granting 20% of the plantation to local farmers is not obligated. The result is astonishing. For example, Golden Agri reported 101,219 hectares of

palm plasma area in 2015, which is 23% increase compared with 82,103 hectares in 2007. Indofood Agri reported 87,107 hectares of plasma area in 2015, a 43% increase compared with 61,000 hectares in 2007 (Hawkins et al., 2016). According to the plasma system, the nucleus (the plantation company) has a management and technical responsibility over plasma farmers. In return, plasma farmers sell their palms to the plantation company's mill.

Having considered two factors, it is true that Indonesian government is taking unprecedented steps to the palm oil industry in Indonesia. It could be suspected that the ratification of the Haze Agreement in 2014 is a starting point for state intervention. As the ASEAN Haze Agreement vaguely yet strongly highlights the state's role in monitoring any activities to prevent forest fires, it is possible to link the agreement and the state intervention in the industry.


III. Conclusion: Will haze keep arising in the region?

The haze issue partially demonstrated how ASEAN can solve transboundary problems in the region. Seamless and immediate cooperation between member countries is limited due to a strong sense of state sovereignty. There are also subtle rivalries between the member states. In this aspect, ASEAN way is less recognised in terms of resolving the issue. However, Indonesia's recent action on promoting smallholder farmers and arresting corrupt figures in the palm oil industry shed a new light on the ASEAN way, as if the Indonesian government started to take aggressive action on the palm oil industry using the ASEAN Haze Agreement as a

pretext.

In Southeast Asia, severe haze equivalent to 1997 and 2015 is less likely to occur in the future because the Indonesian government will not allow new plantations. Unlike 20 years ago, new palm oil plantations are condemned around the globe. Therefore, Indonesia will remain as a dominant player in palm oil production. However, a tentative source of forest fire is the growing number of small holder farmers.

The 2016 and 2017 hotspot counts of Indonesia (Table 1) suggests that ASEAN is close to solving the haze issue, yet at the same time it might be too early to announce the complete end of it. Nevertheless, the low hotspot counts of 2016 and 2017 are an undeniably positive sign. The trajectory of the haze issue displays a substantial part of the ASEAN way of solving regional problems.



아세안에 필요한 새로운 다자주의적 접근 Building a New Approach to Multilateralism for ASEAN

숙련 노동자 이동 협정을 중심으로
Case Study on the Agreements of Skilled Labour Movement

- Hong Sungah Universiti Sains Malaysia

Abstract

The establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community in 2015 is a milestone in the regional economic integration, facilitating the free flow of goods, services, investment, and skilled labour. It contributes to the establishment of an ASEAN as a single market and production base. However, in the regards of movement of skilled labour, it has been discussed whether it causes conflict or it demonstrates economic contribution by replacing domestic labour power. The EU experience such as Brexit shows that discontent with integration of immigrants and flow of labour leads to vicious circle. This experience tells that understanding of mobility of labour

will be one of vital factors to the successful integration of the ASEAN Community. The objective of this paper is to evaluate three agreements of skilled labour movement: MNP [Movement of Natural Person Agreement](#), ACIA [ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement](#), MRAs [Mutual Recognition Agreements](#). Through the evaluation, the paper draws lessons for the future. Firstly, the agreements are evaluated in two contexts: the step of signing agreement attributed to multilateralism which shows consideration on the level of development among countries in the region. Second, it finds that after signing the agreements, commitment has been slow and uneven due to lack of support and regulation to drive the progress. The paper closes with suggestions as Partial Multilateralism which ensures commitments for the progress of skilled mobility within ASEAN.

1. 서론

세계화라는 단어를 필두로 노동과 자본의 이동이 시작되면서 오늘날 국경을 초월하는 노동력 이동은 중요한 현상으로 주목 받고 있다. 노동자들은 일자리를 찾기 위해 새로운 지역으로 이동하기 시작했고, 개발도상국에서 임금이 높은 선진국으로 향하는 현상 역시 일상적으로 일어나고 있다. 그러나 상품 및 자본의 이동과 함께 노동자들의 이동은 새로운 이념과 정체성, 생활양식을 가져온다는 점에서 복잡한 양상을 보이고 있다. 특히 국가 간 경기 및 고용 상황의 격차가 나타나면서 국제 노동력 이동은 경제적 범주를 넘어 정치, 안보, 사회 안정에 이르기까지 다양한 파장을 불러온다. 유럽연합(European Union: EU)의 경우 노동과 서비스의 이동을 통해 국가 간 실업률 격차, 임금 격차가 크게 확대되면서 노동력을 공급하는 인력 수출국과 노동력을 공급받는 인력 수입국의 갈등이 문제점으로 드러났다. 이러한 현상으로 대표적인 예로 2016년 6월 진행된 영국의 유럽연합 탈퇴 찬반 국민투표를 들 수 있다. 당시 영국에서는 과반수의 국민이 유럽연합이 직면한 주요 문제로 “경제상황 및 실업률”을 꼽았고 “2015년 이후에는 이민과 테러를 우려하는 여론”이 높았다(김홍종 & 임유진 2016, p. 4).

이와 같은 현상은 비단 유럽연합에만 국한되는 문제가 아니다. 2015년, 경제통합을 목표로 한 아세안경제공동체(ASEAN Economic Community: AEC)가 출범하면서 아세안 내의 노동력 역시 이동이 가속화되고 있기 때문이다. 유럽연합이 회원국 간에 완전한 노동 및 서비스 이동의 자유를 실현해 온 반면에 아세안경제공동체는 숙련 노동자의 원활한 이동에만 초점을 맞추고 있다. 이는 비숙련 노동자에 비해 숙련 노동자의 유입이 인력 수입국과 수출국 모두에 긍정적인 영향을 끼친다고 보아 숙련 노동자의 유입에 보다 관대하

기 때문이다(강동관, 이혜춘, 이규용 2011, p. 25; 이창수, 송백훈 2014, p. 16). 하지만 상품, 서비스 등과 달리 이질적인 문화를 가진 구성원이 유입된다는 것은 내국인의 고용 기회와 임금 저하, 사회불안 야기, 두뇌의 국외 유출 등을 이유로 잠재적인 위험요소로 지적 받아 왔다.

그럼에도 불구하고 아세안은 2015년 아세안경제공동체가 출범되기 이전부터 숙련노동의 이동 협정을 체결해왔는데 대표적으로는 자연인이동 Movement of Natural Person Agreement: MNP, 포괄적 아세안 투자협정 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement: ACIA, 상호인정협정 Mutual Recognition Agreements: MRAs을 들 수 있다.¹ 위 협정은 유럽연합에 비해 개발도상국의 입장을 반영해 모든 국가의 입장을 수렴하는 다자주의의 협력형태로 체결된 것으로 평가된다.² 다자주의 Multilateralism는 다양한 학자들에 의해 여러 가지로 정의되지만 “형식적으로 볼 때 3개국 또는 그 이상의 국가들의 협력 형태”로 자신의 이익뿐만 아니라 타인의 이익도 고려해 모두에 적용하는 “상호 호혜성 Reciprocity이 강조”되는 구성이다(이인배 2004, p. 29-30).

1 대표적인 글로는 아시아개발은행에서 출간한 ADB. “Achieving Skill Mobility in the ASEAN Economic Community: Challenges, Opportunities, and Policy Implications”, 2015; Bangkok, Thailand; ILO and ADB. “ASEAN Community 2015: Managing Integration for better jobs and shared prosperity”, 2014; Sugiyarto, G., and Agunias D. R. “A ‘Freer’ Flow of Skilled Labour within ASEAN: Aspirations, Opportunities and Challenges in 2015 and Beyond”, 2014 등이 있다.

2 철학자 스테즈코 호바트(Srećko Horvat)은 유럽연합이 동유럽을 내부 식민지로 편입한 “서유럽의 신식민주의 프로젝트”라고 지적한 바 있다. 그는 서유럽과 동유럽 사이에 협상과 대화 없이 “규율”과 “관리”를 통해 “저임금 노동력을 제공”받거나 “고급 노동력을 저렴하게 활용”하는 내부식민지로 편입시켰다고 주장했다. (http://www.pressian.com/news/article.html?no=167526&ref=nav_search). 또한 전문가들은 아세안경제공동체와 유럽연합의 성격과 지향점이 분명히 다르다고 밝히며 “가장 대표적인 차이점은 통합의 형태와 성격”으로 유럽연합이 “단일 통화를 바탕으로 한 강력한 초국가적 통합기구”라면 아세안경제공동체가 지향하는 것은 “상호적 협력 그리고 각 국가의 개별성에 대한 인정”이라고 전했다. 컨설팅그룹 ‘KPMG’의 대표 필립 리(Philip Lee)도 아세안경제공동체는 유럽연합과 같은 중앙집권 없이 “국가 간의 차이를 좁히고 ‘통합을 추구’하며 투자를 끌어올 수 있는 정책을 세워 경제를 발전시킬 것”이라고 전한 바 있다(골든아시아, 2016).

따라서 이 협정의 지난 성과를 살펴보는 것은 아세안의 다자주의가 어떠한 방식으로 드러나고 있는지 살펴보는 데에 도움이 되며, 앞으로 숙련 노동인력의 유입에 대한 장기적인 정책을 추진하는 데 있어 방향을 제시하는 데에 도움이 될 것으로 사료된다. 이 글은 총 5장으로 구성되어 있으며, 2장에서는 아세안 경제통합의 발전과정과 아세안 역내 노동력 이동의 현황과 특성을 고찰하고자 한다. 이어 3장에서는 숙련노동 이동에 관한 3개 협정의 성격과 주요내용을 살펴보고, 4장에서는 3장에서 살펴본 협정의 주요 내용을 평가하고자 한다. 끝으로 5장에서는 시사점을 제시하고 개선방향을 모색하고자 한다.

2. 아세안 경제통합과 노동력의 이동

1967년 방콕협정을 통해 아세안이 창설되었지만 2003년 제9차 정상회의에 이르러서야 정치안보공동체, 경제공동체, 사회문화공동체 3개 분야로 구성된 포괄적인 아세안공동체에 대한 논의가 시작되었다. 이후 제27차 아세안정상회의에서 아세안공동체의 공식출범을 2015년 12월 31일로 선언했고, “경제성장에 대한 관심이 높아 경제공동체 논의를 정치안보, 사회문화 통합 부문에 앞서 진행”해 경제통합을 이루겠다는 청사진을 발표했으며 이를 위한 각 분야별 실행계획 수립에 착수했다(한국무역협회 국제무역연구원 2015, p. 1).

아세안경제공동체 청사진 2025(ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025)은 기존의 목표를 보완해 보다 결합된 경제권 형성, 경쟁력 있고 혁신적이며 역동적인 아세안, 연계성 강화 및 부문별 협력, 포용적이고 인간 중심의 아세안,

글로벌 아세안이라는 “5가지 대영역 아래 29개의 중간 범주의 목표, 74개의 프로그램, 146개의 전략, 75개의 주요조치로 구성”되었다(최경희 2016, p. 5). 이를 통해 아세안은 첫 번째 목표인 통합된 경제권 형성을 위한 상품Goods, 서비스Services, 투자Investment, 자본Capital, 숙련 노동자Skilled Labour의 자유로운 이동을 보장한다고 밝혔다.

2013년 기준으로 아세안 내 이주민 9천 5백만 명 가운데 70%에 달하는 6천 5백 만 명이 타 아세안 국가로 이동한 것으로 나타난다. 1990년에 아세안 내 이주민 가운데 60%가 아세안이 아닌 역외로 이동했다는 점을 감안할 때 역내 이주민 규모가 크게 증가한 것으로 볼 수 있다(Sugiyarto & Agunias 2014, p. 5). 이러한 성과는 아세안의 경제성장과 더불어 아세안 국가들의 통합을 위한 정책적 노력의 결과로 볼 수 있을 것이다. 그러나 아세안 역내 이주민 규모와 숙련 노동자 이동의 연계성을 확인하기 위해서는 보다 엄밀한 분석이 필요하다. Sugiyarto와 Agunias의 연구는 2013년 기준 아세안 역내 이주민의 관계를 <표 1>과 같이 제시한다.

<표 1> 인력수입국, 인력 수출국, 인력수출국-인력수입국 순위(2013년)

순위	인력수입국	인력수출국	인력수출국-수입국
1	태국	미얀마	미얀마-태국
2	말레이시아	인도네시아	인도네시아-말레이시아
3	싱가포르	말레이시아	말레이시아-싱가포르
4	캄보디아	라오스	라오스-태국
5	인도네시아	캄보디아	캄보디아-태국
6	브루나이	베트남	미얀마-말레이시아
7	베트남	태국	인도네시아-싱가포르
8	라오스	싱가포르	싱가포르-말레이시아
9	필리핀	필리핀	베트남-캄보디아
10	미얀마	브루나이	태국-캄보디아

자료: Sugiyarto, Agunias(2014, p. 6-7 참조하여 재구성)

연구에 따르면 최대 인력 수입국은 태국, 말레이시아, 싱가포르 순으로 아세안 이주민 가운데 97%가 이 세 국가로 이동하는 것으로 집계됐으며, 최대 인력 수출국은 미얀마, 인도네시아, 말레이시아 순으로 나타났다. 이를 인력 수출국-인력 수입국 관계로 살펴보면 미얀마-태국, 인도네시아-말레이시아, 말레이시아-싱가포르 순으로 나타났다(Sugiyarto & Agunias 2014, p. 5-7). 최대 인력 수입국인 태국, 말레이시아, 싱가포르의 이주 노동자 통계를 살펴보면 태국의 경우 50.8%의 노동자가 미얀마에서 유입된 것으로 나타난다. 또한 말레이시아로 이주한 외국인 노동력의 42.6%는 인도네시아에서 유입되었으며 싱가포르의 경우 45%가 말레이시아에서 이동한 것으로 나타났다(ILO & ADB 2014, p. 84-5).

하지만 숙련 노동의 이동에 대해서는 아직까지 주목할만한 성과를 드러내지 못하고 있다. 2007년 기준 아세안 역내 이주 노동자 가운데 비숙련 노동자가 87%를 차지하는 것으로 나타났다(Orbeta 2013, p. 4). 또한 2012년 기준 숙련 노동자의 비중은 말레이시아 내 이주 노동자 가운데 10.2%, 태국 내 이주 노동자 가운데 3.1%를 차지하면서 숙련 노동자의 이동 비중은 10% 전후에 머무르고 있다는 것을 확인할 수 있다(ILO & ADB 2014, p. 86). 하지만 싱가포르의 경우 2010년 기준 말레이시아 숙련 노동자 비율이 10.8%로 나타났다(Kok, 2011; as cited in World Bank 2011, p. 101).³ 또한 2000년에서 2010년 사이 말레이시아 25세 이상 대학 졸업자가 일자리를 찾아 싱가포르로 이주한 비율이 6.2% 증가하여 말레이시아의 숙련노동자가 싱가포르로 가장 많이 이주하고 있는 것을 알 수 있다(World Bank 2011, p. 99). 특히 싱가포르 회계사 가운데

3 여기서 숙련노동자는 주재 비자Employment Pass인 P1, P2, Q Pass를 소지한 자를 뜻한다.

약 34%가 말레이시아에서 이주해온 것으로 나타나 말레이시아-싱가포르는 숙련 노동의 이동이 원활한 사례 중 하나로 꼽히고 있다(Jauhar, Yusoff 2011, p. 120).

말레이시아 회계사가 싱가포르로 이주하는 원인을 분석한 바에 따르면 이는 싱가포르의 높은 임금제도, 근무 환경, 완화된 이민 절차, 국제적 개방(International Exposure), 취업 기회, 개인 성향, 사회관계망이라고 밝혀졌다(Jauhar, Abdul Ghani, Joarder, Subhan, & Islam, 2015, p. 707). 이처럼 이주를 결정하는 데에는 다양한 요인이 있으나 이민 절차는 임금제도, 취업 기회와 달리 아세안 국가 간의 협정으로 완화될 수 있는 부분이기 때문에 아세안경제공동체가 주목할 필요가 있다. 따라서 다음 장에서는 이민 절차에 관련된 숙련노동이동 협정을 중심으로 구체적으로 살펴보고자 한다.

3. 아세안 숙련노동 이동 협정의 주요 내용

아세안은 경제통합 단계에서 자연인⁴ 이동 협약을 체결했고 AEC 청사진 2007(AEC Blueprint 2007)이 추진되었던 시기에 8개 직종에 대한 상호인정협정을 체결했다. 또한 2012년부터 포괄적 아세안 투자협정이 효력을 갖게 되면서 숙련노동의 이동을 통해 아세안을 투자보호가 제공되는 지역으로 만 들고자 하는 노력을 보이고 있다.

4 많은 학술지에서 Natural Persons을 자연인으로 번역해 사용하고 있다. 하지만 협정에 관한 문서를 보면 상기 용어는 아세안 회원국의 국민으로 정의되어 있으며 브루나이의 경우 예외적으로 영구 거주자까지 포괄하고 있는 것으로 규정되어 있다(Article 3-f, ASEAN Agreement on the Movement of Natural Persons). 따라서 필자는 Natural Persons에 대한 번역어로 자연인보다 아세안 회원국민 또는 아세안 국적자가 적절하다고 판단하나 본고에서는 혼란을 피하기 위해 자연인이라는 용어를 그대로 사용하고자 한다.

자연인 이동은 1995년 12월 아세안 정상회의에서 승인한 아세안역내서비스협정(ASEAN Framework Agreement of Services: AFAS)에서 볼 수 있는데 이 협정은 서비스 공급의 경쟁력과 효율성을 증진시키고 아세안 국가 간 무역을 자유화하기 위해 체결되었다. 아세안역내서비스협정은 회원국 간의 협력을 통해 서비스 분야를 강화시키고, 장벽을 낮추어 2015년까지 서비스의 이동을 가능하게 한다는 의도를 담고 있다. 하지만 이 협정은 진전 속도가 느리고 실행력이 낮다는 문제점을 지적 받았다(ASEAN studies Centre 2008, p. 26). 본격적인 자연인 이동 추진은 2012년 11월 아세안경제장관회의(ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting: AEM)에서 볼 수 있는데 체결된 이후 아세안 국민 가운데 서비스와 투자에 관련된 상품, 무역에 관계된 기업 방문객(Business Visitors), 계약 서비스 공급자(Contractual Service Suppliers), 회사 주재원(Intra-corporate Transferees) 등의 단기 체류가 가능하게 되었다.

포괄적 아세안 투자협정은 2008년 12월 아세안 경제장관회의에서 체결된 후 2012년 3월 29일부터 효력을 가졌으며 역내 투자자에 대한 보호와 안전을 보장해 투자증진을 목적으로 추진되었다. 이 협정은 1987년 체결된 아세안투자보장협정(ASEAN Investment Guarantee Agreement: IGA)이 규정한 투자보호 및 1998년 체결된 아세안투자지역협정(ASEAN Investment Area: AIA)이 규정한 투자 자유화에 대한 내용을 포함하고 있다. 이 밖에도 이사진 임명에 있어 특정 국적의 독점 현상을 금지하는 새로운 규정들도 포함되었기에 협정에 대한 평가는 긍정적이다(김관호 2009, p. 152). 협정 제 22조를 살펴보면 투자를 위해 설립, 발전, 관리, 조운을 목적으로 한 투자자(Investors), 경영인(Executives), 담당자(Managers), 협력 담당자(Members of the Board of Directors of Other ASEAN Investors)가 상당한 자본과 자원을 투자하고자 하는 경우 입국, 단기 거주, 근무 권한(Work Authorization

을 허용한다고 명시하고 있다. 이처럼 숙련 노동자의 원활한 이동은 공정성과 투명성을 보장해 준다는 점에서 투자의 확대에 이어지기 때문에 아세안의 경제통합 과정에서 중요한 의미를 갖고 있다.

다음으로, 상호인정협정은 아세안역내서비스협정 체결 당시부터 중요성이 검토되었던 사안으로 2001년 11월에 개최한 아세안정상회의에서 본격적인 협정에 관한 논의가 시작되었다. 상호인정협정은 아세안 회원국들에게 공통의 기준을 적용해 보다 체계적이고 투명한 절차를 만들었다고 평가할 수 있다. 협정 단계를 살펴보면 엔지니어(2005년 12월 9일), 간호사(2006년 12월 8일), 측량사, 건축가(2007년 11월 19일), 의사 및 치과 의사(2009년 2월 26일), 회계사(2014년 11월 13일), 관광 분야(2012년 11월 9일) 순으로 나타난다.⁵ 이를 통해 교육, 근무 경력을 인정받을 수 있고 국가에 따라 입국 서류 간소화, 높은 임금 등의 혜택을 받을 수 있게 된 것이다(Fukunaga 2015, p. 16). 하지만 이러한 혜택을 제공받기 위해서는 아세안 소속 국가에서 요구하는 자격과 일정 기준을 통과해야 한다. 상호인정협정은 직업 분류에 따라 다른 조건이 적용되기에 이를 보다 구체적으로 알아보려고 다음 두 분야를 살펴보고자 한다. 그 두 분야는 가장 처음 협정을 맺은 엔지니어와 가장 나중에 협정이 체결된 관광 분야이다.

엔지니어의 경우 등록된 외국인전문엔지니어 [Registered Foreign Professional Engineer:RFPE](#)가 되면 현지 전문가와의 협업에 한해 근무할 수 있다. 등록된 외국인전문엔지니어가 되기 위해서는 아세안공인인증엔지니어 [ASEAN Chartered Professional Engineer:ACPE](#)를 취득해야 하는데 이를 위해서는 엔지니어 학위, 국가

5 <http://www.asean.org/storage/images/2015/October/outreach-document/Edited%20MRA%20Services-2.pdf> 참고하여 작성

등록 혹은 자격증, 졸업 후 7년 경력, 2년의 중요 엔지니어 업무 참여 경력, 기술 향상을 위한 지속적인 교육 및 훈련(Continuing Professional Development)이 요구되며 전과 기록이 없어야 한다.⁶

관광분야의 경우 다른 상호인정협정이 구체적인 직업군에 대한 규정을 두지 않은 것에 반해 호텔 서비스(프론트 오피스, 하우스 키팅, 푸드 프로덕션, 푸드 및 음료 서비스), 여행 서비스(여행 에이전시, 여행 오퍼레이션)와 같은 특정 직업군을 명시하고 있다. 각 직업군별로 수준에 따라 4~7개의 단계로 나뉘어져 총 32개의 직업을 포함하고 있는데 예를 들어 프론트 오피스의 경우 벨보이부터 프론트 오피스 매니저까지를 포함한다.

관광분야에서 외국인관광전문가(Foreign Tourism Professional)로 인정받기 위해서는 지역 마스터 트레이너(Master Trainer)와 마스터 평가자(Master Assessor)의 훈련과 국가 마스터 트레이너, 마스터 평가자의 훈련을 모두 이수해야 한다. 이수 과정을 마치면 관광전문가인증위원회(Tourism Professional Certification Board)에서 평가 및 인정을 받게 되어 외국인관광전문가가 될 수 있다(Fukunaga 2015, p. 25-6). 살펴보았듯이 상호인정협정은 직업 분류에 따라 다른 평가 체제를 구축해 국가 간 숙련노동 이동에 기여하고 있다.

4. 주요 내용 및 평가

자연인 이동은 서비스 무역에 관한 일반협정(General Agreement on Trade in Services:

6 관광분야를 제외한 모든 분야는 최소 경력 기간을 요구하는데 의학분야는 5년 이상, 간호사는 3년, 엔지니어는 졸업 후 7년으로 2년은 중요 엔지니어 업무에 참여해야만 한다. 또한 건축가는 건축 자격증 취득 후 최소 5년의 경력으로 총 10년의 경력이 요구된다. 아울러 전과 기록이 없어야 한다.

GATS에서 규정하는 바와 같이 서비스 교역의 자유화를 위한 이동을 보장한다는 점에서 의의가 있다. 하지만 아세안역내서비스협정 당시 회원국가의 집행 의지가 낮아 느린 속도로 진행된다는 문제가 제기되었다(Ooi K. B et al 2015, p. 224). 이 협정은 2012년에 부분적으로 개선되었지만 집행력에 대한 지적은 여전히 계속되고 있다. 예를 들어 아세안 10개국은 모두 회사 주재원에 대해서는 공통적으로 규정을 준수하여 왔으나 기업 방문객은 브루나이, 미얀마, 싱가포르를 제외한 7개국만이, 계약 서비스 공급자는 캄보디아, 필리핀, 베트남 3개국만이, 기타 범주에 대해서는 협정을 준수하고 있는 국가가 없는 것으로 나타났다(Fukunaga & Hikari 2015, p. 7). 또한 국가마다 재량권을 가져 상이한 기준을 가지고 있는데 예를 들어 기업방문객의 경우, 첫 방문 시 캄보디아, 라오스는 30일, 말레이시아, 태국, 베트남은 90일까지 체류를 허용하며 회사 주재원이 처음 방문할 경우 라오스는 1달, 브루나이와 베트남은 3년, 말레이시아는 10년 이하까지 체류가 가능하다고 명시하고 있다. 또한 국가에 따라 예외사항을 적용하는데, 라오스의 경우 엔지니어 직종에 한해 쿼터제를 실행해 외국인이 총 직원의 20%를 넘지 않도록 규정하고 있으며, 베트남은 기업 당 최소 3명의 외국인 매니저는 허용하나 매니저, 경영자, 분야별 전문가 중 최소 20%는 내국인이어야 한다는 규정이 있다. 또한 인도네시아는 매니저, 분야별 전문가에 한하여 시험(Economic Needs Tests)을 실시하고 있다(Chaisse & Jusoh 2016, p. 136-7).

포괄적 아세안 투자협정은 보다 포괄적이고 안정된 활동 권한을 부여했다. 즉, 투자자, 경영인, 담당자, 협력 담당자의 이동을 보장해 인력을 투자에 적극적으로 활용하게 된 것이다. 하지만 이 협정은 이민법, 노동법, 아세안역내서비스기본협정의 규범 및 국내 정책에 따라 다르게 적용되고 있다.

또한 투자자, 경영인, 담당자, 협력담당자의 정의가 분명하지 않은 문제가 있다. 예를 들어, 투자자는 아세안 회원국에 투자를 유치하거나 기업 합작, 파트너십, 협력, 조직화를 목적으로 한 자연인으로 규정되어 있다^{Article 4.7} 이러한 불분명한 규정은 국가에 따라 자의적인 해석의 근거가 될 수 있다.

상호인정협정은 아세안 역내 공통된 기준을 마련해 숙련노동의 이동을 원활하게 했다는 점에는 의의가 있다. 하지만 집행 측면에서 문제점을 갖고 있는데 예를 들어 브루나이에서 50명의 엔지니어가 외국인전문엔지니어를 취득한 것을 제외하고는 아세안 역내 취득자가 없는 것으로 나타났다(Fukunaga 2015, p. 14). 이는 엔지니어 상호인정협정이 2005년 12월 9일부터 발효되었고, 2013년 1월 브루나이가 마지막으로 협정을 체결한 국가라는 것을 고려할 때 사실상 유명무실하다고 보아야 할 것이다. 또한 내부적으로도 준비가 미흡하다는 문제가 있다. 예를 들어 관광 분야의 경우 캄보디아, 라오스, 미얀마, 베트남에는 국가 마스터 트레이너와 평가자가 없는 것으로 나타났으며 이수 과정을 마친 후 평가 받을 수 있는 기관인 관광전문가 인증위원회는 2015년 말 기준으로 인도네시아, 말레이시아, 미얀마, 필리핀, 싱가포르, 태국, 베트남에만 설립된 것으로 나타났다(ADB 2017, p. 16).

5. 시사점 및 결론

노동 이동의 문제는 다양한 측면에서 이점을 제공하지만 정치, 안보, 사

7 http://www.ascan.org/storage/images/2013/economic/aia/ACIA_Final_Text_26%20Feb%202009.pdf 참고하여 작성

회 등 다양한 문제의 원인이 되기도 한다. 아세안 국가의 경우 경제 개발 격차가 크기 때문에 국가들 간에 보편적인 합의에 도달하기 힘든 측면이 있다. 그럼에도 불구하고 아세안은 다자 협상을 통해 합의를 도출하는 협정을 체결하면서 보다 발전한 통합체로 한 걸음 나아갔다.

그러나 다자주의에 입각한 협정을 실현하는 단계에 있어서는 집행이 이루어지지 않는 문제가 보이고 있다. 즉, 위에서 살펴본 세 가지 협정은 외교적인 절차를 통해 성공적으로 협상 체결에 도달했으나, 국가에 따라 상이한 기준, 낮은 구속력, 실효적 이행장치의 부재로 일정 국가만 협정을 이행하는 문제점을 보였다. 물론 이러한 특징은 여러 국가의 합의점을 찾는 다자주의적 협의체에서 한계로 꼽히는 부분이다. 하지만 향후 아세안의 숙련 노동인력에 대한 수요는 2010년에서 2025년 사이 41%까지 증가할 것으로 전망되기 때문에 집행의 공식화와 제도화에 대한 필요성이 제기된다 (ILO & ADB 2014, p. 52). 앞으로 아세안경제공동체가 성공적으로 숙련 노동인력에 대한 협정과 시행을 이루어간다면 아세안 지역의 기업활동은 보다 안정적으로 확대되고 투자처로서 입지 역시 더욱 확대될 수 있을 것이다.

따라서 이러한 문제를 해결하기 위해서는 단순히 개념적인 정의로 ‘다자주의’를 내세울 것이 아니라 현장에서 실천 가능한 ‘부분적 다자주의’ 관점으로 전환할 필요가 있을 것으로 보인다. 이를 위해서는 공허한 선언적인 성격의 문서가 아니라 현장에서 집행할 수 있는 강제성을 가질 필요가 있다. 즉, 협정을 체결하는 것에 있어서는 상호 호혜성 원칙을 따르지만 협정 체결 이후에는 다자주의적 협력 틀 속에서 집행력을 높이기 위한 방안을 적극적으로 추진해야 한다는 것이다.

이를 위해 첫 번째로, 아세안 국가는 숙련 노동자의 이동에 대한 규정을

구체적으로 정의해야 한다. 북미자유무역협정⁸The North American Free Trade Agreement: NAFTA의 경우 미국, 멕시코와 캐나다 사이에 63개의 전문 직업 군을 허용한다고 명시했으며 이에 포함되는 직업은 회계사^{CPA, CA, CGA, CMA}, 인테리어 디자이너(학사 학위 소지자 또는 졸업 후 3년 이상의 실무 경험자)와 같이 정확한 직업과 자격 조건을 구체적으로 제시해 인력의 이동을 적극적으로 추진하고 있다.⁸ 아세안 국가 역시 협정 체결 과정에서 명확한 정의 규정을 통해 예외사항을 남기지 않도록 해야 할 것이다. 또는 아세안의 상호인정협정이 명확한 자격 요건을 규정해 공통적으로 적용한다는 점을 활용해 이를 기타 협정에 포괄적으로 사용할 수 있는 방안을 모색하는 것도 하나의 대안이 될 것이다.

두 번째로, 아세안은 정책 집행 정도에 대한 척도와 평가기준을 공문화하여 새롭게 규정할 필요가 있다. 통합적인 아세안경제공동체의 형성을 위해서는 아세안 국가들이 체결한 협정 그 자체가 아니라 협정을 얼마나 이행하는지가 중요한 요소가 된다. 이를 위해 정책 입안 및 실행을 위한 범 아세안 차원의 장치가 필요하다. 하지만 경제적 수준과 정치적 권력에 비례하는 집행부를 구성하기 보다는, 협의를 통하여 회원국 모두가 배제되지 않고 참여하는 본연의 모습으로서 다자주의를 실천할 수 있도록 구성해야 할 것이다. 이를 위해 아세안은 선언적인 협정에서 그치는 것이 아니라 국가의 개별성을 인정해 국가에 따라 다른 수준의 협정을 맺되, 체결한 협정에 한해 구속력을 갖는 방향을 고려해야 할 것이다.

물론 아세안 회원국 간의 자발적 협력에 기대하는 것이 보다 이상적인 접근일 수 있지만 위에서 살펴본 바와 같이 집행력이 낮아진다면 아세안

8 <https://www.eahimmigration.com/practice-areas/for-employers/tn-nafta-professionals>참고하여 작성

통합체의 의미가 무색해진다. 또한 노동자의 유입이 사회질서에 불안을 초래하는 존재로 종종 간주된다는 점에서 장기적인 관점에서 접근할 필요가 있다. 따라서 위에서 살펴본 해결책은 아세안이 보다 발전된 다자주의 협력체로 거듭나는 방향으로 작용할 것이다.



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Theme 2

ASEAN-Korea 4.0: Adapting Digital Economy



The world is seeing the realisation of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. How are ASEAN and Korea adapting to the new changes in the global economy? As 2017 marks the 10th anniversary of ASEAN-ROK FTA, how can ASEAN and Korea strengthen their economic partnership in the changing economic environment?





Fostering ASEAN-Korea Digital Economy

— Agi Agung Galuh Purwa Seoul National University

Abstract

ICT Information and Communications Technology has important roles in delivering the digital economy known as Industry 4.0. However, the growth of the digital economy vary between nations. On one hand, one of the regions with the biggest potential to become strong in the digital economy is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. On the other hand, Korea has already boosted its economy by enhancing the use of ICT. ASEAN and Korea have similar goals for improving ICT. Both regions may generate huge advantages through cooperation. Therefore, this paper aims to identify the current situation of both digital economies and the kinds of technologies they already use to strengthen economic growth. Cooperation in building and

maintaining SMEs, and reinforcing online trade and e-commerce seem to be the best opportunities in both region. However, the lack of ICT infrastructure and potential loss of employment are obstacles that have to be addressed.

1. Introduction

The digital economy is creating new opportunities for trade and development (UNCTAD, 2017). More than that, the digital economy could be seen as the prime mover of economic growth nowadays, especially for advanced nations (OECD, 2017). There is no doubt that digital transformation is now on the top of global agenda, especially in terms of communication markets which are still in high demand. Based on a survey by Hootsuite and We Are Social (2017), around 3.773 billion people, or 50% of the worldwide population of 7.476 billion, are internet users. Most people around the globe use the internet to communicate by social media, which nowadays already achieved 2.789 billion users, or 37% of the world population, and it is always growing.

Furthermore, we could see that data-driven innovation, new business models, and digital applications are changing economy. In the same way, digital transformation in this sector leads to job destruction as well as creating something new, such as new forms of work and trade landscapes, especially for direct services with customers, which are changing from a face-to-face basis to become online. Most importantly, the digital economy has taken AI [Artificial Intelligence](#) into the mainstream (OECD, 2017). Machines could identify complex patterns in bigger data sets that are almost impossible for humans to work on based on their own cognitive functions. In this way, there is a big chance for artificial intelligence to establish a new pattern for increasing efficiency and productivity for the growth of the economy.

There are a limited number of countries already in the category of advanced digital economy, and one of them is Korea. The country was developed from scratch after World War II to achieve per capita income of

more than \$25,000 (Choi, Kwon & Koo, 2017) and was ranked the seventh most advanced digital economy out of 60 surveyed countries (KBS, 2017). It seems that the implementation of its economic development plans, which focused on a market friendly environment and exports in the 60s and 70s, then from the 80s began to focus on R&D [Research and Development](#) investment and implementing the digitalisation of their industry (Lee et al, 2017), successfully rebuilt this country to maintain economic growth and make it an advanced digital economy.

Those Korean achievements inspire many countries to follow the same track, including ASEAN, in which the internet-related GDP is already more than \$50 billion, mostly from the huge number of social media users and online games and e-commerce industries (Yu, 2017). Therefore, this paper analyses two main research questions regarding the digital economy, namely: What are the success factors of the Korean digital economy? What is the best strategy for fostering ASEAN and Korea's digital economies? In order to answer those questions, this paper is divided into four chapters. The first chapter is an introduction. The second chapter is a literature review. Several theories, recent findings and models of economic growth as well as the digital economy will be elaborated comprehensively in order to deepen the conception of those two aspects. The second chapter compares two digital economy case studies in Korea and ASEAN. The third chapter presents the findings and discusses them, based on the current situation shown in chapter two. This chapter answers the research questions. The fourth chapter concludes this paper.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Economic Growth

Improving the prosperity and overall wellbeing of the population is the main purpose of many public institutions around the globe, from the United Nations to national and local governments and NGOs [Non-Government Organisations](#) that focus on these issues. To fulfil this purpose, those institutions need indicators to measure the people's overall wellbeing. Basically, experts have proposed three basic indicators for that, the first indicator is economic growth (Kuznets 1937; Woods 1944; Abramovitz 1959; Okun 1962 as cited in Dickinson; 2011), the second indicator is human development (Haq 1994 & Sen 1999) and the third indicator is a combination of economic growth and human development (Anand & Ravallion 1993; Chakraborty 2003; Ramanathaiyer & Macpherson 2000).

Economic growth can be measured from the monetary value of final goods and services produced in a country over a period of time, known as gross domestic product [GDP](#) (IMF, 2017). Based on the perspective of economists, GDP is used as an indicator of the economy's health. In this way, an increase in GDP could be a sign that the economy is going well, employment is likely to increase as companies hire more workers and people have more income. Therefore, economic experts believe that economic growth may improve the quality of people's lives in general. They point out that the higher the per capita income of a country, the more likely it has a higher average life expectancy, lower infant and child mortality rates, higher literacy rates, and greater emphasis on human development (Anand & Sen, 1996).

It is strengthened by Deb (2015) who analysed the positive relationship between income growth and human development at the aggregate level of 140 countries around the world. However, there were experts who made

recommendations against the use of per capita income as a measurement of the quality of life (Noorbakhsh, 1996). In addition, the UNDP (2005) has stated that the main purpose of human development is to widen the range of human capabilities. Moreover, some experts argue that GDP should not focus only on market production but also economic performance from a wider perspective (Stiglitz et al, 2008), such as: environmental protection, quality of life, social integration and sustainability (European Commission, 2013).

In this way, the main conception of economic growth and other theories of human development generally focus on the measurement of people's wellbeing, the faster the growth, it seems, the more quickly the people's wellbeing increases. The conception of public wellbeing itself is wide and it has many different points of view. However, this paper focuses on economic growth in terms of the way in which a country can produce goods and services for the better wellbeing of its society. Since people nowadays mostly act in the digital community, economic growth in this paper specifically refers to an economy that is based on digital computing technologies. The importance of the digital economy is clearly defined by Victoria A. Espinel based on her interview with the World Economic Forum (2016), in which she said that "the digital economy permeates all aspects of society, including the way people interact, the economic landscape, the skills needed to get a good job, and even political decision-making. Our emerging digital economy has the potential to generate new scientific research and breakthroughs, fuelling job opportunities, economic growth, and improving how people live their lives".

2.2 Industry 4.0

In this information age, almost no aspect of our lives can be separated from the use of the internet and digital devices. It starts when computers, the Internet, the World Wide Web, and Social Media are invented and transform societies into digital economies (Helbing, 2016). The European Commission (2014) points out that “the digital economy is the result of the transformational effects of the new general-purpose technologies in the fields of information and communication”. The use of Information and ICT is the key to this digital economic transformation.

In addition, the digital economy has also transformed itself. For example, the shift has already occurred in the internet devices people use, i.e. from personal computers to mobile phones, and now smartphones and smart devices. It can also be seen by the technological developments, from procedural structures to framework programming, from digitisation to big data methods, from single logins to systems integration and interoperability. This massive shift may generate changes in business processes which can make specific business models profitable (European Commission, 2014).

Furthermore, the digital economy has an important role in fostering development growth. The European Commission (2014) reports that the ICT sector and investment in ICT are responsible for 50% of productivity growth in Europe. The internet generates 3.4% of GDP in the G-8 and 5 other countries (Brazil, China, India, Korea, and Sweden), and increases SME productivity by 10%. China’s venture capital sector, which is focused on digital, has grown to 19% of the worldwide total (Woetzel, et.al, 2017). Hooten (2017) elaborates that the US GDP of contribution of mobile internet and apps is about 3.11%. The mobile internet industry accounted for 2% of Korean GDP in 2014, and its contribution to GDP has been increasing by 10% annually

(Korea Internet & Security Agency, 2015).


This digital economy phenomena have been analysed by scientists and global organisations, for example McKinsey Global Institute, The Boston Consulting Group, and UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on Trade and Development](#). Some approaches and frameworks have been introduced in order to measure the scope and the growth of digital economy. The next subsection describes certain frameworks of the digital economy.

2.3 Framework for measuring the digital economy

Considering the huge impact of the digital economy, Bukht & Heeks (2017) analyse a model for the digital economy using three basic measures: the core digital sector, the ‘narrow scope’ of the digital economy, and the broad scope of the digitalised economy. The core digital sector or ICT sector includes manufacturing and services industries that process data and information electronically (OECD, 2002 cited in Bukht & Heeks, 2017). While the digital economy involves all activities that utilise ICT to produce economic output, the digitalised economy covers organisational and social processes (Brennen & Kreiss, 2014 cited in Bukht & Heeks, 2017). Figure 2.1 shows the scope of digital economy.

Moreover, UNCTAD (2017) examines several key technologies that can be derived from the emergence of the digital economy. They are advanced robotics, AI, IoT [Internet of Things](#), cloud computing, big data analytics, 3D printing, and electronic payments. An example of the use of these key technologies is the implementation of Industry 4.0 (Valenduc & Vendramin, 2016). Industry 4.0 uses most of the digital economy’s key technologies to foster manufacturing and service innovation by using intelligent analytics and cyber-physical systems (Lee, et al., 2014). It leads to short production runs of mass-customised products, global business value chains, the networking of

Figure 2.1. The scope of digital economy framework (Bukht and Heeks, 2017)



productive capacities, and reduces the boundaries between economic actors in terms of the roles of sellers, producers, and consumers, as well as between industry and the service sector (Valenduc & Vendramin, 2016). Industry 4.0 not only focuses on the production stage, but also other aspects. Qin (2016) mention that Industry 4.0 includes four main aspects, i.e. smart factories, business networks, smart products, and new purchasing methods for customers.

Moreover, measuring the evolving digital economy can be done by analysing economic growth from GDP, internet GDP (BCG, 2012), ICT penetration, ICT trade and sales trends, the use of ICT (UNCTAD, 2017) and the development of Industry 4.0 (Kagermann, et. al., 2016). Subsequently, identification of key technologies that have been used is also important in order to understand the existing conditions. In light of this, the next section explains the current state of ASEAN and Korea’s digital economies by identifying digital economic growth and technologies that have been implemented.


3. Case study

Most academic papers and reports use GDP to measure the economic development of a country. Korea's GDP per capita in 2016 was about \$27,538.8, when GDPs of ASEAN member states ranged from \$1,269.9 to \$52,960.7 (The World Bank, 2017). This huge variation in economic conditions raises the question of how to minimise the gaps and lift up together for better economic development in each country. One of the solutions could be to foster the use of ICT in an industrial context. Details of the digital economy in ASEAN and Korea are explained in the next two subsections.

3.1. Korean Digital Economy


It is undeniable that Korea has successfully accelerated its economic growth in the past 50 years (UNCTAD, 2017). In terms of the digital economy, Korean GDP growth from the internet in 2010 was 7.3% compared to

Figure 3.1. Internet economy as percentage of GDP in 2010 (BCG, 2012)



especially in high-level smart factory development in Korea (Han, 2016). In terms of robot density in manufacturing, Korea was ranked first among the global automated economies (IFR, 2016). It accounts for 531 industrial robots out of 10,000 employees in the manufacturing industry. Figure 3.3 depicts the number of all types industrial robots in 22 countries around the world.


Figure 3.3. Number of multipurpose industrial robots in the manufacturing industry (IFR, 2016)



Korea's Industry 4.0 is dominated by large-scale companies, for example Siemens, Tesla, LS Corp., and Korea Aerospace Industries. These companies are already implementing integrated automation with artificial intelligence, and preparing to enter the next stage, i.e. fully flexible production and integrated value chains (Han, 2016). However, small and medium-sized companies are still using partial automation with information, though some factories are almost at the level of integrated automation. Figure 3.4 illustrates the automation levels of smart factories in Korea.

It can be seen from Figure 3.4 that the number of small and medium-

Figure 3.4. Level of Smart Factory Deployment (KSOF, 2015 cited in Han, 2016)



sized factories is huge. Therefore, in 2017, Korean Government agreed to increase the number of smart factories by having more than 30,000 factories use advanced technologies by 2025 (U.S. Commercial Service, 2017). Korea’s digital infrastructure also has weaknesses in the development of core technologies for sensors, IoT, and holograms (Ha, 2015). These weaknesses have been addressed by implementing “Manufacturing Industry Innovation 3.0” (U.S. Commercial Service, 2017; Han, 2016; Ha, 2015). This programme was introduced by the Korean Government in June 2014, focusing on four terms: smart, services, sustainability, and platforms (U.S. Commercial Service, 2017). This project aims to create new value and enhance competitiveness in manufacturing by using IT to accelerate smart factory systems (Ha, 2015) and aimed to build 10,000 smart factory sites by 2020 (Han, 2016).

Moreover, the government’s plan included SMEs [Small and Medium-sized Enterprises](#), by introducing smart factory technologies to local SMEs. For example, in March 2015, Samsung Electronics, together with the Creative

Economy Innovation Center, has begun a programme of knowledge transfer of IT know-how to 100 SMEs and other 400 SMEs by 2017 (Ha, 2015). Furthermore, in 2016, the KSOFF [Korea Smart Factory Foundation](#) supported 2,611 smart factories for SMEs. This project has achieved 51.4% quality enhancement, 24.6% cost saving, and 11.8% delivery saving (Han, 2016). This improvement may also be adapted in ASEAN member states by analysing current conditions and potential development that are elaborated on in the next subsection.

3.2. ASEAN's Digital Economy

Located in the same continent, ASEAN member states and Korea have very different situations in terms of digital economy development. ASEAN, with its slogan “One Vision One Identity One Community,” includes 10 countries in Southeast Asia: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam (ASEAN, 2017).


In terms of ICT's contribution to GDP, ASEAN's internet GDP exceeds \$50 billion, mainly from the widespread use of social media and games, travel and e-commerce (Yu, 2017). Indonesia makes a big contribution to world internet GDP. It accounts for 1.3% of the country's \$700 billion GDP in 2010 (BCG, 2012), and this was estimated to increase to about 1.5% of its \$1.5 trillion GDP in 2016. Temasek and Google (2014) as cited in Wang (2017) estimate that by 2020, six ASEAN economies [Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam](#) will together become the fastest-growing internet region in the world with more than 480 million internet users.

This huge potential economy is affected by the use of ICT in many sectors. Firstly, ICT and digital mechanisms are applied in manufacturing

industry, or we call it as smart factory. Singapore has successfully enhanced its advanced manufacturing into Industry 4.0 by using robots and IoT. As the country ranked first on the connectedness index (McKinsey Global Institute, 2016), Singapore has also prepared for the future of smart factories by using advanced robotics. Singapore’s robot density is ranked second after Korea, with 398 robots per 10,000 employees (IFR, 2016). Furthermore, in coordination with Germany, Thailand is starting to develop Industry 4.0 by implementing IoT and big data analysis. Several Indonesian factories have also implemented Industry 4.0, for example, the cement, automotive, and food and beverage industries (Julianto, 2017).

Secondly, e-commerce and digital free trade are used widely in ASEAN. Indonesia was ranked fourth in terms of the proportion of small and large enterprises receiving orders via the internet (UNCTAD, 2017). Moreover, participation rates in social networks in Indonesia are about 80% of total internet users, while about 15% are purchasing goods or services online (UNCTAD, 2017). Figure 3.5 shows the proportion of internet users and their participation in social media. Furthermore, in Malaysia, the government has

Figure 3.5. Proportion of people who use social media and online shopping (ITU cited in UNCTAD, 2017)



launched a Digital Free Trade Zone together with Jack Ma, the founder of Alibaba, one of the biggest online commerce sites in the world. This project aims to open a logistical hub for online retail companies in Southeast Asia (MDEC, 2017).

Thirdly, start-ups and SMEs in Southeast Asia have important roles on enhancing economic growth. They account for more than 96% of businesses in the region (Usasean, 2015 cited in Wakim, 2017). ERIA (2014) states that most of firms in ASEAN are SMEs, and account between 89% to 99% of the total. They contribute about 23% to 58% of GDP. Table 3.1. depicts the significance of SMEs in ASEAN member states. In addition, start-ups in ASEAN have big opportunities since they account for approximately \$20 billion (Hulli, 2017). They also boost venture capital investments which are \$2.6 billion in 2016, 60% higher than in 2015 (Iwamoto, 2017). The biggest start-ups include Gojek, Sea (ex-Garena), Grab, Traveloka, VNG and Tokopedia (Hulli, 2017; Iwamoto, 2017).

This economic improvement is still in the beginning phase. It can be fostered by analysing key advantages and key success factors in one country that may be implemented in other places. Therefore, cooperation among industries or stakeholders could be an opportunity for people in ASEAN as well as in Korea. The next section analysis opportunities and challenges of the development of Industry 4.0 in both regions.

Figure 3.1. Significance of SMEs in ASEAN economy (ERIA, 2014)

Country	Share of Total Establishments		Share of Total Employment		Share of GDP		Share of Total Exports	
	Share	Year	Share	Year	Share	Year	Share	Year
Brunei Darussalam	98.2%	2010	58.0%	2008	23.0%	2008	-	-
Cambodia	99.8%	2011	72.9%	2011	-	-	-	-
Indonesia	99.9%	2011	97.2%	2011	58.0%	2011	16.4%	2011
Lao PDR	99.9%*	2006	81.4%	2006	-	-	-	-
Malaysia	97.3%	2011	57.4%	2012	32.7%	2012	19.0%	2010
	88.8%*							
Myanmar	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Philippines	99.6%	2011	61.0%	2011	36.0%	2006	10.0%	2010
Singapore	99.4%	2012	68.0%	2012	45%	2012	-	-
Thailand	99.8%	2012	76.7%	2011	37.0%	2011	29.9%	2011
Viet Nam	97.5%	2011	51.7%	2011	-	-	-	-

Source: ERIA, 2014

4. Findings & Discussion


Considering the geographic location and cultural behaviour, countries in Southeast Asia and Korea will find it easier to enhance cooperation with each other than they would with other countries in different continents. ASEAN and Korea have conducted cooperation since 1989 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2017). This relationship aims to strengthen trade and investment, and aims for total bilateral trade of \$200 billion by 2020. This cooperation may also be extended in the ICT sectors. In light of this, there are several opportunities which might be developed to increase digital economic growth in these countries.

The first opportunity is promoting and strengthening SMEs and startups. UNCTAD (2017) points out that the “digital economy is helping smaller

business and entrepreneurs in developing countries to connect with global markets more easily, and is opening up new ways of generating income.” The improvement of SMEs in ASEAN can be fostered considering the average SME export shares of five ASEAN member states [Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam](#) is 23%, which is lower than the 43% export share of Korean SMEs (Sato, 2015). However the market for online trade is huge in ASEAN member states since their total population is around 640 million people (OECD, 2017) much larger than Korea, which only has 51.25 million people (World Bank, 2016). In order to boost entrepreneurship, young entrepreneurs usually lack experience and need guidance, especially in terms of building networks (WIEF Foundation, 2017). Therefore, cooperation to share know-how can be a big opportunity that can be done among countries in both regions. This cooperation can be implemented by conducting knowledge transfers between factories and SMEs/start-ups in ASEAN and Korea. Joint working spaces can also be applied among SMEs or between SMEs and MNEs [Multinational Enterprise](#) or MNCs [Multinational Cooperation](#) (ERIA, 2017). Economic integration becomes a key issue in this area. Figure 4.1 shows a framework of building the ASEAN Economic Community. The same framework can also be applied to ASEAN-Korea cooperation.

Secondly, online trade and e-commerce can be a good chance to foster productivity in ASEAN and Korea. In 2015, global e-commerce sales were \$25 trillion, with cross-border B2C e-commerce at \$7 billion. Countries in ASEAN and Korea have to try to benefit from this increasing trade, although ASEAN and Korea have different rates of online selling and buying. In 2010, the internet accounted for \$23 billion of retail in Korea, about 6.6% of total retail (BCG, 2012) while in Indonesia e-commerce accounted for \$400 million or 0.1% of total retail. However, ASEAN

Figure 4.1. ASEAN Economic Community Framework (ERIA, 2014)



Source: ERIA, 2014

member states can learn from the successful stories from the Korean online market. Moreover, Korea and Indonesia were among the top 10 economies by value added for ICT services in 2015 (UNCTAD, 2017). However, the growth in value added of the ICT sectors and subsectors in the world is varied. IT services and software increased 16% and 12% from the previous year, while ICT manufacturing and telecommunication services decreased by about 7% and 10% (OECD, 2017). In this light, the ASEAN–Korea partnership can be fostered by strengthening trade in IT services and software. Figure 4.1 shows the top 10 economies by ICT services value-added in 2015.

Besides generating opportunities, this paper also highlights several key challenges that still exist in ASEAN as well as Korea. There are two obstacles in applying ICT to create a digital economy in ASEAN and Korea: the digital divide and job losses.

Figure 4.1. Top 10 economy countries by value added of ICT services in 2015

	Economy	Value added (\$ billion)	Share in top 10 (per cent)	Share in GDP (per cent)
1	United States	1106	42	6.2
2	European Union	697	26	4.3
3	China	284	11	2.6
4	Japan	223	8	5.4
5	India	92	3	4.5
6	Canada	65	2	4.2
7	Brazil	54	2	3.0
8	Republic of Korea	48	2	3.5
9	Australia	32	1	2.4
10	Indonesia	30	1	3.5
	Total for top 10	2657	100	4.5

Source: UNCTAD 2017, based on data from United Nations Statistics division and national statistics.

Limited ICT infrastructure has become classic problem in developing countries, including those in Southeast Asia, whereas ICT infrastructure is the backbone of Industry 4.0 and digital societies (OECD, 2017). ASEAN country's digital index is still low. According to the Digital Evolution Index (DEI, 2017), Thailand is a 'watch out country' which has a low ranking in both in terms of infrastructure development and innovation. Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia are 'break out nations', which means that they are low in terms of overall digital evolution, but have big potentials to become strong digital economies. There are only two ASEAN member states, Malaysia and Singapore, that range among the 'stand out nations' that are highly digitally evolved as well as advancing quickly. Korea, in addition, is a 'stall out nation' that has reached a high level of digital evolution but needs to focus more on innovation. Moreover, Singapore, as one of eight truly global cities in terms of global connectedness (McKinsey Global Institute, 2016), together with Malaysia and Korea, may lead other ASEAN member states to minimise the digital divide in order to enhance economic growth. In

addition, Korean companies which operate in ASEAN or target ASEAN as their main market could implement corporate social responsibility projects which are specifically designed to minimise the digital divide among the ASEAN member states. This approach will accelerate the reduction of the digital divide based on mutual benefits within ASEAN and Korea.

The second key challenge is lower employment. The ILO [International Labour Organization](#) (2016 cited in UNCTAD, 2017) identifies key technologies that might cause job losses in both areas, particularly in Southeast Asia, including the use of robots in the automotive industry, electrical and electronic factories, and the fashion industry. Table 4.2 shows technologies that will reduce employees in ASEAN industries. In this light, there is an assumption that income inequality in the near future will become wider. This situation will be problematic because in the end, rising income inequality will negatively affect economic performance as well as social political instability within the nations. People will no longer support their governments if they feel that they are losing out while elite groups are getting richer. The OECD (2011) suggests that reforming tax and benefit policies is the most direct and powerful instrument for increasing redistributive effects.

Figure 4.2. Main Disruptive Technologies and Sectors that Reduce Employees

Sector	Main disruptive technologies
Automotive and auto parts	Electrification of vehicles and vehicular components Advancements in lightweight materials Autonomous driving Robotic automation
Electrical and electronics	Robotic automation 3D printing Internet of Things
Textiles, clothing and footwear	3D printing Body scanning technology Computer-aided design (CAD) Wearable technology Nanotechnology Environmentally friendly manufacturing techniques Robotic automation
Business process outsourcing	Cloud computing Software automation Knowledge process outsourcing
Retail	Mobile and e-commerce platforms Internet of Things Cloud technology Big data analytics

Source: ILO, 2016.

Furthermore, government transfers have an important role to play in guaranteeing the poor and low-income households from falling further down in the income distribution. In this way, the governments and main stakeholders should pay more attention to citizens who are in the automotive, electrical, textile, business process outsourcing and retail sectors, because these areas are the main sectors that would be disrupted by the digital economy.


5. Conclusion

This paper has two main research questions that the author mentioned in the first chapter. Regarding the first question about the success factors of the Korean digital economy, the positive growth of the digital economy in this country mainly results from big data analysis, advanced robotics and smart factories. From the case study it shows that Korea's Industry 4.0 is dominated by large companies, however small and medium-sized companies are catching up even though most of them are still at a level of partial automation with ICT. Therefore, the Korean government has a manufacturing industry innovation policy to enhance competitiveness in manufacturing by using ICT. The policy successfully rebuilds SMEs in terms of quality enhancement, cost saving and delivery saving.

Regarding the second question about the best strategy for fostering the digital economy in ASEAN and Korea, this paper points out that ASEAN has a huge potential economy which is affected by the implementation of smart factories, especially in Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia. Secondly,

it shows that e-commerce and digital free trade are used widely in ASEAN, especially in Indonesia and Malaysia. Lastly, start-ups and SMEs in all ASEAN member states have crucial roles in enhancing economic growth, since they are the majority of businesses in the region. In this way, the author suggests two strategies for fostering the ASEAN and Korea digital economies, first by promoting and strengthening SMEs and start-ups. Secondly, by focusing on online trade and e-commerce between two regions.

However, in order to optimise these approaches there are two challenges that should be solved by governments and stakeholders, especially regarding the fact that ASEAN still has a problem with the digital divide all across the region and employment losses because of the use of robots in smart industries. Therefore, corporate social responsibility projects that are specifically designed to minimise the digital divide in ASEAN, carried out by Korean companies which operate in ASEAN or target ASEAN as their main market, could minimise the digital divide based on mutual interests. In addition, reforming tax and benefit policies, as well as government transfers for poor and low-income households is really important to minimizing the side effects of the digital economy in terms of employment, namely job losses in several sectors especially automotive, electrical, textile, business process outsourcing and retail throughout ASEAN.



Leveraging the Potential of the Digital Economy for ASEAN

—Myat Myat Mon Myanmar Institute of Theology

Abstract

The world is constantly changing, and is doing so even faster than any revolutions and improvements in human history. The rise of ICT [Information and Communication Technology](#) and the glorious invention of the internet are the main driving forces in all aspects of the economy, politics and social life. Along with the global tide of the internet, ASEAN member states are also riding the wave of the digital economy, which has given rise to new opportunities and challenges for ASEAN member states to thrive in the age of the digital economy. Yet as the digital economy has become a reality and a hard truth that no nation nor person can avoid, adaptability measures for

ensuring survival in the digital economy are absolute needs for the ASEAN region. This paper focuses on three main aspects of making the digital economy work in ASEAN: The new opportunities the digital economy can bring and ASEAN's current actions to grasp the benefits; the challenges that come along with the digital economy; and the mechanisms to optimise adaptability for countering these challenges and moving forward together as a community.

Introduction

This paper firstly points out obvious changes around the world while considering global economic data on investment and trade in the digital economy and ASEAN's increasing internet penetration and mobile connectivity. ASEAN, with a population of 640 million, its young dynamic labour force and rapid urbanisation provide fundamental opportunities in the digital economy. Diversity in terms of culture, history among the ASEAN member states is the strengths for digitalising ASEAN's own comparative advantage. Despite the opportunities, challenges ahead lie in the digital divide/gap among the ASEAN member states, the low IT literacy rate in some developing member states, the low level of digital security in workplace and in public life, the current political sensitivities in some member states and the institutional structure of ASEAN and the ASEAN Secretariat itself. In order to counter the challenges and move forward in the age of the digital revolution, ASEAN needs to be elastic and adaptive on the new landscape. First and foremost is reforming the legal infrastructure to protect intellectual property rights, privacy and fraud. The second is to invest in digital infrastructure followed by the need for PPP [Public-Private Partnership](#) for digital investment and promoting IT literacy. Reforming into e-governance, creating opportunities for life-long learning, and democratising ASEAN's institutional structure into a strong and transparent body are also essential elastic means to thrive in the digital age. No matter how much effort is done at the ASEAN level and the national level, without inclusivity, survival would be just a dream. Empowering women in ICT education and ensuring an equal playing field is a moral obligation for all the governments and private sectors of ASEAN member states.

More interconnected than ever

With successive waves of globalisation and digitalisation of almost every good and service in the past decades, the landscapes of the economy, politics, social life, media and the lives of billions of people around the world have dramatically changed. More than this, the emergence of internet and easy online accessibility have connected billions of people from the developed, developing and less developed countries.

The economy is almost completely digitalised in terms of production, supply chains, distribution and financial flows. The McKinsey Global Institute's report in 2016 showed that global flows have raised the world GDP by at least 10%, and the value of this totalled \$7.8 trillion in 2014 alone. In addition, there has been a sharp rise in the digitalisation of public sectors and public administration, which allows people easier access to public services and makes public institutions more efficient, accountable and transparent. Quoting the McKinsey Digital Flows report, Thomas L. Friedman noted that "Back in 1990, the total value of global flows of goods, services and finance amounted to \$5 trillion or 24% of the world GDP. There were 435 million international tourist arrivals, and the public internet was in its infancy. Fast-forward to 2014, some \$30 trillion worth of goods, services and finance, equivalent to 39% of GDP was exchanged across the world's borders. International tourist arrivals soared above 1.1 billion" (Friedman, 2016).

The mobile phone revolution pushed global connectivity further. International Telecommunication Union data on mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 people reveals that the number of subscriptions rose along a 'hockey stick' trajectory starting from 1995 with less than 10

subscriptions out of 100 and peaked at 90 in 2014.

Propelling the opportunities – what now?

ASEAN, Grasp your chances!

The most obvious asset ASEAN has is its huge consumer market. With an overall population of 640 million, ASEAN stands as the world's seventh-largest consumer market. The digital revolution in ASEAN could bring the consumers in ASEAN to the global market and take ASEAN's innovations to the global stage. Internet penetration in ASEAN has dramatically increased in the past decades and smartphone penetration is around 35% as of 2015 and is growing rapidly (A.T.Kearney, Inc., 2015). The subscription rate for wireless broadband rose from 1 out of 100 persons in 2009 to 30 out of 100 in 2013. The number of internet users also nearly doubled during the same period (The Internet Society and TRPC Pte Ltd, 2015).

ASEAN's young, dynamic labour force is another factor in the opportunities that Industry 4.0 provides. Out of the region's 630 million people, 40% are under the age of 30, which allows a window of opportunity for digital businesses and innovations, compared to the ageing population in other Asian economies such as China and Japan.

Although global economic stagnation resulted in a reduction of FDI [Foreign Direct Investment](#) from \$130 billion in 2014 to \$120 billion in 2015, the intra-ASEAN investment flow rose to \$22.1 billion in 2015. The prospect of ASEAN investment is also estimated as a potential outlook. A report by Ernst & Young estimated that more than 80% of companies from the US, Australia and EU were likely to increase their trade and investment in

ASEAN in the next five years (Yin, 2017).

One of ASEAN's biggest assets, diversity, is another factor that could allow ASEAN to fully absorb the potential of Industry 4.0. Each ASEAN member state varies in terms of per capita income, the level of economic development, labour force, culture. Above all, every member state has different comparative advantages. While countries such as Thailand, Vietnam and Myanmar are much more focused on agriculture as the main driver of their economies, Singapore specialises in finance. By successfully utilising the digital acceleration, ASEAN member states can digitalise in ways related to their own comparative advantages and connect to the global and regional market.

Rapid urbanisation in the ASEAN region is also another factor that accelerates the digital revolution in Southeast Asia. In 2012, the urban population of ASEAN reached to more than 50% of the overall population and is expected to grow by 2.9% every year between the years of 2010 and 2025 (The Economist, 2013). The growing urban population with a high level of information technology literacy is the best market for digital goods and services and will surely evolve as a source of innovation in the ASEAN region.

ASEAN has also optimised its commitment to the digital economy through the ASEAN ICT Masterplan (2010-2015) with "six strategic thrusts on economic transformation, people empowerment and engagement, innovation, infrastructure development, human capital development and bridging the digital divide." The ASEAN ICT Masterplan 2020 also envisioned "propelling ASEAN towards a digitally enabled economy that is secure, sustainable, and transformative; and enabling an innovative, inclusive and integrated ASEAN Community"

ASEAN: Dare for Industry 4.0?

Despite great potential and opportunities, a lot of challenges remain for ASEAN to adapt to Industry 4.0. The first and most obvious obstacle for ASEAN is its unequal growth in terms of digital infrastructure development among its members. In some ASEAN member states such as CLMV [Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam](#) countries, there are vast amounts of populations living in rural areas with limited or no internet connectivity. ASEAN's internet penetration rate ranges from 73% in Singapore to with a little over 1% in Myanmar in 2014 according to report by Internet Society. A high challenge remains how ASEAN can carry the left-behind countries to the global market and can create opportunities in the era of digital revolution. Moreover, no ASEAN country except Singapore stands above a middle or low rank in UN ICT Index (2013) and in EIU (2011) according to a report by A.T. Kearney.

Digital know-how is one of the major components to accelerate the digital economy. Digital literacy is defined as “the term that measures how well people using the internet understand what they are doing, and how to stay safe online” (Samarajiva, 2016). Some ASEAN member states have very low average national level digital literacy rates. The e-ASEAN Framework Agreement in 2000 recognised the need “to facilitate the establishment of the ASEAN Information Infrastructure, to reduce the digital divide within individual ASEAN member states, States and amongst ASEAN member states and to promote the development of human resources in all its dimensions, so as to enable the peoples of ASEAN to have the fullest opportunity to realise their potential” (ASEAN, 2012). Yet the digital literacy gap is still too large.

As businesses and countries become more connected and more digitalised, the level of dependency of one business and/or one country on others is completely assimilated, and businesses are more vulnerable to the conditions of other businesses. Digital security becomes very important for business, businesses, governments, and individuals. Digital security protects the privacy of businesses and consumers as well as transactions and financial statements. Without digital security, businesses certainly do not have the potential and capacity to develop new products and to expand their businesses. With regards to digital security, some 65% of workers in Southeast Asia are using their personal mobile devices to check work emails, making the businesses more vulnerable to cyber attacks and cyber threats from within the ASEAN region itself and from outsider cyber attackers, and at least 37% of Thais and 31% of Singaporeans use the same password for all of their devices while 32% Indonesians and 29% of Malaysians prefer to store their passwords on their own mobile devices (Lee, 2017).

Political fragility in some ASEAN member states, especially in Myanmar, the Philippines and southern Thailand is a big block for deeper and comprehensive cooperation among ASEAN member states. Without a safe and proper investment environment, rule of law, peace and stability, it is virtually impossible to cooperate between businesses, governments and even between people. No matter how the digital connectivity is thriving and connecting in the global community, the citizens of ASEAN who are suffering from instability and violence are not able to enjoy the fruits of Industry 4.0 and it is seen as a waste of human resources, capital, land and innovative spirit. And without inclusive and comprehensive enjoyment from the digital revolution, sustainable growth in ASEAN region cannot be guaranteed.

Slow infrastructure growth in ASEAN is also a factor that hinders digital acceleration in ASEAN. The Asian Development Bank has estimated that ASEAN member states need to invest over \$60 billion a year in infrastructure until 2020 to maintain their growth. However, the current investment in infrastructure is “around 3 to 4% compared with the desired rate of 5 to 8% of GDP.” (Sheng, 2017).

The institutional structure of ASEAN itself also poses a challenge to the smooth-running and flow of investment in the ASEAN region as well as expanding ASEAN businesses to Asia and the global level as a whole. The heart of ASEAN, its Secretariat which is based in Jakarta, has always been weak to stand and get ASEAN to respond as a whole. The digital revolution needs a stronger ASEAN with efficient and effective institutional tools to immediately respond to the challenges that arise. Historically, there have been calls for a stronger ASEAN and stronger Secretariat that can practically implement its policies and masterplans (Nair, 2016).

Accelerating adaptability for Industry 4.0

Thomas, L. Friedman wrote in his latest book, *Thank You for Being Late* that there is now a gap between the level of human adaptability and the advancement of technology. He has explicitly proved that there is an urgent need to accelerate the degree of human adaptability so as not to fall behind the booming advancement of technology. Therefore, it can even be more urgent and necessary for a thriving community like ASEAN to maintain growth as well as to adapt to new technological advancements. So, questions arise about what needs to be reformed and what needs to be newly built

within ASEAN to adapt to the digital economy.

Legal infrastructure

Reforming the legal infrastructure in ASEAN is on the agenda to leverage adaptability. Legal infrastructure is the safeguard to “prevent the emergence of monopolies resulting from the winner-take-most nature of the digital economy” and protect from violation of IPR [Intellecture Property Rights](#), privacy and fraud (Anandhika, 2017). The governments of ASEAN need to ensure fair competition and a level playing field for domestic businesses and foreign direct investment, as well as taking measures such as providing tax-exemptions for start-ups and emerging entrepreneurs. Moreover, it is also necessary that the laws, rules and regulations need to be up-to-date and effectively respond to the challenges that arise from the fast-changing economic landscape. Consultations need to be done annually or biannually at ASEAN-level conferences and national-level conferences with private sectors and relevant international organisations to update the laws and legal framework so as to keep up with the technological advancements.

Protecting IPR needs to be addressed through legal means as well. The ASEAN Working Group on Intellectual Property Cooperation was established in 1996 is an ASEAN body on cooperation on IPR and adopted the IPR Action Plan 2004-2010 and IPR Action Plan 2011 - 2015. However, emerging ASEAN member states such as Myanmar, Cambodia and Lao PDR need to speed up their implementation processes to cope with the mature economies. Thus, deeper cooperation within ASEAN member states and stronger enforcement by the ASEAN secretariat are major ingredients to fully implement ASEAN standard IPR protection.

Privacy protection and security are the basic ingredients for a thriving

digital economy as well. In digital economy, every digital business platform demands for private and personal information of customers. There is an overarching need to protect the data of customers so as to maintain their trust in digital business and to further invest in innovation and R&D aspects of the business. More trust from the customers means more opportunities to expand the business and to provide better and more secure services to the customers as well. As production, manufacturing and payment and banking systems become more digitalised, businesses become more vulnerable to others. The overall level of cyber security in the ASEAN region is crucial to ensuring security in the digital businesses and to protect from fraud as well as to raise customers' trust in the digitalised businesses. The ASEAN cyber security centre under the oversight of the ASEAN secretariat with technical support from private sector and international digital security agencies should be established to develop digital security policies and strategies and to operate capacity building programs for national-level cyber security centres and private cyber security centres. This cyber security centre should also be responsible for developing new and update technological solutions for possible cyber attacks and fraud that might arise in the ASEAN community.

Investing in digital infrastructure

Developing updated digital infrastructure is the most urgent need for ASEAN as a whole. As shown above, some ASEAN member states have advanced far ahead of other less-developed or developing ASEAN member states in terms of digital infrastructure. These leading developed ASEAN member states also have a moral and institutional responsibility to help others in the community in digital infrastructure development to grow

together for ASEAN as a whole. Effective policies to develop the digital infrastructure in the developing ASEAN member states and to further advance the digital infrastructure in the developed ASEAN member states must be adopted at the ASEAN and national level.

Digital infrastructure, in the 21st century, does not merely mean the physical infrastructure such as internet cables, bandwidth, fibre-optics, and telecommunication, but it also means the digital literacy of the general public. According to a report by Nielsen in 2015, out of overall population of 340 million, 80% of the ASEAN population is expected to live in rural areas and small cities in 2025, where there have been traditional limits about digital education, e-commerce and banking. Moreover, apart from the Singaporeans, ASEAN citizens are between 10% and 30% more reluctant than the global average to share financial information in order to make an online purchase (Menon, 2016). The governments of ASEAN member states must also provide digital literacy campaigns through national policies, media channels, and public awareness campaigns by working with the private sector, public sector and non-governmental organisations while placing digital education at the top of the national and ASEAN agenda in the cultural cooperation campaigns.

Public-Private Partnerships

The 'smaller' the world becomes, the less likely it is to stand alone in the new global economic dynamics. Thus, stronger and deeper public-private partnerships in ASEAN member states are essential to be adaptive to the challenges and the new ways of doing things that can arise from Industry 4.0. Where and what the public and private sectors should work hand-in-hand is a possible problem. Yet ASEAN leaders realise the importance of

PPP in developing infrastructure and connectivity, implementation does not respond to the demands of reality. The Asia Development Bank has estimated that PPPs are beneficial in meeting ASEAN's infrastructure needs of \$60 billion per annum (ASEAN, 2014).

A success story of PPP can be seen in Malaysia's story of mobile connectivity. The Malaysian government, in 2009, subsidised 2.4 billion ringgits (about \$730 million) for Telekom high-speed broadband to "expand the digital network...and to bridge the digital divide." With 20% of government subsidy and the operation by the Telekom Malaysia, broadband penetration in Malaysia has increased by 66% in 2013 with the creation of 100,000 new jobs expected by 2018.

PPP is important in every aspect of the digital economy, from digital infrastructure development to improving digital literacy among the general public. Rather than providing government digital literacy campaigns, support from private sector is a necessary element in promoting digital literacy. With 47% of average social media users and 305 million of Facebook users in the region as of January 2017 (Kemp, 2017), social media companies such as Facebook and Instagram can be seen as effective platforms to campaign digital literacy and to disseminate digital education widely and deeply to the people of urban and rural areas as well. The Ministries of Education and/or relevant actors (such as National Education Commission) of each ASEAN government need to cooperate with social media companies to develop digital literacy content suitable with the context of their countries' needs. In addition to this, a Centre for Digital Literacy comprised of governmental actors, international actors and academia needs to be established to provide technical and financial support to the national-level non-governmental organisations and local non-profit organisations to work

on promoting digital literacy.

E-governance

Developing e-government platforms is fundamental to successfully driving the digital economy forward. E-government platforms are necessary to provide efficient public services and better faster procedures for business and company registration. In terms of digitalising the governments of ASEAN member states, it involves two parts; digitalising government procedures and public service providing mechanisms as well as digitalising the human resource sector of the government. Upgrading the skillsets of civil servants with relevant ICT educational programs is to be conducted immediately at the ministerial level with supportive agendas and policies through institutional bureaucracies. Exchange programs of civil servants within ASEAN to study other countries' action plans on e-government systems need to be initiated under the supervision of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community pillar. A major task to implementing e-governance largely depends on the moral responsibility of the developed member states to provide substantial technical support for the emerging members, which is a core part of what is called 'a community of growing together'.

Life-long learning and digitalising 21st century learning skills

Quoting the futurist writer Alvin Toffler, "The illiterate of the 21st Century will not be the ones who cannot read and write, but those who cannot learn, unlearn and relearn" and quoting Thomas L. Friedman as "In the twenty-first century, knowing all the answers won't distinguish someone's intelligence – rather the ability to ask all the right questions will

be the mark of true genius,” it is obvious that digital citizens are urgently needed to upskill, reskill and discard unnecessary old habits. The digital revolution has dramatically changed the landscape of work life, social life and family life. In order to catch up with the rising tide of digitalisation and to leverage adaptability, there is an urgent need to focus on life-long learning programs and ultimately the willingness to cope with those programs.

digitalising education policy and the education system is a priority in coping with 21st century challenges and to equip with skills necessary in the age of digital revolution. That involves digitalising educational infrastructure such as equipping schools with digital learning labs and innovation hubs where digital literacy and IT literacy are taught starting in early childhood. In doing so, ASEAN policy on digital literacy will be implemented by ASEAN-level educational institutions and the respective national-level private sectors and government agencies. The ASEAN educational institutions with support from the ASEAN Secretariat need to initiate Tech Camps where youths and entrepreneurs can exchange and compete their ideas and eventually to develop an ASEAN Silicon Valley where IT literate youths can develop digital solutions for ASEAN’s challenges and problems.

Building up life-long learning programs is a key area in fully adapting to the digital economy. Private and public educational institutions can work hand-in-hand to develop educational programs and opportunities for professionals and for the elderly. The SEAMEO [Southeast Asia Ministers of Education Organization](#) is a successful case study of regional cooperation in education. SEAMEO was established in 1965 with the aim of promoting cooperation through education, science and culture in the Southeast Asia, and has had seven associated member countries since 2011. Over the past four decades,

SEAMEO has achieved human resource and professional development activities in the region. Similar life-long learning projects with respect to IT literacy and digital education should be initiated ASEAN-wide and nationwide. Free online learning platforms on social media and on educational websites should be developed with financing from respective government and from international organisations.

Democratising the ASEAN Secretariat

While there is no doubt that inequality exists among ASEAN member states, there arises questions concerning the level of benefits gained from the region which might come up with separatism among the member states. Thus, the ASEAN Secretariat needs to be strong, transparent and independent, which would act as a 'glue' for the member states. It needs to initiate reforms in political governance and economic management which will then lead to the demand for change and reform at the national level by open democratic system (Pitsuwan, 2017). ASEAN's way of "consensus building" and "principle of non-interference" weakens the voice and stand of the ASEAN secretariat and reduces the reliability of ASEAN. There is also a diffusion of roles and duties of each consistent organ¹ and how they relate to each other (Chongkittavorn, 2012). Stronger human resources and transparent democratic elections for ASEAN leadership are fundamental requirements for a successful ASEAN.

Inclusivity: growing together

There is a moral obligation to leave no one behind nor to forbid opportunities to enjoy the fruits of digital revolution. The female population of the ASEAN region is greater than that of men with the ratio of 99.8

males for every 100 females and so it is literally impossible to fully thrive in the digital economy without involving women. As Asian perceptions traditionally indicate that men should and are more able to study STEM Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics than women, it is undeniable that this perception influences ASEAN society. In Cambodia, 94% of doctoral students and 79% of researchers in STEM fields are men (Jamann, 2017). Around 60% of students in Myanmar Computer University are women, but the number of women in the field after graduation drops off due to cultural norms and lack of support from the government and private sector (Powell & Chang, 2016). Thus, there is an urgent need for the governments of ASEAN to ensure an equal playing field for both women and men in the ICT field in terms of educational support and job opportunities. Guaranteeing an equal playing field involves governments' commitment as well as huge support from a wide range of private sectors to implement gender equality policies. Empowering non-governmental organisations is another aspect to promoting women's involvement in ICT and to equip women with necessary ICT skills.

Willingness vs. Resistance and moral obligation

Not all the changes are welcomed by everyone. They also come with some level of resistance. Regardless of the willingness or resistance to changes, the reality is that no one can avoid the digital revolution and all we can do is to adapt to the new landscape. Those who can adapt innovatively and creatively will survive and thrive in the age of the digital economy, and those who resist blindly will fail.

The recipe to survive and thrive in the age of digital economy includes five ingredients: enforcement of strong legal foundation at both the ASEAN and national level; greater investment in the digital infrastructure of each ASEAN member state; deeper cooperation at the governmental, ministerial, private sector and individual levels in education; promoting adaptability programmes and in strengthening digital security agencies; reformation of the ASEAN Secretariat; and a strategy of inclusivity.

Besides the visible actions mentioned above, the political will by all governments of ASEAN is also necessary to initiate reforms and to be responsive to the immediate challenges. Last but not the least is the moral obligation and trust from all ASEAN citizens in the plans and policies implemented by ASEAN. Without trust and consent from the citizens, all the policies and action plans would be only on paper and even implemented partially. They will not be able to address the challenges the new reality poses. The moral obligation from stronger ASEAN member states to grow together along with the developing members is the top of all in developing what can be called the 'ASEAN Spirit' to thrive successfully in the age of the digital economy as 'One Vision, One Identity and One Community'.



Association
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



Theme 3

ASEAN-Korea Educational Cooperation for Mutual Understanding



Building a true and long-lasting partnership begins from a deep mutual understanding between each other. Education serves as an effective tool to reach this goal by raising awareness and promoting deeper understanding. In what ways are ASEAN and Korea cooperating in the educational sector to promote mutual understanding? What are the difficulties, and how can they improve this cooperation to foster better understanding?





Championing Sustainable ASEAN-Korea Educational Cooperation through 3Es

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Abstract

The deepening of the relations between ASEAN and Korea has been unprecedented specially in the recent years. The year 2017 was designated as the ASEAN-ROK Cultural Exchange Year by the leaders of ASEAN and Korea. To celebrate this momentous milestone, several events, such as the inauguration of the ASEAN Culture House in Busan, ASEAN

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Culture and Tourism Photo Contest and Exhibition, and the International Conference on ASEAN-Korea Partnership have been held. At the policy level, ASEAN has gained more interest from the Korean government. Since his inauguration as the new Korean president, President Moon Jae-in sent a special envoy to ASEAN for the first time. Furthermore, in one of her recent key speeches, Korea's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kang Kyung-wha, has highlighted three key points to deepen her country's relations with ASEAN: (1) the attainment of conjunct and sustainable growth, (2) the expansion of people-to-people exchanges, and (3) reciprocity in constructing an amicable East Asia.

In the area of education cooperation, ASEAN and Korea have also been working together towards a more enhanced and upgraded educational programs for its citizens. The leaders of the two regions adopted the *Joint Statement of the ASEAN-Korea Commemorative Summit* on the 25th Anniversary of the ASEAN-Korea Dialogue Relations and *ASEAN-Korea Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity (2016-2020)*. The Joint Statement and the Plan of Action are regarded as the predominant scheme for the ASEAN-Korea educational initiatives and programs, most of which are awareness and networking-oriented, youth-focused (particularly at university level), short-term, and typically government-led.

This paper argues that while educational cooperation between ASEAN and Korea has achieved so much progress, there are still significant challenges that need to be addressed. The first challenge is the numerical asymmetry between ASEAN and Korea. It can be seen from the number of people-to-people exchanges. For example, ASEAN students graduating in Korea outnumber Korean students graduating in ASEAN. Another

instance is the inequality between Korean and ASEAN Studies programmes. Korean Studies programme has been much more popular among students in ASEAN than Southeast Asian/ASEAN Studies programs in Korea. Organisational and perceptual gaps exist as well. Finally, there is an intuitive space between ASEAN and Korean people. The ASEAN perception of Koreans is more positive than the way Koreans see ASEAN people. To close these disparities, the this paper outlines the concept of 3Es as a policy recommendation. The 3Es are: empowering ASEAN and Korean youth, enhancing ASEAN-Korea institutional linkages, and ensuring a sustainable ASEAN-Korea relationship. These 3Es can be applied in two ways: (1) a comprehensive framework of ASEAN-Korea educational cooperation, and (2) a built-in approach for supervising the program.

Introduction

The year 2017 is a very meaningful year for both ASEAN and the Republic of Korea. It is the 50th anniversary of the establishment of ASEAN and the ASEAN-ROK Cultural Exchange Year. Events are aligned to pinpoint the vitality of their strategic partnership such as exchange programmes, academic conferences and art forums. Considering the latest statistics of people-to-people exchanges between ASEAN and Korea in 2015, the number of visitors from Korea to ASEAN was higher than those moving in the other direction (ASEAN-Korea Centre, 2016, p. 98). Furthermore, the figure of recorded ASEAN nationals living in Korea, both workers and students, has been increasing since 2000. They account for 26.7% of all registered foreigners in 2015 (ASEAN-Korea Centre, 2016, p. 122). This shows a similar

pattern to the trend of international marriages between ASEAN and Korea that has continuously grown (ASEAN-Korea Centre, 2016, p. 124).

The more ASEAN and Korea has been engaged, the more attention will be gained from policymakers. Lee (2015, p. 209) states that the essentiality of ASEAN has been positively perceived by the policymakers in the Korean government, particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defense. A very good example underpinning Lee's proposal is the dispatch of a special envoy to ASEAN for the first time. Seoul City Mayor Park Won-soon was delegated by President Moon Jae-in in order to disseminate collective interests in economic and security issues between ASEAN and Korea, especially the support of ASEAN in maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula (Song, 2017). Adding to that, the ASEAN Culture House was inaugurated in Haeundae-gu District, Busan on September 1. It is aimed at not only introducing ASEAN culture and history to Koreans but also heightening two-way people-to-people interactions (Lee, 2017).

These developments provide a great opportunity for both ASEAN and Korea to leverage their closer ties. Korea's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kang Kyung-wha, at the ASEAN-Korea Foreign Minister's Meeting commemorating the 50th ASEAN Anniversary and the 24th ARF [ASEAN Regional Forum](#) in Manila in early August, emphasised three prominent visions and strategies of the Korean government toward ASEAN: (1) the attainment of conjunct and sustainable growth, (2) the expansion of people-to-people exchanges, and (3) reciprocity in constructing an amicable East Asia (Kim, 2017, August 31). Likewise, Ambassador Kim Young-sun, Secretary General of the ASEAN-Korea Centre, highlighted 'two-way' and 'reciprocal' as the principal direction in moving ASEAN and Korea forward. He also adds 'knowledge-sharing' of development strategies and 'value-sharing' of

culture to promote regional integration (Kim, 2017). It is undoubted that these propositions are indispensable to the commitment in the future.


Building on these perspectives, the author argues that the formation of an educational coalition between ASEAN and Korea has an impressive passage but some trials still exist. These are numerical asymmetry between ASEAN and Korea in conjunction with organisational and perceptual intervals that need to be raised and narrowed. At the end, the author comes up with the concept of '3Es' to help improve the associated intelligence and trust between ASEAN and Korea. The 3Es are empowering ASEAN and Korean people, enhancing ASEAN-Korea institutional links, and ensuring the ASEAN-Korea sustainable partnership. This paper is divided into four parts. Firstly, it will clarify the notion of communal intuition that ASEAN and Korea should set as their central purpose. Second, the current scope of activities will be reviewed. Then the third section identifies emotional and associational voids between ASEAN and Korea. Finally, it will formulate some policy recommendations based on the 3Es.

Defining mutual understanding of ASEAN and Korea

Before elaborating on the activities and difficulties of ASEAN and Korea, it is imperative to define what 'mutual understanding' is supposed to be. In this article, the author will contend that connected discernment itself can be assessed both in terms of ends and means. As the ends, an interdependent grip is a state or perception of reciprocity in norms, beliefs, consciousness and interests in achieving any goals. Another dimension is to think about convertible insight as a process, interaction, communication, pattern of relations that is likely to be more cooperative than hostile. Benlian and Haffke (2016, p. 106) asserts that interactive apprehension can be

replaced by terms such as public or common perceptivity, interchangeable or hoarded knowledge, correlative or composite vision/recognition, perceptual congruence, consensus, convergence, and agreement. Hence, this paper will interpret the respective senses of ASEAN and Korea from the official documents that are accepted by both sides such as joint statements or plans of action.

Figure 1. Mutual understanding in ASEAN-Korea framework since 2014



• Source: Author's analysis from ASEAN Secretariat (2014a; 2014b)

Figure 1 is drawn from the *Joint Statement of the ASEAN-Korea Commemorative Summit on the 25th Anniversary of the ASEAN-Korea Dialogue Relations* in December 2014 plus the *ASEAN-Korea Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity (2016-2020)* (ASEAN Secretariat, 2014a, 2014b). Two-sided realisation, in these two endorsed chronicles, has been illustrated in specific operations. The author's thought on the plan is that three pillars of ASEAN cannot be separated. They are intertwined and influential on each other. In the joint statement, three predominant schemes comprise shared peace, shared prosperity, and shared progress. Figure 1 stipulates that a steady region

can be conducive to a growing amount of investment and capital while the advancement of resources can be attractive to further people-to-people exchanges. At the same time, these attributes can upgrade the unified breakthrough among three pillars and the community as a whole.

Keeping these intentions in mind, the ASEAN-Korea educational coaction for required recognition should be translated into three questions of what, how, and who. The first is, what has been undertaken so far to advocate the abstraction of concerted stability, gathered opulence, and cumulative movement? Next, how should the projects be designed to reinforce a ‘partaken and sustainable’ relationship between ASEAN and Korea? Lastly and most importantly, who are the targets of these events? The final point is the most compatible when discussing the plan or project implementation. Four groups of targets are categorised by the author: Korean people living in Korea, Korean people living in ASEAN, ASEAN people living in Korea, and ASEAN people living in ASEAN. As represented in Table 1, each grouping will be dealt with through dissimilar sorts of activities tailored either to awareness or engagement. The traits of educational programmes between ASEAN and Korea will be inspected in the following section.

Table 1. The quadrant of target groups of ASEAN-Korea educational cooperation

	Korea	ASEAN
Korea	(1) Ends: To be aware of ASEAN Means: Medias, lectures, workshops	(2) Ends: To engage with ASEAN society Means: Tourism, business, investment
ASEAN	(3) Ends: To engage with Korean society Means: Projects run by related organisations	(4) Ends: To be aware of Korea Means: K-Wave, workshops, conferences

Source: Author's analysis

Investigating the extent of ASEAN-Korea educational cooperation

ASEAN and Korea have worked out together over the years. Kim and Hong (2015, p. 257) claim that some socio-cultural agreements between ASEAN and Korea prevailed before 1990. After the convention of ASEAN-Korea joint sectorial cooperation committee in 1991, some cooperative projects were applied, such as ASEAN Week in Seoul, the Korean Language Training Program for Tour Guides, observation tours for ASEAN Insurance Supervisory Authorities, assistance for Visit ASEAN Year 1992, computer link network projects, the ASEAN Travel Fair, sellers-buyers exchange programmes, technical transfers in agriculture (Kim & Hong, 2015, p. 265-266) as well as capacity-building and training workshops including the Conference on Working toward a Cyber Pornography and Cyber Prostitution-Free Southeast Asia (Kim, 2015, p. 128-129). These proceedings reflect very diverse actions and motives in ASEAN-Korea educational concurrence from the outset.

At the institutional level, Kim and Hong (2015, p. 264) reveals that there was an attempt from the Korean government to create the 'ASEAN Promotion Centre' in the 1990s, although no concrete plan was adopted during that time. A number of ministerial meetings regarding education, culture and arts, labour, information, science and technology have been arrayed according to the ASEAN+3 configuration (Kim, 2015, p. 149-150). Various agreements, and working groups in wide-ranging affairs were also set up. These samples are the Agreement of ASEAN-Korea Forest Cooperation in 2010, the ASEAN-Korea Transport Cooperation Roadmap and the 27 joint projects for the year 2010-2014, the ASEAN-Korea Joint Science and Technology Committee in 2011, the formation of ASEAN-Korea

Film Community in 2012, and the ASEAN Connectivity Coordinating Committee-Korea Meeting on Connectivity initially held in 2013 (Kim, 2015, p. 128).

Generally, educational responsiveness for ASEAN nationals in Korea is comparable to Korean nationals in ASEAN in the mode of activity. Governmental entities including AKC [ASEAN-Korea Centre](#), the KF [Korea Foundation](#), the KOICA [Korea International Cooperation Agency](#), the Mission of the Republic of Korea to ASEAN, and the National Institute of International Education have played a significant role in binding the ASEAN people to Korean society through events and activities. For instance, ASEAN-Korea Centre has generated both educational and cultural programmes for ASEAN and Korean nationals in both ASEAN and Korea e.g. ASEAN art exhibitions, ASEAN culture and tourism photo exhibitions, the ASEAN-Korea Academic Essay Contest, ASEAN-Korea tourism capacity building, ASEAN school tours, the ASEAN Youth Career Mentorship Program, the ASEAN-Korea Youth Network Workshop, a lecture series on Southeast Asia for the Korean public (ASEAN-Korea Centre, 2017; Kim, 2017). along with full scholarships for ASEAN students and academics.

On the ASEAN side, the AUN [ASEAN University Network](#) and the ASEANFoundation have been a major actor in bridging ASEAN and Korea. The AUN has banded together with many institutions in Korea for many programmes e.g. ASEAN Cyber University (with Seoul Cyber University), ASEAN-Korea Academic Exchange Program (with the Korea Association of Southeast Asian Studies), the AUN and ASEAN+3 Educational Forum and Young Speakers Contest, the ASEAN Youth Cultural Forum, the ASEAN+3 Rector's Conference, the ASEAN Future Leaders' Programme (with Daejeon University). The most recent development in educational cooperation between ASEAN and Korea is the

deliberation between the AUN and Incheon National University to conduct the programme under the theme 'Port Cities'. Prospective actions involve one-year scholarships and possible joint research between Incheon National University and the ASEAN port-city university league (Dhirathiti, August 4, 2017).

Learning from these actualities, typical characteristics of ASEAN-Korea educational cooperation are awareness and networking-oriented, youth-focused (particularly university level), short-term, and mostly government-led. Fitting these events into the intentions of building 'shared peace, shared prosperity, and shared progress', they have advanced the interactions between ASEAN and Korean people. At least, they can improve the awareness and realisation of each other. The author had a chance to observe these events arranged by the AKC, the AUN, and the KF many times. It is worth noting that the participants enjoyed networking, making friends, and dissipating knowledge. Some of the activities are very relevant. For example, the AKC jointly organised the workshop on Korean unification with the KF in May 2016 to make the attendees envision the truce on the peninsula. Another event is the ASEAN-Korea Youth Forum held in September 2017 to foster the sense of global entrepreneurship among ASEAN and Korean youth.

Taking the quadrant of target groups (Table 1) into consideration, it is probably that almost all ASEAN-Korea educational collaborations are located in (3) as AKC has been frequently hosting the events to engage both ASEAN and Korean students with wonderful courage from its ASEAN colleagues such as the ASEAN Secretariat, the AUN, the ASEAN Foundation. ASEAN students studying in Korea are expected to be the aim of the programme. However, the author is not saying that the ASEAN side is inactive in interacting with the Korean students in ASEAN. This situation is due to the nature of people-to-people exchanges itself, in that

there are not a large number of Korean students in ASEAN member states. The Koreans in ASEAN member states are usually tourists, businessmen, and retirees (ASEAN-Korea Centre, 2016, p. 97, p. 98, p. 106; Wilson & Koh, 2013; Lim, 2016). How to address this lop-sidedness between ASEAN and Korea will be examined in the next section.

Recognising the breathing space of educational cooperation

After examining the arrangements of ASEAN-Korea educational collaboration so far, this section will determine its divergence. Kim (2017) indicates the status of ASEAN-Korea higher educational cooperation in five fields: rising communication in higher education, unbalanced associations and flow of student mobility, a market-oriented approach to higher educational synergy, event-oriented as a dominant style, and the shortage of worries about human resource development in ASEAN member states and, frankly speaking, the controversy of brain drain. Referring to his presentation, the first difficulty is the imbalances on educational exchanges. The number of ASEAN students graduating in Korea is higher than Korean students graduating in ASEAN. A similar pattern is found in the balance between Korean studies and Southeast Asian/ASEAN studies. Korean studies has been much more popular in ASEAN than Southeast Asian/ASEAN studies in Korea.

Secondly, the exertion of the programmes may have some challenges. In the opinion of Anantasirikiat (2016, p. 216), “educational programmes are anticipated to build a long relationship at a high cost with uncertain return.” Scrutinizing from an educational aspect, these features are acceptable because it is the responsibility of the government to allocate ‘public goods’ and value to society. As a student in politics and public

administration, the author truly understands this ‘cost-benefit’ perspective in project management. Yet, both ASEAN and Korean leaders have pledged to proceed with friendship, well-being, and generic betterment in addition to the ‘people-centred’ community and ‘inclusive’ regional development. The evaluation of the educational programmes should be performance-based not cost-based, so that they can reach the most efficient and effective execution.

Apart from the project assessment, ASEAN and Korea are encountering a third impediment: intuitive holes. In this paragraph, the author mirrors the attitudes of some ASEAN and Korean participants in the workshop of Korean Unification held in 2016. It is very compelling when one looks at the outcomes. Most ASEAN students joining the event have a positive view in comprehending Korean Unification at the site of Goseong-gun. It should be noted here that some ASEAN students expressed their appreciation and emotion toward the Korean families visiting the unification site. They also conceived the objective of the event which is to forge the ‘people-centred’ community and ‘networking’. However, one participant who is a descendent of Korean War veterans made interesting remarks. That participant covered the preeminent character of ASEAN judgment shaped by Korea’s soft power to the region such as developmental assistance, economic partnership, cultural promotion, and the spread of the ‘Miracle of the Han River’. The participant brought up the problem of ‘contextual difference’ when Korea tried to adapt its experiences to the ASEAN case (Anantasirikiat, 2016, p. 214).

Speaking from the constructivist view, not only material capabilities but also ideational factors do matter in outlining social reciprocal action in international society. Even though some parts of the K-Wave itself have a kind of dissonance with some ASEAN cultures such as transgender contentions in the Muslim world, its liking of appearances and behavioural

practices still works in the context of ASEAN (Shim, 2017). Simultaneously, the Korean view of ASEAN people is clashing. The illustration of illegal migrants is widespread in regular sense of Korean people when talking about ASEAN people (Nam, 2016). Plausible policy advice on this will be taken up in the succeeding final section.

Fulfilling the interludes with policy recommendations

The author introduces the creation of the 3Es to close the breathing space of ASEAN-Korea educational cooperation. The 3Es incorporate empowering ASEAN and Korean people, enhance ASEAN-Korea institutional interconnections, and ensuring ASEAN-Korea sustainable partnership. The key method to apply the 3Es in the real world is to contemplate them as a comprehensive framework for ASEAN-Korea educational cooperation in the next decades with some proposed activities. An additional technique is to accommodate the 3Es as a built-in approach for handling the programme.

3Es as a comprehensive framework of ASEAN-Korea educational cooperation

Empower ASEAN and Korean people

The principle of ‘no one left behind’ is a focal part of this framework. It is correct that general ASEAN-Korea educational cooperation stresses on the role of youth but the definition of ‘people’ here is wider. It includes the retirees, international couples, workers, the vulnerable groups, and so on. Consequently, educational programmes should focus on improving their capacity in functioning as training programmes for recreational activities for elderly people or knowledge-sharing programmes between ASEAN and Korean workers. Another type of activity is to extend the participation to different

target groups just like the workshop on unification for international couples or migrant workers, ASEAN-Korea essay contest for the general public, etc.

Enhance ASEAN-Korea institutional linkages

The account of institutional interdependence was concisely underlined in a prize-winning essay in the 2016 contest (Jang, 2016). It is captivating that the backing of Korean studies and Korean culture is very strong in ASEAN but mostly by Korean organisations themselves, including the embassies, the Korean cultural centres and Korean companies. These entities can be linked with the universities or high schools since some of them have Korean culture clubs that match the Korean government's interests. Concurrently, the alumni association of ASEAN students who graduate from Korea should be inaugurated to sustain the relationship and engagement between ASEAN students and Korea along with the alumni association of Korean students graduate from ASEAN. Thus, both ASEAN and Korea should maximise benefit from the like-minded institutions in pursuance of expanding the friendship network that can be a part of 'soft power projection' in the future.

Ensure ASEAN-Korea Sustainable Partnership

Embong (2017) steps up an essential concern on how valuable research fortified by ASEAN-Korea academic cooperation will be sponsored by the general public. The author's preliminary answer is that ASEAN and Korea should come up with a long-term strategy consisting of communication strategy and knowledge strategy. On communication strategy, Shim (2017) offers a 'media platform' as a possible solution. The author thinks that programmes like Korean TV show Non-Summit are an excellent idea for bringing the ASEAN and Korean youth together to circulate the present-day

affairs in ASEAN and Korean society. The programme can be accompanied in either English or Korean and ASEAN languages.

In addition, the author has two knowledge strategies that ASEAN and Korea should reinforce. The first one is the endowment of ASEAN roundtables in Korean universities. This roundtable would be a meeting of the students or people having keen interests in ASEAN to talk and share their own perceptions of ASEAN and Korea. The ASEAN-Korea Cooperation Fund is a potential financial source for this. Another programme is what the author learned from the Ship for Southeast Asian and Japanese Youth Program (SSEAYP). As Anantasirikiat (2016, p. 221) points out, ASEAN and Korea should constitute such programmes with a new form of implementation. It can be a car project travelling from Vietnam to Myanmar along the East-West Economic Corridor. Then, the participants will have a great opportunity to learn the real life of people and think about the future of the region together with other ASEAN and Korean friends.

3Es as a built-in approach for supervising the program

This part will reconsider the programme in the past as a sample of analysis. The 2016 ASEAN-Korea Youth Network Workshop is suited of the 3Es for three reasons. First of all, this activity was predetermined to moulding the mind of future generation as the driving force of the community building. The topic of ‘marine conservation’ is consistent to what ASEAN and Korea had agreed to coordinate. Next, the workshop was organised by the AKC in collaboration with the ASEAN Studies Center of Chulalongkorn University who worked as strategic partners in arranging one part of the programme in Thailand. This action can be perceived as an effort to strengthen the institutional linkage between ASEAN and Korea. Finally,

environmental issues are a shared belief and value of the international society. The 2016 workshop was also the first year which welcomed attendees from China and Japan, stepping up to a ASEAN+3 collaboration. Good will to ameliorate ASEAN-Korea sustainable partnership was witnessed in these entities through the communication and knowledge strategies.

Empower ASEAN and Korean people

According to Anantasirikiat (2014, p. 96), youth are outstanding actors in building the community. They can help bolster mutual understanding to their family, friends, peer groups, and the publics. Moreover, youth will play a constructive role in political, economic, and socio-cultural domain. In the present world, social media draws up the alternatives in campaigning and broadcasting the environmental safekeeping. This programme empowered them to do so by offering knowledge on ASEAN and marine protection in both academic and practical ways. Participants were also given a chance to communicate with local people, the direct stakeholders and shareholders in environmental management. Making video workshop taught them how to frame the view, implementing the projects, and calculating the results of their campaign. This echoes the real world how environmentalists have taken action for one activity.

Enhance ASEAN-Korea institutional linkages

Apart from developing people-to-people connectivity at the grass-roots level, this program provided great opportunities for students working in the field of environment, development, policy planning and performance, and international collaboration. In the policy discussion session, the specialists from these areas sit together and share their own insights. The

attendees of the programme were fortunate that they could practice with them before going to experience the reality. Institutional and site visits at Suncheon Bay Wetland Reserve, the Korea Institute of Ocean Science and Technology, the South Sea Research Institute, and the Kung Krabaen Bay Royal Development Study Center, were effective illustrations on how Korea and Thailand actualised the international covenants into national and local circumstances. Also, the attendees could figure out the division of task among encircled organisations from ASEAN and Korean insights.

Ensure ASEAN-Korea sustainable partnership


Sustainability has been underscored in the working documents at the global and regional level covering the Sustainable Development Goals and the ASEAN Vision 2025. Anantasirikiat (2014, p. 98) argues that youth can act as peace-builders, skilled labour, and ASEAN developers through their daily lives, particularly by using social media as a communication tool to connect the ideal world to practical world. The pictures of participants were announced through several media showing that they gathered in Korea and Thailand in August 2016, in favour of comforting the marine preservation. This programme is a valuable inception of building caring and sharing society from the grass-root level.

Conclusion

The author has investigated the activities by the approach of four quadrants of target audiences ranging from (i) the Koreans living in Korea, (ii) the Koreans living in ASEAN, (iii) ASEAN people living in Korea, and (iv) ASEAN people living in ASEAN. The result shows that most ASEAN-Korea

educational programmes target ASEAN students living in Korea because of the nature of people-to-people exchanges between ASEAN and Korea. As the author points out in the second section, the key features of ASEAN-Korea educational programmes are short-term, awareness and networking-based with the main focus on youth. In addition, these programmes are mostly run by government-related organisations. The author would like to indicate the four quadrants as an effective tool for either scholars or policymakers to analyse the objectives of the programme as well as the way to achieve them. This is why the author constructed the 3Es in order to close the space of the analysis by the four quadrants

The concept of 3Es affords two ways to solve the problem of numerical imbalances of people-to-people exchanges between ASEAN and Korea as well as the organisational and perceptual gap. To empower ASEAN and Korean people derives from the principle of ‘no one left behind’. Although it puts youth as the leading actor in the community building, it opens the platform for other stakeholders and shareholders in ASEAN-Korea educational cooperation. The second ‘E’ is to enhance ASEAN and Korea institutional correlations. This is a further step beyond the variety of people-to-people connectivity by evolving the personal relations to formal institutions. It also maximises the advantage of the students in both ASEAN and Korea with regard to elevating the performance of the project and share the cost with gain. Finally, the partnership between ASEAN and Korea will be sustained by the communication and knowledge strategies. The author also suggests some useful thoughts on the completion of built-in approach in managing the programmes in the future. All of the proposals are sincerely intended to make partnership more healthy and wealthy because ‘ASEAN-Korea, we are friends’.



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ASEAN and Korea Education as a Means towards a Higher Plane of Multilateral Cooperation

—Tan Yong Kang Nanyang Technological University

Abstract

A great number of us spend, or have spent, a significant part of our lives enriching our minds in academic institutions, and as we undergo the process of education, we come to learn about the world, its logic, and its intrigues. That entire experience, and the knowledge it imparts, goes on to shape the opportunities we receive, the advancement of our careers, our personal development, and many other aspects of our lives, in manners that are both apparent, and yet obscure. But not known to many is that the education we receive often serves a purpose other than just the individual's

pursuit of his or her goals in life, or at the broader national level, the development of a state's human resource capabilities. In fact, education is a vital tool for the proper conduct of international relations.

The primary purpose of this paper then, is to examine how ASEAN and Korea have sought to deepen their international cooperation by using education to imbue the values and attributes required amongst their respective citizens.

But to provide a more comprehensive analysis, the paper will first elucidate how education serves as the fundamental building block of diplomacy, and how works its way through the machinery of society, starting from the bottom, with the individual citizen, to the very top, where the arena of international politics rests.

To construct a more contextualised understanding of the educational cooperation between ASEAN and Korea, descriptions of a number of initiatives will be woefully insufficient. Therefore, this paper will go on to provide an evaluation of the current partnership, which will be helpful in identifying the difficulties and limitations present, such that areas for improvement can be determined. The potential pitfalls and hurdles that have been delineated will then pave the way for the possible policy alterations and solutions that can be adopted to alleviate the problems in the current relationship.

This paper will then conclude by highlighting the economic miracle that is Asia, and how ASEAN and Korea can take advantage of their geographical homelands' rise to economic pre-eminence by continuing to weave a fabric of closer transnational educational partnership to provide the necessary scaffolding for cooperation in all other fields.

Introduction

In recent years, the world has come to observe a marked increase in nationalist sentiments spreading across the West. With the United Kingdom's self-ejection from the European Union, to Donald Trump's shock electoral victory built on his firebrand populist nationalism, most of the world remains shell-shocked, while attempting to cautiously navigate this abrupt shift in the paradigm of international relations.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, home to over 640 million people (The ASEAN Secretariat, 2016a), has a new and pivotal role to play in combatting the 21st century threats to multilateralism. Its broad diplomatic network stretching across Asia can be developed into strategic weapons to maintain and develop the prospects of international cooperation against a backdrop of Western nationalism.

Maximising those weapons however, will require cooperation with its regional allies, and amongst those allies, the Republic of Korea, more commonly known as Korea, stands out in several key indicators. Cooperation between ASEAN and Korea is not nascent, and it in fact dates back to 1989, when sectoral dialogues first began. Following initial dialogues, Korea was accorded a full Dialogue Partner status in 1991 (The ASEAN Secretariat, 2017a).

With advancements in the diplomatic relationship, several channels of cooperation have now been established, ranging from the AKFTA [ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Agreement](#) , to the formation of the ASEAN+3 forum. Now as things stand, Korea is ASEAN's fifth-largest trade partner, with total trade amounting to over \$130 billion in 2014 (The ASEAN Secretariat, 2015a). Korea also invests heavily in ASEAN, with FDI [Foreign Direct Investment](#) into

ASEAN economies constituting 13% of its total FDI in 2016 (ASEAN-Korea Centre, 2017a). Most recently, both parties have also agreed to new measures aiming towards the integration of transport systems in East Asia at the 23rd ASEAN Transport Ministers Meeting (Tang, 2017).

But as we examine the tools of diplomacy, we come to a realisation that they are vast and varied, and so the focus of this paper will be on particular tool that is often overlooked and less cited: Education. Understandably, educational cooperation is much less detectable, for unlike the more conventional tools, it differs greatly in both means and ends. Where the more traditional tools tend to bind countries to well-publicised sets of mutually beneficial rules in areas like economic development, education takes a more nuanced approach to establishing the socio-cultural fundamentals that develop into the cornerstone of all other forms of cooperation.

However understated, education is nonetheless an essential diplomatic tool that endears states to develop friendlier relations and seek a greater degree of coadjuvancy through the power of ideas and cross-cultural understanding (Peterson, 2013). For relations between Korea and ASEAN, the story is one and the same, as education forms the bedrock of current and future cooperation between both parties.

Educational cooperation and its links to international relations

In his book *World Order*, former United States Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger summarised the obstacle to establishing a system for international cooperation as “how divergent historical experiences and values can be shaped into a common order” (Kissinger, 2014, p. 10). With that general

principle in mind, it is pertinent for us to forge a deeper understanding about how education seeks to bridge the socio-cultural divides that exist between a group of nations.

It is a well-understood fact that participating in global learning will raise our awareness of global events and cultures outside of our own, and that awareness can then be translated into a deeper understanding of the global economic, political, and socio-cultural machinery. But herein lies the key question: How does that understanding enable us to extend cooperation beyond national boundaries? According to World Savvy, an American non-profit aimed at incorporating global competence in the American education system (World Savvy, 2017), global education is about encouraging the individual to embody the following attributes:

- Openness to new opportunities, ideas, and ways of thinking
- Desire to engage with others
- Sensitivity and respect for differences
- Valuing multiple perspectives
- Empathy and humility (World Savvy, n.d.)

These values will go a long way in establishing better lasting relationships between states, for they nurture new perceptions that are understanding towards different cultures, traditions, and belief systems. They also encourage critical thinking about the historical events that have come to shape the different communities existing around us. Only by encouraging people to engage in a journey of discovery and digging deeper into what is unknown to them, will they be better able to comprehend and leverage the diversity that exists in our world. That higher-level understanding

will manifest itself in the formation of a vast network of social-cultural cross-linkages that transcends national boundaries, paving the way for the amplification of a sustainable diplomatic relations between a group of nations.

With the mechanism through which education impacts international relations now well-illustrated, we can forge on to examine how ASEAN and Korea have been cooperating in the educational sector.

Educational cooperation between ASEAN and Korea

Educational cooperation between ASEAN and Korea began upon the institutionalisation of ASEAN+3 at its third summit in 1999 (The ASEAN Secretariat, 2017b). Since then, extensive progress has been achieved in this area, with the landmark moment being the adoption of the *ASEAN Plus Three Plan of Action on Education for 2010-2017*, from which numerous initiatives to integrate the educational sectors of ASEAN and East Asian countries have originated.

However, while formal cooperation officially began 18 years ago, a form of ‘tacit cooperation’ amongst institutions of higher learning in ASEAN member states and Korea had existed prior to the Third ASEAN+3 Summit. It must be noted that the word ‘tacit’ is no indicator of secretive collusion, but rather that tertiary institutions in both ASEAN and Korea have had a history of dedicating resources to a particular field of study that equips students with a better understanding of regional affairs, and that field is East Asian studies.

Notable ASEAN universities that have long been offering East Asian studies include, Malaysia’s University of Malaya’s Department of East Asian Studies established in 1996 (University of Malaya, 2017), and the National

University of Singapore's East Asian Institute founded in 1997 (NUS - EAI, 2017). A number of Korean universities have also been lauded for their courses and programmes in relation to the field of East Asian studies. For example, Korea University offers a bachelor's program in international studies with the possible specialisation in area studies, under which students are exposed to Southeast Asian history and current affairs (Korea University, 2017). Similarly, students undertaking the Asian history course at Seoul National University (SNU) are also required to take modules in relation to Southeast Asian affairs (SNU, 2017). While this 'tacit cooperation' may not have been a mass coordinated effort, the promotion of East Asian studies and ASEAN studies is in fact under the list of commitments agreed under both the *Joint Statement of the ASEAN-ROK Commemorative Summit* (The ASEAN Secretariat, 2015b) and the ASEAN+3 Cooperation Workplan 2018-2022. In the ASEAN+3 workplan, member states have highlighted the importance of these two fields of study in cultivating a unique East Asian identity in the regional community (The ASEAN Secretariat, 2017c). Therefore, while it is hard to measure the quantitative contribution of such universities towards establishing a better partnership prior to any formal cooperation, the fact that ASEAN+3 is now focusing on these programmes gives significant weight to their perceived effectiveness. Hence there is no doubt that the continuing education of students in East Asian studies on both sides of the aisle has forged a higher understanding of the cultural heritage and history of the region.

Returning to the modes of formal cooperation between ASEAN and Korea, we come to see that there has been significant progress achieved in the bilateral relations. On 4 July 2012, the First ASEAN Plus Three Education Ministers Meeting was convened in Yogyakarta, where participant ministers reaffirmed their countries continuous commitment towards the

ASEAN Plus Three Plan of Action on Education for 2010-2017 (The ASEAN Secretariat, 2012). Since then, a slew of positive developments has flowed from that commitment, and they run the gamut from establishing an integrated network of universities in ASEAN+3 countries to the regular reviewing of educational policies associated with the Plan of Action. Examples include the ASEAN+3 UNet ASEAN Plus Three University Network, its affiliated initiatives, and the ongoing ASEAN Plus Three Working Group on Mobility of Higher Education and Ensuring Quality Assurance of Higher Education.

The ASEAN+3 UNet traces its origins to the formation of the AUN [ASEAN University Network](#) in November 1995 (The AUN Secretariat, 2017a). Following that, at the 11th ASEAN+3 Summit held in Singapore in 2007, member states initiated the *ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation Work Plan (2007-2017)*, under which provisions for the expansion of the AUN to include universities from China, Japan, and Korea were adopted, giving birth to the ASEAN+3 UNet (The AUN Secretariat, 2017b). As of today, the ASEAN+3 UNet has a set of multifarious programmes that encourage student exchanges between ASEAN and Korean youths in tertiary institutions.

For example, the master of arts programme in Korean studies, with its signature collaboration between Chulalongkorn University and SNU, has enrolled a total of 25 students (as of 2015) from Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. Under this programme, students enrol at Chulalongkorn University and spend one semester at SNU, where they are required to take two elective modules and the Korean Language (The AUN Secretariat, 2015).

The Fostering Future ASEAN Leaders Programme is another similar initiative. Each year around 20 students from the fields of information

and communications technology, and humanities and social sciences, are awarded a scholarship to partake in a one-year exchange programme at Daejeon University. Besides undergoing regular academic rigour, participating students are also offered the opportunity to intern at prestigious Korean organisations such as the ASEAN-Korea Centre, the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, and the Korea Advanced Institute for Science and Technology – Centre for Science-based Entrepreneurship (The AUN Secretariat, 2016).

Both the masters of arts programme in Korean studies and the Fostering Future ASEAN Leaders Programme play an important role by providing a common platform for ASEAN and Korean students to interact, which is key to nurturing a cooperative mindset, coupled with the immersion in and understanding of the cultural differences between ASEAN and Korea.

Additionally, the AUN also collaborates with the KASEAS [Korea Association of Southeast Asian Studies](#) to organise and implement the ASEAN-ROK Academic Exchange Programme, where selected scholars and students are invited to conduct research in their respective fields of expertise. They are then presented the opportunity to share and discuss their findings and insights at the bi-annual ASEAN-ROK Academic Conference, on how ASEAN and Korea can move forward in forging an intellectual community dedicated to transnational development and greater solidarity in the region (The AUN Secretariat, 2017c).

Besides organising educational exchange programmes, the ASEAN+3 UNet is also attempting to develop a framework for greater integration of institutions of higher education and harmonisation of educational standards in the ASEAN+3 region through the use of the ACTS [ASEAN Credit Transfer System](#). Under the ACTS, students on AUN Exchange Programmes will be able to

immerse themselves in a different culture and simultaneously obtain the credits they require for fulfilling their academic obligations (The AUN Secretariat, 2017d). The project's ultimate aim is to elevate student mobility in the region, allowing member universities to bridge gaps in their cooperation.

Korea has also shared its advanced e-learning technology with developing ASEAN nations under the ACU [ASEAN Cyber University](#) project. The project initially involved universities from the CLMV [Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam](#) countries and the AUN in partnership with Seoul Cyber University (ACU, 2017). Building upon Seoul Cyber University's relevant expertise in the sphere of online university courses, and with Vietnam's assistance in piloting the development of the required e-learning infrastructure (UWN, 2011), the ACU was founded to make higher learning more affordable and accessible in the less privileged CLMV countries. Now, given the ACU's rapid pace of development, its membership has expanded to include Thai universities and is expected to incorporate all of ASEAN by 2020 (Lee, 2015), in an ambitious bid to forge a highly-integrated university network.

On top of collaborating in programmes catered to educational joint cooperation, ASEAN member states and Korea are also members of the ASEAN Plus Three Working Group on Mobility of Higher Education and Ensuring Quality Assurance of Higher Education. Established after the First ASEAN Plus Three Education Ministers Meeting in 2012 (Kitamura, 2016), the working group and its sub-committees are primarily tasked with overseeing the smooth implementation and execution of transnational educational programmes in the ASEAN+3 region. The working group also ensures that these programmes contribute to higher student mobility and greater harmonisation of educational standards in the region (Wajjwalku, Ho, & Yoshida, 2016). For example, the working group oversees the ASEAN Credit Transfer

System and proposes solutions to rectify problems that students face while on their exchange programmes, such as non-recognition of credits obtained at partner universities (Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports - Japan, 2017).

From the long list of collaborative educational projects between ASEAN and Korea, one can conclude that there have been a great many achievements and a rapid expansion in innovative practices that would define the partnership as a success. However, achieving the ultimate goal of forging a more intimate working relationship between the two regional powers is a continuous process that requires a constant tweaking of policies, and it would be wise to identify the limiting factors that inhibit a closer partnership.

Limitations of the current modes of educational cooperation

As affirmed by the *Joint Statement of the ASEAN-ROK Commemorative Summit*, the importance of cultivating an East Asian community united by a single vision cannot be understated (The ASEAN Secretariat, 2015b), for it is an essential prerequisite for a closer partnership between ASEAN and Korea. Key to establishing that community is a deep and relatable sense of mutual understanding and camaraderie amongst citizens from both blocs. For the educational cooperation between the two parties to serve this purpose, it has to expand its scope to encompass a wider group of students.

While the current programmes serve well in providing the necessary platforms for cultural exchanges to occur at the tertiary level, they play a much less prominent role in primary, secondary, and pre-tertiary educational institutions. Given the multiplicity in the levels of development in the ASEAN+3 region, it follows naturally that the gross enrolment rate

Table 1. Gross enrolment rates for tertiary education (both genders) in selected ASEAN member states and Korea (2013 – 2015)

Gross tertiary education enrolment rate (%)			
	2013	2014	2015
Brunei Darussalam	24.3	31.7	30.8
Cambodia	-	-	13.1
Indonesia	31.3	31.1	24.3
Laos	18.1	17.3	16.9
Malaysia	36.4	27.6	26.1
Philippines	33.6	35.8	-
Republic of Korea	95.3	94.2	93.2
Singapore	82.7	86.6	89.5
Thailand	51.4	52.5	48.9
Vietnam	25.0	30.5	28.8

All data rounded-up to the nearest one decimal place

• Source: UNESCO Institute of Statistics and Data.gov.sg

for tertiary education varies vastly as well. As illustrated in Table 1, with the exception of Singapore and Korea, the rate remains relatively low. Consequently, restraining educational cooperation to the tertiary level risks limiting the effectiveness of any initiatives to a small group of individuals in selected institutions. That in-turn prevents the creation of a vast network of social-cultural cross-linkages amongst the general populace that is required for ASEAN and Korea to enhance their diplomatic relationship.

Moreover, it can be observed that the current educational exchange programmes organised by ASEAN and Korea generally exhibit a tilt towards the humanities and social sciences, with less emphasis placed on students pursuing other academic courses (The AUN Secretariat, 2016). Though it is understandable that forging a unique East Asian identity through the extensive study of cultural heritage, traditions, and history is key to establishing a deeper mutual understanding, excessive focus on this field of

study will inevitably exclude a large pool of students specialising in other areas from opportunities to augment their learning experiences with the immersion in a different culture. This will certainly have a knock-on impact on the realisation of the goals of the ASEAN-Korea working relationship.

Aside from the policy-specific limitations of the educational initiatives launched by ASEAN and Korea, another impediment to closer educational cooperation between both parties is an ASEAN-centric issue that has been earmarked as a key focus area by policy-makers in the region (US Agency for International Development, n.d.). However, before identifying that issue, it would be helpful to take a look at certain statistics in relation to it.

As highlighted in Table 2, there exists a large disparity between the levels of government spending on education in ASEAN member states, with spending peaking at 29.5% of total government expenditure in

Table 1. Government spending on education (% of total government expenditure) in 2012.

Government spending on education (% of total government expenditure)	
	2012
Brunei Darussalam	16.9
Cambodia	-
Indonesia	20.2
Laos	13.2**
Malaysia	21.3**
Myanmar	6.1
Philippines	12.3***
Singapore	21.0
Thailand	29.5*
Vietnam	19.8***

*data for 2011, **data for 2010, ***data for 2009

• Source: ASEAN State of Education Report 2013

Thailand and dipping to just 6.1% in Myanmar. With the percentage of a government's budget dedicated to education representing the country's ability to invest in the development of its human resource capabilities, the divergence in government funding is indeed an area for concern (The ASEAN Secretariat, 2014).

Drawing a link to the educational cooperation between ASEAN and Korea, it quickly becomes clear that the limited capacity of a number of ASEAN nations to invest in educational institutions will be a hurdle to the expansion of any joint educational programmes launched by both parties. The success of any educational partnership undertaken by ASEAN and Korea in creating cross-cultural understanding is directly linked to the magnitude and the reach of the programmes launched. With around half of ASEAN seriously lagging behind in government funding for education, the size and scope of these initiatives will be undoubtedly curtailed by the limitations in funds available.

Having crafted a contextualised analysis of the current modes of partnership, logically our scrutiny should shift towards the possible policy solutions that can help overcome the hurdles present in the current framework. With this in mind, the solutions proposed will aim to expand the aperture of ongoing initiatives, as well as address the difficulties that arise from the diversity of ASEAN member-nations.

Improvements to the current mode of educational cooperation

East Asia is a region unlike any other, with a rich cultural heritage and a shared common history dating back several millennia. It is also an economic powerhouse (Bunker & Ciccantell, 2007) and leads the global economy with a

forecasted growth rate of 6.0% for 2017 (ADB, 2017). ASEAN and Korea, both party to the stellar rise of East Asia, should harness this vibrancy, and tailor their educational cooperation to follow suit.

One possible enhancement to the present initiatives would be a more extensive harmonisation of the academic curriculums of ASEAN nations and Korea. In this regard, harmonisation does not equate to the complete convergence of the academic structures of all eleven nations. Rather, it calls for a more coordinated effort in establishing an ASEAN-Korean identity through a common curriculum of Southeast Asian and Korean studies in all educational institutions. Currently, Korean students are exposed to mostly Korean history prior to entering university (Clark & Park, 2013), while Singaporean students are provided the option to study history from the secondary level, under which East Asian history is a compulsory topic (Ministry of Education - Singapore, 2016).

Therefore, while the convergence in this field at the tertiary level (under the ASEAN+3 UNet framework) is noteworthy, present cooperation seems to concentrate mostly on tertiary institutions, neglecting students at the lower levels. The creation and propagation of an integrated Korean and Southeast Asian studies syllabus, incorporating students at the primary, secondary, and pre-tertiary levels, will foster a closer integration of students and teachers (UNESCO - IBE, 2017) across the 11 nations. That will also provide the pathway for better cross-cultural understanding to expand beyond a select few individuals, and penetrate educational institutions at all levels.

In concurrence with the inclusion of students at lower educational levels, it would also make sense to expand current educational cooperation to encompass students in other fields of study. As mentioned, the educational programmes launched in tandem by ASEAN and Korea lean towards the

humanities and social sciences, which in-turn excludes students specialising in other areas.

As the world economy undergoes rapid digitalisation, Singapore and Korea are at the forefront of the 'Fourth Industrial Revolution'. Korea has emerged top of the Bloomberg 2017 Innovation Index (Jamrisko & Lu, 2017), and evidence of the innovativeness of its economy lies in its conglomerates like LG and Samsung, who are now leaders in the global market for consumer electronics (Deutsche Welle, 2016). Singapore on the other hand, has secured the top spot in the 2016 Pisa rankings, indicating that Singaporean youths have surpassed their global counterparts in the fields of mathematics, reading, and science (Coughlan, 2016).

In a similar spirit to the ACU collaboration, the two most advanced economies in the partnership can play a crucial role by lending their expertise to the rest of the region, which is undeniably less endowed. With Korea as global leader in innovative technologies and engineering, and Singapore cultivating a world-class education system, much can be done to expand educational cooperation into the fields of science and technology, by increasing the availability of technical and vocational education and training opportunities across the region (ASEAN-Korea Centre, 2015). Such an endeavour would then require Singaporean educational authorities and institutions to work closely with Korean companies in creating a transnational education framework, under which there would be greater sharing of and access to the relevant knowledge and expertise. One product of such a system could be the establishment of technological universities in ASEAN nations, backed by Korean multinational companies, with operating systems and teaching methods modelled after Singaporean educational institutions. On top of improving the human resource capabilities in the region, the goodwill

accumulated by filling current gaps in educational spending in certain ASEAN nations will also provide the scaffolding for ASEAN and Korea to take their working relationship to a higher level (Velloor, 2017).

Conclusion


The famed American educator, Ivan Welton Fitzwater, once declared:

“The future of the world is in my classroom today, a future for the potential for good and bad...” (Fitzwater, n.d.)

These axiomatic words sum up the power of education tidily and they can be interpreted in a variety of manners. In the case of the ASEAN-Korea relationship, education is an indispensable component of an increasingly intertwined partnership. By informing the young minds in our region about the similarities we share, and encouraging them to embrace the diversity of our cultures, education seeks to forge an all-inclusive East Asian community, to which we can all call home. Only with this shared community, will there be a continuous flow of mutual reliance and goodwill, that will enable ASEAN and Korea to constantly seek-out new common ground and build upon existing areas of cooperation.

The future of Asia is a bright one. With Asian economies now dominating the globe, the burgeoning wealth of the Asian middle class has evolved into the engine for global economic growth. Both ASEAN and Korea have contributed to that exponential growth in prosperity, and it should be no surprise that both parties will play an even larger role in the years to come. Although this paper lacks the ability to provide an entirely comprehensive understanding and review of ASEAN-Korea relations, there

is no doubt that a greater level of cooperation will nudge both parties in the direction of enhancing the development of their respective societies and reaping the maximum benefits of international cooperation.



Higher Education Cooperation with ASEAN-Korea Academic Communities

Case Study on Parliamentary Debate in Asia

—Hong Minhyuk Kyung Hee University

Abstract

Affirming the significance of the ASEAN-Korea relationship and the role that educational cooperation plays in its development, this thesis seeks to elucidate upon a method of educational cooperation that possesses the capacity to foster deeper mutual understanding and awareness. In order to do so, this paper begins by providing a comprehensive analysis regarding the current educational cooperation efforts of ASEAN and Korea, thereby identifying how such endeavours mainly incorporate partnerships within higher education. Through this analysis, this thesis argues that the unilateral management of cooperation initiatives limits their effectiveness and

accentuates the need to pursue a multilateral approach instead. Taking this into consideration, this essay presents its proposal of forming institutional partnerships with pre-existing academic communities by elaborating upon the conceptual definition, implementation process, and expected effectiveness of this proposal. Moreover, in order to ensure high feasibility, this thesis assesses the given model through the perspective of game theory. Through this analysis, this thesis will recognize the problem-agent problem that could potentially become advent from such partnerships, and alleviate such concerns by emphasizing the repeating nature of such cooperation and the natural incentives that derive from it. Building upon this analysis, this thesis will introduce an academic community in which such solutions can be implemented through a case study on The Debating Community of Korea and Asia, as this sector of academic cooperation successfully exemplifies the academic cooperation, academic mobility, and university networking that ASEAN and Korea are attempting to pursue.

1. Research Background

a. ASEAN-Korea Relations

The political, economic, and cultural relationships shared and treasured by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and Korea have never been stronger. In the political domain, ASEAN and Korea are cooperating through ASEAN-led mechanisms, such as ASEAN+3, in order to enhance regional peace and prosperity while establishing a regional institutional framework for the future (ASEAN-Korea FTA, 2012). Through such efforts, there have been no open conflicts between ASEAN member states since 1975 (ASEAN, 2012). In regards to the economic domain, ASEAN is the second largest trading partner as well as the second largest investment destination of Korea, while Korea is ASEAN's sixth largest trading partner (ASEAN-Korea Centre, 2016). Furthermore, this economic relationship has expanded 15 times in scale from 1989 to 2015, and this figure is expected to increase even more through the impending ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Agreement (ASEAN-Korea Centre, 2017). In consideration to the cultural domain, ASEAN is the most popular travel destination for Koreans, while Korea is the third most popular for ASEAN tourists. This tourism, combined with 'Hallyu', has resulted in a significant upsurge of cultural interactions and mutual interests (ASEAN-Korea Centre, 2017). However, it must be affirmed that the utility derived from this relationship has not yet reached its limit, as the joint statement released at the ASEAN-ROK Commemorative Summit of 2014 affirms that additional political-security, economic, and socio-cultural cooperation between the two entities is impending (ASEAN, 2014). All in all, it is clear that this relationship is truly beneficial for both ASEAN and Korea, and that its benefits are still on the rise.

b. Education Cooperation

By reaffirming the importance of the ASEAN-Korea relationship, it is imperative that educational cooperation should be strengthened to protect and further develop this relationship. To elucidate, education cooperation in the context of this paper can be defined as mutual educational efforts that are pursued to enhance cultural interaction. This is necessary as such forms of cultural diplomacy promote the mutual respect and understanding needed to achieve improved cooperation, thereby enabling the utility of such associations to be procured (Academy for Cultural Diplomacy, 2012). Accordingly, it is ubiquitously utilised in the international sector as a highly effective means of raising mutual awareness and understanding, particularly by entities that share similar values. Similarly, ASEAN affirmed the need for such programmes in its *Strategic Plan for Culture and Arts 2016-2025* (ASEAN Strategic Plan for Information and Media 2016-2025, 2016), while asserting the need to increase the number of such programmes in its *Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025* (ASEAN, 2016). Hence, it is clear that education cooperation is crucial to sustaining and improving the multi-dimensional relationship shared by ASEAN and Korea.

c. Research Design

This paper will propose an education cooperation model with the potential to foster international interaction as well as people-to-people connectivity. In order to do so, it will evaluate the current education cooperation efforts of ASEAN and Korea in order to identify the type of education cooperation that is being pursued. Following such findings, the current system will be assessed, so as to recognise the limitations that restrict its effectiveness. Building upon this analysis, this paper will

present its proposal through elucidating upon its conceptual definition, implementation process, and expected effectiveness. However, the author concedes that no solution is perfect, and that all actions instigate a potential reaction. Consequently, this paper will analyse its proposals through the perspective of game theory in order to determine and overcome the potential limitations of the given model. Subsequent to this, this essay will conduct a case study on the academic community of (mock) Parliamentary Debates in Korea and ASEAN in order to provide a potential academic sector in which this proposal can be implemented. Finally, this paper will conclude by evaluating the plausibility of this model as well as its potential prospects.

2. ASEAN-Korea Education Cooperation

a. Overview: Cooperation within Higher Education

Through the consortium known as the ASEAN+3 University Network, ASEAN and Korea accentuates academic partnerships within higher education in order to pursue academic cooperation, mobility, and networking (ASEAN, 2009). In order to understand such endeavours, the ASEAN+3 Educational Forum and Young Speakers Contest, the ASEAN-ROK Academic Exchange Programme, and the ASEAN Cyber University project that epitomise the higher education cooperation pursued by the two entities will be elaborated. To begin with, the ASEAN+3 Educational Forum and Young Speakers Contest is a competition in which students can confer their concerns and opinions on topics relevant to ASEAN. Through this, it was hoped that collaborative youth networks would be established

between ASEAN and Korea (AUN, 2015). Moreover, the ASEAN-ROK Academic Exchange Programme provides students from ASEAN and Korea with the opportunity to travel to ASEAN or to Korea in order to carry out research that strengthens regional and bilateral relations (AUN, 2016). Following such research, a preparation workshop and an academic conference is convened to consolidate the academic community of ASEAN and Korea while disclosing the results of the research (AUN, n.d.). Finally, the ASEAN Cyber University project is an e-learning platform used by universities in Korea, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Vietnam, and Thailand (ACU Project, n.d.) in order to enhance communication through the removal of spatial restraints (Korea Institute for Curriculum and Evaluation, 2015).

Furthermore, various credit transfer systems are utilised as well. To elucidate, these systems measure the academic progress and achievements of students in different educational systems (European Credit Transfer and Accumulation Systems, n.d.), thereby allowing students to attend universities in various countries (ASIC News, 2015). Moreover, although numerous credit transfer systems can be identified within and beyond the ASEAN region, some of the systems, namely the UMAP Credit Transfer System, the AUN's ASEAN Credit Transfer System, and SEAMEO-RIHED's Academic Credit Transfer Framework for Asia can be considered to be the most relevant in ASEAN-ROK relations. To begin with, the UMAP Credit Transfer System involves 35 countries, including Korea and eight ASEAN member states with over 570 participating universities ("About UMAP", n.d.). This system incorporates the usage of Asian Academic Credits, which enable academic institutions in Asia to mutually transfer credits on a one-to-one basis (Hotta, 2016). Continuing on, the AUN's ASEAN Credit Transfer System consists of the 'elite' universities of ASEAN and Japan, and Korea's participation is also anticipated (Henard et al,

2016). Finally, the Academic Credit Transfer Framework for Asia is currently under development and will eventually incorporate 7,000 higher education institutions from member states of the Greater Mekong Sub-region, ASEAN, Japan, and Korea within its scope of operations (“Credit Transfer System”, n.d.), and will utilise the Asian Credit System as well (Hotta, 2014).

b. Limitation: Unilateral Management of Cooperation Efforts

Regarding these endeavours, the unilateral approach used in enhancing inclusiveness and awareness restricts its effectiveness. To elucidate, the regional institutions of ASEAN and Korea lead such educational cooperation efforts by utilising a top-down approach, rather than through jointly cooperating with the individuals that participate in it (Nguyen, 2009). However, it must be noted that these institutions do not possess the adequate capacity (Nguyen, 2009) nor the national commitment and governmental support needed to independently pursue and maintain these efforts (Henard et al, 2016). Consequently, it has been evaluated that the current promotional efforts are insufficient and only raises awareness to those who are ‘already aware’ (Nguyen, 2009). For this reason, there were no participants from Korea in the ASEAN+3 Educational Forum and Young Speaker Contest in 2015 (AUN, n.d.) and in the ASEAN-ROK Academic Exchange Programme from 2004 to 2011 (AUN, n.d.).

Moreover, due to such limited capabilities, it has been argued that mobility and interaction within ASEAN is relatively low as only a limited amount of universities are included within the scope of operation of these cooperation efforts (Henard et al, 2016). To provide support, only six schools from ASEAN are affiliated to the ASEAN Cyber University project (Methaneethorn,

2015), which has led to the Education Ministers of the ASEAN+3 to include the need to expand this mechanism to include more participant universities (ASEAN, 2016). In addition, it was also assessed that not many higher educational institutions are incorporated within the UMAP Credit Transfer System (Henard et al, 2016), as only nine universities in Korea are affiliated to this network ("UMAP Membership", n.d.). Similarly, although the inclusiveness of the ASEAN Credit Transfer System is already low as it only consists of first-tier universities, no university from Korea has yet entered into this partnership (Henard et al, 2016). All in all, it has been assessed that East Asia is far behind other regions of the world in regards to the policy harmonisation of higher education, thus requiring additional multilateral efforts to include a larger array of individuals as well as to raise participation in such processes (Nguyen, 2009).

3. Cooperation Model: Institutional Partnerships with Academic Communities

a. Conceptual Definition

Taking such analysis into consideration, this paper proposes that national and regional institutions develop partnerships with the international academic communities of ASEAN and Korea. To be specific, these communities refer to the tertiary networks of certain academic sectors specialising in activities such as parliamentary debate, model UN conferences, and educational volunteering that already exist between ASEAN and Korea. Through these partnerships, this paper asserts that national and regional institutions can further the ability of these academic

communities to thrive by assisting them in a variety of ways. In regards to this, although the methods of providing such assistance are potentially numerous, this thesis will elaborate upon this by accentuating the need for the government to independently convey platforms for interaction in addition to supporting those that already exist.

b. Implementation Process

To elucidate, these efforts can be initiated with a ‘transition phase’ in which national and regional institutions will need to conduct studies on the target academic sector in order to acquire the information needed to enter into it. Such studies can be complemented with interviews and consultations with the academic sector of the target sector, as the practical understanding held by these individuals would alleviate the difficulties of entering into this field. Subsequent to acquiring the necessary apprehension, these institutions can advance to the ‘consolidation phase’, in which these institutions begin to cooperate with the academic community of the target sector in order to procure the direct experience necessary to further advance into this field. This cooperation can be actualised through sponsoring and financing existing competitions and workshops, while promoting such events through their own networks as well as through the pre-existing university networks in the academic community. To provide an example of such networks, promotional mechanisms on social media and affiliated websites, among other means, can be taken into consideration. Finally, once these institutions have accumulated enough experience, the ‘directorial phase’ can begin. In this stage, these institutions will be able to independently convey such events on an international scale, thereby enabling them to create platforms for interaction in accordance with

supply and demand. In addition, also following supply and demand, these institutions can continue to sponsor and finance existing platforms in order to incentivise additional participation. Through this, education cooperation in the target sector can be qualitatively and quantitatively improved, as the academic community of the target sector will be able to access an increased amount of professional platforms.

c. Expected Effectiveness

To begin with, these institutional partnerships instigate the additional participation of individuals by improving accessibility to these platforms for interaction. To be specific, this is made possible through the joint utilisation of the networks and mechanisms of both the academic community as well as the institutions, as this enables information concerning the target sector to become available to a larger scope of individuals. Through this, because the promotional methods of each stakeholder target different range of individuals, the overall awareness of such activities can be increased. Consequently, individuals that have an interest in such activities are provided with the information and opportunity necessary to pursue those interests, thereby raising the level of potential participation. Yet, such effects are augmented because each individual has their own individual network of social relations, and thus can assist in promoting such activities to other individuals (Wellman, 2002). Furthermore, the financial aid provided by these institutions can reduce the financial pressure held by students regarding the participation in an international event, as students often lack the capital to independently pursue such opportunities. Consequently, students will be more incentivised to participate in such events, thus heightening the overall participation in education cooperation.

Through these partnerships, it is clear that the overall quality of the interaction shared by the academic community of the target sector can be enhanced. The justification for this is relevant to that of Public-Private Partnerships, a concept in which the public sector and the private sector cooperate in order to address a public need through the appropriate allocation of resources and risks (Canadian Council for Public-Private Partnerships, n.d.). In this context, because the national and regional institutions have a superior managerial capacity while these academic communities have a higher practical understanding of the sector, a partnership between these two stakeholders would enable each stakeholder to focus on its own area of experience (PPIAF, 2009). For example, institutions would primarily be responsible to work relevant to promotion and logistics, while the academic community would primarily concentrate on the improving the content of the educational experience. Thus, through utilising the comparative advantage of each stakeholder, the overall standard of such platforms will increase (PPIAF, 2007). Therefore, it is clear that a higher quality of education cooperation can be procured.

4. Perspectives of the Game Theory: Proposal Assessment

a. Potential Limitation: Principal-Agent Problem

The Principal-Agent Problem refers to a situation in which an externality is instigated due to the differing interests of the entity that is responsible for assigning tasks and the entity performing the task (Caillaud & Hermlin, 2000). This problem is exacerbated through moral hazard, in which entities may

increase their exposure to risk when insured, as they are not fully subject to the subsequent costs (Caillaud & Hermalin, 2000). However, this hindrance may come about within the partnership proposed in this paper, as the interest of institutions is to enhance cultural interaction, while that of the academic community is to enjoy the activity itself. Consequently, because other institutions assist in the logistical aspects of organising events, the academic community may be tempted to promote and organise the event in a less active and diligent manner. For this reason, this paper concedes that this limitation must be addressed in order to maximise the effectiveness of its proposal.

b. Potential Solution: Repetitive Interactions

Regarding this, the incentives deriving from the continuous nature of such partnerships can appease such concerns. To begin with, it must first be noted that academic events are held regularly throughout the year, and that institutional support plays a significant role in ensuring their success. However, because the success of the event is crucial in maintaining such partnerships, the academic communities possess a natural incentive to practice due diligence in order to ensure that such support is continuously given. In addition, the repetitive interactions within the academic community also act as an instigator of due diligence, as the stakeholders that host such tournaments also participate in similar tournaments as well. Consequently, failing to host a successful tournament will result in criticisms toward the organisers of the event from the rest of the academic community, thereby affecting their public image within the community. For this reason, it can be confirmed that such stakeholders have a natural incentive to maintain due diligence and refrain from moral hazard.

5. Case Study: The Debating Community of ASEAN and Korea

a. Overview: Parliamentary Debate

To provide a potential application of the model proposed in this paper, this paper will present a case study regarding the Parliamentary Debate in Asia, as the education cooperation within this sector successfully exemplifies the type of higher education cooperation that ASEAN and Korea are pursuing. To start off, it must be noted that students in various universities across the world have formed ‘debate societies’ in order to refine their competency in rhetoric and logic. This holds true in the cases of ASEAN and Korea as Korea is host to the Korean Inter-varsity Debate Association, an organisation that represents the debate community of Korea (KIDA, 2013), while tertiary communities in ASEAN have formed similar organisations as well. Through such organisations, the debaters of a country are provided with a platform that connects them with one another through the various domestic workshops and tournaments that are hosted throughout the year. In addition, these national organisations are also internationally connected through various platforms on social media. Consequently, international networking is made possible, as this platform can be utilised to promote the numerous international tournaments and workshops that are held throughout the year.

To depict an example of how such international networking is actualised, the tournament known as ‘Seoul Open’ will be elaborated upon. This tournament, which is open to all debaters, promotes itself through the various social media platforms that connect the debate institutions and organisations from all over Asia, including ASEAN. Through this, 48

teams from 12 different countries including those from ASEAN member states such as Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Philippines, and Vietnam were invited to Korea in 2017 (Debate Korea, 2017). Moreover, Seoul Open was sponsored by Air Asia in order to enhance student mobility through enabling low travel prices (Lee, 2017). In addition to the academic aspects of this competition, Seoul Open hosts ‘socials’ after each day of the tournament as well, providing an opportunity for students from different universities and nations to develop amiable relations with each other. Such relations are easily formed, as it is often tradition for teams that have faced off against each other in the tournament to meet one another during these socials to exchange words of congratulations and encouragement. Moreover, because the individuals participating in such tournaments regularly participate in other international tournaments, the possibility of repeated encounters is rather high. Consequently, through such repeated direct interaction, the formation of amiable relationships is ubiquitous within these competitions. Through these relationships, additional relationships can be formed, as it is courtesy to introduce colleagues from different societies to your own. Hence, this event, along with the other numerous international tournaments held in Asia every year, provides students from Korea with the opportunity to form friendly as well as academic relations with debaters from ASEAN through participating in a mutually enjoyed activity.

b. Assessment: Evaluation through Interviews

In order to evaluate the status quo of the parliamentary debate academic community in Asia, the author of this paper conducted extensive interviews with the chief executive officer and secretary general of ‘Debate for All’ and

‘Debate Korea’, respectively. To start off, regarding the existence of a unified debate community between ASEAN and Korea, it was stated “There is definitely a debate community that connects students from Korea to their counterparts in ASEAN with tournaments happening every weekend in various corners of the continent.” Through this statement, it was confirmed that platforms for interactions are conveyed on a periodic basis, unlike the annual events that currently comprise most of ASEAN-Korea education cooperation. In addition, it was also affirmed that these tournaments are hosted by many countries, which fulfils the current inadequacy of current cooperation efforts in achieving high inclusiveness.


Moreover, concerning the role of debate in fostering academic and friendly relations, it was expressed that “Debate tournaments serve a unique role as a platform for students to engage on an academic level to foster better understanding of a variety of issues but also to develop life-lasting friendships. Through debate, students are able to analyse issues involving their community and nation, listen to diverse opinions, and learn from their opponents (and) students are often inspired to travel and study in different countries due to the relationships and lessons created and learnt through debate.” Indeed, this epitomises the academic cooperation, mobility, and networking that ASEAN and Korea are attempting to attain through their education cooperation. However, it must be noted that it does so in a manner that complements current education cooperation efforts. This is because the friendships formed through debate can serve as the incentive needed to incite interest in overseas tournaments and credit transfer systems, as such relationships can contribute to alleviating the concerns held by students in entering an unfamiliar country.

Finally, in relation to the limitations of the current debate community that exists between ASEAN and Korea, there were criticisms that financial restraints are barriers of participation as most universities do not sponsor their teams. It is argued that as there are many tournaments in Korea inviting students from ASEAN, support from the public and private sector is necessary to accelerate further cooperations. For this reason, it can be emphasised that a sector of education cooperation that is already thriving can be further improved through the provision of such financial support.

Hence, taking such evaluations into consideration, it is clear that the academic sector of debate between ASEAN and Korea is host to a high and improved level of education cooperation. Accordingly, it is recommended that institutions with an interest in pursuing education cooperation in this field begin the studies necessary to 'transition' into this sector, and start to 'consolidate' these transitions through co-sponsoring competitions, such as Seoul Open, in order to procure the necessary experience. Consequent to this, such institutions can begin to 'direct' the international interaction within this field through hosting new competitions and workshops that require a lower registration costs. Moreover, this can also be done by sponsoring pre-existing events by providing logistical support in order to reduce financial costs by providing a venue in which tournaments can be held. Through this, in addition to granting financial subsidies to teams that meet institutional standards, ASEAN and Korea can facilitate additional participation in such platforms. In accordance with such efforts, it is clear the educational cooperation in this sector can be greatly enhanced.

6. Prospects

All in all, through this proposal, improved education cooperation between ASEAN and Korea can be attained in both a feasible and effective manner. Regarding feasibility, this cooperation model incorporates the usage of pre-existing mechanisms, networks, and communities, thereby enabling cooperation efforts to be led by means that are already thriving. Consequently, cooperation can be fostered and ameliorated without having to pursue additional promotion or interaction methods that all have their own risk of failure. In addition, this thesis conceded to and addressed the potential limitations of its proposal through pre-existing incentives, further reducing the need to implement additional changes. Concerning effectiveness, cooperation would be directed in a manner that is co-led by governments, institutions, and students, rather than unilaterally led by institutions as in the status quo. This is imperative as such a multilateral approach is crucial in determining the success of regional education cooperation, thereby contributing to the achievement of the much needed policy harmonization (Nguyen, 2009). Therefore, through these institutional partnerships, it is clear that the regional relationship treasured by both ASEAN and Korea can fully realise its potential to become the means to attaining a prosperous future for the individuals of ASEAN and Korea.



ASEAN-Korea Relations

Educational Cooperation and Challenges

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Abstract

The ASEAN and Korea began diplomatic relations in 1989. Moving from sectoral dialogue relations, now we are into a strategic partnership and this will continue to step forward in the future. This achievement can be generated from cooperation in various aspects ranging from political-security to socio-cultural. Thus, both partners have been active in the educational cooperation which boosts people-to-people connectivity in the region. Likewise, the ASEAN and Korea have been working in e-learning improvement, the conduct of workshops, training, joint research, exchange programs and scholarship in the field of education. Moreover, both have been promoting Korean Studies and ASEAN Studies through the

provision of scholarships, joint research or annual meetings. Last but not least, Korea has been a helping hand in the enhancement of education in ASEAN through technical and financial assistance, especially in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam. However, there are some challenges in education to be considered. Though the cooperation is working well, there is still a gap in education between the ASEAN and Korea and also among ASEAN member states. There are still not enough education facilities and the lack of focus on marginalised or ethnic minority groups is still a matter to be concerned with. Besides, ICT [Information and Communication Technology](#) is also an area to be improved along with administration in the education field to make sure that everyone can access the opportunities provided by ASEAN and Korea. Overall, this strong partnership comes from the commitment of both sides in capacity building for ASEAN and Korea to grow interdependently, because education serves as an important factor in a country's development. Also, this cooperation in the educational sector brings closer and deeper mutual understanding not only between the governments, but also the citizens of both ASEAN and Korea. Thus, together despite diversities, we are working for peace and prosperity in the region.

I. Introduction

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations was founded in 1967 with the principle objective of bringing economic prosperity as well as maintaining security and peace in the region. Not only working within the 10 member states, ASEAN has also expanded its relations with other countries outside the region. Particularly, under the ASEAN+3 platform, ASEAN began to work in harness with the Republic of Korea, through close cooperation in the field of politics, security, economics, social and culture. In 1989, ASEAN and Korea started their relations with the endorsement of numerous sectoral dialogues. As a result, in 1991, Korea has finally become a full dialogue partner at the 24th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (ASEAN, 2012a). Moreover, ASEAN and Korea developed greater commitment by building the ASEAN-Korea Centre in 2009 to celebrate their 20 years of dialogue partnership (ASEAN-Korea Centre, 2015). A year later, the comprehensive cooperation of ASEAN-Korea dialogue relations was then upgraded to strategic partnership by adopting a Joint Declaration on the ASEAN-ROK Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity and its Action Plan (ASEAN, 2012b). With another crucial step in 2012, Korea established the Mission of the Republic of Korea to ASEAN with the purpose of stimulating deeper and closer relations between both partners (Mission of the Republic of Korea to ASEAN, 2015). By 2014, ASEAN and Korea also had a *Joint Statement of the ASEAN-ROK Commemorative Summit*, which focused on the future vision of the ASEAN-ROK Strategic Partnership with the motto “Building Trust, Bringing Happiness” (ASEAN, 2014). Interestingly, the connectivity between the people of Korea and ASEAN also broadened. In 2016, there were roughly about 8.2 million visitors from both ASEAN and Korea travelling to one another destinations (ASEAN-Korea Centre,

2017). As can be seen, both ASEAN and Korea have been active in broadening their relations in many sectors. Among those, education plays a vital role in deepening ASEAN-Korea relations in order to realise the goal of connecting people in the region as one, which is presented in the *Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity* (ASEAN, 2011). Thus, this paper presents how ASEAN and Korea work together in the educational sector to promote mutual understanding, and identifies the challenges.

II. ASEAN-Korea educational cooperation

2.1. Educational exchange programs

In the educational sector, ASEAN and Korea have fostered collaboration mainly in capacity building to enhance their mutual understanding and cooperation. As shown in ASEAN-ROK Plan of Action aligning with the Joint Declaration on the ASEAN-ROK Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity 2016-2020, both partners have a great interest in education by proposing their commitment in activities such as initiating workshops, joining research, and increasing exchange programs (ASEAN, 2012b). This can be seen in the Training Project for ASEAN Children's Librarians. The project has been established since 2010 by Korea's National Library for Children and Young Adults. The project has selected 20 children's librarians from each ASEAN member state every year in order to promote reading culture in the region and bring closer cooperation between ASEAN and Korea through mutual exchanges (National Library for Children and Young Adults, n.d.). Furthermore, the ASEAN-ROK Academic Conference happens twice a year in one of the ASEAN member states. The platform has given the

opportunity for researchers and scholars to discuss current issues in ASEAN and Korea, and thus allows them to find common ground in solving the issues and get to understand one another better (ASEAN University Network, n.d.a). Besides, there are also other activities, such as the AUN ASEAN University Network and ASEAN+3 Educational Forum and Young Speakers Contest, established in 2011. It allows youths from ASEAN and East Asia (Japan, China and Korea) to raise their voices and discussions in regional issues through public speaking and presentations (ASEAN University Network, n.d.b). Moreover, recently the 2017 ASEAN-Korea Youth Network Workshop was co-hosted by the ASEAN-Korea Centre and International Youth Centre (United Nations ESCAP, n.d.). The workshop focused on ASEAN, its relations with Korea, and especially the environmental sustainability of cities.

2.2. Scholarship programs

ASEAN and Korea have also worked on providing scholarships for students from the two nations. Both partners have shown their commitment through initiatives such as the international college student exchange programme between ASEAN and Korea since 2006, the ASEAN-Korea Academic Exchange Programme since 2006, and the ASEAN Millennium Leaders College Student Exchange Programme since 2010 (ASEAN, 2012a). Moreover, the AKCF ASEAN-ROK Cooperation Fund was created to foster relations by initiating projects that include academic exchanges (ASEAN-ROK Cooperation Fund, n.d.). Annually, AKCF has spent around \$7 million to support the ASEAN Secretariat to work jointly in the education sector in order to raise awareness of the ASEAN Community and diminish the gap in development in the region. Thus, through the AKCF, roughly 380 projects have been initiated and implemented, of which 34 are in social welfare, labour, and education (ASEAN-

ROK Cooperation Fund, 2017). Those projects have been implemented under two main funds – the Special Cooperation Fund and Future Oriented Cooperation Project Fund. Therefore, some programs are currently active such as the programme for Fostering ASEAN Future Leaders, the ASEAN-Korea Future-Oriented Youth Exchange Programme, ASEAN-Korea Academic Exchange, etc. For instance, the ASEAN-Korea Academic Exchange Programme was originally established by the AUN and the Korean Association of Southeast Asian Studies in 1999. The purpose of the programme is to create academic communities to enhance cooperation between ASEAN and East Asia (ASEAN University Network, n.d.a). More than that, there are other scholarships from the government of the Republic of Korea including the Global Korea Scholarship. The Global Korea Scholarship has provided ASEAN students 5-week training in the field of science and engineering aiming at fostering the future leaders and enhancing cooperation between ASEAN and Korea (National Institute for International Education, 2012). In addition, there is the Korean Government Scholarship Program, which is not only open to students from ASEAN member states, but also many countries in the world.

2.3. ASEAN and Korean studies

ASEAN and Korea have been working actively in the promotion of ASEAN and Korean studies. In this regard, the Korea Foundation was established in 1991 and initiated many public diplomacy activities including the promotion of Korean studies to other nations to improve understanding about Korea (Lee, n.d.). It has provided the Korea Foundation ASEAN Fellowship for Korean Studies, which gives ASEAN scholars opportunities to pursue Master's degrees or doctorates in Korean studies (Korea Foundation, n.d.). Thus, there are some ASEAN member states which are eligible

for the scholarship such as Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. More than that, Korea also funds a scholarship in the Master of Arts Programme in Korean Studies provided by the AUN in partnership with Chulalongkorn University and Seoul National University to increase mutual understanding between ASEAN and Korea (ASEAN University Network, n.d.c). Also, there is the Korean Studies Association of Southeast Asia created by Korean Research Institute at UNSW Canberra. It was established in 2003 in order to promote Korean Studies through joint academic research, conferences and other activities in Southeast Asia (UNSW Canberra, 2017). In addition, the Korean government also focuses on the promotion of ASEAN studies. The Korean government has provided their students scholarship opportunities for those who want to pursue the ASEAN studies programme initiated by the AUN. The programme consists of 21 modules ranking from history, politics, economics, to other ASEAN issues (CEFIA, 2016).

2.4. Financial and technical assistance

Korea has helped ASEAN member states in the field of education through technical and financial assistance. The Korean government has been active in helping developing countries' education in ASEAN by approaching individual countries. The KOICA [Korea International Cooperation Agency](#) is a Korean governmental organisation that has offices in many developing countries. It has been working with Cambodia on a development programme since 1991 and finally set up a base in Phnom Penh in 2003 (KOICA, 2017). In 2014, for example, KOICA cooperated with the United States Agency for International Development to improve education in Cambodia by having KOICA volunteers teach children in the provinces. It also worked with the Ministry

of Education, Youth and Sport of Cambodia in many projects, one of which was the establishment of Cambodia-Korea Cooperation Center at the Royal University of Phnom Penh (Hort, 2014). Additionally, Korea has developed a Country Partnership Strategy with the Lao PDR for 2016-2020 which one of the focus areas is education. According to the Korean government, the main aim of the project is to enhance girls' access to education, improve the quality of secondary and higher education, build capacity in university degree and research programs, and strengthen the administrative and governance of education. Thus, 70% of the Korea's official development assistance for Lao PDR is planned to be used in those prioritised areas which also includes education (The Government of the Republic of Korea, 2017).

III. Challenges in the cooperation

The cooperation between the ASEAN and Korea has improved the education systems in the region significantly. However, there are still obstacles to consider. There is the wide gap in the level of educational development, not just amongst the ASEAN member states per se but also between ASEAN member states and Korea. According to OECD (2016), in 2015, only Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea have a rank in the OECD Programme for International Student Assessment. This indicates the better quality of education systems in the countries. In contrast, other ASEAN member states, especially the CLMV [Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam](#) countries, are still lagging behind. Even though governments have worked actively to tackle the problems in education, some concerns still remain. One reason is the lack of education access and skilled teachers in the rural


or remote areas. For example, in Cambodia, there is still a shortage of skilled teachers, mainly at the primary level (CDRI, 2014). Another instance is in the case of Lao PDR. Within government efforts, significant progress can be seen in primary school enrolment, which rose by 5.4% from 2009 to 2011; however, the rate of dropping out is still considerable in rural areas (Save the Children International, 2017). On the one hand, many educational projects initiated by both ASEAN and Korea, such as the international college student exchange programme or the ASEAN-Korea Academic Exchange Programme, do not focus much on the lower-level education. Consequently, this barrier hinders the cooperation in a way that it would make ASEAN and Korea unable to develop their education quality at the same pace. In addition, opportunities such as funded scholarships, seminars, training and exchange programs are not sufficiently widespread. The access to information still remains low in some countries. One of the factors is the administration office. When the information spreads, it needs to be handed down through too many structures in the offices concerned. Besides, the access to the internet and information is not widely available for some students, mostly in developing countries.

As a result, both partners should provide more technical and financial assistance to the countries with the least capability in order to catch up. Special attention should be paid not only to higher education, but also to primary education. It should be noted that the strength in the primary level of education is an important base for every child to grow well in education for their future. Also, more initiatives focused on young learners should be created, like the Training Project for ASEAN Children's Librarians. In addition, ICT [Information and Communications Technology](#) is crucial in contemporary development because it helps boost the knowledge and productivity of the students. Therefore, both

partners should conduct more training and workshops to raise awareness of ICT and develop related skills not only in students but also teachers.

IV. Conclusion

Overall, the relations between ASEAN and Korea have drastically improved. Both partners have joined hands in improving the educational capabilities of member states for closer mutual understanding through their citizens. In spite of the challenges, both partners have jointly worked to provide educational exchanges, scholarships, technical and financial assistance, and also to promote ASEAN and Korea studies. Interestingly, what has been a great subject of admiration is the drive of Korea, whose economy was once in a critical condition and is now reaching its peak in the modern era. Korea does not forget its struggle to achieve this, and has been helping other developing countries as well as ASEAN member states in many sectors for growth and stability. Particularly, 2017 has been marked as one of the most significant years between ASEAN and Korea. It is the 10th Anniversary of the ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Agreement and also the ASEAN-ROK Cultural Exchange Year. As recently in September 2017, the ASEAN Culture House was finally inaugurated in Busan as part of the celebrations for the 50th Anniversary of ASEAN (Lee & Kim, 2017). The ASEAN Culture House will undoubtedly serve as a strong source of connectivity between ASEAN and Korea for closer relations and deeper mutual understanding of one another's cultures. Thus, together despite diversities, we are striving for peace and prosperity in the region.



새로운 동남아시아사를 위한 제언

A Proposal for New Southeast Asia History

관계성과 비교의 가능성으로부터

From the Possibilities of 'Relationship and Comparison'

— Jo Ho-yoen Osaka University

Abstract

This paper suggests that prejudice of Koreans on Southeast Asia originated from the absence of education on history and culture of Southeast Asia, hence proposes a viewpoint of 'relationship and comparison' as a new history narrative system. For this, this paper critically reviews the content and narrative of the Southeast Asian history from the current middle school history textbooks in Korea. 'The 2009 revised curriculum' on history of middle school describes that Southeast Asia has always been intertwined with Southwest Asia, and history of Southeast Asia is not thoroughly covered in textbooks. Moreover, it is problematic that causal

relationships of history is absent among the main component of the history textbook. Instead, the textbooks only list down facts which is regarded as a cause of increasing the learning burden for students. On the other hand, a research on Korea-Thailand history by Miyajima Hiroshi(宮嶋博史) showed new possibilities by comparing the characteristics of each region and culture from the relation of specific topics such as agriculture, family, and kinship relations. Also, 'A World History for Citizens(市民のための世界史)', written by Osaka University History Education Project, is worthy of notice., In this book, Southeast Asia is equally described with other Asian and European countries. The concept of causal relationship is emphasised, while the facts are simply listed down to be memorised. As the '2015 revised curriculum' of high school and middle school have been abolished together with the national textbooks, in the future, Southeast Asia should be educated as an important area for students' recognition of history: It is important to understand history through the concept-based learning and 'relationship and comparison'.

1. 머리말

오늘날 한국과 동남아시아 사이의 교류는 국가 간의 외교를 넘어 일상적인 영역에까지 확대되고 있다. 이는 무엇보다도 한국사회의 이곳저곳에서 그들을 찾아볼 수 있기 때문이다. 2017년 4월의 통계에 따르면, 국내 체류 중인 외국인노동자는 중국인이 239,395명으로 가장 많지만, 베트남(46,607명), 캄보디아(35,226명), 인도네시아(34,710명) 등 동남아시아를 모두 합치면 약 225,515명으로 중국과 견주어 보았을 때 적지 않은 인원이 된다(아시아이주문화공간오늘 2017). 한편 2016년의 국제결혼 건수를 보면, 중국이 5,661건으로 가장 많았지만 국내에 거주하는 이주여성의 경우를 살펴보면 5,337건인 베트남이 가장 높다 (통계청 2016).

그렇다면 한국 사회는 이들을 어떻게 대하고 있었을까? 2015년 유엔 인종차별철폐 특별보고관은 결혼이주여성과 이주노동자에 대한 다양한 권리를 보장하는 것을 시작으로, “다문화 가족 정의에 이주노동가족, 중국 및 중앙아시아 동포가족 탈북자 가족”을 포함시킬 것, “미디어의 인종주의, 외국인 혐오 방지를 위한 지침”을 마련할 것, “인종차별을 범죄로 규정하고, 인터넷상의 혐오발언 방지를 위해 강력한 규제와 처벌할 것” 등을 권고했다 (헤디앙 2015).

한국 사회가 가지고 있는 차별 문제는 그대로 한국인의 인식을 반영한 것이라고 볼 수 있다. 예를 들어 2013년 세계가치관 조사(World Values Survey)에 따르면, 한국인은 1/3 이상이 다른 인종과 이웃에 살고 싶지 않다고 대답했다 (FisherMax 2013). 2017년 경기도 외국인 인권지원센터의 조사에 따르면, 이주민의 13%가 일터에서 “차별이 매우 심하다”, 30.7%가 “차별이 약간 심하다”고 대답하였다 (연립뉴스 2015).

필자는 이와 같은 차별과 편견의 기원이 학교교육의 부재에 의한 것이라고 생각한다. 지금까지 한국의 외교정책에서 동남아시아가 비교적 중시되지 않았던 현실과, 일상에서 이주노동자와 이주여성의 매우 단편적인 모습에만 노출된 사람들이 그로부터 발생한 편견을 수정할 기회를 얻지 못한 채 고착되었다고 볼 수 있다. 왜냐하면 학교 현장에서 동남아시아의 역사는 다뤄지지 않거나 다뤄지더라도 부차적인 차원에서 이루어지기 때문이다. 단적인 예로, 2015개정교육과정 중학교 『역사』 교과에서 동남아시아를 비롯한 서아시아 등의 역사가 삭제되었다. 동남아시아의 역사는 한국과의 관계가 적고, 중요하지 않으므로 이를 삭제함은 학습 부담을 경감시키기 위한 합리적인 조치라는 것이다.

하지만 이러한 서구 중심주의는 학생들이 가지고 있는 편견을 오히려 악화시킬 우려가 있다. 다시 말해 유럽의 근대화 역사를 중시하는 태도는 근대화가 곧 서구화이며, 근대화에 실패한 타국의 역사는 중요하지 않다는 의식의 발현이다. 또한, 이는 우리와 직접적인 관련이 없으면 “굳이 상관하지 않아도 된다”라는 생각으로 이어질 가능성이 크다. 그러한 태도와 편견을 기르게 하는 것을 『역사』라고 부를 수 있을지 필자에게는 의문스럽다. 게다가 동남아시아사가 고등학교 『세계사』에는 나오지만, 선택과목이므로 학교 현장에서 동남아시아에 대해 배울 수 있는 기회는 박탈당한 것과 같다.

본고에서는 지금까지 우리의 역사교육에서 소홀히 해왔던 동남아시아사 교육을 되돌아보고, 나타난 문제점들을 해결할 수 있는 방안을 모색하고자 한다. 이를 위해 우선 기존의 중학교 『역사』 교과서 속의 동남아시아 서술의 문제점을 파악하고, 기존의 문제점을 해결하기 위해 ‘관계성과 비교’라는 새로운 원리를 제시할 것이다. 그리고 한국사와 동남아시아를 비

교하여 새로운 시각을 얻을 수 있었던 연구를 소개함으로써 그 가능성을 살펴보고자 한다. 이는 학습자가 동남아시아에 대해 갖고 있던 선입관으로부터 벗어나게 하고, 동남아시아에 대해 흥미를 가지게 하는 것을 주된 목적으로 하기위한 것이다.

II. 2009개정교육과정 중학교 『역사』의 동남아시아사 서술

본 장에서는 2009개정교육과정의 내용 체계와 이를 바탕으로 쓰인 천재교육에서 출판한 중학교 『역사』 교과서를 대상으로 동남아시아사에 관한 서술을 분석한다 (천재교육 2013). 보다 최근 수정된 2015개정교육과정에서는 동남아시아에 대한 서술이 아예 배제되었으므로 분석대상으로 적절치 않아 이전의 2009개정교육과정을 분석대상으로 삼았음을 밝히며, 본 분석에서 체계는 구조를, 서술은 본문 내용을 의미한다.

1. 체계

우선 『역사』 교과서는 총 두 권으로 나누어져 있으며 각각의 권은 한국사와 세계사로 나누어져 있다. 두 권은 각각 한 학년에 걸쳐 학습하는데, 언제 무엇을 가르칠지는 학교 재량에 맡겨져 있다. 1권의 앞부분은 4대 문명에서부터 조선까지의 한국사를, 뒷부분은 고대에서부터 근대 전까지를 다룬다. 같은 방식으로, 2권의 앞부분은 개항기에서부터 현대까지의 한국사를, 뒷부분은 시민혁명에서부터 현대의 각종 문제까지 다룬다.

구체적으로는 어떻게 구성되어 있을까? 그 내용 체계를 교육과정 문건의 세계사 영역을 중심으로 살펴본 것이 다음의 <표1>이다. 각 영역에

표시된 괄호는 인용자가 편의를 위해 작성한 것이다. 먼저 「1) 통일제국의 등장」의 내용 요소를 보면, 동남아시아가 없는 것이 눈에 띈다. 이는 이 영역의 주제가 ‘통일제국’이기 때문에 구조적으로 당시 통일제국이 성립하지 않았던 동남아시아에 대해 서술할 수 없기 때문이다. 그런데 「2) 지역세계의 형성과 발전」이나 「3) 전통사회의 발전과 변모」의 내용에서조차 ‘동남아시아’는 보이지 않는다. 바로 이는 동남아시아가 ‘서남아시아’의 서술에 종속되어 있기 때문이다. 동남아시아는 시종일관 인도와 같은 장에서 다뤄진다.

실제로 천재교육의 『역사』를 살펴보면, 이를 더욱 뚜렷하게 알 수 있다. 1권 「8단원 지역 세계의 형성과 발전」의 두 번째 중단원으로 ‘인도와 동남아시아 국가의 성장’이, 2권 「5단원 아시아·아프리카 세계의 변화와 민족운동」의 세 번째 중단원으로 ‘인도와 동남아시아의 민족운동’ 등이 설정되어 있는 것을 보면 동남아시아가 인도와 같은 카테고리 안에서 서술되고 있다는 사실을 알 수 있다.

이로부터 『역사』교과서의 두 가지 문제점을 지적할 수 있다. 첫째, 동남아시아는 인도 혹은 서남아시아와 섞여 기술되고 있다는 것이다. 이는 동남아시아가 인도나 이슬람 문화에 종속되어 있다는 왜곡된 인식을 심어줄 우려가 있다. 더불어, 인도와 동남아시아가 하나의 중단원에서 함께 다뤄짐으로써 분량 축소를 가져온다. 둘째, 「1) 통일제국의 등장」이나 「3) 전통사회의 발전과 변모」에서와 같이 아예 동남아시아가 등장할 수 없거나, 등장하기 어려운 내용으로 되어 있는 경우가 있다. 통일제국이 성립되지 않은 배경과 이유를 서술함으로써 동남아시아의 특징을 타지역과 비교하여 부각시키는 방법도 있겠지만 그러한 방법은 전혀 고려되지 않았다.

2. 서술

그렇다면 이와 같은 내용 체계를 바탕으로 기술된 교과서의 내용은 어떤 식으로 구성되어 있을까? 천재교육의 『역사』를 중심으로 살펴보고자 한다. 동남아시아가 하나의 중단원의 내용으로 등장하는 단원은 1권의 8단원과 2권의 5단원이다. 그 외에는 통일제국과 관련한 장처럼 등장하지 않거나, 제국주의가 관련된 장처럼 아시아·아프리카와 함께 등장한다. 따라서 여기서는 8단원과 5단원을 중심으로 서술하며, 대단원과 중단원을 정리하면 다음과 같다. 중단원 뒤의 괄호는 분량을 의미한다.

천재교육 『역사』는 1권 8단원 중단원⁽²⁾에서 먼저 인도를 다룬 뒤에, 소단원⁽²⁾에서 동남아시아 세계에 대하여 다룬다. 3페이지의 분량에서 3개의 주제를 다루고 있다. 먼저 “1) 동남아시아 세계”에서는 동남아시아는 수많은 섬으로 구성되어 있기 때문에 해상 교역로로 중요하게 작용해왔다고 적고 있다. 이러한 지리적 위치 때문에 인도와 중국으로부터 많은 영향을 받았지만, 자신들의 고유한 전통을 간직하고 있었고, 그 예로 힌두교가 도입되었지만 카스트제는 도입되지 않은 점이나, 베트남에서 유학이 도입되었지만 여성의 지위가 높은 편이었다는 점을 지적하고 있다.

하지만 교과서는 동남아시아가 갖는 ‘독자성’이 무엇인지에 대해서 서술하지 않았다. 물론 여성의 지위가 높은 점이나, 평등한 사회 등을 추측할 수 있겠지만, 이는 단편적인 사실이며, “어떻게 그것이 가능했는가”에 대한 의문에 답해주지 못한다. 즉, 타지역·문화와 비교했을 때 동남아시아 지역이 갖는 문화적 공통성을 제시하는데 실패한 것이다.

이후 2)와 3)에서 각각 대륙부와 도서부를 나누어 설명한다. 또 그안에서 지역과 종족에 따라 역사를 서술하고 있다는 점이 특징이다. 앞선 대단

권	대단원	중단원	비고
1	1) 통일 제국의 등장	춘추전국, 진, 한의 정치·문화적 변화 마우리아 왕조와 쿠산 왕조의 변화와 불교 페르시아의 발전과 쇠퇴 및 문화 특징 그리스 폴리스, 로마의 정치·문화적 변화와 크리스트교	동남 아시아 서술 없음
1	2) 지역세계의 형성과 발전	삼국 분열 이후 수·당의 정치·문화적 변화 동아시아 세계의 형성과 일본 고대국가 발전 인도, 서남아시아의 정치 변화와 이슬람교의 유입 이슬람교의 성립, 전파와 이슬람 제국 발전 서유럽 세계의 형성과 비잔티움의 역사	서남 아시아에 중속
1	3) 전통사회의 발전과 변모	송, 원, 명, 청의 정치적 변화와 동서교류 일본 무사정권의 출현과 동아시아 국제질서의 변모 서·남아시아 이슬람 국가들의 성립과 발전 대서양 무역의 확대 절대왕정의 성립	서남 아시아에 중속
2	5) 산업 사회와 국민 국가의 형성	영국의 산업혁명과 그 영향 프랑스 혁명과 나폴레옹 전쟁 미국 독립전쟁과 국가 수립, 라틴아메리카의 독립 자유주의와 민족주의, 국민국가 체제의 성립 제국주의의 개념과 특징	동남 아시아 서술 없음
2	6) 아시아·아프리카 세계의 변화와 민족 운동	제1, 2차 아편전쟁, 태평천국 운동, 양무와 변법, 의화단 운동, 신해혁명 메이지 유신과 일본 천황제 국가의 확립 인도와 동남아시아의 반제국주의 운동 서아시아, 북아프리카의 개혁운동과 민족 운동	인도와 함께 다루어짐

〈표 1〉 2009개정교육과정 중학교 『역사』 내용체계 중 세계사 영역

원에서 동남아시아가 등장하지 않았기 때문에, 1세기부터 12~13세기까지의 역사를 지역·종족을 중심으로 무미건조하게 시간 순으로 나열하고 있다. 대표적으로 ‘인도차이나 반도의 여러 나라’라는 주제를 살펴보자.

먼저 “메콩 강” 하류 지역에서 “크메르 족”이 “푸난(1세기)”을 세우고, 또

“첸라(6세기)”를 세웠다. “앙코르 왕조(9세기 등장)”는 “앙코르와트”를 남겼다. 한편 베트남은 “오랫동안 중국의 지배”를 받다가 독립하여, 국명을 “대월(11세기)”이라고 하였고, 중국의 문화를 받아들였다. 하지만 “중국의 간섭에 맞서 꾸준히 저항하였고, “찐 왕조(13세기)” 때에는 “쓰놈 문자”를 만들어서 독자성을 추구하였다. “미안마” 지방에서는 “파간 왕조(11세기)”가 “불교”문화를 발전시키고 “타이족”이 “수코타이 왕조(13세기)”를 열었다. <표2>은 위와 같은 서술 과정에서 나타난 고유명사와 중요개념을 정리한 것이다.

소단원	주제	학습 요소(고유명사 · 중요개념)
2) 다양한 문화 전통을 지닌 동남아시아	1) 동남아시아 세계	수많은 섬, 해상 교역로, 지리적 이점 인도와 중국의 영향 고유한 전통, 여성의 지위, 카스트 제도 없는 힌두교
	2) 인도차이나 반도의 여러 나라	메콩 강, 크메르족, 푸난, 첸라, 앙코르 왕조, 앙코르와트 베트남 북부, 대월, 과거제와 유학, 찐 왕조, 쓰놈 미안마, 파간 왕조, 타이족, 수고타이 왕조
	3) 섬 지역의 여러 나라	수마트라 섬, 스리위자야 왕조, 몰라카 해협 자와 섬, 사일랜더 왕조, 대승 불교, 보로부두르 사원 마자파힛 왕조, 향신료 무역

<표 2> 「8단원 지역 세계의 형성과 발전」의 소단원, 주제, 학습 요소

이러한 서술 방식의 가장 큰 문제점은 학습 부담을 증가시킨다는 점에 있다. 고작 3페이지 안에서 외워야 할 고유명사만 20개이다. 이러한 ‘사실’은 ‘개념’이나 ‘일반화’와 결합되었을 때 의미가 있으며 학습자의 이해를 돕는다. 하지만 단순히 동남아시아 지역을 대륙과 도서라는 지리적 기준으로 나누었을 뿐, 어떠한 상위개념이 존재하지 않는다. 이에 2015개정교육과정에서 학습 부담을 운운하며 동남아시아에 대한 부분을 삭제하기에 이

른 것이다.

한편, 예로 들었던 베트남 부분의 서술을 보면, 베트남은 중국의 지배에서 독립했고 과거제와 유학과 같은 중국의 문화를 받아들였다가, 또 다시 간섭에 저항하여 쯔놈(字喃) 문자를 만들었다고 기술되어 있다. 하지만 이러한 서술 방식은 학생들로 하여금 오해를 낳을 수 있다. 베트남이 중국의 간섭에서 벗어나기 위해 중국 문화를 적극적으로 받아들였다는 사실을 명확히 서술할 필요가 있지만, 구체적인 과정이 생략된 단순한 결과만 적고 있다.

다음으로 2권의 5단원 중단원3의 서술을 살펴보자. 여기서도 역시 인도의 민족운동을 먼저 서술 한 뒤에, 소단원 2)에서 동남아시아의 민족운동을 서술하고 있는데, 본문의 분량은 2페이지이다. 베트남에서 프랑스의 압박에 대항하여 근왕 운동이 일어났다는 점, 판보이쩌우(潘佩珠) 등 지식인이 일본의 근대화에 감명을 받아 동유(東遊) 운동을 전개했다는 점이나, 필리핀과 인도네시아에서 각각 카티푸난(Katipunan) 과 이슬람 동맹이 조직되어 독립운동을 전개하였다는 점 등을 서술하고 있다.

하지만 이 부분에서도 설명이 유기적으로 구조화되어 있지 않다. 단순히 ‘동남아시아 지역에서 일어난 민족운동’이라는 카테고리 아래에서 각각의 운동은 개별적으로 설명되는데 그친다. 예컨대, 베트남의 근왕 운동·동유 운동, 필리핀과 인도네시아의 카티푸난과 이슬람 동맹이 갖는 ‘동남아시아적’인 특징은 무엇인가? 동남아시아라는 지역에서 비슷한 문화를 공유하고 있던 나라들에서 일어난 민족운동이라면 그에 걸맞는 특징이 나타날 것이다. 하지만 이들을 하나로 묶을 상위개념은 서술되어 있지 않아, 이러한 상술한 의문이 해소되지 않는다.

위와 같은 서술 방식에서 두 가지 문제점을 지적할 수 있다. 첫째, 과정

소단원	주제	학습 요소(고유명사 · 중요개념)
(2) 동남아시아의 반침략 운동	1) 베트남의 반프랑스 동맹	간뽀응(근왕) 운동 판보이쩌우, 메이지 유신, 동유 운동
	2) 필리핀과 인도네시아의 독립운동	필리핀 연맹, 카티푸난, 필리핀 공화국 이슬람 동맹

〈표 3〉 「5단원 아시아·아프리카 세계의 변화와 민족 운동」의 소단원·주제·학습 요소

과 이유가 생략되어 있다. 역사는 시공간 위에서 일어나는 일의 인과관계를 좇는 학문이므로 그 변화의 과정과 원인을 중요시한다. 하지만 위의 서술에서는 단순히 결과만을 서술하고 있다. 둘째, 상위개념 제시에 실패하고 있다. 동남아시아만이 갖는 특징을 제대로 서술하지 않고, 단순히 개별적인 사실을 늘어 놓았다.¹ 단순한 사실의 나열은 단순한 암기로 이어질 가능성이 크고, 이는 학습부담을 증가시키는 동시에 역사 과목, 특히 동남아시아에 관한 흥미를 떨어뜨린다.

III. 동남아시아사의 새로운 가능성 - 관계성과 비교라는 원리로부터

앞선 문제점들에 의해 발생한 학습부담의 증가, 그리고 유럽 외의 역사를 부차적인 것으로 생각하는 서구중심사관이 결합되어 2015개정교육과정에서 동남아시아 등의 역사가 배제되기에 이르렀다는 사실은 앞에서 언

1 예를 들어 『역사』 1권 8단원의 4. 중세 유럽 세계의 형성과 발전을 보자. 이 단원은 1. 봉건제가 성장한 중세 서유럽 세계와 2. 크리스티교 중심의 중세 서유럽 문화로 구성되어 있다. 다시 말해 ‘봉건제’와 ‘크리스티교’이라는 상위개념 아래에서 중세 유럽이라는 특정 시기, 특정 지역의 역사를 이해할 수 있다는 의미이다.

급한 바 있다. 필자는 이러한 문제점을 해결할 수 있는 원리로서 관계성과 비교를 제시한다. 왜냐하면 동남아시아와 동아시아, 나아가 한국과의 관계성을 통하여 동남아시아가 우리와 관련이 없다는 편견을 불식시키고, 비교를 통하여 각 지역과 문화의 특징을 이해할 수 있기 때문이다. 본장에서는 관계성과 비교를 이용한 연구를 소개하고, 이를 적용한 역사 서술 사례를 살펴본다.

1. 미야지마 히로시의 조선·타이사 비교 연구

식민지 시기 일제가 자신들의 식민지 지배를 정당화하기 위해 한반도의 역사를 타율적이고 정체한 것으로 본 것 타율성·정체성론은 주지의 사실이다. 해방 후 한국사 연구의 목적은 식민사관을 극복하는 것으로, 이에 한국사의 내재적 발전을 주장하는 자본주의 맹아론이 등장하기에 이르렀다. 하지만 식민사관과 자본주의 맹아론은 모두 ‘근대’를 절대적인 것으로 간주하고 논의를 전개한다는 점에서 동전의 앞뒤와 같다. 이에 미야지마 히로시 宮島博史는 타이 타이왕국·태국의 역사를 시야에 넣음으로써 경제 발전 단계로 근대화·식민지화를 설명하는 종래의 방법론에 철퇴를 가했다(宮島博史, 1986).

그에 따르면, 농업의 발전 형태에는 「농학(農學)적 적응」과 「공학(工學)적 적응」이 있는데, 농학적 적응이란 벼농사의 조건이 자연에 맡겨져 있어서 인간은 그 자연에 적합한 ‘품종’을 적절하게 선별함으로써 농사를 이어나가는 것이고, 공학적 적응은 가까운 곳에 수원(水源)이 없는 경우, 이를 관개(灌漑)하고 그것을 유지시키며 농사를 하는 것을 의미한다. 타이의 차오프라야 Chao Phraya 강과 조선의 낙동강의 발전 양상을 비교해보는다면, 전자는 농학적 적응에, 후자는 공학적 적응이 우월한 지역이라고 한다.

이러한 적응의 차이는 곧 사회 구조에 큰 영향을 미친다. 왜냐하면 조선은 공학적 적응 아래에서 연작상경(連作常耕)이 가능하게 되었기 때문이다. 반면 타이는 농학적 적응 아래 휴한 농법을 이어갔다. 다시 말해 조선은 연작상경으로 인해 그 노동력을 전부 농업에 쏟아 붓는 것으로 농업생산력의 증가를 가져왔다. 한편 타이는 한시적(限時的)인 농번기를 제외하고는 잉여 노동력이 남게 되었다. 잉여 노동력의 존재 형태 차이는 사적 소유나 세금, 부역 등의 형태뿐만 아니라, 자연관 등의 심성에도 변화를 일으켰다. 하지만 무엇보다도 중요한 것은 농업생산력의 극대화는 잉여재산의 축적으로 이어졌고, 농민에서부터 지배층인 양반층까지 그 안에서 계층 분화, 즉 이질화(異質化)가 이뤄지는 데에 일조하였다는 사실이다. 이에 반해 타이는 농업과 이를 보충하는 무역, 노예 등의 부역 등 다양한 경제 형태가 존재하는 중층화(中層化)에서 멈추었다. 종래의 방법론에 따르면 타이는 조선보다 열등한 단계에 머물러있는 것이다.

하지만 근대화와 식민지화의 기로에서 독립을 유지한 나라는 조선이 아니라 타이였다. 종래의 설명은 라마 4, 5세의 탁월한 정치·외교적 처세와 지도력을 근거로 들지만, 사실 그러한 능력을 발휘하기 위해서는 사회적인 조건이 갖추어져 있어야 한다. 즉, 자본주의 세계 체제에 적합한 경제체제로의 변혁을 위해서는 국내 정치체제의 변혁이 선행되어야 하는데, 이 과정에서 반드시 지배·피지배 계층 모든 곳에서 불만이 터져 나오기 마련이다. 하지만 타이는 그때까지 농학적 적응에 맡겨 온 지역을 공학적으로 개척하기 시작하였고, 여기에는 방대한 양의 노동력이 필요로 했지만, 그 노동력은 지금까지 잉여 노동력으로 존재해왔던, 노예제와 부역 제도의 폐지를 통해 보충할 수 있었다. 지배계층에게는 델타 개척에서 나오는 우대

조건을 부여함으로써 반발을 억제했다. 이러한 변화 속에서 국제적 조건에 맞춘 외교 능력이 발휘되었을 때, 타이는 독립을 유지할 수 있었던 것이다.

반면, 조선에서는 세계경제에 편입되기 위한 개혁을 둘러싸고 정치·경제적 대립이 끊임없이 발생하였다. 대표적으로 위정척사파와 개화파의 대립으로 대표되는 이러한 대립은 이미 다양한 계층 분화가 이루어질 정도로 경제가 발전되어 있었기 때문이며, 이러한 현상은 지배층뿐만 아니라 농민 계층에까지 침투하여 하층 농민의 불만을 심화시켰다. 여기에 조선은 이미 공학적 적응에 따른 토지 개발이 거의 끝난 상태였으므로, 남은 노동력을 투입하고 그곳으로부터 이권을 얻어 지배층의 불만을 잠재울 수도 없었다. 결국 조선은 일본의 강압적이고 폭력적인 수단에 의해 그 경제 체제를 바꾸게 되었지만, 그것은 자본주의 세계 체제가 아닌 제국 일본에 종속된 식민지 경제였기 때문에, 지주제가 강화되고 다수 농민이 몰락하는 결과를 낳았다.

이와 같이 미야지마의 연구를 통해 이해하는 타이와 조선 농업사의 관계와 비교를 바탕으로 근대화와 식민지에 대하여 새로운 인식을 얻을 수 있다. 미야지마는 여기에서 멈추지 않고, 타이의 가족·친족 구성과 동아시아 제국(諸國)의 그것을 비교한 연구를 진행하기도 하였다. 이처럼 동남아시아와 한국의 역사를 관계성과 비교라는 원리 속에서 생각한다면, 구태의 연한 서구중심주의에서 벗어나 세계화 시대에 걸맞은 창의적인 사고가 가능할 것이다.

2. 오사카대학 역사교육 연구회 『시민을 위한 세계사』

오사카대학 역사교육 연구회가 쓴 『시민을 위한 세계사』²는 기존의 고등학교 세계사 교과서의 보습을 위해 만들어진 것이 아니라고 천명한다. 즉 “암기 사항의 나열”은 배제하였고, 흥미를 돋우기 위해 일화나 자료를 이곳저곳에 배치하면서도 “각 장의 본문 내용으로서는 시대별로 세계사의 구도, 일어난 일의 인과관계나 의미부여 등의 크고 새로운 설명, 이들 배경에 있는 학계나 세계의 움직임” 등을 서술하였다. 이를 그대로 시민 위한 세계사이며, 여기서 ‘시민’이란 지구촌으로서 ‘세계’의 시민이다(大阪大学歴史教育研究会 2014).

본 서적은 기존의 유럽중심주의에서 벗어나 유럽과 아시아를 동등하게 서술하고, 동남아시아나 라틴 아메리카와 같이 부차적으로 여겨왔던 지역까지 배려하고 있다. 이는 목차 구성을 보면 알 수 있다. <표4>에 나와 있는 목차에서 가장 의아한 제목의 장은 「제 7장 유럽의 기적(奇跡)」이다. 바로 유럽이 근대화에 이를 수 있는 것은 기적과도 같은 것으로, 어떤 필연적 법칙만이 아니라 우연적 요소도 존재했다는 것이다. 이러한 논리 아래에서는 서구화만이 오로지 근대화의 유일한 길이라고 단언할 수 없다.

동남아시아사는 고대문명·고대제국이 주된 주제인 1장에서는 등장하지 않지만, 2장을 시작으로 유럽만을 다룬 7장을 제외한 거의 모든 장에서 등장한다. 더불어 12장과 13장에서 각각 4. 베트남 전쟁과 아메리카 패권의 요동과 4. 세계화와 반세계화에서 중요하게 다뤄지며, 특히 후자는 아세

2 이 책의 서술 방식은 현재 일본에서 새롭게 만들어지고 있는 『역사총합(歴史総合)』 과목(2022년부터 시행)의 하나의 모델이 되고 있다는 점에서 의미가 있다. 지금까지의 일본 세계사 교육도 우리나라와 마찬가지로 단지 사실을 암기시킨다는 비판을 받아왔다.

1장 고대문명 · 고대제국과 지역세계의 형성	7장 유럽의 기적
2장 지역세계의 재편	8장 근대화의 확대
3장 해륙(海陸) 교류와 몽골 제국	9장 서양의 충격과 아시아의 고뇌
4장 근세세계의 시작	10장 제국주의와 아시아의 민족주의
5장 대항해시대	11장 제 2차 세계대전과 아시아태평양전쟁
6장 아시아 전통 사회의 성숙	12장 냉전과 민족운동의 시대
	13장 현대세계의 빛과 그림자

〈표 4〉 『시민을 위한 세계사』의 목차

안의 역사를 설명함으로써 지역통합이 단순히 유럽연합으로 대표되는 서양의 것이 아니라는 사실을 지적하고 있다.

다음으로, 앞서 『역사』에서 문제가 되었던 내용을 중심으로 살펴보고자 한다. 2장의 4. 유라시아 남방의 변용에서는 ②동남아시아 세계의 형성과 발전에서는 먼저 지리적 특성과 관련하여 해상무역으로 “항시(港市) 국가”가 발전하였음을 적고 있다. 또 인도나 중국 문명을 “체계적으로” 도입한 이유는 “국가권력을 강화하기” 위한 것이지만, 동시에 “모든 것을 받아들인 것이 아니”었다면서, 카스트제 등을 받아들이지 않은 이유로서 “유동성이 높은 사회에 맞지 않”기 때문이라고 그 이유를 설명하고 있다. 또한 “자와 섬의 불교건축 보로부두르 사원, 캄보디아의 힌두교 사원 앙코르 와트” 등을 하나로 묶어서 8~13세기에 발전한 농업국가가 남긴 종교건축물임을 적고 있다.

또 10장의 2. 아시아의 민족주의, 3)동남아시아의 민족주의에서는 먼저 동남아시아 민족운동의 전제를 설명한다. 즉, “민족구성이나 종교분포가 복잡하며 게다가 유동적인 동남아시아”이기 때문에 “어디서, 누가 그 주체가 되어야 하는가를 둘러싸고, 많은 모색과 대립”이 다발했다는 것이다. 이러한 상위개념을 제시하고 난 뒤에, 필리핀 · 인도네시아 · 베트남 · 태국 ·

미얀마 순으로 개별적인 사항을 적어 나간다. 여기서 민족구성과 관련된 문제가 발생하였음을 각 나라별 서술에서도 지적하고 있다는 점이 중요하다. 예를 들어 “독자의 국가를 가지지 못했던 필리핀에 사상 최초 ‘필리핀인’ 의식이 탄생했다”라든가, 인도네시아에서는 “많은 모색 속에서 지역·민족이나 계급·종교를 초월한 하나의 국민국가로서의 독립을 목표로 하는 의식”이 나타났거나, 태국와 미얀마에서 “상좌부 불교를 핵으로 하는 민족의식의 강화”를 토대로 화교나 인교(印僑)를 배척하기 시작했다거나 하는 모습을 서술하고 있다. 특히 인도네시아의 국시(國是)인 ‘다양성 속의 통합’ *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* 을 통해서 국민통합의 역사와 과제를 설명하고 있으며, 태국 등이 일본에 접근한 점을 다른 나라와의 차이점으로 지적하고 있다.

『시민을 위한 세계사』는 역사적 사건이나 사실들을 연결할 수 있는 상위개념을 제시함으로써, 사실을 암기하지 않아도 비교를 통해서 이해할 수 있게끔 도움을 준다. 앞서 한국의 교과서가 필리핀의 민족운동을 설명하면서 필리핀 연맹, 카티푸닌, 필리핀 공화국 등 사실의 나열에만 치중했다는 점을 생각해본다면, ‘필리핀인’이라는 의식의 탄생을 갖는 중요성을 제시하여, ‘민족운동의 주체는 누가 되어야 하는가’라는 상위개념과 결합시킨 『시민을 위한 세계사』의 서술이 종래의 서술과 얼마나 다른지 이해할 수 있을 것이다. 마찬가지로 태국이나 미얀마가 어째서 ‘상좌부 불교’를 통해 민족의식을 강화하였는지도 그들이 배척한 집단이 믿는 종교를 통해서 쉽게 이해할 수 있을 것이다.

이와 같이 『시민을 위한 세계사』는 구성의 측면에서 동남아시아사를 모든 장에서 다루려고 노력하였고, 인도 등 서남아시아와도 구별했다. 또한, 서술의 측면에서도 상위개념 아래에서 사실과 사실 혹은 개념과 사실 사

이의 인과관계를 나타냄으로써 사건이나 사실의 나열에서 그치지 않고, 사상(事象)의 관계를 분석한다는 역사가 가진 본래의 목적까지 달성하고 있을 수 있다. 마지막으로 단일민족으로 이루어진 국가라는 인식을 주로 가진 일본독자에게 새로운 시각을 제시한다는 점에 주목해야 할 것이다. 이와 같은 시각은 일본과 마찬가지로 단일민족으로서 ‘한민족’이라는 선입관을 가지고 있는 우리에게도 많은 교훈을 줄 수 있으며, 다문화 사회로 나아가고 있는 현시점에서 동남아시아에서 오랫동안 일궈온 ‘다양성’과 ‘통합’이라는 새로운 관점을 보여준다는 점에서도 의미가 있다.

V. 맺음말

무역협회 통계에 따르면 2016년 대한민국 교역 규모는 약 9,000억 달러였고, 미국과 중국이 교역 규모가 가장 큰 나라로서, 각각 1위(23%)와 2위(12%)를 차지하였다. 이어서 일본이 3위(8%), 베트남(5%)이 4위를 차지하고 있다. 그런데 유럽연합이나 아세안 등 지역공동체를 고려하면 다른 결과가 나온다. 2016년 EU와의 교역 규모는 985억 달러로, 전체 교역액의 11%에 달한다. 동년 아세안과의 교역 규모는 전체 교역액의 13%를 차지하는 1,185억 달러로, EU는 물론 미국을 앞서는 제2교역 파트너이다(한국일보 2017).

그럼에도 불구하고 지금까지 동남아시아와의 정치적 협력 체계는 이루어지지 않았고, 외교 역시 한반도 정세에 직접적으로 관련이 있는 이른바 4강(미국, 중국, 일본, 러시아)과의 외교가 중시되었다. 하지만 2017년 정부는 새롭게 EU와 아세안이나 인도, 호주 등에도 특사를 파견함으로써 다자 협력과 외교의 틀을 확대하고자 하였다. 특히 아세안과의 관계는 신남방정책과 직접적

으로 연결되어 있으며, 이는 지역 내 협력 관계를 성공적으로 이끄는 하나의 사례라는 점에서도 중요하다고 할 수 있다.

그러므로 역사교육에서도 패러다임의 변화가 필요한 시점이다. 2015개정교육과정은 고등학교 『한국사』와 중학교 『역사』를 국정화하려는 시도에서 만들어진 것으로, 곧바로 폐지의 수순을 밟았다. 향후 정부는 『한국사』와 『역사』에 대해 2018년 1월에 교육과정을 새로 만들고, 검정을 거쳐 2020년부터 적용하기로 하였다.

중학교 교육과정에서 그 모습을 감출 뻔했던 동남아시아사 교육의 위기는 곧 기회로 바뀌었다고 할 수 있다. 사실 관계성과 비교라는 원리는 이미 고등학교 『동아시아사』에서 쓰이고 있으며, 일본의 역사교육에도 영향을 줄 정도로 모범적인 사례로 꼽히고 있다. 이러한 모범적인 사례를 바탕으로 국내외의 동남아시아의 역사에 관한 최신 연구를 도입한다면, 아세안이 한국의 다자 외교에서 중요한 파트너가 되었듯이, 학생들의 역사 인식에도 중요한 지역으로 자리 잡을 수 있을 것이다.



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
Theme 4

Champions of the ASEAN Miracle



Celebrating its 50th anniversary, ASEAN's remarkable success is often described as the 'ASEAN Miracle'. Such achievement is the fruit of effort and dedication committed by those who yearned for the peace and prosperity of the region. Who are the leading figures behind the ASEAN Miracle and how did they contribute toward the foundation and/or the development of ASEAN? How can we learn from their philosophies, convictions and endeavours in order to achieve greater development of ASEAN?





Champions of the ASEAN Miracle

—Sebastian Hoe Wee Kiat Singapore University of Social Sciences

Abstract

The year 2017 marked the golden jubilee of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations against the backdrop of global uncertainties and rising protectionism in the West. The 640 million people of ASEAN not only developed an economic powerhouse, but also gave hope and lessons for the world to learn from in this region – a truly modern miracle. The launch of the ASEAN Community at the end of 2015 was a major milestone for deeper regional economic integration. Continuous people-to-people contact will enhance knowledge of the peculiarities and best practices of ASEAN’s culture and professional spheres. Furthermore, ASEAN’s three crucial community pillars, namely the ASEAN Political-Security

Community, the ASEAN Economic Community and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community boosted the progress and evolution of ASEAN and its citizens. These achievements could not have been made if it weren't for the leading figures from ASEAN who emerged with lessons to be shared, and they are the founding fathers of ASEAN and their strong leaders, notable government officials such as the Eminent Persons Group and the people of ASEAN. Their personal encounters ranged from golf diplomacy to legal adventures with an impact on the ASEAN region. Lastly, the importance of ASEAN youth programmes are emphasised as nurturing future leaders of the regions is crucial to sustain ASEAN's miraculous achievements. The youths of ASEAN will play a critical role in the coming century in tandem with the ASEAN way.

Introduction

On the 8th of August 2017, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations celebrated its 50th anniversary with great fanfare, amidst a backdrop of rising protectionism in the West and growing uncertainties in the Asia-Pacific region (United Nations, 2017). ASEAN has come a long way since its humble beginnings; its purpose was to thwart communism and serve as a unifying force at the height of the Cold War (Sundram & Tay, 2015). Nonetheless, ASEAN is a marvellous, living and breathing modern miracle. Home to 640 million people, ASEAN brought peace and prosperity to a region of turbulence, engendered inter-civilizational harmony in a microcosm of diversity, and offered hope to the people worldwide (Mahbubani & Sng, 2017). Furthermore, China's rise can be attributed to ASEAN acting as a critical catalyst (Mahbubani, 2016). This essay seeks to highlight the leading figures behind the ASEAN Miracle and their contribution towards ASEAN development. The essay will champion their courage and convictions, and the philosophies we can learn from in order to bring ASEAN forward to the next century and achieve greater development. Indeed, the authors of *The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace* are apt in saying that ASEAN has achieved a miraculous peace dividend and it is long overdue for ASEAN to be nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize.

We live in tumultuous times and the ASEAN story is one of hope in a sea of pessimistic voices drowning even the most prosperous parts of the world (Mahbubani, 2017). A good sailor is not enough to navigate the rough seas and geopolitical winds. The ship requires a team of sailors and a captain, and that ship is ASEAN. Together, the 10 sailors, or ASEAN member states formed an economic powerhouse, the fifth-largest economy worldwide,

with a combined gross domestic product of \$2.5 trillion. It was forecast to become the fourth-largest economy by 2050 (HV, Thompson, & Tonby, 2014). From strength to strength, ASEAN centrality and the ASEAN way, a result of assimilating the Indonesian custom of *musyawarah* and *mufakat* [consultation and consensus](#) will set the ship smoothly sailing despite the rough seas. According to Article 31 of the ASEAN Charter, ASEAN ‘captain’ or chairmanship shall rotate annually based on the alphabetical order of the ASEAN member states’ English names. Singapore will serve as the ASEAN chair in 2018 and had pledged to prioritise e-commerce and the digital economy in ASEAN (Tanoto, 2017). ASEAN also requires the support of the community for cooperation in the regional trade and security. As such, the announcement of the establishment of the ASEAN Community on 31 December 2015 had enhanced ASEAN integration and boosted the ASEAN Community’s three pillars: The APSC [ASEAN Political-Security Community](#), the AEC [ASEAN Economic Community](#) and the ASCC [ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community](#). In this regard, this essay will focus on the three tracks of leading figures behind the ASEAN Miracle and how they contributed to the foundation and development of ASEAN. They are the founding fathers of ASEAN and their strong leaders, the notable government officials of ASEAN, and the outstanding ASEAN citizens in their respective fields.

Leading Figures behind the ASEAN Miracle

ASEAN was established on the 8 August 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand, with the *Bangkok Declaration* signed by the ASEAN’s founding fathers namely: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam then joined on 7 January 1984, Vietnam on 28 July 1995, Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Myanmar on 23 July 1997, and

Cambodia on 30 April 1999. We will look at the five foreign Ministers-and-founding fathers of ASEAN: Thanat Khoman (Thailand), Narciso Ramos (Philippines), Adam Malik (Indonesia), Abdul Razak (Malaysia) and S. Rajaratnam (Singapore). We will also look at some of the key leaders of their respective countries who have been instrumental in the development of ASEAN.

Thanat Khoman – Born in 1914 in Thailand, Thanat Khoman was a Buddhist educated in France. Due to his French education, he was more accustomed to European literature, wines, and cuisine than those of Asia. Despite that, he was a profound anti-colonialist. His writings of the *Bangkok Declaration* had shown signs of such inkling.

“On 8 August 1967, the ‘*Bangkok Declaration*’ gave birth to ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, an organisation that would unite five countries in a joint effort to promote economic co-operation and the welfare of their peoples. After repeated unsuccessful attempts in the past, this event was a unique achievement, ending the separation and aloofness of the countries of this region that had resulted from colonial times when they were forced by the colonial masters to live in cloisons etanches, shunning contact with the neighbouring countries.” – Thanat Khoman, *ASEAN Conception and Evolution*, ASEAN, 1 September 1992

Narciso Ramos – Born in 1900 in Pangasinan, Philippines, Narciso Ramos was a Christian and educated in Manila. He was a journalist, lawyer, and five-term legislator. Serving as the foreign secretary, he was the signatory to the ASEAN declaration. He wrote that the tedious negotiations that preceded the ASEAN declaration signing “truly taxed the goodwill, the imagination, the patience, and understanding of the five participating Ministers.”

Adam Malik – Born in 1917 in Sumatra, Indonesia, Adam Malik was a

Muslim and educated in Indonesia. His language fluency included Bahasa Indonesia, Dutch, and English. His worldview was shaped by Sukarno's nationalistic speeches and the struggle of anti-colonialism against the Dutch. Despite sharing Sukarno's view that Malaysia and Singapore were by-products of artificial neocolonialism, and should rightfully belong to the Nusantara (the Indonesian archipelago or the greater Indonesian nation), he suppressed his nationalistic instincts to respond to the Communist threat.

Abdul Razak – Born in 1922 in Pahang, Malaysia, Abdul Razak was a Muslim and studied at Raffles College in Singapore before furthering his education at Lincoln's Inn in London from 1947 to 1950. His time in London allowed him to be introduced to many Singaporean leaders, especially Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Keng Swee and S. Rajaratnam, as they had banded together to fight against British colonial rule. Abdul Razak felt a sense of cultural affinity with his Singaporean counterpart, S. Rajaratnam due to them spending their core formative years in London.

S. Rajaratnam – Born in 1915 in Jaffna, Sri Lanka to a Sri Lankan Tamil Hindu family, S. Rajaratnam moved to British-colonised Singapore when he was three months old. He was educated in London from 1937 to 1948 but never formally graduated from university. S. Rajaratnam was an eloquent writer and excogitated nationalism against colonial rule.

Lessons from leading figures: Iron spines and political wisdom

In summary, these five men comprised of “one Buddhist Thai, one Christian Filipino, two Muslims and a lapsed Hindu came together to sign the ASEAN declaration, unlikely to come from any more diverse cultural spheres” (Mahbubani & Sng, 2017). This unlikely cast of characters from

the five sovereign nations launched the second-most successful regional organisation in the world, the first being the EU [European Union](#) (Koh, 2017). In addition, ASEAN was fortunate to have strong leaders in its formative timeline of its history (1980s). Indonesia President Suharto, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Malaysia Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, and Thailand Foreign Minister Siddhi Savetsila were particularly noteworthy. All of them are culturally different, highlighting the uniqueness of ASEAN cultural diversity. However, they had two powerful key qualities: They were iron-willed and had political wisdom to achieve greater heights for ASEAN. Their iron will could be seen when ASEAN intervened and strongly condemned Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia – a clear violation of international borders and an act of external aggression (Wong, 2011). Singapore's former Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng said in the author's interview of *The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace* that, "A key part of ASEAN's success was that Suharto was big enough and willing to support ASEAN". President Suharto's leadership was crucial. His contributions can be better appreciated by examining the problems of similar regional organisations to ASEAN like the OAS [Organization of American States](#) and the SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation](#). OAS failures can be traced to over-dominance by its most powerful member state, the United States. Similarly, the SAARC failed because India, the most powerful member, had sought to dominate it, which prevented any authentic sense of regional cohesion. The country that has the world's biggest Muslim population and Southeast Asia's largest economy is Indonesia. Indonesia is also the biggest and most powerful AMS. However, Indonesia displayed remarkable wisdom in not attempting to dominate ASEAN despite its sheer prowess. President Suharto was instrumental in the development of ASEAN. He approved of ASEAN

leadership led by the smaller member states such as Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore. President S.R Nathan of Singapore said: “Suharto’s maturity lies in the fact that he decided to play a backroom role in ASEAN, and allow the other member states to carry out their own relations” (Mahbubani & Sng, 2017). This strengthened ASEAN cohesion and allowed the regional organisations to foster an authentic community. Suharto’s astounding feat was his readiness to take a back seat and provide his foreign counterparts the opportunity to lead ASEAN. This is because, back at Suharto’s domestic front, he had the reputation of an assertive and strong leader; he was no pushover. The Indonesian economy excelled under his leadership, expanding from \$26 billion in 1965 during his ascendancy to Presidency to \$202 billion in 1995, three years before he stepped down. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations also presented him with a gold medal in 1985 for the attainment of rice self-sufficiency in Indonesia, which rescued tens of millions of Indonesians from poverty. Furthermore, the people of ASEAN also benefited from Suharto’s wisdom in geopolitics, not attempting to stifle ASEAN. He joined the other ASEAN member states to condemn Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia despite being suspicious of China and being told by influential leaders within his government to instead support Vietnam. History could have conceived a different fate for Southeast Asia if not for the critical role played by the strong ASEAN leaders that led ASEAN’s success.

Interestingly, Lee Kuan Yew and Suharto shared an unusual and enduring friendship despite their differences. Lee Kuan Yew was educated in Britain and was trained as a lawyer, whereas Suharto, imbibed with traditional Javanese culture, was trained exclusively in military affairs. Not to mention the psychological impact and diplomatic tensions between the two nations

that lingered during and after Konfrontasi in which Indonesia and Malaysia fought an undeclared war from 1963 to 1966. Singapore's late Prime Minister wrote, "Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, we met almost every year to keep in touch, exchange views and discuss matters that cropped up." He also said of Suharto, "I found him to be a man of his word. He made few promises but delivered whatever he had promised. His forte was his consistency". Trust, rapport, and confidence were constructed between these two men, key leaders of their respective countries which provide the foundation for ASEAN to develop and connect within the ASEAN member states. Furthermore, an unlikely partnership within ASEAN was established between Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir Mohamad, both acrimonious political rivals when Singapore was part of Malaysia (1963-1965). Lee championed for a Malaysia where all races would be equally treated. On the other hand, Mahathir advocated for special treatment for the Malays. Mahathir's harsh tongue-lashing was expressed through his words "the mad ambition of one man to see himself as the first Chinese Prime Minister of Malaysia", claiming that Lee was a perfect example of an "insular, selfish and arrogant" Chinese chauvinist. Despite their previous political enmity, both of them worked together for the good of ASEAN and their countries. Both parties signed bilateral military exercise such as the Semangat Bersatu army exercises started in 1989 and the Malapura naval exercise started in 1984. These joint military exercises were "initially opposed for fear of 'territorial familiarisation' of the host nation by the guest country's security forces". Singapore's then Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong proposed the Singapore-Johor-Riau Growth Triangle in 1989 to further enhance economic links between the region which subsequently became the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle, boosting ASEAN sub-

regional integration.

Thailand Air Chief Marshall Siddhi Savetsila who served as foreign minister of Thailand (1980-1990) displayed tenacity. He was known to gain the trust and confidence of the King of Thailand and also critical members from the Bangkok establishment. He played a key role in ensuring that his country's foreign policy towards the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia remained steady despite influential voices within the Thai government lamenting the perceived harsh stance towards Vietnam. The founding fathers and leading figures of ASEAN certainly taught us the importance of a strong leader coupled with their attributes: Geopolitical wisdom and iron will, which leads to the betterment of ASEAN and its citizens.

Notable government officials and ASEAN's golf diplomacy

The founding fathers were not the only contributors to the ASEAN Miracle. Figures who helped develop functioning institutions to revitalise the ASEAN community. The huge stride towards institutionalisation was enhanced with the adoption of the ASEAN Charter (2007), with the establishment of the EPG [Eminent Persons Group](#) (2005) to propose the Charter's outlines. Notable government officials were included in the EPG, which consists of prominent ASEAN statesmen and citizens tasked with creating the ASEAN Charter. They ranged from top diplomats to former and current government officials. Tommy Koh (Singapore), Zain Azraai (Malaysia) Ali Alatas (Indonesia), and Nitya Pibulsonggram (Thailand) have been notable figures among the ASEAN fraternity. The beauty of ASEAN is that through its 50 years of existence, there was not a single war fought between ASEAN member states, highlighting the peace and stability ASEAN has brought to the region. Nevertheless, military tensions do exist, such as the case of

Preah Vihear temple (2008) between Thailand and Cambodia. Indonesia and Malaysia similarly executed hostile naval patrols (2005) around the disputed islands of Ligitan and Sipadan. The ASEAN Miracle is an ecosystem of peace developed by the leaders of ASEAN and its citizens. How then does golf plays a part in the seemingly labyrinthine diplomacy of ASEAN? The former Singapore foreign minister, S. Jayakumar, wrote in his book, “It helped that Ramos, Ali Alatas, Musa, Jock Seng and I had also been long-time golf buddies!” when he explained why the EPG accepted to a draft report prepared by him. The former foreign minister of Singapore, S. Dhanabalan, also talked about the critical aspect of golf and frequent ASEAN meetings serving as a platform for ASEAN leaders to foster an ASEAN identity (Mahbubani & Sng, 2017). A diplomatic incident (Phnom Penh, July 2012) illustrated that when ASEAN foreign ministers relinquished the ability to arrive at an agreement over a joint communique, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and his foreign minister Marty Natalegawa, along with his salient leaders in policy-making, rushed to reconcile the diplomatic wounds in Phnom Penh over a game of golf.

Citizen perspectives: Legal adventures and the ASEAN’s people award

The ship and its crew’s skillfulness will cease to thrive without support from the regional community, as it will not be welcome to dock at the shores and exchange goods and ideas with the locals. Similarly, ASEAN government officials’ robustness will be deemed by its citizens as a fancy bureaucracy concocted by leaders in an ivory tower without their support. Thus, its efforts may be perceived as futile at best by its citizens and at worst, depreciate in its value for the lack of practical relevance to the

common folk of ASEAN. Fortunately, the AEC and the institutionalisation drive with the adoption of the ASEAN Charter helps to foster an ASEAN identity, boosting regional trade and security in Southeast Asia. An example is the realisation of the Open Skies Policy by 2015. The ASEAN aviation industry had seen significant growth over the past couple of years with the ASEAN airlines total seat capacity enjoying double-digit growth (2009-2013). The share of low-cost carriers has also increased impressively (2003-2014, 13.2%-57%) resulting in the perpetual growth of the ASEAN tourism industry due to the strengthened inter-connectivity of its airspace (ASEAN Single Aviation Market: One Sky, One Region). The ASEAN layperson could travel visa-free for up to 14 days (ASEAN Framework Agreement on Visa Exemption Kuala Lumpur, 25 July 2006) for tourism such as from Singapore Changi Airport to Kuala Lumpur International Airport and exit through an expedited 'ASEAN lane' which is an express immigration lane for citizens of ASEAN. The increased people-to-people contact within ASEAN will influenced and shaped an ASEAN identity and even developed best practices around the region in the various professions from arts and culture to even paediatrics (ASEAN Pediatric Federation) and law (ASEAN Law Association). The list is not exhaustive, as there are a plethora of outstanding organisations and citizens in ASEAN making amazing contributions towards the ASEAN Miracle. The section will focus briefly on two Singaporean lawyers excelling in their crafts and contributing to the ASEAN legal scene.

Alvin Yeo – The youngest lawyer appointed as Senior Counsel (2000); an active member of the Korean Commercial Arbitration Board and the Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration aside from the Singapore International Arbitration Centre's Council of Advisors (Tang, Hor, & Koh, 2011). He handled a decade-long court saga surrounding a \$185 million arbitration case involving firms backed by Malaysian and Indonesian tycoons (Vijayan, 2017).

Cyril Chua – Started his practice in 1996 with his involvement in management mainly revolving around the anti-counterfeiting portfolios for multinational clients and brand protection advisory. He is well-versed in intellectual enforcement and travelled to Malaysia and the mountains of Lao PDR for raids (as part of anti-counterfeiting practice) with law enforcement officers. On the home front, he was also part of the legal force combatting software piracy in Singapore, conducting raids in the notorious pirate-infested den that is Sim Lim Square. His foray into anti-piracy was tapped on in the regional arena such as in ASEAN. His work involved sharing his knowledge of intricate product supply chains to formulating anti-piracy strategies in the ASEAN region such as in the Thai-Laos border.

The citizens of ASEAN, from laymen to specialists, contributed to the progress of ASEAN in numerous dimensions. The great philosopher Aristotle was right to say that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Each ASEAN citizen teaches us the importance of working hard and working smart, and collaborating with one another for the good of the community. ASEAN is indeed a force to be reckoned with and a modern miracle encapsulating a collective wisdom to learn from. ASEAN, overcoming its social divisions, has the potential to develop normative power that lies in its diversity. Perhaps the EU can learn from ASEAN just as ASEAN has learned from the EU. An example, EU leaders can accept the offer from Indonesian President Joko Widodo. Joko Widodo had previously offered to share his country's best practices in dealing with the topic of immigration and counter-radicalisation to EU leaders mired with the immigration crisis during his visit in Europe in April 2016 (Spandler, 2017). Any country leader who would want to be successful economically can look at how multicultural Singapore managed racial integration through

meritocracy, pragmatism, and honesty (Channel NewsAsia, 2015). The winners of the ASEAN People's Award in 2015 each received \$10,000 from the ASEAN Secretariat for their significant contributions to the ASEAN community development were: An anti-drug abuse association [Persatuan Basmi Dadah](#) from Brunei, Union of Youth Federations of Cambodia, public relations guru [Prita Kemal Gani](#) from Indonesia, Thasano Rice and Seed Multiplication Centre from Lao PDR, Malaysia's former Home Minister (The late Tun Muhammad Ghazali Shafie), Parami Roundtable Group from Myanmar, Ray Paolo J. Santiago from the Philippines, Saisuree Chutikul from Thailand, Singapore Polytechnic, and Nguyen Manh Cam from Vietnam (The Star Online, 2015).

Singapore Polytechnic's ASEAN outreach thrust program brought over 1,000 ASEAN students to Singapore since 2012. Southeast Asia's relatively young populations is a boon for ASEAN not just in the economic realm but also in the socio-cultural and political-security aspects, and such youth exchanges will develop deep friendship between the young minds – future leaders of ASEAN. ASEAN-themed programmes are widely appealing to the young citizens of Southeast Asia. Young citizens of ASEAN are engaging with the world affairs through such programmes, as they take their opportunities to learn within the ASEAN community and beyond. This allows the youth to share their respective cultures and collaborate together in various spheres from social entrepreneurship to regional security - all for the good of the collective ASEAN society.

Conclusion

The men and women who yearned for the peace and prosperity of

the region dedicated their blood, sweat, and tears to the formation and development of ASEAN. We have looked at the founding fathers of ASEAN and their respective country leaders, the government officials such as the EPG and the people of ASEAN. We learned the importance of how strong leaders with wisdom can play a critical role in leading ASEAN and also the power of support rendered by the ASEAN citizens in fostering regional community spirit. Their courage and convictions shall be inked not only in history but on the hearts and minds of the people. In this regard, I invite the readers to learn from them and I support the authors of *The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace* on the nomination of ASEAN for the Nobel Peace Prize. Lastly, the next generation of youths will play a critical role in the development of ASEAN. Let us march forward to the dignified tune of the ASEAN Anthem and the motto of ‘One Vision, One Identity, One Community’.

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ASEAN-KOREA CENTRE

The ASEAN-Korea Centre was established as an intergovernmental organisation mandated to promote economic and socio-cultural cooperation among the ASEAN Member States and Korea. The Centre was officially inaugurated on March 13, 2009, the year that marked the 20th anniversary of the Dialogue Partnership between ASEAN and Korea, in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding signed at the ASEAN-ROK Summit in November 2007.



The ASEAN University Network (AUN) is officially established in 1995 as an autonomous organization under the auspices of ASEAN. AUN conducts programmes and activities to encourage and promote higher education cooperation and capacity building within ASEAN and with dialogue partners and to enhance regional integration in achieving global standards.



The Korea Herald

The Korea Herald, founded in 1953, is the nation's largest English-language daily. It is a member of the Asia News Network.

ASEAN-Korea Academic Essay Contest

2017 is a monumental year for ASEAN and Korea. Since its foundation in 1967, ASEAN has reached a golden milestone, celebrating its 50th anniversary. This year is also highlighted by the 10th anniversary of the ASEAN-Korea FTA, and the ASEAN-ROK Cultural Exchange Year, with inauguration of the ASEAN Culture House in Busan which is the first of its kind outside ASEAN region.

Amid the development in the ASEAN-Korea relations, the international community is witnessing rapid changes. There are growing uncertainties in the international relations such as Brexit and America's withdrawals from multilateral agreements. Technological advancement has reached another level and now, digital economy has become reality for many countries including ASEAN and Korea.

On such a significant juncture, the ASEAN-Korea Centre, an inter-governmental organisation mandated to promote economic and socio-cultural cooperation between ASEAN and Korea, has organised the 2nd ASEAN-Korea Academic Essay Contest inviting students of ASEAN and Korea to share their perspectives and knowledge on ASEAN and ASEAN-Korea relations. The young perspectives of the youth of ASEAN and Korea will contribute toward building a true, genuine and lasting partnership.

