

The Future of ASEAN-Korea Partnership Vol.4

ASEAN and Korea in the Emerging
Indo-Pacific

ASEAN Connectivity and Beyond

Toward a Reciprocal Cultural Exchanges:
ASEAN Wave in Korea

30 Years of ASEAN-Korea Relations:
Retrospect and Prospect



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The Future of ASEAN-Korea Partnership Vol.4

YOUNG
PERSPECTIVES

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Young Perspectives

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Lee Hyuk

Secretary General, ASEAN-Korea Centre

2019 was a milestone year for ASEAN and Korea. The two regions celebrated their 30th anniversary of dialogue relations which culminated in the 2019 ASEAN-ROK Commemorative in Busan. At the summit, the leaders agreed to take the partnership to new heights towards building a community of peace and prosperity centred on the peoples of ASEAN and Korea. There was particular emphasis on the importance of people-to-people contacts, especially exchanges among the youths.

In fact, the youth play a critical role in shaping the future of our partnership. It is therefore important to empower the youth, encourage them to be involved and help them voice their views on and ideas for a better future together. Nurturing the future generation as advocates and leaders to carry the torch of ASEAN-Korea partnership will be an important step to building the future community of ASEAN and Korea.

In this regard, the ASEAN-Korea Centre has been organising the ASEAN-Korea Academic Essay Contest since 2016 to hear the young perspectives on political, economic and socio-cultural issues of ASEAN and Korea and the larger region. This year, in commemoration of the 30 years of steadfast relations, the contest called for papers from the youths of ASEAN and Korea on the following four themes: ① ASEAN and Korea in the Emerging Indo-Pacific; ② ASEAN Connectivity and Beyond; ③ Toward a Reciprocal Cultural Exchanges: ASEAN Wave in Korea; and ④

30 Years of ASEAN-Korea Relations: Retrospect and Prospect. A total of 123 submissions were submitted from the two regions, and among them 15 essays were selected as finalists. Among the winning essays, 10 papers are included in this volume. Taking this opportunity, I would like to acknowledge all the participants for their contributions and congratulate the winners for their outstanding achievements. Also, special thanks go to our partner organisations, ASEAN University Network, Pukyong National University and the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam who have been unwavering in providing their full support for the program.

The following essays will give fresh stimulus for us to revisit some of the issues that we need to keep in mind as we move our partnership forward. Also, for many young students out there, I hope this volume will trigger interest in ASEAN and Korea relations and encourage them to join in subsequent programs.

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Lee Hyuk, Secretary General of ASEAN-Korea Centre 004

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



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Asian
Nations

ASEAN and Korea in the Emerging Indo-Pacific



Contributing to 65% of world population and over 60% of global GDP, the Indo-Pacific region today has become the centre of global attention. China's Belt and Road Initiative, the Indo-Pacific strategies by the US, Japan, and Australia and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific all point to the geopolitical significance of the region. As middle powers in the region sharing common strategic interest, in what ways can ASEAN and Korea increase cooperation in the political-security area?





Flashpoints as Opportunities: The Korean Peninsula and South China Sea as Opportunities to Deepen ASEAN-ROK Strategic Relations

—Teo Ang Guan Nanyang Technological University

Abstract

As the Sino-US strategic competition continues to simmer, the Indo-Pacific region has become the main geopolitical arena for the two to jostle for power and influence. States within the region now fear being reduced to being mere pawns in their contest for power. Necessity is the mother of invention. Of late, regional entities like ASEAN and the Republic of Korea **ROK** have intensified efforts to insert their voices within the existing discourse to secure their place at the table. Thus far, the rhetoric coming out of both ASEAN and Korea suggest some acknowledgment of the precarious situation they are in while recognising that their respective

visions of the emerging regional architecture are similar. However, concrete policy measures to promote greater synergy between the two have rooms for improvement. This paper makes the case for fostering stronger strategic ties between ASEAN and Korea. The logic it presents is simple – strategic cooperation between the great powers makes ASEAN and Korea more relevant in the emerging regional security landscape. This gives them currency to expand their manoeuvring space and strengthen their voices vis-à-vis the larger powers. Two areas of interest, namely, the Korean Peninsula and South China Sea **scs** are fertile grounds to explore cooperation. The rationale for this choice is because the two issues lie on the top of Korea and ASEAN respective agendas. Considering the feasibility and the benefits of any prospective policies, this paper argues for an expansion in efforts to engage North Korea via ASEAN-led mechanisms while arguing for an expansion in cooperation amongst the defence industries in response to ASEAN's South China Sea dispute.

By the end of the paper, it will be clear that there is a need to adopt a cautiously optimistic view when looking at the future of ASEAN and Korea within the emerging Indo-Pacific. Obstacles abound, but there remains much room for optimism. What ASEAN and Korea need to do before the door shuts before them is to strive to remain relevant to the emerging political landscape. To this end, this paper has presented policy recommendations catered to helping both parties build relevance in the two respective situations. As explained, they are feasible and beneficial to both ASEAN and Korea. The time is now for both ASEAN and Korea to stand together to weather the brewing storm in the emerging Indo-Pacific.

1. Background

As the Sino-US strategic competition continues to simmer, the Indo-Pacific region has become the main geopolitical arena for the two to jostle for power and influence. Of note is the widespread use of the term “Indo-Pacific”, which is in itself testament to the deteriorating relations between the two. While Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe articulated the idea of an “Indo-Pacific” region in 2007, usage of the term only caught fire after US President, Donald Trump, mentioned it in a speech in Hanoi a decade later. What has followed is a stream of efforts on the American part to communicate and actualise the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” [FOIP](#). Key documents like the National Security Strategy, National Defence Strategy and the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report have since been released. Additionally, past and present Secretaries of State and Defence have travelled across the region to lobby for support. On the flip side, in an attempt to delegitimize the conversation of an Indo-Pacific region, China has seemingly refused to acknowledge it. During this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue [SLD](#), China’s Defence Minister, General Wei Fenghe, made zero mention of the “Indo-Pacific”. The term was conspicuously absent in China’s latest defence white paper as well.

On the Belt and Road Initiative [BRI](#), China continues to promote it with the age-old narrative of win-win cooperation. During his SLD speech, General Wei explained that China was keen on growing the pie to benefit all and pointed to the growing international interest in the BRI to augment his case (*International Institute for Strategic Studies*, 2019). Unsurprisingly, the US remains unconvinced, maintaining its line of attack that BRI terms are opaque and imprisoning recipients of BRI loans in debt traps. Reality suggests that

neither side paints the full truth. According to the Asian Development Bank [ADB](#), infrastructure needs in developing Asia and the Pacific is projected to exceed \$22.6 trillion through the year 2030 (*ADB*, 2017). Seen in this light, the BRI does quench the growing thirst for infrastructure investment in the region. That said, the Sri Lankan experience of having the Hambantota port seized, coupled with the recent string of borrowing states scaling down or scrapping BRI projects reveals the darker side of taking on BRI-related loans.

As the two giants continue to tussle, states within the region now fear being reduced to being mere pawns in their contest for power. Necessity is the mother of invention. Of late, regional entities like ASEAN and Korea have intensified efforts to insert their voices within the existing discourse to secure their place at the table. ASEAN released the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific [AOIP](#) during the 34th ASEAN Summit. Despite the AOIP being criticised as “a broken record” that “sings the old tunes”, it would be foolish to dismiss the AOIP as empty talk (*Tang*, 2019, p.2). For one, the AOIP was the clearest indication that ASEAN was not going to sit still and wait for the great powers to dictate the terms of international rules. Within the five-page document, ASEAN Member States [AMS](#) sought to reaffirm ASEAN Centrality as the underlying principle driving cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region (*ASEAN*, 2019a). Additionally, the document spelt out specific areas of interests – maritime cooperation, connectivity, along with achieving UN Sustainable Development Goals 2030 among others – that ASEAN is keen on pursuing with its dialogue partners. On Korea’s part, the Moon Jae-in Administration has been focusing on the broader strategy of creating a Northeast Asia Plus Community for Responsibility-sharing [NEAPC](#), which consists of the Northeast Asia Community Platform, New Northern Policy

and New Southern Policy. Of interest to this paper is the New Southern Policy [NSP](#). According to the website of the Presidential Committee on NSP, the Moon Administration seeks to create a “Korea-ASEAN Community of Shared Future”, hinging on the pillars of People, Prosperity and Peace (Presidential Committee on NSP, n.d.). Despite being a US ally, the initial response of the Moon Administration to the FOIP has been ambivalent. This has changed of late, with President Moon announcing his administration’s intention to “put forth harmonious cooperation” between the NSP and the FOIP (NATO Defence College Foundation, 2019).

Notably, both initiatives by ASEAN and Korea surface a greater desire for closer relations with the other. Within the AOIP, ASEAN saw it necessary to emphasize that the Outlook is inclusive in signalling its willingness to get behind any initiatives that support ASEAN’s vision of the Indo-Pacific, while the Moon Administration has explicitly stated Korea’s intention to elevate ASEAN-ROK relations to be on par with the four traditional major diplomatic partners – the US, China, Japan and Russia (Lee, 2019). According to the Co-Chairs’ statement of the 2019 ASEAN-ROK Commemorative Summit, Korea has committed to support the AOIP (ASEAN, 2019b).

However, concrete policy measures to promote greater synergy are lacking. In stark contrast to the economic and socio-cultural dimensions of ASEAN-ROK relations, there was hardly any mention of concrete measures relations in the Co-Chairs’ statement in which the two could engage in to strengthen their strategic relations. The same could be said when looking at this year’s Chairman’s Statement of the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference [PMC](#) 10+1 Sessions (ASEAN, 2019c). This paper makes the case for fostering stronger strategic ties between ASEAN and Korea. The logic it presents is simple – strategic cooperation makes ASEAN and Korea

more relevant in the emerging regional security landscape. This gives them currency to expand their manoeuvring space and strengthen their voices vis-à-vis the larger powers. Two areas of interest, namely, the Korean Peninsula and South China Sea [SCS](#) are fertile grounds to explore cooperation. The rationale for this choice is simple – they lie on the top of Korea and ASEAN’s respective agendas. This paper argues for an expansion in efforts to engage the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [DPRK](#) or [North Korea](#) via ASEAN-led mechanisms while arguing for an expansion in cooperation amongst the defence industries in response to the South China Sea dispute. These proposals will be discussed with a consideration of their respective feasibility and benefits.

Having explained the existing discourse surrounding the Indo-Pacific from the major players, the next two sections will look at the opportunities for cooperation within the Korean Peninsula and the SCS. The paper concludes by reiterating the importance of deepening strategic cooperation now as the window of opportunity could shut any moment.

2. Korean Peninsula

Thus far, efforts to achieve a denuclearised Korean Peninsula have failed. The Agreed Framework in 1994 broke down in 2002, with the US and North Korea faulting the other for violating terms. Following North Korea’s withdrawal from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Six-Party Talks were initiated. However, efforts failed again when North Korea pulled out from the talks in retaliation to the United Nations Security Council [UNSC](#) President statement condemning its satellite rocket launch (UN, 2009). Tensions

peaked during the back-and-forth between President Trump and North Korea's leader Kim Jong-Un, with the former threatening to "totally destroy North Korea" (Politico, 2017) while the latter calling President Trump a "dotard" (The Guardian, 2017). Of late, the mood surrounding US-DPRK relations is best described as a rollercoaster ride. While relations seemingly warmed with the duo meeting in Singapore, Viet Nam and the demilitarised zone DMZ of the Korean Peninsula, recent affairs suggest that the honeymoon period is all but over. North Korea sent a sharp warning in early December this year, saying "it is entirely up to the US what Christmas gift it will select to get", a veiled reference to the restarting of an intercontinental ballistic missile ICBM launch (Borger, 2019). In response, President Trump remarked that he would "handle them as they come along" (Chalfant, 2019). Given that the US is adopting a wait-and-see attitude, it is unlikely that any fruitful diplomatic efforts will happen, let alone succeed.

On Korea's part, then-President Kim Dae-jung launched the Sunshine Policy during his presidency 1998-2003, hoping to foster warmer ties through "the establishment of peace, expansion of reconciliation and cooperation" (Lee, 2003, p.180). The policy started well, with the first Inter-Korean Summit held in 2000. Aside from that, various levels of governmental and non-government level talks were instituted. Despite this, inter-Korean relations remain plagued by incidents like the Battle of Yeonpyeong in 2002, the shooting of a South Korean tourist in the tourist zone at Mount Kumgang in 2008 and ROKS Cheonan sinking in 2010 alongside North Korea's continued missile launches. These, amongst others, prompted the Lee Myung-bak Administration to declare that "engagement did not meet the expectations and demands of the Korean people" in the 2010 White Paper on Korean Unification, pointing to the end of the Sunshine Policy (Ministry

of Unification, 2010, p.19). Following the election of President Moon, the Sunshine Policy was brought back to the spotlight, as he sought to foster stronger inter-Korean relations through greater cooperation again (Straub, 2018). Thus far, President Moon has much to boast about. Inter-Korean summits have restarted, and Moon has been credited with his efforts in orchestrating the first US-DPRK summit (Kim, 2018).

While inter-Korean relations are on the right trajectory, US-ROK joint military drills remain a sore point. In protest to the joint military exercise this year, North Korea conducted six major weapons tests (Oh, 2019). That said, analysts are right to caution against overreading the situation, as the current testing appears to be more like "signals rather than provocations" (Ho & Nah, 2019). That said, the current rhetoric coming out of North Korea bodes ill for future inter-Korean relations, with the country's Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Country announcing that North Korea would not resume dialogue with Korea (Smith & Kim, 2019).

Against this backdrop, ASEAN-Korea cooperation could take the form of coordinating efforts to engage North Korea via ASEAN-led mechanisms. As President Moon explains, "ASEAN and Korea have had a common understanding so far to peacefully resolve the North Korean nuclear issue" (ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2018, p.9). This alignment improves the prospects of cooperation. Additionally, unlike its attitude towards the Six-Party Talks, North Korea has been open to ASEAN-led mechanisms, sending its foreign minister to represent the country for all, but this year's ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), in the past decade (Ho & Nah, 2019). Hence, ASEAN should consider President Moon's suggestion of pacing efforts to bring North Korea into the fold in tandem with the latter's denuclearisation efforts (ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2018). Some areas include facilitating opportunities for inter-Korean

dialogues in the ARF and encouraging greater participation by North Korea in the various ARF related bodies. Aside from such formal settings, the recent Trump-Kim meeting at the DMZ suggests that impromptu and informal meetings could provide valuable bridges to building stronger relations. Hence, ASEAN could consider roping in the foreign ministers of two Koreas to participate in the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Retreat. As Singapore's former Foreign Minister, Shunmugam Jayakumar shares, "retreats promote frank and candid discussions" (Jayakumar, 2011, p.85). According to the Press Statement by the Chairman of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Retreat, the situation in the Korean Peninsula was discussed during the retreat (ASEAN, 2019d). Since this issue is already discussed, inviting the foreign ministers of two Koreas will not cause a complete disruption of the retreat's agenda. In addition, this need not be a permanent arrangement, but merely an improvised one amid the current tensions between the two Koreas. There is no better candidate than an ASEAN-centred setting, given North Korea's longstanding relations and openness to ASEAN initiatives. Should ASEAN pursue this path, however, it will be prudent to limit participation to the two Koreas first, rather than expanding to other dialogue partners. This will make the entire retreat more manageable and productive. At its core, more dialogue and interactions, regardless of the political setting, will certainly augment the chances of a peaceful resolution of the situation in the Korean Peninsula.

Such a partnership creates a win-win situation. As explained, the present climate suggests that the best shot at restoring inter-Korean dialogue lies in ASEAN taking the lead. ASEAN must rise to the occasion. Through this, ASEAN can promote and safeguard the much-cherished ASEAN Centrality by pointing to the tangible benefits ASEAN-led mechanisms have brought

about in the resolution of the situation on the Korean Peninsula, whereas Korea can tap on ASEAN-led mechanisms as a tool to foster stronger relations with North Korea. Besides the benefits, this measure is feasible as the promotion of multilateralism is unlikely to prompt any strong responses from both the US and China.

3. South China Sea

The SCS remains one of the dominant strategic concerns of ASEAN. Of late, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the People's Republic of China (FMPRC) announced that ASEAN and China had, ahead of the stipulated schedule, completed their first reading of the single draft negotiating text for a Code of Conduct (CoC) (FMPRC, 2019). Although news of this development injected some positivity, the rosy picture depicted could be exaggerated instead. Recently, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) published a report detailing how Chinese Coast Guard vessels were harassing oil and gas operations by ASEAN Member States in the disputed waters (CSIS, 2019). This comes on the back of Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte telling China to "lay off" an island occupied by Manila in the early half of the year (Reuters, 2019). Such incidents cast a long shadow over whether the CoC, if concluded successfully, would institute any behavioural changes and calm tensions. Additionally, the increased frequency of Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOP) by the US and her allies increases the risk of a reoccurrence of the near-miss incident in 2018. That would be a nightmare for ASEAN. As Ng Eng Hen, Singapore's Defence Minister, warned then, regardless of intentions, "the price of any physical incident" is "too high and

unnecessary” (Mahmud, 2018).

Amidst this, how can ASEAN and Korea cooperate to deescalate the existing tensions on the SCS? Scholars like Kim Sung-Mi are right in cautioning that the deepening of strategic relations between ASEAN and Korea would drag the latter into the SCS dispute (Kim, 2018). This has far-reaching consequences for Korea, as it cannot avoid the reality that actions taken concerning the SCS have implications on bilateral relations with the US and China. However, this advice should be read as a plea for Korea to proceed strategically, rather than a call to avoid the issue completely. After all, Korea does have some skin in the game. The respect for international law, freedom of navigation, taming excessive territorial claims and most importantly, denouncing the notion that “might is right” are the international norms that Korea cares about. Therefore, the right course of action within Korea foreign policy establishment is debating how to help, rather than whether they should help ASEAN. Considering the dimension of ASEAN-Korea relations alongside their respective bilateral ties with the US and China, one possible area for cooperation lies in expanding cooperation between their respective defence industry. This could take the form of more arms deals and co-production between the AMS and Korea.

Given recent developments, the appetite for military equipment in the region has increased tremendously. According to data provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI](#), spending in the Asia and Oceania region on arms has increased by 46 per cent between 2009 to 2018, the largest of any region (SIPRI, 2019). At present, it appears that Russia is the key beneficiary of this trend, with an analysis by Bartlett suggesting that Russia’s strong year-on-year growth in arms sales was driven by Asian states (Bartlett, 2019). ASEAN and Korea would be foolish to not exploit this

opportunity to strengthen their strategic relations. There is much potential here, in large part fuelled by the urgent need to boost their aerial and maritime capabilities to close the gap between them and China. Individual AMS have long shown interest in equipment from Korea, where AMS like Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam have purchased equipment from Korea, with Indonesia being one of the biggest importers of South Korean defence equipment (Bitzinger, 2010; Parameswaran 2018). On their shopping lists include a myriad of weapons ranging from the Chang Bogo-class diesel-electric attack submarines, Jose Rizal-class frigates, T-50 jet trainers and FA-50 fighters (Chang, 2019). Beyond sales, Korea has also donated equipment such as the Pohang-class frigate to the Philippines (Nepomuceno, 2018). Such developments are positive steps towards stronger defence ties and should continue. After all, arms deals are not mere discrete transactions – they are a gateway to stronger military relations. Additionally, a successful arms deal acts as a catalyst for future opportunities. Beyond greater sales, defence relations could advance in the forms of increased frequency of defence officials’ meetings and joint military exercises. The ripple effect may further generate spills over to the economic and socio-cultural dimensions of bilateral relations as well.

However, as Farley notes, Korea’s arms deals with other countries may be subject to certain level of US export controls due to joint projects and technology transfers between defence industries of Korea and the US (Farley, 2018). Therefore, the challenge for the Moon Administration would be to first find markets where an arms deal is feasible and then act to actualise the possibilities. For now, Korea could look at past deals to design the blueprint forward. Korea could look at expanding its existing footprint by selling more of these weapons to a wider pool of AMS who are interested.

As Korea seeks to expand its footprint, much could be learnt from Russia's success story. Russia's ability to penetrate the respective AMS markets rests on the price advantage, flexibility of payments by offering counter-trade deals and also by playing on the regional frustration with the US (Buszynski, 2006). While the latter might not be an appropriate move for Korea to take, what it can consider is the first two factors.

Alas, as with any transactions, the efforts of the sellers are insufficient. Respective AMS must be open and flexible in dealing with Korea too. Should both ASEAN and Korea set their sight to the larger picture, all problems ranging from the price, quality to other miscellaneous details can be resolved. At its core lies one question – can ASEAN and Korea negotiate in good faith, considering the strategic benefits these arms deals could bring? In the end, the desired outcome would be the conclusion of intergovernmental initiatives and agreements, to ease the entry and expansion of South Korean defence contractors in the respective AMS markets. This is a classic example of win-win cooperation – ASEAN gets to tap on Korea's military technology to modernise their armed forces, whereas Korea gets to expand its footprint in the region.

Aside from arms deals, co-production of weapons is another area that the respective defence industries could cooperate in. Indonesia is in the midst of developing a fifth-generation stealth fighter jet, the KFX (Bitzinger, 2013) whereas the Philippines' top rifle manufacturer United Defence Manufacturing Corporation and Korea's S&T Motiv recently signed a joint venture agreement to produce arms for the Philippines' military and police force (Musico, 2018). As Wu notes, developing defence industries is a "key development priority" for some AMS (Wu, 2018). Therefore, with the right conditions, AMS will likely be open to collaborating with Korea.

As the two examples suggest, these collaborations could take the form of small arms to sophisticated equipment, opening the possibility for AMS with less developed defence industries to participate as well. Whether these collaborations translate to the enhancement of the aerial and maritime capabilities of the AMS is secondary; what is crucial here is to build industrial linkages that can translate to stronger strategic relations between ASEAN and Korea.

These are good areas to explore as Korea can kill three birds – strengthening relations with ASEAN and appeasing the US, while simultaneously avoid the trap of angering China – with one stone. On the first, efforts to support AMS in their bid to strengthen their ability to defend their sovereignty amidst growing challenges would build goodwill. Strengthening these bilateral ties will certainly pay dividends on a regional level. On the US, the Moon Administration can package these efforts as concrete policy moves to fulfil President Moon's promise of bringing about "harmonious cooperation" between his NSP and the FOIP. This will augment Korea's case that she is a responsible ally of the US who responds to the latter's call for greater burden-sharing. Lastly, China is unlikely to retaliate against Korea simply because Korea is selling more arms to the AMS. While scholars like Chang are right in pointing out that arms deals have "turned heads", they are unlikely to escalate tensions and trigger aggressive retaliation from the Chinese (Chang, 2019). Drawing parallels between Korea's arms deals with AMS with that of the THAAD deployment is an erroneous move. The effects of the status of Korea *an ally of the US* and the direct involvement of the US on the psyche on the Chinese cannot be discounted. These factors, alongside the fact that the deployment of the THAAD did pose potential threats to China's national security likely prompted the

Chinese to react in such a hostile manner then. Aside from these factors missing, one key reason why the Chinese are unlikely to retaliate against arms deals lies in her willingness and desire to maintain strong relations with individual AMS. Thus, China is unlikely to react aggressively since such attempts would likely play out badly amongst the AMS, who would read such moves as an encroachment of their national sovereignty. For ASEAN, cooperation between the respective AMS and Korea defence industry promotes goals that AMS are keen on. Should negotiations on arms deals go well, AMS can strengthen their military capabilities while enjoying superior technology at favourable rates. On the issue of co-production, AMS can achieve their national goals of developing a mature defence industry.

4. Conclusion

Current developments in the emerging Indo-Pacific suggest that the situation for regional entities like ASEAN and Korea could take a turn for the worse in the foreseeable future. However, the goal of this paper is not to promote greater pessimism. The opposite holds true. Obstacles abound, but there remains much room for optimism. What ASEAN and Korea need to do before the door shuts before them is to strive to remain relevant to the emerging political landscape. To this end, the paper has called for greater cooperation between them. Clearly, strengthening ASEAN-Korea strategic relations would require both parties to devote significant resources to see the project to fruition. However, as shown in the detailing of the historical context of the Korean Peninsula and the SCS, common interests

have always existed between ASEAN and Korea. At this juncture, the stakes involved have only grown. Therefore, cooperation is not a tough call to make. This paper has presented policy recommendations catered to helping both parties build relevance in the two respective situations. As explained, they are feasible and beneficial to both ASEAN and Korea. The time is now for both ASEAN and Korea to stand together to weather the brewing storm in the emerging Indo-Pacific.

ASEAN-ROK Defence Cooperation for the Peace of ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific Era: Focusing on Military Personnel Exchanges

— Han Ma Eum Yonsei University

Abstract

For the past three decades, the relationship between ASEAN and Korea has continued to develop, and since the introduction of President Moon Jae-in's New Southern Policy, ASEAN's position in Korea's foreign policy agenda has been elevated. There are three pillars supporting the New Southern Policy: People, Prosperity and Peace. Unlike the values of 'People' and 'Prosperity' in the vision of the New southern policy, the value of 'Peace' is not only difficult to continually pursue policies in accordance with global security issues and the logic of international order, but also has great difficulty in achieving results. However, Korea should not overlook

defence cooperation with ASEAN countries to foster peace and prosperity of the region. For Korea to achieve its national security objectives such as 'contribution to peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia and the world' as well as reach the long-term and comprehensive policy goal of the peninsula's 'peace and prosperity', it is necessary to establish mutual understanding and trust with ASEAN Member States.

Based on this problem recognition, this paper explores the ASEAN-Korea defence cooperation opportunities to achieve peace in the ASEAN region in the Indo-Pacific era. Defence cooperation is a high-level concept that includes military alliance, military cooperation, and military exchange. The ROK Ministry of Defence carries out defence diplomatic activities in various fields, ranging from military exchange, operation, and military defence. Focusing on the field of military personnel exchange among the areas of defence cooperation, the current situation of the ASEAN-Korea defence cooperation are examined. It proposes the establishment of a systematic and connected education system and the establishment of military education programs for ASEAN soldiers for practical and close cooperation in the near future.

The security environment is constantly changing. Relationships between countries can worsen or disconnect. However, with faith and trust within one another, we can prevent the worst case scenarios, and relationships can be restored through personnel exchanges. Therefore, the emphasis is placed on the activities of personnel exchange in the field of defence cooperation. If trust can be built through such measures, it will serve as a supporting foundation for a continuous and consistent defence foreign policy, which can contribute toward peace of ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific era.

인도-태평양 시대 아세안 평화를 위한 국방협력 방안: 인적 교류를 중심으로

1. 서론

한국과 아세안의 관계는 대화 관계가 수립된 이후 지난 30년간 지속적인 발전을 거듭해왔다. 특히 2017년 문재인 대통령의 표명 이후 추진되고 있는 한국의 신남방정책에서 아세안은 한국에게 있어 상생과 발전을 위한 핵심적인 파트너로 자리매김했다. 신남방정책은 ‘사람 중심의 평화와 번영의 공동체’ 비전 아래 사람^{People}, 상생번영^{Prosperity}, 평화^{Peace}의 가치를 골자로 하고 있다. 사람과 상생번영의 비전은 무역과 투자, 관광, 인적 교류 등 경제와 문화분야에서의 여러 성과로 가시화되고 있다. 아세안은 중국에 이은 제2위의 교역대상으로 2019년 8월기준, 한국의 총 교역량에서 16.5%를 차지했으며(한-아세안센터, 2019), 이는 작년 같은 기간에 비하면 0.6%가 증가된 규모이다. 대아세안 직접투자 역시 2017년 약 52억 달러에서 2018년 약 60억 달러로 증가했다. 한-아세안 센터의 2018년 통계에 따르면 작년 한국을 방문한 아세안 관광객은 246만명에 달했으며 유학생, 결혼이민자나 근로자 등 국내의 아세안 인구 수도 2016년 44만여명에서 2018년 59만여명으로 해가 갈수록 증가함을 알 수 있다.

이에 반해 평화 비전의 구현이라 할 수 있는 국방 분야에 있어서의 보여지는 성과는 상대적으로 저조하다. 이는 시시각각 변화하는 국제 정세와 외교 문제와 안보상황의 영향을 받을 수밖에 없으며 국가의 존립과 직결되

는 국방이라는 특수함 때문일 것이다. 국방부는 “정부의 ‘신남방정책’ 기조에 따라 다원화된 국방외교의 틀을 구축하고 동남아 국가와 실질적 국방협력을 창출하기 위해 상호 협력을 강화하는 한편, 국가별 안보 상황에 맞춰 호혜적이고 맞춤형 국방 및 방산 협력을 적극 추진하고 있다”고 밝혔다(국방백서 2018, pp.137-138). 하지만 당장 올해 국방부 2019년 자료와 중기와 장기적인 청사진으로 볼 수 있는 국방부 2020~2024년 중기계획, 그리고 국방개혁 2.0에도 아세안과 관련된 계획이나 자료는 빈약하다. 국방부와 외교부 내부에서도 관련 업무를 담당하는 부서가 있지만 복잡하고 다각적인 국제 안보 상황 속에서 미국 등의 기존 강대국 중심의 담당부서 편제와 업무 경중의 차이는 빚어질 수밖에 없는 가운데 아세안과의 국방협력분야는 국방부와 외교부의 외교안보적 사각지대에 놓일 수밖에 없다.

이러한 문제 인식을 바탕으로, 이 글에서는 인도-태평양 시대 아세안 평화를 위한 국방 협력 방안에 대해 다루려 한다. 아세안 지역의 평화와 안정을 위해서는 아세안 국가의 역할이 매우 중요할 뿐만 아니라 아세안 지역의 평화는 비단 아세안만이 아니라 국제적인 안보 질서와 평화에도 큰 영향력을 가지고 있기 때문이다. 총 4장으로 구성되어 있으며 2장에서는 한국의 아세안 국가와의 국방협력의 현황에 대해서 살펴보고, 3장에서는 인적교류를 통한 국방협력 방안을 제안하고자 한다. 마지막으로 결론에서는 앞선 내용의 요약과 함께 아세안 평화를 위한 국방 협력의 중요성을 강조하며 글을 마무리하고자 한다.

2. 한-아세안 국방협력 현황

1) 국방외교와 국방협력

한국에서는 군사외교(military diplomacy)와 국방외교(defence diplomacy, 군사협력(military cooperation)과 국방협력(defence cooperation)이 혼용되어 사용되고 있으나 2018 국방백서에서는 군사외교와 군사협력이 아닌 국방외교(defence diplomacy)와 국방협력(defence cooperation)을 사용하였다(국방백서 2018, p.135). 이 글에서는 국방부의 공식 용어 사용에 따라 국방외교와 국방협력으로 표기했으며, 국방외교라 함은 “외교와 군사 영역이 중첩되는 부분”이라 정의한 최영종(2004)의 정의를 따른다(p.185). 국방외교는 군사부문의 외교적 영역과 외교부문의 군사적 측면으로 나뉘어 질 수 있으며, 군사부문의 외교적 영역이 우리나라에서 일반적으로 지칭하는 국방외교이다.

국방기술품질원의 국방과학기술용어사전에는 군사협력(military cooperation)에 대해 “공동의 적 혹은 위협에 대한 공동의 안정이나 이익을 추구하기 위하여, 군사적 부문에서 국가들 간에 협조적 관계를 유지하는 것”이라 기술하고 있으며 국방협력에 대해서는 별도로 명시하고 있지 않다. 대부분의 선행연구에서는 윤종호(1991)의 국가안보의 한 요소로서 군사분야에 국한된 국가 간의 협력의 의미를 차용하고 있다(p.12). 국방협력은 군사동맹, 군사협조, 군사교류 모두를 포함하는 개념이다. 공동의 위협이나 적을 상정하고 조약에 의해 이루어지는 군사동맹과 공동의 위협에 대한 협력적 관계를 유지하되 조약이나 의무 관계가 없는 군사협조와 달리 군사교류란 조약의 관계도 없으며 공동의 위협을 가정하지 않는 단순한 군사분야의 협력이라 할 수 있다. 또한 국방협력은 협력분야에 따라 인사분야, 군수방산, 군사작전

의 교류로 나뉘어 질 수 있는데 단순한 군사교류에서 군사협조, 군사동맹으로 나아갈수록 협력의 강도도 커질 수밖에 없으며 인사분야의 교류에서 군수방산분야와 작전분야의 교류로 진전될 수 있다(박주경, 1996, pp.6-9).

결국, 국방협력은 국방외교의 외연 속에 이루어지는 활동이라 할 수 있다. 여기에서는 방대한 국방협력의 분야 중 군사교류에서 인사 분야에 한정하여 논의할 것이다. 궁극적으로 국가안보 및 국익증진에 기여하는 군사적 대외활동인 국방외교의 장에서 인사 분야의 교류가 원활해지고 신뢰가 쌓일 때, 구축된 신뢰를 바탕으로 지금보다 긴밀하게 군수방산, 군사작전의 분야 국방협력이 가능할 것이기 때문이다.

2) 아세안 국가와 인사분야 국방협력 현황

한국 국방부는 군사적 이슈에 대한 대화와 협력을 증진함으로써 지역 안보환경을 변화시키고 국방외교의 지평을 확대하고자 아세안 확대 국방장관회의(ADMM-Plus), 아세안 지역안보포럼(ARF), 아시아 안보회의(ASS), 헬리팩스 국제안보포럼(HISF), 동북아 협력대화(NEACD), 풀러튼 포럼(Fullerton Forum)과 같은 아시아 태평양 지역 내 다양한 다자안보회의에 적극 참여하고 있다. 또한, 2012년부터 아시아 태평양 지역의 다자안보협력과 한반도 평화정착에 기여하기 위해 다자안보대화체인 서울안보대화(SDD)를 매년 개최하고 있으며, 2017년 서울안보대화 이후 매년 한-아세안 국방차관 회의를 개최하고 있다.

신남방정책의 출범 이래 국방분야에 있어서도 아세안 국가와의 협력이 한층 더 강조되고 있으며, 아세안 국가와의 활발한 국방외교활동이 이루어지고 있다. 2017년 서울안보대화를 계기로 한국은 아세안 국가 중 여섯 번

제로 미얀마와 국방협력 양해각서에 서명하였으며, 2018년 서울안보대화를 계기로 캄보디아와 브루나이와 협정을 체결하며 국방교류협력 강화를 위한 제도적 기반을 닦았다. 2018년에는 인도네시아, 태국, 베트남, 캄보디아, 필리핀, 라오스 국가들과 국방 고위급 회담이 있었으며, 양국간 향후 국방협력 활성화를 위해 긴밀히 협조하기로 합의했다(국방백서 2018, pp.135-138). 2019년 9월에는 문재인 대통령 태국 순방 계기 한국과 태국간 군사비밀 정보보호협정(PSOMIA)을 체결하였으며, 같은 달 한국은 서울에서 개최된 한-아세안 국방차관회의를 주관하여 아세안 지역의 차관급 국방관료와 전세계 민간 전문가와 함께 한-아세안 30년 협력의 성과와 향후 국방협력 비전, 뿐만 아니라 사이버 위협대응을 위한 협력 강화 방안을 모색했다. 정경두 국방부 장관은 11월 방콕에서 열린 2019년 6차 아세안 확대 국방장관 회의(ADMM-Plus)에서 아세안 국가 간 “분야별 정보 공유, 세미나, 공동훈련 등 다양한 활동을 통해 국가 간 협의를 활성화” 해 나가고 있으며, 특히 한국은 오랜 기간 지속해 온 아세안 국가와의 폭넓은 관계를 신남방정책을 통해 지속가능한 안보를 위한 파트너로서 협력을 강화할 것이라고 밝혔다. 한-아세안 특별정상회의 간에는 한국은 필리핀과 싱가포르와 한-필리핀 특정 방산물자 조달 시행약정 개정 및 한-싱가포르 화생방 분야 정보교환 합의를 체결하여 방산분야의 협력을 이끌어 냈다.

한편, 한국군은 다양한 국가의 군사지식을 습득한 지역 군사전문가를 육성하기 위해 국방외교 대상국 40여 개국의 군사교육기관에 국방대학원, 지휘참모대학, 병과학교, 사관학교 등 연간 300여 명을 파견하고 있으며(국방백서 2018, p.71), 한국 군사교육기관에서 매년 40여 개국 100여 명 규모의 외국군 수탁교육을 지원하고 있다(국방통계연보 2018, pp.126-127). 외국군의 수탁교육은 장교를 양성하는 사관

학교부터, 병과학교와, 영관급 소령, 중령, 대령 장교들을 대상으로 하는 국방대학원, 지휘참모대학, 국방어학원의 한국어 과정까지 다양한 교육기관에서 이루어지고 있다. 외국군의 수탁교육 지원은 한국군의 위탁교육의 목적과 마찬가지로 외국군과의 인적 유대 강화를 위한 목적이 크며, 장차 국방협력과 국방외교를 위한 초석을 다지는 것이라 할 수 있다. <표 1>의 2019년 지휘참모대학 육군대학, 해군대학, 공군대학 외국군 수탁장교 현황을 살펴보면 총 29개국, 53명 가운데 아세안 국가 7개국, 총 18명의 군인이 수탁교육 중에 있다.

<표 1> 2019년 외국군 수탁장교 현황

구 분	인원(명)	수탁기관		
		육군대학	해군대학	공군대학
캄보디아	2	0	1	1
인도네시아	4	1	2	1
말레이시아	2	0	1	1
미얀마	2	1	1	0
필리핀	4	1	2	1
태국	2	0	2	0
베트남	2	1	1	0
비아세안국가	35	22개국 (호주, 브라질, 중국, 콜롬비아, 이집트, 인도, 이라크, 일본, 카자흐스탄, 쿠웨이트, 키르기스스탄, 몽골, 네팔, 나이지리아, 파키스탄, 사우디아라비아, 터키, 투르크메니스탄, 우간다, 우크라이나, 미국, 우즈베키스탄)		
총	53	29개국		

출처: 국방부 인적자원개발과 정보공개청구 문서 재구성(2019)

3. 인적교류를 통한 국방협력 방안

국방부의 국방외교 활동은 다양한 군사교류와 여기서는 언급하지 않은 작전분야와 군수방산 분야에 이르기까지 다방면에서 이루어지고 있지만 이 글에서는 인사분야에 초점을 두었다. 이는 “사회자본의 형성은 신뢰 구축 및 장기적인 군사협력에 있어서 필수적”일 뿐만 아니라 “사람과 사람 사이의 접촉과 신뢰 관계가 중요한 역할”을 하기 때문이다(최영중, 2004, p.195).

앞서, 2장에서는 아세안 국가와의 국방 고위급 회담을 통한 국방협력의 제도적 기반과 공조의 성과, 군사교육기관에서 이루어지는 수탁교육의 현황에 대해서 살펴보았다. 신남방정책을 추진하기 이전부터 외국군 수탁교육생의 대부분은 아세안 국가 출신이 상당수를 차지해왔다(국방통계연보 2018, pp.126-127). 문제는 기존에 유지해오던 실무적인 차원들의 교류 현황까지는 신남방정책의 파급력이 아직 미치지 못했다는 것이다. 2018년 연말에 발행된 국방백서에는 신남방정책에 따른 국방분야에서의 실질적인 국방협력 창출에 대한 담론이 명시되어 있지만 2019년 국방부 업무 보고문서나 중기계획 상에는 그런 논의들이 미흡하며, 현장이라 할 수 있는 조직의 말단, 교육기관에서는 변화를 찾아볼 수 없다. 아울러 국가별 산발적으로 이루어지는 활동들이 장기적으로 지속될 수 있는 방안을 강구해야 한다. 이러한 현 상황에 기초하여 체계적이고 장기적인 차원에서의 국방협력 방안을 다음과 같이 제안한다.

첫째, 수탁 군사교육 교류의 정규 시스템 정립이다. 아세안 국가 출신 수탁교육생 비중은 지휘참모대학의 현황을 기준으로 1/3을 차지할 정도로 상당한 것 같지만, 아직 한 번도 교류를 하지 않은 국가도 있으며, 아세안 국가들 내의 불균형의 문제도 상존한다. 수탁교육을 지원하고 있는 군사교

육기관의 나열로만 보면 장교양성기관인 사관학교부터, 임관후의 병과학교와 영관급의 지휘참모대학과 특수대학원인 국방대학원까지 기본교육부터 고급교육까지 지원을 하는 것 같지만 세부적으로 살펴보면 교육의 연계성이 부족하다. 사관학교와 위관급의 군사교육인 초군반(Basic Course)과 고군반(Advanced Course), 영관급의 군사교육인 지휘참모대학(Staff College)의 교육을 연계성 있게 수혜국에게 제공하는 수탁 군사교육 교류의 정규 시스템을 정립해야 한다. 수탁교육을 받는 군인들이 일회성, 단기적으로 한국을 방문하고 그치는 것이 아니라, 그들이 한국 군사전문가로 해당국가에서 성장하고 활동할 수 있도록 양성해야 할 것이다.

둘째, 아세안 평화를 위한 새로운 군사교육과정 개설이다. 이미 고위급에서는 많은 회담과 활동으로 한반도를 넘어 아세안의 평화와 안정을 위한 공동체의 노력이 필요함에 대해서는 공감대가 형성되었다. 하지만 지금 이루어지고 있는 것은 각국의 군사교육기관 안에서 서로의 군사지식과 문화를 습득하는 수준이다. 테러, 질병, 기후변화, 난민, 재난구호 문제 등 아세안 지역이 직면하고 있는 글로벌 안보 현안의 해결을 위한 새로운 교육 과정을 만들어야 한다. 한국군에서는 국제평화유지활동 관련 교류협력을 추진하고 교육체계를 발전시키는 국방대학교 산하의 국제평화활동센터(PKO, Peacekeeping Operation)가 있다(국방백서 2018, p.159). 국제평화활동센터와 유사한 역할을 수행하고 있는 각국의 센터나 기관에서 아세안 지역의 평화유지 활동을 위한 연구와 교육, 훈련을 체계적으로 지원할 수 있도록 그 기능과 역할에 대해 고민하고 실질적인 협력 방안을 논의할 필요가 있다. 교육과정을 수료한 아세안 지역의 군인들이 자문화중심의 시야에서 벗어나, 아세안 지역의 초국가적 작전의 구현을 위한 능력을 구비토록 해야 할 것이

다. 그럼으로써, 이와 같은 교육훈련 안에서 행해지는 연습이나 수반되는 연합훈련이나 통해 공동의 안보위협에 대한 아세안의 연대감을 갖게 하는 것이다.

4. 결론


한국군은 평화와 번영의 한반도를 위한 ‘강한안보, 책임국방’을 구현하려 한다. 하지만 단순히 한국군의 노력과 힘만으로는 평화와 번영의 한반도를 이룰 수 없다. 초국가적이고 비군사적 위협이 증대하고 있으며, 다양한 안보위협이 상존하는 안보 상황 속에서 국제적인 공조 노력이 필요하다. 신남방정책 천명 이후, 한반도의 평화 담론은 한반도를 넘어 지평이 확장되었고, 특히나 지정학적으로 중요한 아세안과의 국방협력은 그 어느 정부때보다도 더욱 활발히 진행되고 있다.

한편, 신남방정책의 3가지 비전 가운데 ‘사람’과 ‘상생번영’의 가치에 비해 ‘평화’의 가치는 시시각각 변화하는 글로벌 안보 현안과 힘의 논리에 따라 정책을 연속성 있게 추진하기도, 성과를 헤아리기에 어려움이 있다. 하지만 아세안 지역의 평화를 위해서는 아세안 국가의 역할과 아세안 국가와의 국방외교적 관계를 간과할 수 없다. 아세안 지역과의 상호이해와 신뢰가 구축될 때 비로소 한반도의 평화와 번영을 위한 기반이 확대될 수 있기 때문이다.

이 글에서는 이러한 문제인식을 바탕으로 인도-태평양 시대 아세안 평화를 위한 국방 협력 방안에 대해 모색했다. 국방협력은 군사동맹, 군사협

조, 군사교류 모두를 포함하는 상위 개념으로 국방부의 국방외교 활동은 다양한 군사교류와 작전분야, 군수방산 분야에 이르기까지 다방면에서 이루어지고 있지만 국방협력의 분야 중 인적 교류분야에 초점을 맞춰 한국과 아세안 국방협력의 현황을 살펴보았다. 신남방정책 이후 많은 진전들이 있지만, 체계적이고 장기적인 계획이 부족하다는 점과 정책의 파급력이 전투력이 가시화되는 현장에는 아직까지 미미하다는 점이 시사점이었다. 이러한 상황을 바탕으로 미래 지향적으로 실질적이고 긴밀한 협력관계를 위해 체계적이고 연계성 있는 수탁 교육 시스템의 정립과 아세안 국가 군인들을 대상으로 하는 군사교육과정 개설을 국방협력의 방안으로 제안했다.

안보 환경은 끊임없이 변하고 있다. 영토, 종교, 인종 등 전통적 갈등 요인과 테러, 사이버 공격, 질병 등의 다양한 신형 안보위협 속에서 국방외교 활동은 장기적인 추진력을 갖기가 어렵다. 국가간 관계가 악화되거나 교류가 단절될 수 있다. 하지만 서로에 대한 믿음, 신뢰가 있다면 적어도 최악의 상태는 방지할 수 있을 것이며, 신뢰가 형성되어 있는 한 관계의 회복이나 교류의 재개가 가능할 것이다. 그렇기 때문에 국방협력에서도 인적 교류의 활동에 무게를 두는 것이다. 따라서 인적 교류의 활동과 유대 관계를 유지하기 위한 노력은 아세안 평화를 위한 국방협력에 있어 필수적일 것이다. 두터운 인적 네트워크를 형성하고, 상호간의 신뢰를 쌓아간다면, 이는 지속적이고 일관된 국방외교정책의 버팀목이 될 것이다. 아울러 인도-태평양 시대에 아세안의 평화의 가치는 빛을 발할 수 있을 것이다.



ASEAN-Korea Relations: Shaping Strategic Partnership for the Emergence of Indo-Pacific

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Abstract

In almost three decades, ASEAN has been a sustainable partner for Korea, and the two sides have established many areas of dialogue and cooperation. The emergence of the Indo-Pacific provides ASEAN and Korea with another challenge to work together to protect their common interests. The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that has the potential to generate enormous trade and investment opportunities which benefits every stakeholder involved. Consequently, it became the centre of most countries' attention. On one hand, ASEAN and Korea strive to assert their influence on each other. On the other hand, ASEAN and Korea have United

States who seeks to counter China's expansionism and reassert its influence. Currently, both ASEAN and Korea maintain a low profile to avoid being caught in the middle of the US-China conflict despite having opportunities and responsibilities in the long-term stability in the regions. As a result, it is bound to be debated as to whether ASEAN and Korea can increase their cooperation to navigate through the tides of the emerging Indo-Pacific. This paper looks into the key challenges prevailing in the region and identifies prepositional challenges attached to ASEAN and Korea partnership. Then, the paper develops notions analytically based on historical experience, present circumstances, and future aspects for ASEAN and Korea to shape their strategic partnership against the challenges in the emergence of the Indo-Pacific.

Introduction

The relations between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN](#) and the Republic of Korea [ROK](#) have always been particularly significant. It was a historic year when the two established dialogue relations in 1989 since the Communist bloc began to collapse, which was the starting point of a more peaceful global landscape. At the same time, the United States emerged as the sole global superpower. ASEAN adapted to this global scenario by incorporating its old adversary, Viet Nam, as its seventh member, and Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Cambodia joined the regional entity soon after. Currently, ASEAN's total GDP per capita increased by 63.2 percent compared to 2007, with overall trade grown to USD 2.3 trillion (Khasru, 2017). Meanwhile, Korea has reshaped and transformed dramatically as well. Korea at the present is considered as a nation with the history of fastest-growing average GDP and has ranked the world's 11th largest economy.

Since the inauguration of the dialogue relations, ASEAN and Korea have been able to work together on many problems of mutual concerns and interests. Korea has been strongly cooperative with ASEAN in the political-security field by actively participating in ASEAN's dialogue process and forums such as ASEAN Regional Forum [ARF](#), ASEAN-ROK Summit, Ministerial Meetings, and many more. In the economic sector, Korea has always been a leading trade and investment partner for ASEAN. In 2018, Korea was the fifth largest trading partner of ASEAN with two-way trade reaching USD 160.5 billion. Meanwhile, Foreign Direct Investment [FDI](#) inflow from Korea to ASEAN stood at USD 6.6 billion, making Korea as also the ASEAN's fifth-largest external source of FDI (Overview of ASEAN-ROK, n.d.).

The fruitful development of Korea's New Southern Policy which primarily concentrates on advancing ASEAN-Korea cooperation and the recent 2019 ASEAN-ROK Commemorative Summit celebrating the 30th anniversary of the dialogue relations made 2019 especially a remarkable year for both sides. Nonetheless, there has been no shortage of challenges confronting ASEAN-Korea partnership.

For the last couple of years, one of the predominant concerns throughout the region as a whole, including ASEAN and Korea, was the emergence of the Indo-Pacific. Considered as one of the most dynamic locations in the world, its surrounding areas are home to 65 percent of the global population and provide the most important maritime routes for the global economy. As a result, it is unavoidably posing security and economic challenges. On one hand, ASEAN and Korea have China who strives to assert influence across the region through naval capabilities and the Belt and Road Initiative [BRI](#). While on the other hand, they have the United States who responds through its own Free and Open Indo-Pacific [FOIP](#) strategy. Given ASEAN and Korea's geographical location and the size of its economy, ASEAN and Korea place a high responsibility on ensuring the Indo-Pacific community to maintain peace, stability, and prosperity. Unfortunately, both entities still maintain a low profile on the issue compared to other regional stakeholders. As a result, it is bound to be debated as to whether ASEAN and Korea can safely and prosperously navigate through this tide of the emerging Indo-Pacific. This paper will briefly explain the current geopolitical challenges within the Indo-Pacific before proceeding to demonstrate the measures imperative in shaping ASEAN-Korea strategic partnership against the challenges within the emergence of Indo-Pacific.

1. Indo-Pacific's Strategic Challenges

The emergence of the Indo-Pacific can be compared to an artwork that increased its values over time. Similar to every artwork, it became a target once people started to realize its significance. According to Das (2019), the region can be understood broadly as an interconnected space between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. However, from the perspective of experts, the Indo-Pacific refers to the process of interconnectedness and interdependence resulting from the rapidly evolving globalisation and the development of maritime mobilisation which integrates the world's two major oceans. The regions and surrounding areas are known for their economic and demographic dynamism together with its maritime routes for global trade and natural resources. It is thus unsurprising that it has become the theatre of competition between the two global powers: China and the US. Since the start of the 21st Century, China has been challenging the US in almost every sphere; from trade, technology, infrastructure, to military capabilities. It has escalated disturbingly within the Indo-Pacific in recent years. China has strived to spread its influence in the region through its massive BRI infrastructural investment while expanding maritime strategic presence through its naval bases and artificial islands. Nonetheless, China's influence within the Indo-Pacific has indicated aggressiveness, unfair competition, and lack of respect for sovereignty. The US, on the other hand, responded by declaring FOIP to counter China's influence, dealing with potential aggression, strengthening the regional alliance, and reasserting its own influence at the same time. This further complicates ASEAN and Korea who has a stake in the long-term stability in the regions. To a certain extent, it represents two prepositional challenges.

First, the emergence of Indo-Pacific is still very much in its early phase. Thus, it is understandable why both ASEAN and Korea prefer a safer route by trying to avoid taking a strong position on the issue. This is reflected through the slow and vague stance on the recently released ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific AOIP, and Korea being reluctant to come up with its version of mechanism to navigate in the Indo-Pacific like Australia, India, and Japan. True, this approach enables ASEAN and Korea to maintain good relations with both the US and China. However, it simultaneously creates a problem in which both regional entities are unable to create effective strategic planning to secure their interests. As demonstrated through an article by du Rocher (2019), this problem of diplomatic slowness and uncertainty is that it will not only turn out to be unfitting for a long term success in the Indo-Pacific, but it also provides advantages for the powerful stakeholders to shift the regions into a direction that does not accommodate to the collective best interests. Furthermore, the current geopolitical scenario will oblige ASEAN and Korea to unavoidably engage in the foreseeable future. Especially with China's increasing assertiveness, they should shortly prepare and develop a more concrete strategy for long-term implementation so as to provide a sure guarantee for peace, economic prosperity, and stability in the Indo-Pacific community.

Second, opposed to what is commonly believed, the rivalry between China and the US is not only about trade. It is about the competition for global supremacy in which China has risen to challenge the US's position to become a revisionist power. Within the Indo-Pacific, it is a primary driving force for the rapidly evolving regional security issues, and its footprints will be very likely to impact in the next following decades. Whether China will be able to dominate the Indo-Pacific before proceeding to obtain global

supremacy status or whether FOIP will reject China's expansionism and reassert US's influence is very much still unpredictable. It is particularly difficult to predict with President Trump's lack of seriousness with his diplomatic moves when confronted with China as evident through the recent Huawei political controversies. Nonetheless, in the face of this unpredictability, it is presenting a huge opportunity for ASEAN and Korea to mitigate the US-China tension and promote peace in the region. Regrettably, both entities have yet to embrace this opportunity so far. Based on this context, should ASEAN and Korea wish to maintain their prospect as effective regional stakeholders, they have to showcase a more active and credible role in the regional affairs, or to the least avoid being subjected to the push and pull of major powers.

2. Shaping ASEAN-ROK Strategic Partnership for the Indo-Pacific

Korea is an important partner for ASEAN's vision for the Indo-Pacific. Both sides have potential to build a strategic partnership to thrive in the emergence of the Indo-Pacific. However, the vital question remains in how to manage this strategic partnership.

Embrace the Indo-Pacific Concept

The important rationale of why the Indo-Pacific concept should be embraced can be demonstrated by comparing it to the preparation phase before the ASEAN Economic Community [AEC](#) integration. During the introduction of AEC, one of the first priorities is to have ASEAN

citizens embrace this concept. In doing so, member states seek every possible approach particularly through the education system and media outlets to establish a foundation that citizens of ASEAN understand their opportunities and responsibilities within the AEC. Although currently, the AEC is considered as a failure by many critics, there are still some silver lining ([Fensom, 2015](#)). One of the positive aspects of this collective effort is that many ASEAN citizens have good understanding of the AEC and are able to participate when it comes to regional cooperation. Returning to the primary discussion, the problem with the Indo-Pacific concept for ASEAN-Korea partnership is that both regional entities have yet to embrace this concept. For one, there is a lack of cultivation on the issues. Unlike other regional stakeholders such as India or Australia which have plenty of literature, publication, and research to analyse and discuss to gain better perspectives on the issue, the only educational documents that connect ASEAN and Korea to the Indo-Pacific concept are mostly available in the news article. The lack of encouragement from the governments of ASEAN member states plays an important obstacle in embracing this concept. Another problem is ASEAN and Korea's lack of enthusiasm in the Indo-Pacific concept. Even in the recently released 9-page long Co-Chairs' Statement from the 2019 ASEAN-ROK Commemorative Summit, the term Indo-Pacific was only mentioned once. The approach in embracing the Indo-Pacific concept does not have to be too profound. To the least, it has to reach a certain standard that both government and citizens alike able to prepare for the strategic partnership's opportunities and responsibilities when the situation is required.

Strengthen ASEAN-ROK Maritime Connectivity

Ocean-based transportation has always been crucial to the global economy as it is responsible for around 80 percent of the global trade (“Review of Maritime Transport,” 2018). Therefore, it is comprehensive to see why countries are competing to enhance their maritime capabilities. For the Indo-Pacific, there is no exception as the maritime sphere has always been the main source of its geopolitical challenges. China, as a regional power, invests massively in its maritime capabilities. While the US decreased its maritime presence in Asia, China often used its maritime power as a political instrument to enhance its naval presence and shifting the regional architecture to its desire. Against this backdrop, the ASEAN-Korea partnership must increasingly focus on developing maritime connectivity to protect their maritime interest. ASEAN and Korea occupy important strategic positions in the Indo-Pacific. Therefore, it is critical to enhance partnerships between ports and other maritime facilities to maintain substantial economic link and connectivity. Through this, ASEAN and Korea can promote greater trade and generate employment opportunities to the people living in the region. Greater regional connectivity, sequentially, can provide ASEAN and Korea with bigger leverage to make significant contributions to counter China’s assertiveness. With efficient maritime capacity, ASEAN and Korea can also engage with other maritime powers regionally and globally to strategically keep the sea lanes safe from piracy and other types of hostility. Stronger maritime connectivity is a win-win for ASEAN, Korea, and the region as a whole.

Promote Greater Cooperation

The lack of reliability by the US made its allies reluctant to depend on

her for regional security matters. The withdrawal of US troops from Syria which allowed Turkey to launch its offensive attack against the Kurds is a good case to point out. Under this circumstance, especially with the current geopolitical scenario of the Indo-Pacific, it is paramount that ASEAN and Korea need to promote greater cooperation with other regional stakeholders to share regional burdens, responsibilities, and power. Snyder (as cited in Chun, 2000) noted that countries through the expansion of cooperation and alliance can create a different security alternative to fend off the common threat and reduce the prospect of being attacked. An individual state alone may be weak, but through cooperation and alliance, ASEAN, Korea and like-minded stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific can work together to protect their common interests. For sure, countries can choose an alternative approach to independently build their military capacities to ensure their security and survival. However, this approach appears to be inadequate for the post-World War II scenario. The historical evidence showcases the experience of the Soviet Union who tried to isolate themselves among its communist bloc and focus primarily on enhancing military capabilities which, ultimately, led to its collapse. With collective efforts from both within and outside the region, ASEAN and Korea will have bigger power to counterbalance with the major powers. As such, it is especially important for ASEAN and Korea not to perceive this strategic partnership as a club with limited membership, but seek to promote greater cooperation from other regional stakeholders if they are serious in making efforts to shape the Indo-Pacific.

3. Applying Preventive Diplomacy Model in the Indo-Pacific

The purpose of preventive diplomacy is set within the term itself; to prevent rather than restore. Former United Nations Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali (as cited in Tay & Talib, 1997) defined preventive diplomacy as “any diplomatic approach that prevents disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from evolving into conflict and to prevent conflict from spreading once it takes place.” For the region that occasionally embodies mistrust and patterns of a zero-sum game behaviour, it is indispensable to promote the use of preventive diplomacy to change the Indo-Pacific’s geopolitical landscape. Currently, the US and China rivalry continues to be the main concern for the region. The US identifies China as a threat who aggressively wants to dominate the region. Meanwhile, China perceives that the US is trying to obstruct its emergence as regional dominant. Consequently, it generates a deficiency of trust not only between China and the US, but also for the other regional stakeholders who concern that their national interest may also be threatened. Thus, there is a critical need for a mechanism such as preventive diplomacy that can build a better understanding and confidence among Indo-Pacific community.

The practice of preventive diplomacy includes offering assistance to a potential conflict, fact-finding missions and mediation during the onset of potential conflict. Its vital component is to counteract dispute from developing into conflict. It can be simple as an information-sharing during the onset of a crisis (Archarya, 1996). ASEAN itself is an ideal specimen of how to employ preventive diplomacy to maintain regional prosperity and peace. Although it is solely based on trust and promises to continue the peace, it

does not necessarily require great financial resources, military power, political will or other forms of intervention. That is why such approaches to build peace will easily attract everyone to the negotiation table, and not likely to be opposed by any major powers. For reference, preventive diplomacy has effectively maintained the peaceful coexist of ASEAN and its external partners for decades despite its relatively abstract nature. By establishing the ASEAN Regional Forum [ARF](#) in 1994, ASEAN has been pivotal in exercising the preventive diplomacy by bringing together 27 member states with the indiscriminate political systems, military capabilities, economic development, and strategic outlooks to deal with acute security issues in the region. Instead of cooperation like NATO or many other security organisations, the ARF was not established for competition or to respond to any threats. Rather, it was established within the framework of cooperation with primarily focusing on cooperation and peaceful coexistence (Singh, 1994).

The preventive diplomacy seeks to prevent conflict through negotiation, inquiry, mediation, or arbitration which appropriate to employ to prevent any early development of the dispute (Tay & Talib, 1997). Although considering the Indo-Pacific as the early stage of the dispute might be a little bit exaggerated, this approach ideally correlates to the current geopolitical scenario. The preventive diplomacy mechanisms can be employed through the establishment of a new multilateral forum similar to the ARF that brought all relevant stakeholders together to reconcile the differences, to solve the existing disputes, or to negotiate a new agreement. Overall, it must be within the framework of building mutual trust and confidence. If the Indo-Pacific is to prosper, all stakeholders must be able to discuss tough issues and engage with each other over their differences. Therefore, cooperation from inside and outside the region, especially between the

US and China, is pivotal to ensuring the positive discussion on regional problems, information sharing, promoting confidence-building and enhancing transparency. After all, it is cheaper to prevent conflict through peaceful engagement rather than spend millions on reconstruction efforts after the wars.

4. Maintaining the Rule of Law

Similar to preventive diplomacy, the promotion of the international rule of law is an essential component that has to be embedded into ASEAN and Korea's strategic visions, should they wish for long-term peace, security, and prosperity. In the Indo-Pacific, the main concerns shared among stakeholders are about the emergence of China who is characterised by an assertive trajectory. Currently, China is pushing the "rule-based order" by insisting that the international laws or the rule of law are not fitting into the regional context, which instead should be handled through mechanisms that build specifically for regional context (du Rocher, 2019). However, the rule of law, for centuries, has been vital in maintaining global peace and prosperity. It is an essential component for maintaining peace and prosperity, and for the building of trust among countries.


Both the rule of law and rule-based order indeed provides both advantages and disadvantages. However, the diminishing of the rule of law periodically resulted in disastrous circumstances. During the 1930s, rule of law and mutual understanding between states became gradually irrelevant and so ultimately led to the misery and tragedy of the World War II. Furthermore, the rule of law became the main agenda of the

United Nations for quite some period to build global peace. This concept fundamentally embedded the provision of the UN with the responsibility "to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained" (UN Charter preamble, para. 1). While for the Indo-Pacific, the deficiency of trust between China and the US made both sides perceive international laws, treaties, and norms as something that can be overlooked in order to push for its unilateral interests. Therefore, maintaining the rule of law is more important than ever to prevent any systemic threats to the Indo-Pacific community.

The problem is how can rule of law withstand China's rule-based order? First of all, the reason that allows China to popularise its rule-based order mechanism to the region so far is that the majority of the regional stakeholders, including ASEAN member states, have scepticism over upholding the rule of law. To solve this, ASEAN and Korea must present themselves with the concepts that are relevant to the regional context. In these processes, both regional entities can and should facilitate greater analyses of the rule of law mechanism that is suitable for the region by beginning with assessing the regional needs and capacities to ensure the effective and sustainable. At the same time, the commitment to the rule of law will allow ASEAN and Korea partnership to work well with like-minded peers such as Australia, Japan and other regional shareholders to uphold its principles despite pressure from major powers. It will help enhance cooperation and regional security while mitigating violent conflicts in the short term. In the long term, these efforts can oppose the regional unilateralism and authoritarianism by strengthening peaceful principles, norms, and help each stakeholder be accountable for their actions.

Conclusion

In conclusion, a closer look at the Indo-Pacific indicates that this region can be represented as a two-edged sword. The region is rich with potentials both economically and politically. At the same time, these potentials encourage states, specifically the strong and powerful, to compete in spreading their influences to dominate the region. It generates concerns for regional stakeholders who wish that the region continues to maintain peace, stability, and prosperity. While some might argue that peripheral stakeholders such as ASEAN and Korea should wait until the tide calm before engaging with the regional affairs. However, based on the current regional geopolitics, ASEAN and Korea must not display any slow and uncertain attitude. The two are ideal and capable partners to thrive in the emergence of the Indo-Pacific. Therefore, both sides can and must represent themselves as competent regional stakeholders by being enthusiastic about the potential of the Indo-Pacific, embrace its concept, while expanding cooperation and connectivity. At the same time, mitigating the regional tension must also be embedded into the strategic framework should long-term peace be achieved. Otherwise, the collective interests amongst the regional stakeholders will be threatened and this partnership will become mere pawns of the powerful states. 30 years ago, ASEAN and Korea forged together for a shared faith that both regional entities can be united for mutual prosperity, and it was a rewarding 30 years of relations for both sides. The two parties have been able to work positively together despite confronting many challenges. With the experiences from the past 30 years of partnership, ASEAN and Korea should demonstrate their abilities to navigate through the tides of the emerging Indo-Pacific again.



The Importance of ASEAN-Korea Relationship to the Indo-Pacific's Regional Security

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Abstract

ASEAN and Korea are indisputably important, not only for the prosperous growth, but also for the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region. This is clearly reflected in the strong vitality, the miraculous development as well as the important voice of both ASEAN and Korea in regional issues. Besides the fact that this is an inevitable process, based on the complex context of the Indo-Pacific region today, this is also an extremely urgent process, when the region is witnessing a strong shift in both the political centre and the balance of power. This specific status quo

negatively affects the development of countries, which raises the question of whether ASEAN and Korea – with an undeniably crucial role in the region – should play bigger roles to maintain peace. The close relationship between the two sides has consistently been strengthening over the past decades, but the two have not yet been able to come up with common policies for regional security, when the Plan of Action of ASEAN and Korea appears to remain as mere suggestions and objectives of cooperation. Different studies actually indicate that their relationship in a stronger, more robust form would benefit both sides, but they failed to acknowledge the effect of the relation to region's greater security issues. With the important role of the two sides in the region, a common policy and strong relationship could be the key to addressing regional security.

With the aforementioned questions, this paper aims to clarify the role of the relationship between ASEAN and Korea on regional security. This paper will focus on explaining what the role of ASEAN and Korea in the region is in reality, and what roles they should play in theory. This can be clarified by showing the capability of their different dimensions, how their set goal of development is affected in the current context, and thereby leading to the question of what policies should be adopted by the two sides to address both domestic and regional security needs.

By gradually explaining and answering the aforementioned questions, this paper attempts to offer a potential and specific solution to the security issues of ASEAN and Korea as well as the Indo-Pacific region, in a new perspective and a new approach.

A. Introduction

The US-China trade war and the series of security issues in the Indo-Pacific region – which is currently playing the central role in the world politics – raised questions on the stability of regional security and the role of nations in the issue. In terms of economy, in general, the trade war is adversely affecting the region, entailing global economic instability as well as reducing confidence throughout the Asia-Pacific region. The expected average growth rate for the ASEAN-5 for 2019 was 4.3 percent, down by 0.3 percentage points compared to the March survey and is the fourth consecutive correction in the direction of deteriorating since September 2018 (Writer, 2019). Meanwhile, the trade war is only a small part of the emerging unrest in the region, as big countries are also using military and political hotspots as cards for negotiation and construction influence in the area.

This raises the question, what ASEAN and Korea – as significant political parties in the region – can do and should do to adjust and curb regional conflicts, to ensure stability and peace. This paper is designed to provide a different perspective on the current situation of the region as well as ASEAN and Korea to provide an effective solution for all parties.

B. The security status quo of Indo-Pacific

1. Security of Indo-Pacific

1.1 What is security

Security, in the most fundamental understanding, is the ability of one object to maintain safety against threats (Walt, 1991). Undergone many changes, the concept of security can now be narrowed down into two main notions known as traditional security and non-traditional security. By clarifying the two notions, one could thoroughly understand to what extent the security form of Indo-Pacific is.

To a certain extent one could view traditional security as military and non-traditional notion as economy. To explain further, while traditional definition of security only involves the military field as stated in Realism era, non-traditional security contains distinct aspects including climate change, terrorism, refugees etc. However, only in terms of economy where it requires extensive cooperation may create massive domino effect. The rise of non-traditional security notion also made its first appearance in the neo-liberalism and constructivism era, in which the economy is stated to be the main cause for high level integration. This is because after the Cold War ended, economy became so deeply intertwined with diverse aspects of the society and nation as a whole. This can be seen in the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998, which there are still records that some countries are not yet to fully recover from the event.

With that to be stated, the author believes that, both on theoretical and logical aspects, political-security and economy are the two main elements when considering about security, and this paper would mainly focus on

these two elements.

1.2 Roles of each stakeholder in a region's security aspect

Considering the roles of each factor of international relations in a highly unstable environment, one should consider the choices accordingly, based on the current morphology. The chaos state in security aspect of one region or the world in general usually involves the conflicts between great powers. This specific situation undoubtedly forces medium and small countries into unwanted position as they have to clarify their policy choices. Realists argue that one can consider the following alternatives: bandwagon to one side, balance in between or isolated itself, when great powers conflicts are heated. These are rational choices for one country, suggested that those choices should bring into consideration for the best of national interest, but each option should thoroughly understand to have immense impact on the status quo since it precisely affects the balance of power within the situation.

With the aforementioned theories to be applied into Indo-Pacific current status quo, one may answer the question of what stance should we take in the near future and which stake holder would be playing an important role in maintaining peace and security.

2. Current state of Indo-Pacific security

2.1 The unstable peace

To consider about the current status of security of Indo-Pacific, one should scrutinise the region's political and economic status. In terms of the political and military situation of the region, although there are no

significant armed conflicts, there are several hotspots in the area that are potentially dangerous to the current trend, such as the situations in Taiwan, Hong Kong and South China Sea. Meanwhile, the economic development in the region is on an excellent rate but there also exist several trade obstacles, namely the significantly deceleration of the regional linkage process and the US-China trade war. In general, we can assess that the region is in a moderate phase but not genuinely stable. The region is now the centre of international politics with the contradictory policies of the big countries, but the medium and small countries are yet to come up with their own policies of possible solutions concerning regional security.

2.2 The original causes

The Indo-Pacific regional context is in the process of shifting into a more complex and diverse form. Firstly, the region has recently witnessed China's "peaceful rise" in the region, with its hard and soft power dramatically increasing through a series of different economic and diplomatic policies. This makes the area's morphology particularly more sophisticated and heats up the region's major conflicts, the US-China relations. Secondly, trend of the region since the end of Cold War is mainly concentrated on creating a peaceful, stable environment for mutual development, which is the inevitable outcome of the massive integration. However, in the recent period, with the commitment of the US to the region and middle powers' decelerations in the development process, a different tendency such as nationalism and protectionism is challenging this main trend.

The aforementioned threats are challenging the developing process of the entire region in general, and negatively influencing the development of each major country such as ASEAN and Korea. This form of Indo-Pacific

has directly led to the aforementioned status quo in the region, in which the political and economic aspects are in a moderate state but at the same time significantly sensitive, leading to high chances of provoking greater conflicts. In this situation, great powers are the ones who dominate, while most medium countries – who play the decisive role as explained above – have not yet developed a thorough nor firm foreign policy to stabilise the situation. Both ASEAN and Korea are aiming for a major balance policy as a long-term strategy, but with the current growing tension, the counterbalance ability of the two parties is showing obvious weaknesses.

C. The undoubtedly important relationship

3. The importance of a robust relationship between ASEAN and Korea to regional peace

3.1 On theoretical aspect: Indo-Pacific need the relation for stability

The policy of small and medium-sized countries in the region is evidently related when it is arduous to form a tripod structure to restrain conflict. What would the future be like if countries maintain their current policies for the long run? Great powers such as the US, China, and Russia will still declare opposing policies, causing continuous conflicts in order to maintain their influence and political power over other nations. It is believed that no party would be willing to step down from the conflicts as an act of protecting the image and prestige of a great nation. This will lead to intensification of contradictions and disputes in the region, worsening

the security situation. However, when middle powers, such as ASEAN and Korea, do not develop a robust policy, no third party would be able to curb conflicts as the role of the Non-Aligned Movement in Cold War. Hence the security status of the region will only grow into a more unstable direction, directly threatening the current peace. This situation easily provokes large-scale disputes and crises, affecting not only the Indo-Pacific region but also other regions, creating unwanted enormous domino effect. This context requires both ASEAN and Korea to have further steps to maintain regional peace and come up to their important political role.

3.2 On practical aspect: the two parties' need of regional stability

There are reasons behind their hesitation in declaring a more robust policy, and it is evidently presented with their political standing and political ability. While the role of the two parties are undoubtedly critical, their inner capability have not yet come to full expectation.

3.2.1 The important standing

First of all, we need to clarify how important and critical ASEAN and Korea is to the region. After 50 years of formation and development, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations not only creates important foundations for the development of member states, but also becomes a "nucleus", playing a "central role" in cooperation mechanisms and regional structure in the region (ASEAN, 2008). ASEAN is recognised by the international community as one of the most successful multilateral organisations. Most of the major countries participate in ASEAN mechanisms, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus, and

consider them to be a framework to build security structures of the region. In the economy field, ASEAN is an indispensable partner in the cooperation mechanism of major countries as well as in different economic organisations within the Indo-Pacific. With the current collective gross domestic products GDP of almost USD 2.8 trillion in 2017 (ASEAN, 2018), ASEAN is now ranked as the world 5th largest and Asian 3rd largest economy. ASEAN is proving it to be the important motivation of economic growth in the region.

On the other hand, Korea is a middle power country that holds the important key to peace and prosperous status with its outstanding economy growth and crucial geopolitical position. Korea is the fifth largest economy in Asia after China, Japan, India and Indonesia and ranked 14th in terms of GDP worth of USD 1.5 billion in 2016 (Worldometers, n.d). In addition, Korea is located in one of the most prominent political and security hotspots in the region, the Korean Peninsula where the two Koreas are still technically under war, suspended by an armistice. By maintaining peaceful efforts and stable solutions, Korea has brought bright points about peace and solidarity in the region, rapidly yet firmly built up the image of a peace-loving nation, handled international issues rigorously, abiding international law. Korea is also an intermediary country that harmonises relations between major regional powers, typically the recently heated US-China relationship.

It can be seen that ASEAN and Korea are firm and expanding economies with great potentials in this region, while also playing important roles in maintaining equilibrium and stability in the peace process in region by not taking sides of a particular great power. Together, the relationship between ASEAN and Korea can play decisive roles to the region's peace and prosperity. Therefore, the ability of these two parties to independently and sustainably develop will boost the region's economy and stable political

environment, and it would also provide the two parties the ability to independently build a peaceful policy at the aforementioned hotspots, which all resulted in a more peaceful, stable Indo-Pacific.

3.2.2 The Downside

The current context of the Indo-Pacific is giving unfavourable signs to ASEAN's development. ASEAN's member states are all in developing process. Moreover, the acceleration of development as well as the current state of the economy is uneven, meaning that the economic gap among member states is considerable. This can be seen in the economic status within ASEAN. For example, more than 30% of Cambodia and Lao PDR's population live in poverty. The economic gap becomes extremely stark when one compares the GDP per capita figures of the CLMV Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Viet Nam countries with the ASEAN-6. Singapore, the wealthiest country in ASEAN, for instance, has a GDP per capita that is 23 times more than the poorest country in the region, for instance, Myanmar in 2004 (C-A, 2005).

The ASEAN's economic environment is thus unstable, uneven, and lacks a leading country to coordinator the economic relations within the group. Indonesia and Singapore together are the two largest economy in the region but they themselves are yet to fulfill their expected position. For example, Singapore, with exquisite GDP and trade policies, yet fails to become an engine of regional growth due to its small population and absolute share of GDP (Jetin, B. Petit, P. 2018). Therefore ASEAN member countries cannot solely only count on themselves to drive their economy to a highway, since they all have different economic status and requires different needs and policies. This leads to the fact that the inter-country links in ASEAN are

not remarkably vigorous. This means that under such circumstances where great powers interfere into regional policies, chances of disagreement are higher, hence, affecting the stability of not only the organisation but also the entire region. In conclusion, ASEAN's concern would be far more complicated than just the growth of the organisation in general; ASEAN needs to consider decreasing development gap between the member states, strengthening regional link to sustain the organisation.

For Korea, this has been reflected directly in the financial reports in recent years with negative growth rate and severe difficulties in reviving the economy from 2018 until the first half of 2019 (World Bank, n.d). The trade war and Washington's policies has forced Korea to maintain a balance between US, its security ally, and China, its top trading partner. As one of America's closest allies in Asia, Seoul relies on Washington's military force to deter North Korea, as the two Koreas are still technically at war. According to the Korean - US Joint Defence Treaty ¹⁹⁵³ signed after the Korean War, Korea allowed 28,500 US soldiers to be stationed on the territory as a security wall against "provocative" actions of Pyongyang which provides firm ground on security. However, on the other hand, Korea is in a difficult position because it has strong economic relations with China, importing 25% of Korea's exports (Lee, 2018). Seoul is still recovering from the THAAD situation in 2017, which made China to boycott traveling to Korea, causing losses estimated at KRW 7.5 trillion USD 6.7 billion in the first 9 months of 2017 (Huang, 2017), which resulted in the negative growth rate of Korea in 2017.

Furthermore, Korea's dilemma also appeared to be far more complicated given its geographical proximity with China and with the role China plays in the unification process between Seoul and Pyongyang. To achieve unification of the peninsula, Seoul will need Chinese acquiescence and

strategic understanding. Korea also needs China to maintain extractive industry contracts with Beijing, and seek Chinese understanding if Korea wishes to keep its alliance with the US after unification (Cha, 2019). As Cha claims, "while denuclearisation negotiations with North Korea requires the United States, unification of the Korean peninsula also requires China." Under this very circumstance of heated conflicts between the US and China, Korea is struggling to maintain its own policies to be transparent and balancing between the US and China. Unfortunately, Korea is not a great power to be able to independently balance on both sides due to its yet full developed status and the fluctuated growth over the past few years.

Both ASEAN and Korea want to maintain a peaceful environment in the Indo-Pacific for inner development, and the Indo-Pacific itself needs the two parties to play a bigger role for regional peace. Even though they share the same vision for the region's security, both ASEAN and Korea have not established aligned policies which can precisely effect in region.

3.3 The Reasons

To clarify, one needs to understand why ASEAN and Korea have not yet made collaborative policies.

Both ASEAN and Korea are in a dilemma where they both want to be independent enough to provide a stable and balance policy, but the context is unsuitable for one to develop up to the stage that can provide independency. With the same aim for the region's security and for each nation, ASEAN and Korea should imply more integrated policies since both parties had mutual interest in containing conflicts and promoting peace, stability in the region. Until now, ASEAN and Korea are making similar and joint policies in balancing and controlling regional conflicts

such as great power balancing, creating a triangle status quo to maintain peace, decreasing conflicts by cooperation and integration. For instance, in the most recent meeting, the 2019 ASEAN-ROK Commemorative Summit under the theme of “Partnership for Peace, Prosperity for People”, the economic section covered nearly two third of the statement – which is a tremendous effort – while the section on political-security cooperation contained only four articles. The statement failed to address the key security issues and contained no thorough strong joint plan of action nor any joint code of conduct. However, one may point out that it may be too early to judge, given the relationship between the two sides has just been pushed further recently. Their relationship has not truly deepened yet because they have not had enough time to develop deeper strategic cooperation. Thus, this is what hindered the process of cooperation of both parties and precisely the reason why ASEAN and Korea have not established joint policies on the situation yet.

3.4 The Consequences

In the current context, the policies of ASEAN and Korea remain independent in maintaining regional peace when both sides need to actively play an intermediary role in major conflicts. Such policies tend to stand alone making them significantly uncertain and unsteady. If contexts get far more complicated, all of these efforts wouldn't contribute much to the stability of the region. Furthermore, as individual policies from individually fragile parties could be affected under the pressures or enticements of policies from great powers, these strategies are extremely easy to sabotage due to the different national interests of both ASEAN and Korea. This means that both ASEAN and Korea are highly in need of

a stable environment for development. Also, if a great power such as the US or China offers a promising but conflicting offer to them, there will be considerations in actions that would end up in the unbalancing of the Indo-Pacific.

With the practical ability as well as the policies of both China and the US, the continuation of separated policies by ASEAN and Korea will make them both unable to achieve their goals both in terms of national security and regional security. This would further push the region into a more difficult and complex situation due to lack of a third party to balance the power forces within the regions.

4. Solutions suggested

4.1 Explanation

The aforementioned policy will directly solve the problem of regional linkage, thereby resolving the contradictions and complexities of policies of major countries. Since relationship plays an important role in this region, tightening the relationship between the two sides has a directly positive impact on the regional cooperation, particularly given they are middle powers. Small open economies are not likely to resort to protectionist measures that would be suicidal given their reliance on trade, which made they have few options other than strengthening their safety nets to minimise the suffering of its populace. When medium-sized countries enthusiastically participate in the regional economic model, it will stimulate other small and medium countries to join, thereby pushing back the trend of national protectionism and increasing the trend of cooperation because

these countries are highly dependent on each other (Baldwin & Evenett, 2011). This can be seen in the case of the rise of Group of Thirty G30 and BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, promising groups of medium countries and new great powers when G20 failed to commit to their promises going against protectionism, and the two party are believed to be the new leading factors for world's economy (Brosig, 2019). Under these policies, countries will once again become closely tied to each other on the economic level, with military-political binding following inevitably. It would thereby increase regional links forming a three-pillar tie comprising ASEAN, Korea and third parties other small and medium-sized countries.

When the three-pillar posture is formed, great powers will have difficulties to establish contradictory regional policies because medium-sized countries now have equally played neutral roles in conflicts. Since then, to avoid causing systematic collapse, big nations will also be more careful with their policies in the region. Even if there is a big conflict, middle powers would be strong enough to balance the two sides. A similar example can be seen in the history, especially in the Cold War period with the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement NAM which is a forum of 120 developing states that were not formally aligned with or against any major power bloc. The purpose of the organisation was enumerated in Havana Declaration of 1979 as to ensure “the national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of non-aligned countries” in their “struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation, domination, interference or hegemony as well as against great power and bloc politics” (Castro, F. 1979). This created a similar idea of having a third pillar to sustain the peace within region.

The policies of strengthening relationship between ASEAN and Korea

to a stage that the two parties develop and establish policies on regional security level is not only suitable on the theoretical level but also on the practical level. Overall, this is the most effective choice for not only ASEAN and Korea, but the whole region in general.

4.2 What should be done

Based on the above arguments, it can be concluded that the tightening of relations between ASEAN and Korea in the near future is extremely important to the security of Indo-Pacific in general.

First, in terms of awareness, it is important that both sides are aware of the importance of each other for their future. Both ASEAN and Korea need to recognise the other in terms of a long-term strategic relationship rather than one that simply responds to eminent situations. Seeing each other from such perspectives will make it easier for the two sides to develop strategic trust with each other.

Moreover, the two sides need to strengthen relations based on economic and political aspects. Currently, Korea is ASEAN's fifth largest economic partner, and this step needs to be further improved. Furthermore, the economies of ASEAN and Korea are fundamentally complementary and not competitive. The Korean private sector should be encouraged to look more closely for investment opportunities in ASEAN, taking advantage of the bilateral free trade agreement and the ASEAN Economic Community. In addition, the digital economy and ASEAN's network of Smart Cities are two potential new areas of cooperation. But under a higher note, the issues have been successfully addressed in the 2019 ASEAN-ROK Commemorative Summit, with the statement to highly focus on the technology transfer, trade policies, and especially a new channel of communication between the

ASEAN Secretary-General and the Association of ASEAN Korea Chambers (ASEAN, 2019). The tremendous effort implies that the relationship is heading to a bright future, for both ASEAN and Korea, and for the region in general.

In terms of military and political cooperation, ASEAN and Korea could continue to work together to build and defend a regional order which is open, transparent and inclusive and they should also cooperate to strengthen the international law in Asia. The documents between the two sides up until now mainly focuses on marginal issues such as transnational crime, human trafficking, and does not precisely address the core issues that affect regional security, as mentioned above. Collaboration on security and politics should focus more on common voices, common policies on regional issues, common defence options for specific cases, similar to that of the Non-Aligned Movement. Moreover, the two parties should work on establishing united policies toward the current situation in the Indo-Pacific. With that applied, the relations would be strengthened, tighten, and would ultimately benefit the whole regional peace.

D. Conclusion

The paper provides the necessary arguments to demonstrate the importance of establishing close relationship between ASEAN and Korea for the security of the Indo-Pacific region in the current context. The argument was built through the international relations theories and concludes that policies should be on the same line and be applied to the situation.

First, the paper clarifies the main elements of security, pointing out the main aspects of security as political-security and economy, and

simultaneously indicate the choice of countries under such context. The author then applied the theories to briefly indicate the current regional security context and on the options that regional countries can consider. Then, the paper identifies the original causes of the Indo-Pacific regional security context; lack of thorough policies of ASEAN and Korea toward the situation. The paper continues on clarifying the importance of the relationship between South ASEAN and Korea in the current status quo in terms of theory and reality. This indicates that developing a common policy for regional security would be undoubtedly critical to the regional peace and stability.

From the above arguments, the author provides basic suggestions for ASEAN and Korea, starting from increasing relations between the two sides to the extent that it is possible to adopt a general policy. This can be achieved through positive economic and military policies. The study achieves the goal of contributing ideas on a different perspective, providing a more effective solution to regional security issues based on the development of relations between ASEAN and Korea



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



Theme 2

ASEAN Connectivity and Beyond



ASEAN visions “to achieve a seamlessly and comprehensively connected and integrated region that will promote competitiveness, inclusiveness, and a greater sense of Community” as proclaimed in the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025. A well-connected ASEAN will bring its goods, services and people together, creating a foundation for a more resilient, competitive and prosperous ASEAN Community. What are the key areas ASEAN should focus on to achieve fulfill its connectivity visions? How can ASEAN Connectivity achieve a regional integration that will connect beyond the ASEAN region?





ASEAN Connectivity and Beyond

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Abstract


Ever since its establishment in 1967, the ten ASEAN Member States – Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam – have experienced a growth in economics and development. In 2018, ASEAN's accumulated gross domestic product ^{GDP} reached USD 2.7 trillion, making it the fifth-largest economy in the world (Deutsche Bank, 2019). This is a significant growth compared to its GDP in 2000 of only USD 620 billion (ASEAN, 2018). However, as a very dynamic and diverse region, the before-mentioned growth is not equal among member states. At the same time, the idea of connectivity has risen to prominence as a global major trend in recent

years (The World Bank, 2019) and there has been an increasing need for linkage between communities, economies, and countries (World Bank Singapore Hub & GICA, 2018). Such connectivity can translate into higher productivity, trade growth, and increasing global supply chain efficiency (The World Bank, 2019). A well-connected ASEAN would, therefore, reduce inequality between the ASEAN Member States and propel the region's growth as a whole. Accordingly, a vision of ASEAN Connectivity is then established to achieve a seamlessly and comprehensively connected ASEAN that will promote economic competitiveness, inclusiveness, and a greater sense of Community. A well-connected ASEAN will bring its goods, services, and people together, creating a foundation for a more resilient, competitive and prosperous ASEAN Community. In order to achieve this vision, a few key areas should be the focus of ASEAN connectivity strategies. This paper explores four key areas – namely infrastructure, human capital development, regulations, and digital disruption, based on the Master Plan for ASEAN Connectivity 2025 strategic objectives – ASEAN should focus on to achieve its Connectivity vision that expands beyond the region, as well as providing ways for ASEAN to contribute in each area.

I. Introduction

The idea of connectivity has risen to prominence as a global major trend in recent years (The World Bank, 2019). It subsequently has become a defining feature of the modern economy – reflected in the increasing investment demand for resources to link communities, economies, and countries (World Bank Singapore Hub & GICA, 2018). In fact, in the Asia-Pacific region alone, investments on connectivity infrastructure is estimated by the Asia-Pacific Risk Center (APRC) to double in the next decade and reach USD 2.5 trillion per year by 2020 (APRC, 2017). Concurrently, it is expected by 2020 that the Asia-Pacific region will account for almost 60 percent of projected global connectivity infrastructure spend, with AMS taking up 46 percent (Figure 1 of the region's total, excluding China and Japan (APRC, 2017).

FIGURE 1. Infrastructure Expenditure Across Asian Economies (excluding China and Japan)



Source: APRC analysis of data from the Construction Intelligence Center (APRC, 2017)

Although different agents employ varying definitions of connectivity (World Bank Singapore Hub & GICA, 2018), in its most general term, connectivity refers to any form of informal relationship among countries or regional groupings that has the potential to increase economic opportunities, improve international relations, foster growth, stability, and cooperation within and between regions (Abeldinova & Kemp, 2016). Greater connectivity can translate into higher productivity, gains in service efficiency, greater spillover benefits of investments, and growth in trade (The World Bank, 2017). Thus, connectivity becomes increasingly important for economic growth and global supply chain efficiency (World Bank Singapore Hub & GICA, 2018). The World Bank posits that connectivity can boost a region's aggregate demand in the short-term – through increased constructions and the associated employment creation – and has long-term effects in strengthening the foundation for future economic growth by increasing the efficiency and productivity of labour markets (The World Bank, 2019; World Bank Singapore Hub & GICA, 2018). The Centre for Spatial Economics (2015) supports this argument by providing that an extra dollar spent on infrastructure in Canada could increase the country's GDP in the long term by \$2.46-\$3.83. Moreover, as the growth of global value chains (GVCs) transforms the economic relationship of trade and competitiveness, the demand for countries to cooperate more with one another in terms of trade increases (The World Bank, 2019). Poor connectivity, in this case, results in higher costs, lower speed, and a higher risk of exclusion from GVCs. Thence, economies that seek to join GVCs are dependent on connectivity to build strong relationships with international markets, increase international border efficiency, and create a sound investment climate (Taglioni & Winkler, 2016).

Connectivity has become a key priority for policymakers, governments, and international stakeholders in recent years (The World Bank, 2017), with ASEAN

being no exception. In ASEAN, the term connectivity refers to the physical, institutional, and people-to-people linkages that can contribute towards a more competitive, inclusive, and cohesive ASEAN (ASEAN, 2016a). Physical e.g. transport, ICT, and energy, institutional e.g. trade, investment, and services liberalisation, and people-to-people e.g. education, culture, and tourism linkages are the foundational supportive means to achieving the economic, political-security, and socio-cultural pillars of an integrated ASEAN Community (ASEAN, 2016a). To achieve this vision, ASEAN leaders reaffirm the importance of building an ASEAN Community that will contribute to a more competitive, resilient and well-connected ASEAN on the occasion of the 28th ASEAN Summit in Vientiane, Lao PDR (ASEAN, 2016c). The result of this reaffirmation is the establishment and adoption of A Master Plan for ASEAN Connectivity MPAC 2025 (ASEAN, 2016c, 2016a). It becomes an important step towards ASEAN Connectivity, as the adoption of MPAC 2025 means ASEAN Leaders recognise that enhancing connectivity would continue to benefit all AMS by promoting greater competitiveness, prosperity, inclusiveness, and sense of Community (ASEAN, 2016c).

Nevertheless, the biggest challenge of connectivity is in its implementation and there are a few areas that ASEAN should prioritise to optimise its MPAC 2025 adoption. This paper looks into four key areas ASEAN should focus on to achieve its vision of connectivity and ways for ASEAN to contribute to each area. Besides the narrated introduction in the first section, this paper discusses the background of ASEAN and MPAC in the second section. The third section discusses key areas that ASEAN should focus on to achieve connectivity. The last and fourth section is the conclusion.

II. ASEAN and Connectivity

On 8 August 1967, five leaders – the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand – sat down together in Bangkok, Thailand and signed a document that would be known as the Bangkok Declaration (ASEAN, 2012). It is by the virtue of this declaration, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN was born. The aforementioned five founding countries, together with the addition of Brunei Darussalam, Viet Nam, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Cambodia are named the ten ASEAN Member States AMS. Fifty years after its establishment, the ASEAN region now encompasses economies that share immense growth potential, albeit within different stages of development (Vinayak, Thompson, & Tonby, 2014).

Currently, the AMS has a combined GDP of USD 2.7 trillion and is the fifth largest economy globally (Deutsche Bank, 2019). With a projected annual growth rate of over 5.5 percent per year, ASEAN is forecasted to take over as the fourth-largest economy by 2050 (SBR, 2018). The ASEAN region is also the fourth largest population in the world, having a staggering total population of 630 million people in 2018 (The ASEAN Post, 2018). A very diverse and dynamic region, ASEAN is filled with vast opportunities for business and economic growth, yet it is not free from the risks of disparity – lack of integration in ASEAN would easily increase inequality between AMS and halt regional growth. Henceforth, a vision of a well-connected and integrated ASEAN becomes more important than ever.


At the 30th Anniversary of ASEAN in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, the ASEAN Leaders agreed on a shared vision of ASEAN in 2020 as a concert of Southeast Asian nations, outward-looking, living in peace, stability and prosperity, bonded together in partnership in dynamic development and a

community of caring societies (ASEAN, 1997). This vision is further ascertained through the formation of the ASEAN Community at the 27th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia – almost twenty years after the establishment of ASEAN Vision 2020 (ASEAN, 2015a). Subsequently, ASEAN established three pillars of the ASEAN Community, which comprises of the ASEAN Political-Security Community, the ASEAN Economic Community, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, with each pillar having its blueprint (Keng, 2009). The adoption of the ASEAN Community and its three pillars are in hopes of improving the lives of its people, reflected on the region's economic and cultural development, social progress, regional peace and security, collaboration mutual assistance in training and research, improvement of living standards, promotion of Southeast Asian studies, and cooperation with regional and international organisations (ASEAN, 2015a). This vision was reaffirmed by the ASEAN Leaders at the succeeding 28th ASEAN Summit in Vientiane, Lao PDR, that resulted in the establishment of MPAC 2025 (ASEAN, 2016c, 2016a). The vision of ASEAN Connectivity within MPAC 2025 becomes the foundational supportive and facilitative means to achieving these pillars of an integrated ASEAN Community. By adopting MPAC 2025, the ASEAN Leaders recognise that enhancing connectivity would continue to benefit all AMS and foster the achievement of The ASEAN Community, in tandem with ASEAN Vision 2020 (ASEAN, 2016c).

MPAC 2025 aims to achieve a seamlessly and comprehensively connected ASEAN that will promote competitiveness, inclusiveness, and a greater sense of ASEAN Community (ASEAN, 2016c). Accordingly, MPAC 2025 is then outlined through five strategic objectives (ASEAN, 2016a) – which consists of sustainable infrastructure, digital innovation, seamless logistics, regulatory excellence and people mobility [refer to Figure 2](#) – that are deemed crucial to

enhancing physical, institutional and people-to-people connectivity in ASEAN (Maria, 2018). These strategic objectives also become the basis of this paper's discussion, which are the key areas ASEAN should focus on to achieve its connectivity vision and ways for ASEAN to contribute in those areas. This paper proposes four key areas of focus: (1) infrastructure, which represents the strategic objectives of sustainable infrastructure and seamless logistics; (2) human capital development, which represents the strategic objective of people mobility; (3) regulation, which represents the strategic objective of regulatory excellence; and (4) digital disruption, which represents

FIGURE 2. ASEAN Connectivity Vision and Strategic Objectives 2025



Source: Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (ASEAN, 2016a)

the strategic objective of digital innovation.

III. KEY Areas of ASEAN Connectivity

1. Infrastructure

The infrastructure that connects AMS is the groundwork for physical connectivity, essential in achieving the desired regional integration that propels ASEAN economic growth. In today's globalised economy, value chains are spread out all over the world, including the ASEAN region (OECD, 2018). Reliable infrastructures could improve ASEAN's position in GVCs by increasing efficient movements of goods and services, enabling seamless logistics, and allowing greater people mobility, within and outside ASEAN. These infrastructures can range from transport systems, public utilities, communication networks, and social facilities, hard or tangible infrastructure, to institutions and regulations that relate to efficiency, soft or intangible infrastructure (Luo & Xu, 2018). Infrastructure development that supports physical connectivity consists of two main stages: (1) the development of transport infrastructure that significantly lowers transport costs; and (2) the development of communication infrastructure that lowers coordination costs (Luo & Xu, 2018). OECD and WTO (2013) posit that transport costs remain the main obstacle to entering, establishing, or moving up in GVCs. By developing transport infrastructure that reduces transport costs, ASEAN is not only able to move up the GVCs, but also change the boundaries of production, increase social integration and global competitiveness, reshape the economy, as well as expanding growth beyond the region itself. On the other hand, increased communication

infrastructure can reduce coordination costs and making knowledge sharing across national borders feasible (Baldwin, 2013). Infrastructure services like telecoms, internet, express service delivery, and customs clearances enable firms in the region to share a similar labour pool and enjoy knowledge spillovers that lead to coordinated productivity. Therefore, well-developed infrastructures not only reduce the distance and integrate communities within the region but also connect them to other economies outside the region, thus making it essential for ASEAN connectivity and beyond.

Infrastructure is also closely related to economic development, as accelerated infrastructure investments can drive business and trade growth (Égert, Kozluk, & Sutherland, 2009). As shown in Table 1, higher investment in infrastructure enables a country to increase its output, which then leads to a higher GDP growth rate. Countries with higher infrastructure investments per capita also tend to have better quality infrastructure and are more globally competitive. This proves that investments in infrastructure are important to achieve ASEAN Connectivity.

Nevertheless, following the Asia Financial Crisis of 1997–98, a significant

Table 1. Infrastructure Investments, Quality, and Global Competitiveness

ASEAN Countries	Infrastructure Investment per capita (in USD)	Infrastructure Score	Global Competitiveness Score (out of 100)	Global Rank in Competitiveness
Singapore	572.53	95	84.8	1
Malaysia	397.25	78	74.6	27
Thailand	195.71	68	68.1	40
Indonesia	194.03	67.7	64.6	50
Viet Nam	158.09	66	61.5	67
Philippines	126.83	58	61.9	64
Cambodia	109.21	55	52.1	106

Source: World Economic Forum (2019); Global Infrastructure Hub (2019)

infrastructure deficit emerged as the AMS sought to rein in current account deficits and foreign investment (ASEAN, 2016a). As a result, public spending as share of GDP declined in most ASEAN economies and never recovering to pre-crisis levels (Asia Development Bank, 2017). An infrastructure gap – the difference between the infrastructure investment needed and the resources made available to address that need (ACCA & CPA Canada, 2019) – is apparent within AMS [Figure 3](#). A report by Asia Development Bank (2017) shows the total infrastructure spending in 2015 in the ASEAN region [excluding Singapore, Laos, and Brunei Darussalam](#) being USD 55 billion, while the required annual spending needs is estimated to be USD 147 billion by 2020, thus, an annual gap of USD 92 billion is expected. If measures are not taken to further increase infrastructure spending, the expected demand for infrastructure will not be met, the infrastructure gap will remain, and economic growth will slow or stagnate, which in turn halt connectivity.

There are many ways to minimise the infrastructure gap in ASEAN. Presently, the public sector still dominates infrastructure financing in the region. This alone will not be enough to meet the demand and to fill the gap (Asia Development Bank, 2017) – significant private sector infrastructure financing is required to supplement this need. Yet, given that increases in private sector financing will likely be gradual, innovative ways for raising more revenues and reorienting spending should be considered by governments in AMS (Asia Development Bank, 2017). Prime examples of this are using value capture, capital recycling, civic crowdfunding, and setting user charges for infrastructure services (ACCA & CPA Canada, 2019). Institutional investors – such as large pension funds and sovereign wealth funds – and a range of existing or emerging funding vehicles – such as the Asia Bond Fund (ABF) and the ASEAN Infrastructure Fund AIF – are able to provide a significant scope

for financing development outside the AMS domestic capital markets as well (UNCTAD, 2015). Other ways to minimise infrastructure gaps are reducing the costs of infrastructure projects that contributed to high infrastructure spending needs and increase infrastructure productivity (Dobbs et al., 2013). The cost of infrastructure can be reduced through better project selection, more efficient delivery and greater accountability, an emphasis on maximising the life span and capacity of existing assets, strong infrastructure governance, and a robust financing framework (Dobbs et al., 2013). Meanwhile, knowledge

FIGURE 3. Estimated Infrastructure Gap in the ASEAN Member States (2018, in million US\$)





FIGURE 4.



Source: Global Infrastructure Hub (2019)

sharing between AMS can help increase infrastructure productivity and enhance connectivity in ASEAN, as AMS vary widely on different elements with each of their own relevant best practices (ASEAN, 2016a). To support this, ASEAN can establish a new assessment framework and a platform for knowledge sharing.

With rapid economic growth and its overarching impact on climate, there has been a corresponding global emphasis on sustainable infrastructure development in ASEAN (ASEAN, 2016a). Previous researches (see: INTOSAI WGEA, 2013; Kennedy, Fox-James, Dethier, & Capizzi, 2018; Laurance et al., 2015; Teo et al., 2019; etc.) have shown that the social and environmental impacts of infrastructure – during construction, within, and beyond its lifetime – can be profoundly harmful. The construction of infrastructure, albeit providing employment, can expose people to hazardous working conditions. Transport infrastructure provides access that enables the overexploitation of natural resources and fragmentation of habitats. The air pollution from infrastructures like transport, buildings, and power generation, even contributed to major health risks that caused seven million deaths annually (WHO, 2018). The fact that the ASEAN region is already facing risks of climate change, environmental pressures of groundwater depletion, air pollution, and unsustainable management of fisheries, and access to basic resources challenges means sustainability issue in ASEAN is more important than ever (ASEAN, 2016a). Despite this, most AMS is still far behind the global rank in terms of achieving its sustainability targets refer to Table 2 because infrastructure developments in ASEAN remain fuelled by energy-intensive, carbon-emitting, and polluting production (Anbumozhi, 2017). Therefore, it is worth noting that to achieve physical connectivity within and beyond the region, ASEAN must consider the social and environmental impacts of its future

infrastructure development, as well as selecting projects that are not only productively beneficial to the economy but also the environment.

Table 2. Environmental Performance Index of ASEAN Member States (2018)

Countries	2018 EPI	10-year change (%)	Global Rank 2018
Brunei Darussalam	63.57	-1.94	53
Cambodia	43.23	-10.53	150
Indonesia	46.92	3.14	133
Lao PDR	42.94	15.37	153
Malaysia	59.22	3.85	75
Myanmar	45.32	1.05	138
Philippines	57.65	1.02	82
Singapore	64.23	-12.78	49
Thailand	49.88	4.55	121
Viet Nam	46.96	15.86	132

Source: Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy (2018)


Another important issue related to infrastructure development is rapid urbanisation. Only a quarter of the ASEAN population lives in a city today, so the trend towards urbanisation is going to accelerate in ASEAN (Zink, 2015). As an effect, affluence is rising and being concentrated in urban centers, which is beneficial for ASEAN because it brings a workforce that can potentially contribute to economic growth. However, it is worth noticing that urbanisation, albeit drives growth, can also drive inequality between urban centers or cities and rural areas. A smart and sustainable urbanisation system is, therefore, needed to be developed with a reliable infrastructure to reduce inequality between urban and rural areas (ASEAN, 2016a).

2. Human Capital

In order to achieve connectivity within and beyond the ASEAN region, ASEAN not only needs to focus on infrastructure or physical development but also human capital development. The region's population is generally characterised by high and continuously rising proportion of productive working-age population – with 50 percent of the population are between the ages of 20 to 54 in 2017 [refer to Figure 4](#) – and at a current World Bank estimates of 350.5 million people, the region is the third-largest labour force in the world (*The ASEAN Post*, 2018). This means that ASEAN is not only capable of supplying the region's workforce needs, but also the workforce needs of other countries outside the region. The rising migration of ASEAN's workforce is already witnessed in recent decades, with intra-ASEAN migration reaching 9.9 million in 2015 – three times its number in 1995 – and ASEAN migration outside the region reaching 12 million in the same year (*Kikkawa*, 2019). These opportunities are supported by the region's low labour costs. As seen from Table 3, minimum wages in the majority of ASEAN countries remain significantly lower than those in the developed economies of the world, such as the United States whose current federal minimum wage of approximately USD 1200 – 1300 per month (*Rastogi*, 2018). Over the medium term, it is believed that the production platform will migrate to the cheaper markets of ASEAN to benefit from its lower labour costs (*Maguire, Roberts, Fabo, & Ng*, 2015). However, competing based on low wages alone would not be adequate to propel economic growth and raise living standards in the region in the long term. ASEAN needs to compete on skills and productivity – areas at which most AMS is currently at a disadvantage. Aside from Singapore, the share of highly skilled migrants –

defined as managers, professionals, and technicians– in AMS remains low. The average labour productivity in ASEAN remains significantly lower than in other countries [Figure 5](#) and in Indonesia and Myanmar alone, there is a projected undersupply of 9 million skilled and 13 million semi-skilled workers by 2030. There is also the disparity of labour skills between AMS – called the human capital gap – which is a major driver of inequality and poverty in the region. It is important to narrow this human capital gap so the region's average labour quality can be increased, labour mobility can be eased, and people-to-people connectivity between AMS can be achieved. This means ASEAN needs to focus on the development of building their workforces' skills and increase labour productivity in a manner that does not differentiate between AMS to improve people's mobility and people-to-people connectivity, as well as becoming a competitive, innovative, and dynamic economic community.

FIGURE 5. Population Age Structure in ASEAN (2000-2017)



Source: ASEAN Secretariat, ASEANstats database (ASEAN, 2018)

Table 3. Minimum Wage in ASEAN (2019)


Country/ Region*	Daily Minimum Wage		Monthly Minimum Wage		Exchange rate (value of 1 US dollar)
	Local currency	In US dollars	Local currency	In US dollars	
Cambodia (US dollar)	-	5.66 (Garment industry)	-	170 (Garment industry)	-
Indonesia (Rupiah)	48,471.8- 121,601.2	3.42-8.59	1,454,154- 3,648,035	102.74 - 257.73	14401 Indonesian Rupiah
Lao PDR (Kip)	36666	4.33	1100000	130	8402.18 Kip
Malaysia (Ringgit)	30.67-33.33	7.64-830	920 - 1000	229.11 - 249.03	4.06 Ringgit
Myanmar (Kyat)	4800	3.29	144000	98.88	1435.47 Kyat
Philippines (Peso)	256-512	4.80-9.61	7680 - 15360	144.14 - 288.3	53.30 Peso
Thailand (Baht)	308-330	9.19-9.85	9,240 - 9,900	276 - 295	33.19 Baht
Viet Nam (Dong)	92,000- 132,666	4-5.75	2,760,000- 3,980,000	120 - 173	22,783.00 Dong

*Brunei and Singapore do not have a mandatory minimum wage.
With effect from January 1, 2019, Viet Nam's minimum monthly wage rate will increase to VND 2,920,000 - VND 4,180,000

Source: Asia Briefing (Rastogi, 2018)

To build ASEAN's workforce skills and increase labour productivity, education becomes the key. Currently, 11 percent of ASEAN's population have no educational background and roughly 60 percent have only primary education or lower. ASEAN can meet this challenge by promoting greater access to basic education and harmonisation of higher education institutes among AMS (Kiatiwongse & Sciortino, 2018). At the same time, promoting education in ASEAN, especially within CLMV countries Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet

FIGURE 6. Labour Productivity Level Per-Worker GDP (2015)



Source: APO Productivity Database 2017

Nam, allows the region to narrow its human capital gap, preferably between CLMV countries and ASEAN-6 Table 4. Besides education, continuous training and retraining can also help ASEAN's workforce gain access to skill development. One initiative is developing a system of continuous training and retraining that support lifelong learning in the government, private sector, and community. ASEAN can also utilise information and

communication technologies [ICT](#) to meet this challenge massive retraining. Online courses and massive open online courses [MOOCs](#) can help workers gain specific skills on their own regardless of location and at low cost since they provide training at scale and are particularly suitable for workers in full or part-time jobs (Kiatiwongse & Sciortino, 2018).

Table 4. Gap of Human Development Index Indicators between CLMV Countries and ASEAN-6 (2011)

Country	HDI	Income per capita	Health (life expectancy)	Education (actual years of schooling)	Education (expected years of schooling)
Cambodia Gap with ASEAN-6 average	0.212	19,840	11.2	2.2	2.4
Lao PDR Gap with ASEAN-6 average	0.211	19,341	6.8	3.4	3.4
Myanmar Gap with ASEAN-6 average	0.252	20,048	9.1	4.0	3.6
Viet Nam Gap with ASEAN-6 average	0.142	18,630	-1.0	2.5	3.0
ASEAN-6 average	0.735	21,756	74.3	8.1	13.5

Source: ASEAN-Australia Development Cooperation Program Phase II (2011)

Meanwhile, to increase labour mobility, ASEAN needs to introduce policies and programs that encourage movement across a wide array of skills. The Mutual Recognition Arrangement [MRA](#) initiative, which establishes common skill and qualification recognition schemes in the ASEAN region, is one of the steps ASEAN has already taken in facilitating regional skill mobility (Kikkawa & Suan, 2019). To date, these arrangements have been signed for seven qualifications, including engineering services, nursing, architectural

services, tourism, medical practitioners, dental practitioners, and accounting services (Kikkawa, 2019). However, there's still room for improvement, as noticeable asymmetric information between host countries and potential mobile skilled workers keep discouraging labour force to work overseas. In this case, ASEAN can utilise ICT to help reduce some of these challenges by providing information related to the laws and regulations in each ASEAN country as well as the benefits the labour force can expect working overseas. Another example of a policy that can improve intra-ASEAN mobility is a priority job application for workers with a regional qualification in an industry that mutually benefits source and destination economies, so sharing talent efficiency can be maximised (Kikkawa, 2019). As security is one of the main topics of establishing and maintaining labour migration, an information system that collects data is also critical for better-informed labour mobility. To support human capital development that propels ASEAN connectivity and beyond, ASEAN can also work together with external partners. ASEAN remains a net exporter of human capital, with roughly 60 percent of ASEAN's international migrant workers residing outside the region, such as non-ASEAN Asian countries and the Middle East (Kikkawa & Suan, 2019). Developing partnership with these countries in regards to workforce mobility can help ASEAN to increase its skilled labour mobility.

3. Regulations

A harmonised set of standards and regulations is needed for ASEAN to ensure a seamless flow of trade and investment (ASEAN, 2016a). It is the


backbone of institutional connectivity that at the same time also eases the path for physical and people-to-people in ASEAN. To achieve connectivity, the need for effective institutional support and a participatory consultative mechanism for regulatory reform within the region is more apparent than ever. By addressing this issue, movements of goods and services across the region and with other international trade partners can be eased—making it essential to ASEAN connectivity within the region and beyond.

Standards, conformance, and technical regulations often lead to significant barriers to trade across borders, which in turn adjourn connectivity. During the 2019 ASEAN Regulatory Summit, authorities in the ASEAN region acknowledge that regulators commonly work in isolation and it has negative impacts for cross-border regulatory harmonisation (Carroll, 2019). While complete parity among jurisdictions is unlikely, efforts for harmonising regulations in ASEAN are critical to mitigating the financial and business costs arising from cross-border regulatory differences. To put into perspective, firms that operate across the ASEAN region are having to deploy compliance experts in up to 27 different jurisdictions, as opposed to a mere handful of teams looking after regulatory blocs such as the European Economic Area, or countries covered by the North American Free Trade Agreement (Carroll, 2019). Standards, conformance, and technical regulations also halt micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) to expand trade. Currently, MSMEs makeup about 95 percent of ASEAN business but only account for around 30 percent of exports in ASEAN (ASEAN, 2016b). Albeit having a lot of opportunities to become globally competitive, MSMEs are limited by their difficulties in understanding the region's regulations. Therefore, harmonising trade standards and regulations, as well as developing appropriate benchmarks, will create more opportunities not

only for firms but also for MSMEs in the ASEAN region.

In order to do so, coordination between the ASEAN Consultative Committee for Standards and Quality (ACCSQ), trade officials, and national regulators need to be enhanced (ASEAN, 2016a). ASEAN can create a mechanism for these stakeholders to work towards accelerating standards harmonisation, mutual recognition agreements, and to address technical regulatory barriers. The formation of free trade agreements, such as AFTA, can also help improve regulatory harmonisation and support connectivity by reducing these barriers (Lun & Hoffmann, 2016). The reduction or removal of tariffs, for example, contributes to reduced total costs of importing goods (Eaton & Kortum, 2002), encourage new inflows of goods from member countries (Schiff & Winters, 2003), and improvement in production, consumption, international investment flow, GDP, and welfare in the area (Hertel, Walmsley, & Itakura, 2001).

FIGURE 7. Progress of Tariff and Non-Tariff Measures in ASEAN (2016)



Source: Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025 (ASEAN, 2016a)

Other than standard conformance and technical regulations, a survey of businesses in ASEAN has highlighted non-tariff barriers as the highest


priority that needs to be addressed to enhance regional economic integration. While tariff barriers in ASEAN have undergone a significant reduction in the past few years [Figure 6](#), there are still over 2,000 non-tariff measures remaining (ASEAN, 2016a). In the region, some of the well-intentioned measures for safety and environmental issues can act against trade and regional integration. Regulatory transparency is important to reduce these trade-distorting nontariff measures – one initiative is using the ASEAN Trade Repository [ATR](#). ATR is a comprehensive database that will consolidate national trade repositories [NTR](#) from all AMS and select trade-distorting measures can be prioritised for further action, based on their impact and benefits on trade. This database will be publicly available so AMS can take further actions against these measures, thus improving the transparency of NTR between AMS. Private-sector consultation will also be welcomed through this database.

4. Digital Disruption

Digital technology has been recognised as being key in achieving the desired ASEAN connectivity in 2025 (Tse Gan, 2018). Technology has always been a powerful force for change, disrupting the way we do things, and creating new economic value—from the printing press to the steam engine and the Internet—but the difference today is the sheer ubiquity of technology, the pace of innovation, and the scale of adoption (Thompson, Tonby, Sneider, & Woetzel, 2015). Disruptive technologies fundamentally change the way we live, work, and relate to one another at an accelerated pace (K Schwab, 2017) and the ASEAN region is no exception to this impact. Initially, the ASEAN

region starts from a relatively low base in terms of its digital infrastructure, the adoption of digital technologies, and innovation. Flash forward today, Southeast Asia is the world's fastest-growing Internet region, with over 700 million active mobile connections and a projected user base of 480 million by 2020 (Tse Gan, 2018). Communications and trade are growing exponentially across ASEAN borders and devices propelled by these technologies (ASEAN, 2016a). Disruptive technologies are estimated to unleash USD 220 billion to USD 625 billion annual economic impacts in ASEAN by 2030 [Figure 7](#). The use of disruptive technologies – including mobile internet, big data, cloud, the Internet of Things [IoT](#), automation, and SMAC – are even included in ASEAN ICT Master Plan 2020 to enhance access to ICT, affordability of ICT, and connectivity in the ASEAN region (ASEAN, 2015b). However, these

FIGURE 8. Impact of Disruptive Technologies Across Key Sectors in ASEAN




- These estimates do not represent GDP or market size (revenue), but rather economic potential, including consumer surplus
- Includes 17 billion USD to 52 billion USD of sector-related impact from sector-related effects such as greater financial inclusion.
- Additional sectors represent 25-30 percent of ASEAN's total GDP. Impact estimate based on top-down estimate of disruptive technologies.

Source: McKinsey Global Institute (ASEAN, 2016a)

advances are not taking place at the same speed for all AMS [Table 5](#). To achieve ASEAN connectivity that expands beyond the region, this digital divide needs to be bridged with innovations to support inclusive economic growth.

Table 5. Indicators of Network Readiness Index Across ASEAN Member States in 2016



Overall rank	Country	Readiness ²			Usage ³		
		Infra-structure	Affordability	Skills	Individual	Business ⁵	Government
1	Singapore	15	72	1	12	14	1
31	Malaysia	71	91	46	47	26	6
45	Brunei Darussalam ⁴	37	129	30	50	56	30
62	Thailand	67	64	73	64	51	69
73	Indonesia	105	38	65	92	34	65
77	Philippines	87	107	54	79	36	63
79	Viet Nam	121	3	82	85	81	61
104	Lao PDR	108	82	106	124	89	110
109	Cambodia	98	43	120	101	104	116
133	Myanmar	115	122	113	131	138	137

1 The Networked Readiness Index includes four sub-indexes: Environment, Readiness, Usage, and Impact.

2 The Readiness sub-index measures the degree to which a society is prepared to make good use of an affordable ICT infrastructure and digital content.

3 The Usage sub-index assesses the individual efforts of the main social agents to increase their capacity to use ICT as well as their actual use in day-to-day activities.

4 Data as of 2014; Brunei Darussalam did not participate in 2015 and 2016 survey.

5 Includes 1) Firm-level technology absorption; 2) Capacity for innovation; 3) PCT patent applications per million population; 4) Business-to-business Internet use; 5) Business-to-consumer Internet use; 6) Extent of staff training. Data is from the World Economic Forum's Executive Opinion Survey (~14,000 executives from over 140 countries.)

Source: World Economic Forum (ASEAN, 2016a)

Data management—including issues relating to data privacy, data

analysis and interpretation, data storage, and cross-border data transfers—in the ASEAN region becomes significant in reducing the digital divide between AMS. To support enhanced data management, ASEAN needs to strengthen the governance of digital data, with a view of promoting the trade growth and data flow within and among AMS in the digital economy (ASEAN, 2016a). One of the initiatives that ASEAN has already implement to achieve this is the ASEAN Framework on Digital Data Governance, which is intended to commission a study that compares data management frameworks across AMS, identify current practices, develop case studies, and disaggregate issues in local, national, ASEAN, and cross-border levels (ASEAN, 2011). This framework is expected to enhance data management, facilitate harmonisation of data regulations among AMS, and promote flows of data within and beyond the ASEAN region (ASEAN, 2011). Meanwhile, according to ASEAN ICT Master Plan 2020, digital divide between AMS can be addressed by defining and identifying underserved communities across the region, developing recommendations to increase broadband connectivity, improving ICT affordability, identifying basic digital services to be made available for communities and citizens in ASEAN, and highlighting implementation of broadband in different sectors (ASEAN, 2015b).

The fact that a large proportion of ASEAN's businesses still lag in terms of technology readiness and usage is also an issue that ASEAN must focus on to achieve its connectivity. As the majority of ASEAN businesses consists of MSMEs, equipping MSMEs with the capabilities to access new technologies can help MSMEs to expand across and beyond the region, while at the same time increasing ASEAN's overall readiness for digital disruption. MSMEs' adoption of digital technologies will also allow them to achieve a significant uplift in productivity, efficiency, and

market expansion within the region (ASEAN, 2016a). This, however, requires coordination from regulators from across the ASEAN region, the MSMEs, as well as technology service providers and skills development institutions (Maria, 2018). Developing a committee that enhances coordination between these stakeholders can help ASEAN in achieving such objectives. Besides increasing MSMEs' adoption of digital technologies, supporting financial access by delivering financial products and services through digital technologies can help the currently underserved MSMEs community as well (ASEAN, 2016a). Combined, it promotes financial inclusion in ASEAN. The ASEAN ICT Master Plan 2020 seeks to achieve this by raising the awareness of digital trade and the use of electronic payment among businesses, so that they can better transact with suppliers and customers, including online consumer protection (ASEAN, 2015b). On the other hand, ASEAN can further support on this detailed approach by making working committees on financial inclusion and payment systems.


Digital disruption also relates to other areas. To capture the growth and productivity gains of the digital revolution, ASEAN needs to put the necessary infrastructure in place. Most regions across ASEAN are still suffering from low penetration of landline phones and fixed-line broadband Internet and even though urban residents can already access a growing number of free wi-fi hot spots, they are still suffering from inconsistent coverage and speeds as well (Thompson et al., 2015). Disruption in the labour market propelled by these technologies is also projected, as there are ongoing trends of automated supply chains and assembly lines, e-commerces that support traditional stores, as well as adopted next-generation construction methods. By 2030, some 6 to 8 percent of the total non-farm labour force in ASEAN alone – or 12 million to 17 million workers – could be


displaced by technology (Thompson et al., 2015). In this case, ASEAN has to ensure that its workforce gain access to support and retraining that emphasise the skills required in a more digital economy, especially digital literacy, English proficiency, deep analytical talent.

IV. Conclusion

As connectivity continues to become a global major trend in recent years, the need for linkage between communities, economies, and countries is increasing. ASEAN – being one of the largest economies in the world currently – need to become a well-connected and integrated community in order to foster its growth. Accordingly, a vision of ASEAN Connectivity is then established to achieve a seamlessly and comprehensively connected ASEAN that will promote economic competitiveness, inclusiveness, and a greater sense of ASEAN Community. A well-connected ASEAN will bring its goods, services, and people together, creating a foundation for a more resilient, competitive and prosperous ASEAN Community. In order to achieve this vision, a few key areas should be the focus of ASEAN connectivity adoption – based on the strategic objectives of ASEAN Connectivity – namely infrastructure, human capital development, regulation, and digital disruption. Infrastructure development is the groundwork for physical connectivity and is essential in achieving the desired regional integration that propels ASEAN economic growth. However, there is an apparent issue of funding in infrastructure that slows this development. An infrastructure that propels connectivity should also be a sustainable one and address the urbanisation trend in ASEAN.

Human capital development is also important since the continuous rise of the ASEAN population and workforce provides opportunities for labour exports. Yet, the issue of labour skill in ASEAN must be prioritised as it can halt this people-to-people connectivity. Harmonisation of standards and technical regulations is also beneficial in ensuring a seamless flow of trade within and beyond the ASEAN region, becoming the foundation of institutional connectivity that propels physical and people-to-people connectivity as well. Lastly, digital disruption is an important area to focus on because its technologies impacted communications and trade within and beyond the ASEAN border. Some frameworks shall be established to narrow the digital divide between AMS so the ASEAN connectivity through digital disruption utilisation can be achieved. If ASEAN could focus on the development within these key areas, it does not rule out the possibility of ASEAN being one of the leading economic forces in the future.





Enhancing the ASEAN Connectivity: Building Consolidated Data Platform in Southeast Asia

—Song Ji Eun National University of Singapore

Abstract

Along with the progress of IR4.0 in ASEAN, the importance of big data and its utilisation is growing in this region. To make it more efficient and accessible to ASEAN member countries, building a consolidated data platform will be suggested. There are several statistical system and platform for diverse purposes in Southeast Asia; such as ASEAN Community of Statistical System [ASCC](#), API Exchange [APIX](#), ASEAN Single Window [ASW](#). However, existing platforms cannot cover diverse topics to describe the complex phenomenon and changes occurring in ASEAN. For this reason, the proposal for building a consolidated

data platform with recapitulative approaches and methods will be introduced. Lastly, the implications of building a consolidated data platform on the enhancement of the ASEAN connectivity will also be discussed.

1. Introduction

The Fourth Industrial Revolution [IR4.0](#) is making waves all around the globe and ASEAN is no exception. Over the past decade, ASEAN countries have shifted from an agrarian economy to emerging economic powerhouses, which will drive innovation as the next growth engine. Although the most recent data from the Asian Development Bank [ADB](#) suggested that Southeast Asia has grown less than expected, growth of this region remains robust.

There have been slight downward revisions to the forecast of annual GDP growth rates which now stands at 4.8 per cent (2019) and 4.9 per cent (2020), lowered from 4.9 per cent and 5.0 per cent, respectively. Along with weakening global growth, slowing trade, and softer commodity prices, export prospects are dim for the highly trade-engaged economy of ASEAN ([ADB, 2019](#)). But still, ASEAN is growing at a rate of 5.9 per cent, which is much higher than the global economic growth rate of 3.8 per cent. Its sharing proportion of global economic prosperity has also risen. With an expected growth in the future, ASEAN is anticipated to become the 4th largest economy by 2030. It implies that even if the growth potential of ASEAN seems to be promising, this regional community still has to seek for long-term growth momentum.

As IR4.0 is going forward, the importance of involved technologies is emerging as well, for example, Cloud Computing, Internet of Things [IoT](#), Artificial Intelligence [AI](#), and so on. More than all, big data represents this new era in a large quantity and varieties of data utilisation and application. Since the mechanism of society has become data-driven, the economic frame and concept of development have changed along with this breakthrough. For this reason, when future economic development or growth is discussed,

it cannot be dealt only with merely the traditional way such as the assigning of labour and capital or improving productivity for production. In this era of internationalisation and large-scale global interdependence, regions like ASEAN that are in need of strategic and comprehensive data platform and relevant policy at a regional level is growing.

In this paper, consolidating the dispersed data into one integrated system or platform in ASEAN will be the main subject. The objective of this paper is to suggest strategies and feasible methods for building the data platform. More specifically, the current status of data and analytics market in ASEAN as well as several data platforms existing now in Southeast Asia will be introduced to grope for potential improvements.

The way to build a consolidated data platform will be suggested thereafter. Possible questions include how ASEAN will achieve qualitative and quantitative abundance in the data platform; which sectors are most likely to be significant, such as regional economies, SMEs, retail and consumption, transportation, employment and human mobility. Implications on enhancing the ASEAN connectivity will be discussed at the conclusion. Consolidated data platform under the unified standards and structure in Southeast Asia will help ASEAN countries to utilise the data efficiently and promote the enhancement of connectivity for this regional community itself.

2. The Status Quo in ASEAN Data Platform

The global data platform market is estimated to grow up to USD 115 billion in 2023 with 29per cent of CAGR [Compound Average Growth Rate](#) through

the forecast period from 2017 to 2023 (Market Research Future, 2019). Specifically, the market size of overall analytics and data science industry in Southeast Asia is currently estimated to be USD 6.8 billion annually. This shows only the current state of the relevant industry in ASEAN, and so the potential size is expected to be much higher. There also are several cases of the existing data platforms in ASEAN. Through this, features and current weaknesses of relevant statistical system and platforms will be discussed to seek a way forward.

2.1 ACSS: The main statistical system in ASEAN

The ASEAN Community of Statistical System [ACSS](#) is being operated by the ASEANstats [ASEAN Statistics Division](#), one of the divisions under the ASEAN Economic Community [AEC](#) Department of the ASEAN Secretariat. ASEANstats provides statistical services to the ASEAN bodies, stakeholders, institutions, businesses and civil societies who need the statistical information. Currently, it functions as the main statistical system in ASEAN, which is easily accessible and open to the public.

Along with the economic growth and the increased leverage of ASEAN to the global market, the importance of describing this tendency in statistics has been emphasised. For this reason, ACSS has been established under the slogan of ‘Sustainable Development of Statistics for the ASEAN Community’ in 2011. In line with ACSS Strategic Plan 2016-2025, it performs to improve and strengthen the statistics of ASEAN and at the same time narrow the gap of data availability among member countries (ACSS, 2015).

In particular, various plans have been suggested through the Strategic Plan to overcome the weaknesses ASEAN had in terms of statistics. To deal

with the issues of insufficient data in the system itself and the unsystematic organisation, Strategic Plan emphasised the standardisation, consolidation, reliability, coherence throughout time series, comparability, and accessibility.

Statistics provided by ACSS Committee is available through ASEANstats as a form of database. However, further improvements can be made in the variety and systematicity of statistics to build an integrated data platform. Official statistics on topics such as macroeconomic indicators, foreign direct investment [FDI](#), international trade, tourism, transports, labour migration can be found easily in this database, but they tend to be biased on measures related to international trade and transports.

2.2 APIX: International Open Financial API Platform in ASEAN

APIX [API Exchange](#) [API: Application Programming Interface](#) is an initiative of the ASEAN Financial Innovation Network [AFIN](#), established through a partnership between the Monetary Authority of Singapore [MAS](#), the ASEAN Bankers Association [ABA](#) and the International Financial Corporation [IFC](#) of the World Bank in 2018. Across Asia, the digital economy is transforming the contours of economic development and providing new opportunities for inclusive growth. AFIN is a new generation of market infrastructure that can support this wave of change and ensure that smaller economies and institutions equally benefit from the new tools, skills and business models that can facilitate financial market development.

It helps banks across ASEAN to collaborate with financial technologies [FinTech](#) firms and brings financial access to underserved segments. It will embrace digital innovation, enhance growth, financial market development and access as well as accelerate the transformation of the financial sectors

across ASEAN (APIX, 2018).

One of the significant features is that this is an Open API platform between FinTech enterprises and financial institutions, which is the first cross-border international open API and Sandbox platform in the world. Therefore, it is evaluated to be a truly meaningful attempt to connect various sectors and countries. APIX is expected to contribute to the enhancement of the institutional connectivity, but the field is yet limited.

2.3 ASW: Digital Platform for lubricating regional trade in ASEAN

The ASEAN Single Window [ASW](#) is a regional initiative that connects and integrates National Single Window [NSW](#) of each ASEAN member state. The objective of ASW is to expedite cargo clearance at customs and promote regional integration towards a higher level of integration by enabling the exchange of border trade-related documents.

Companies across ASEAN are benefitting from smoother regional trade, thanks to a digital platform that simplifies customs clearance. Traders can now handle all cross-border customs documentation through the platform of ASW, which contributes to reducing the formalities by paperwork (ASW, 2018).

The platform initiated the operation in 2018 to five ASEAN member states: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam. The ASW provides a secure IT architecture and the legal framework in enabling trade, transports and commercial data to be exchanged electronically among government agencies or within the trading community (Chia, 2018).

This form of data platform can be the most ideal consolidated data platform in ASEAN, which enables the organically connected region not

only in terms of data but also in the context of physical and institutional connectivity.

3. The way to proceed

It is indisputable that data will be the most critical and fundamental factor of IR4.0, which acts like crude oil for the conventional Industrial Revolution. To achieve this, improvement is needed in the aspect of the qualitative and quantitative abundance in data for establishing the data platform.

The consolidated data platform is suggested to support a chain of collection, analysis, and distribution of the various data via one-stop platform, covering the diverse and critical areas such as Regional Economics, Finance, Employment, SMEs [Small and Medium-sized Enterprises](#), Transportation, Retail and Consume, Health Care, Telecommunication, Culture and Media, Environment and Natural Resources, and so forth. Among these fields, Environment and Natural Resources can enable a cooperative multilateral response to the disaster and risk management, water management, natural disasters like haze or flood, climate change, as well as conservation of biodiversity and environmental sustainability in the long term.

In particular, shared and accumulated data towards employment and human mobility within this data platform will contribute to invigorating the actual human mobility among ASEAN countries, which will further result in the strengthening of people-to-people connectivity.

This form of data platform under the standardisation can be the cornerstone for building Data Value Chain, like Global Value Chain [GVC](#)

which is mainly about manufactured goods at present. It will also lead to extended progress towards this platform itself and economic growth in ASEAN overall, through the economy of scale and network effect.

However, currently, Singapore contributes 44 percent to the data market size of Southeast Asian countries (Bhatia, 2019), so it can be said that Singapore is leading this market in ASEAN which applies the same to many other sectors.

In this context, ASEAN is still being exposed to several pressing matters, mainly, the development gap among member countries; represented as income inequality and the lack of basic infrastructures in some countries. Imbalance among nations is an obstacle to achieving a concept of 'One ASEAN'. Not only about the income inequality between countries, but the availability of internet services and utilisation of bank services differ considerably much depends on the country and its development (Lim & Hong, 2019). There are also a few more challenges and obstacles being expected to face in building the data platform with all member countries. Since this international platform is aiming at the participation of several different countries, a common agreement among participating states has to be preceded first. Not only regarding the political and diplomatic aspects, but also more specific areas such as economic, legal, and technical sectors have to be involved.

For example, in legal terms, cooperation in legal framework with each country will be required as well as in terms of data security and protection of private and sensitive data. In a bid to fulfil this agenda, Singapore's 2018 ASEAN Chairmanship resulted in the adoption of the ASEAN Framework on Personal Data Protection and Digital Data Governance (Michalak, 2019).

Technically, the consolidated data platform must be based on the database

which can accommodate the gigantic volume of data from ten countries in ASEAN, and at the same time, it means that physical data centre or cloud computing service to support this database is needed. This issue is directly linked to the economic standpoint as well, regarding a budget and utility. All of these factors mentioned in the paper are profoundly related to the feasibility that they have to be dealt with through further studies.

Therefore, the build of the consolidated platform has to consider a fair number of factors as mentioned above, as well as the unbiased participation and fair accessibility of every single ASEAN member country.

4. Implications on enhancing connectivity


According to the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025, improving open data usage was suggested as one of the strategic objectives in the pillar of Digital Innovation, as well as supporting enhanced data management among ASEAN member states (ASEAN Secretariat, 2016).

In this context, building the consolidated data platform will satisfy every single initiative under the category of Digital Innovation; enhancing the technology platform for the SMEs, developing the ASEAN digital financial inclusion framework, and establishing an ASEAN open data network and digital data governance framework, respectively.

Not only agendas in this field of Digital Innovation, but also other sectors within the concept of connectivity can be enhanced and promoted by building consolidated data platform and providing insights, such as seamless logistics and people mobility.

Building the consolidated data platform will have positive and synergetic

impacts on ASEAN connectivity, which can drive ASEAN to sustainable and robust socio-economic growth in the long term.





Theme 3





Association
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Toward a Reciprocal Cultural Exchanges: ASEAN Wave in Korea



With increasing interactions and socio-cultural exchanges between ASEAN and Korea, the perception of ASEAN has been expanding in Korea. However, while Korean cultures are widely spread in the ASEAN region with the tides of the 'Korean Wave', understanding of ASEAN's unique and diverse cultures are still in the growing stage in Korea. How can we effectively promote ASEAN's unique and diverse cultures in Korea? In what ways can ASEAN and Korea cooperate to facilitate and spark the 'ASEAN Wave' in Korea?





When Two Currents Meet: Utilising Common Grounds as a Stepping Stone to Reciprocal ASEAN-Korea Cultural Exchanges

—Adila Nurul Ilma University of Indonesia

Abstract

The world has witnessed the mammoth impact of Korean Wave, or Hallyu on a global scale. As a tool of cultural diplomacy that has successfully demonstrated the power of culture in bolstering interstate relations, Hallyu is undeniably crucial in improving the relations between the Republic of ASEAN and Korea member states and has brought upon mutually beneficial opportunities for both parties. Yet, as of 2019, the contribution of culture in advancing cooperation and bolstering amicable relations between the two regions remains lopsided, with Korean culture evidently

more widely known and disseminated throughout the ASEAN region than vice versa despite the ongoing efforts to achieve mutual cultural exchanges. This paper finds that the cause of such asymmetry can be boiled down to the lack of understanding and familiarity of ASEAN on Korean society's part, and the lack of robust regional identity and 'we-feeling' shared among ASEAN citizens. Mutual respect and understanding are fundamental to the realisation of two-way ASEAN-Korea cultural exchanges. This paper seeks to address the two underlying problems by exploring the idea of harnessing common grounds between the two regions and building a sense of relatability through what is labelled as "Asian values". This paper expounds on the aforementioned elements and highlights the vital role of mass media in breaking persistent negative stereotypes as well as strengthening points of commonality between ASEAN and Korea by increasing media exposure and representation of ASEAN and ASEAN nationals in Korea at a popular level that highlights the socio-cultural aspects of the region. Moreover, this paper argues that there needs to be more investment in building a robust regional identity among ordinary ASEAN citizens through, among others, media and education.

I. Introduction

ASEAN and Korea have made significant strides in bolstering the amicable relations between the two regions through multitudinous platforms since their first sectoral dialogue relations in November 1989. This relation was further strengthened following the emergence of Korean cultural phenomena, dubbed the Korean Wave or Hallyu, which became widely popular in the ASEAN region. The Korean Wave effectively served as a tool to enhance Korea's soft power and cultural diplomacy which resulted in the strengthening of relations between ASEAN and Korea. Yet, the cultural exchanges between ASEAN and Korea has been largely asymmetrical, with cultures from Korea more widely known in ASEAN rather than vice versa (Fabrian, 2017). There is a paucity of exhaustive studies with regards to how Korean Wave unfolds in Southeast Asia, as most studies and researches were conducted in Northeast Asian countries such as Japan and China (Shim, 2011). The dearth of studies concerning ASEAN influence in Korea merits special attention as it indicates that ASEAN culture is yet to be widely dispersed or significant enough in Korea. This paper argues that, in order to achieve two-way cultural exchanges between ASEAN and Korea and induce a surge of ASEAN Wave in Korea, a consistent effort to familiarise ASEAN culture in Korea must be redoubled not only within the confines of governmental or academic sphere, but also to common Korean society at large through the exploration of common denominators or some semblance of relatability between ASEAN and Korean societies. This paper seeks to identify the barriers of reciprocal cultural exchanges by expounding on theories of intercultural communication as well as placing great emphasis on mass media which led to the popularisation of Korean Wave in the beginning,

while highlighting the need to improve ASEAN representation in Korean media as well as building a robust ASEAN identity among ASEAN citizens. Furthermore, this paper will also analyse the common grounds that ASEAN countries and Korea have in the sociocultural sphere despite the many “overt” differences between the two regions, fittingly encapsulated in the so-called “Asian values” or Asian way of living that serves as a cultural binding force of Asia Pacific countries, to which ASEAN and Korea are both part of.

II. Korean Wave and ASEAN Wave: An Overview

Nowhere is the impact of Korean Wave henceforth “Hallyu” more conspicuous than in the ASEAN region. To start with, the region is the second largest market – only preceded by East Asia – for South Korean content exports. As explained by Jang Won-ho, the amount of Korean content exports to ASEAN countries saw an increase from USD 800 million in 2015 to 1.3 billion in 2017 (Handayani, 2019). Not only that, the impact of Hallyu extends beyond cultural realms; it has also pervaded other aspects of life that runs the gamut from lifestyle, tourism, cuisine, to beauty standards. According to Kim (2015), there are three theoretical analyses that seeks to explain how Hallyu boom first came about: (1) competence *hard power*, which explains that Hallyu phenomenon is engendered by economic prosperity of Korea due to the rapid industrialisation it experienced in the late 20th century, wherein Hallyu is emblematic of Korean hard power/cultural technology *CT* which enabled the production of better cultural products by Korean entrepreneurs/workers; (2) attractiveness *soft power*, which places a great emphasis on the

inherent “attractiveness” of K-pop culture, in which the dynamics and traditional values of Korean civil society is maintained; and, ⁽³⁾ criticism. Some critics are of the conviction that Hallyu, instead of it being a result of qualitative excellence of Korean culture, could “succeed only in targeting an Asian ‘niche market’ under the US-led global cultural order” (Kim, 2015). The previous analyses are crucial to be considered as points of departure with which we can analyse, by the same token, how ASEAN Wave in Korea can also be established.

This paper will only focus on the first and second point in brief analysis, namely the theory of competence and attractiveness. With regards to the former, ASEAN has demonstrated tremendous economic progress, as reflected by its combined gross domestic products **GDP** of almost USD 2.8 trillion in 2017, which makes the region the 5th largest economy and the 3rd largest in Asia (ASEAN, 2018). As regards to the latter, ASEAN is also host to a vast array of diverse cultural heritages and traditions that are unique to each of its member states. The traditional values embraced by ASEAN civil society are still well reflected in day-to-day affairs, even in the most industrialised of the ASEAN member states, namely Singapore, which, like its ASEAN counterparts, plays host to a convergence between a lifestyle of modernity and tradition. As such, diversity—be it among its people or natural resources—serves as a point of attraction or asset of the ASEAN region. We can conclude thereupon that ASEAN has a great potential to bring ASEAN Wave in Korea. Collectively, the region has already fulfilled the two factors that similarly led to the success of Korean Wave in its competence and attractiveness. Yet, the potentials of ASEAN to generate a ripple effect throughout Korean society have remained largely unexplored and not harnessed with a well-aimed approach.

III. The Role of Culture in Improving ASEAN-Korea Relations

In an ever-globalised world of today, culture plays a significant role in maintaining relations among states in the world. For one thing, it can contribute in the improvement of a country’s public diplomacy owing to its ability to “showcase a diversity of views, perspectives and opinions” as well as “breaking down persistent national stereotypes” (Bound, Briggs, Holden, & Jones, 2007). It has to be acknowledged as an ideal medium for public diplomacy due to its ability to reach vast numbers of audiences. Indeed, it is through culture that points of commonality and difference can be found, which then leads to a better understanding of one another (Bound, Briggs, Holden, & Jones, 2007). As such, it is no wonder that ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community **ASCC** is set out as one of the organisation’s three pillars, not only pertaining to affairs among the member states but also with external partners, such as Korea. As was mentioned, the surge of Korean Wave in ASEAN has brought about many benefits for both sides that has opened up the doors for collaboration and cooperation. For instance, the popularity of Korean culture in ASEAN has contributed to the rising demands of Korean cultural content and Korean studies in higher institutions, as well as familiarisation of the country and its people on a massive scale within ASEAN.

Theories of Cultural Exchange

It is crucial that we consider the theory of cultural exchange to properly analyse the ways in which reciprocal, two-way cultural exchanges between ASEAN and Korea can be achieved. As defined by Rogers (2006), cultural exchange involves the “reciprocal exchange of symbols, artefacts, genres,

rituals, or technologies between cultures with symmetrical power.” The two-way flows of music and visual arts is an example of cultural exchange (Rogers, 2006; Elerick, 1998). According to Holden, Briggs, Jones, and Bound (2007), cultural exchange allows us to “appreciate points of commonality” and “understand the motivations and humanity that underlie our differences” (Russo, 2011; Elerick, 1998). Drawing upon the previous definition of cultural exchange, it can be concluded that presently the cultural exchange between ASEAN and Korea is negligible if we underline the element of reciprocity between the two.

In addition, it is also necessary to shed a light on the concept of cultural proximity, which was first coined by Joseph Straubhaar (1991). The kernel of the concept is that there is a preference of locally produced cultures that comes from one’s own or the most similar over those that are not. According to cultural proximity theory, there are three stages in which the cultural attributes of the origin and local culture progresses, as stated by Suh, Kwon, & Choi (2006): (1) a stage of separation between the two cultures; (2) a stage of one-way communication, and (3) a stage of mutual communication including the reactions from the local culture (Suh, Kwon, & Choi, 2006). As highlighted by the authors, there are multiple factors that determine these states, chief among them are: (a) cultural superiority/inferiority, (b) cultural similarity/differences, (c) political relations *ideology, legal systems, national religion and political power*, and (d) economic relations *openness, trade dependence, and similarity of economic system* (Suh, Kwon, & Choi, 2006). With the previous factors in mind, it can be said that the popularity of Korean Wave throughout ASEAN can be attributed significantly to Korea’s economic achievements, bolstered further by its close cultural proximity and affinity shared among neighbouring Asian countries (Lee, 2011).

Furthermore, Korean popular culture acts as a juncture between dearly

embraced, traditional Asian values and the progressivity of the West. The values represented in the cultural contents offer a higher degree of relatability which increases the likelihood of its acceptance amongst Asian audiences. For instance, Korean television shows often deal with family issues, love and filial piety in an age of rapidly advancing technology without forsaking traditional values of Confucianism. This makes Korean culture more relatable, and, as such, more appealing and “close to home” than that of Western entertainment (Lee, 2011). Likewise, ASEAN cultures also share similarities with Korea. If this point of commonality between the two region is given enough limelight and exposure, surely ASEAN Wave can deliver the same impact that Korean Wave has upon ASEAN region.

IV. Challenges of ASEAN Wave

The road to achieving ASEAN Wave is rife with challenges. Shim (2017) identifies the challenges that preclude smooth cultural exchange in ASEAN as follows: (1) the lack of understanding of the importance of cultural exchange; (2) the lack of appreciation of cultural diversity in the region; (3) lack of institutional and collaborative efforts to both public and private sectors to enhance cultural exchange; (4) low priority given to the area of culture in national/international agendas; (5) the unidirectional mode of cultural flow in the region wherein the cultures of bigger and stronger nations are exported to smaller and weaker nations (Shim, 2017, p. 293).

The challenges presented above are by no means “permanent” in a sense that they cannot be improved upon. The author believes that in the status quo, culture has already been given special attention by both ASEAN and

Korean governments. Yet, there exist serious deficiencies inhibiting the progress of the policies intended to improve two-way cultural exchanges, namely prejudice and lack of understanding among the public, which means that no matter how many policies there are, the public will hardly pay heed to it in practice. As such, it is important to enhance public understanding at a popular level.

a. Overcoming Differences

Differences between ASEAN and Korean society makes the gap between the two regions more pronounced. On the society level, Korean society is greatly homogeneous despite having endured invasions and occupations. They have been termed *han minjok*, a term derived from Korean ethnic nationalism or racial nationalism, which constructed a national consciousness bound by blood that remains even after the division of the Korean peninsula (Yim, 2002). By contrast, the ASEAN region is very much heterogenous. It is ethnically and culturally pluralistic, comprising groups of diverse cultures and ethnic as well as religious backgrounds.

Notwithstanding the inherent differences between ASEAN and Korea, the values shared among the two regions are greatly similar and universal, with only negligible differences. These universal values are encapsulated in what is labeled the “Asian values”, a term that first came to prominence in the 1990s and promoted in the Bangkok Declaration of 1993. The term comprises “the cultural, commercial, intellectual, and even psychological elements particular to East/Southeast Asia” (Baba, 2016). These values include, among others, the preference for collectivism over communitarianism, social harmony, and respect towards authority. However, as underscored by Koro Bessho (1999) and quoted by Baba (2016), there is “no single set of

clearly defined values applicable to Asia as a whole, or even to East Asia.” Thus, rather than a “rigid, regional-defining package”, Asian values are more of a “flexible set of cultural and psychological commonalities” (Baba, 2016). These “Asian values” can collectively act as a unifying force among Asian countries that can serve as a strength if cultivated and harnessed well. Such universal Asian values place, among others, the aforementioned emphasis on the community rather than the individual, familial piety, and respect to authority (Baba, 2016). In short, the Asian values are commonly understood as a “shared” Confucian heritage in Southeast Asia.

While claiming that Confucian values are “Asian values” is an overgeneralisation of the diverse Asian cultures, particularly in Southeast Asia, Confucian values do share commonality with other values, such as Islamic values. Take Malaysia, for example, a Muslim-majority country in which the penetration of Korean culture was met with warm reception because the cultural values contained within the cultural products are evocative of Malaysian lifestyle and places a great emphasis on deeply embraced values in the country (Ariffin, Abu Bakar, & Yusof, 2018). Similarly, Muslim youths in Indonesia found that there are similarities of Confucian values to Islamic ones, such as the emphasis on hard work and familial piety that is reflected in Korean dramas (Rosidi, 2016). Likewise, such universal quality embodied in Korean culture also has broad appeal to Singapore’s multiracial demographic (Viet Nam News, 2019). Hence, Asian values, when implemented in tandem with other efforts can act as a solid social glue that allows for smooth cultural exchange between ASEAN and Korea.

b. Building a Strong ASEAN Identity

ASEAN nationals have to cultivate a strong sense of regional identity,

which can serve as a strong and unifying appeal of the region in order to expand to beyond Southeast Asia, including Korea. Yet, the concept of ASEAN identity is still far removed from the day-to-day affairs of regular citizens of ASEAN countries despite the call for the building of an ASEAN community by 2020 (Oba, 2014). A survey conducted by Moorthy & Benny revealed that many ASEAN nationals are unaware of ASEAN's socio-cultural initiative that aims to build a cohesive ASEAN community (Moorthy & Benny, 2013). Therefore, ASEAN must enhance the exposure and understanding about ASEAN to its citizens and involve them in peer-to-peer exchanges, not only among the academia, government officials, but to other sectors as well and to the general public. According to Acharya (2017), a true regional identity can only be developed if interactions and identifications are achieved at the popular level, wherein ordinary ASEAN citizens identify with the regional entity, not only national ones (Acharya, 2017). This goal to foster a common identity among the peoples of the ASEAN region is indeed included in ASEAN Strategic Plan for Culture and Arts (2016-2025) and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community framework, yet, despite this, the ASEAN identity "suffers from a disjuncture between the official ASEAN and the people's ASEAN" (Acharya, 2017).

Without a solid sense of regional identity as ASEAN citizens and detachment from the idea of regional "we-ness", it will be difficult for ASEAN Wave to prevail among itself, let alone extend to extra-ASEAN countries like Korea. ASEAN needs to redouble the effort to boost enthusiasm about the idea of ASEAN identity to its people which aims to increase the bond shared among fellow citizens of ASEAN, or at least to build awareness of their membership or belonging in a collective body beyond the nation-state to which they belong (Jones, 2004). Such consciousness

necessitates a cultural, rather than a national, understanding of citizenship, by which ASEAN citizens would "classify themselves as belonging to a distinct social environment" as well as "sharing common ground with citizens of other ASEAN states", wherein such socio-cultural common ground could be provided by Asian values (Baba, 2016). Yet, given the cultural diversification within ASEAN community, the socio-cultural contribution of Asian values alone is not enough to achieve ASEAN's regional identity goal (Baba, 2016). This means that ASEAN countries have to also work on, among others, enhancing cooperation in media sectors and beyond among themselves to bolster intra-ASEAN bond, foster amicable relations as well as integrating in-depth knowledge of ASEAN into the school curriculum to acquaint citizens to the organisation and what it stands for from an early age (Moorthy & Benny, 2013). The ASEAN identity is contingent upon how ASEAN citizens define their role and character in the regional order and how they develop a 'we-feeling' (Acharya, 2017). ASEAN identity serves as a bedrock to an appealing, durable, and long-lasting ASEAN influence in so many aspects. Only once it is achieved can the region seek to induce ASEAN Wave in Korea and leave profound impact in other sectors as well.

V. Finding Common Grounds

In addition to building a strong identity, it is also crucial to find common grounds and semblance of relatability between the two regions. The exploration of universal values can also serve ASEAN Wave well. Asian values such as familism and filial piety can also serve as a unifying value between ASEAN and Korea (Kim, 2010). For instance, Malaysians watch

Korean dramas because it resembles Malaysian lifestyle, therefore relatable (Ariffin, Abu Bakar, & Yusof, 2018), and Muslim youths in Indonesia look up to Korean culture more than Western ones due to the fact that it still embraces traditional Asian values despite its modernity (Rosidi, 2016). By the same vein, cultural products from ASEAN region should be able to tap into the hearts of Korean public by projecting the relatability and commonality between the two regions with the help of mass media and popular culture.

a. Role of Media Representation

Media representation is vital in building trust and reaching wider audiences. Media itself plays a major role in fostering intercultural communication. As articulated by Anthropologist Benedict Anderson, the media plays a significant role in constructing national identity (Shim, 2017). It is especially so now because the versatile internet has climbed up as a primary source of information. Cultural exchanges conducted in the form of one-stop information stalls, exhibitions and museums, such as the ASEAN Culture House in Busan and ASEAN Cultural Center in Bangkok, are important and momentous. Unfortunately however, they are not widely accessible and tend to be “static”, whilst media is dynamic and more appealing, as audiences can get access to the contents from the comfort of their homes at any time without the hassle of having to, for example, commute or physically come to the venue to immerse themselves in the culture. This is not limited to the exposure of popular culture, but also of other unique strengths inherent among ASEAN countries: tourism, cuisine, diversity, and so on. Yet, although media has enormous capacity to encourage global awareness and cross-cultural understanding, tolerance and acceptance of intercultural differences, this potential “force for good”

can backfire easily through the dissemination of messages that “create and reinforce negative stereotypes and perpetuate misconceptions” (Howard, Idriss, & Amanat, 2008). As such, there must be greater investment in cultural diversity & intercultural dialogue to curtail such prejudices, which can be detrimental to the effort of enhancing reciprocal cultural exchanges (UNESCO, 2009). Increasing the representation of ASEAN nationals and other strengths particular to ASEAN countries can enhance familiarity of the region to Korean nationals. This can be done through multitudinous ways, the most effective and accessible being the utilisation of mass media and social media to facilitate two-way cultural exchanges and enhance familiarity between the two regions as well as involving ASEAN nationals in the process. Korean TV shows and other mass media outlet must represent ASEAN and its citizens better. The TV shows and media outlets must enhance exposure about the region beyond highlighting political milestones in the news in a way that is digestible by the public, such as by displaying the uniqueness of ASEAN in socio-cultural dimension. It must be appealing to the general audience that may enjoy the shows in their leisure. Platforms such as the ASEAN-Korea Media Forum organised by the ASEAN-Korea Centre should also be encouraged, as such venue serves as a roundtable for people who work in the media to exchange ideas, expertise, and collaborate to foster two-way cultural exchanges between the region.

Just as Korean Wave is appealing in ASEAN countries due to the relatable values and culture contained within its cultural products, such commonality should also be highlighted when it comes to increasing the exposure of ASEAN to Korean public. That way, a certain degree of understanding and relatability can be achieved, leading to shredded prejudice and breakdown of persistent stereotypes that emerge as a result of very strong racial

boundaries within Korean culture. Benetatos (2014) conducted a survey which revealed that Koreans who participated in it strongly disapprove dark skinned Asians and Africans. Such disapproval mirrors the cultural and character perceptions of the aforementioned peoples (Benetatos, 2014). Often, poor character is associated with dark-skinned people. Such distorted perception stems from the lack of exposure and the promotion of racial oversimplification of people of colour, which then shape rigid standards of beauty that may consequently give rise to racial discrimination and intercultural tensions (Benetatos, 2014). This is where the media can come in and help change such perceptions. Ralsmark (2017) finds that the level of social tolerance towards a minority group rises with the increase of the general media visibility of minorities because individuals receive more correct information about the groups in line with increasing exposure. Additionally, Ralsmark's findings suggest that a positive and non-stereotypic media visibility can reduce potential conflicts that may arise between the majority and minority group (Ralsmark, 2017).

b. Role of Popular Culture

Korean Wave stands as a crucial pillar that underpins the strong relationship between ASEAN and Korea (Park, 2019). According to Seksan Antasirikiat, Korean pop culture has erected a positive image of Korea in Thailand (Shim, 2019). In the same way, the role of popular culture in proliferating ASEAN Wave cannot be understated. For example, in the Korean pop scene, some idols working in the industry hail from ASEAN-related backgrounds, including Bam Bam from GOT7, Lisa of Blackpink, Nichkhun from 2PM. They managed to increase the exposure of and pique interests regarding ASEAN (Fabrian, 2017). This is not strictly limited to Korean

pop, but also to other branches of culture at large. Hallyu is indeed the quintessential melting pot with far-reaching appeal, especially to youths, the linchpin of the effort to induce ASEAN wave and sow positive image of ASEAN to the public.

The exposure and familiarisation of ASEAN and its people through popular culture takes away the “distant” and seemingly “subaltern” prejudice about ASEAN. Joint ASEAN-Korea concerts or festivals, such as the ASEAN Fantasia music festival in Korea, as well as collaborative dramas or co-produced movies starring Korean artists along with ASEAN artists can also help reshape the Western-oriented beauty standards in Korea and allow for more diverse representation of ASEAN nationals. In the end, this will greatly reduce discrimination, as people tend to be more discriminative towards people that they have not encountered before or are not well-acquainted of.


In addition, how Southeast Asian nationals are portrayed in the media is still far from flattering, as they are mostly framed as ‘dark skinned migrant workers’ or ‘poor’ (Won, 2018; Koh, 2018). Such stereotype instils the notion that Southeast Asians (mostly ASEAN citizens) hold a subordinate position in comparison to OECD nationals who receive less discrimination compared to Southeast Asians (Kim & Kim, 2011). Unfortunately, such generalised image of ASEAN nationals is already pervasive (Koh, 2018). For the phenomenon to deserve the moniker ‘ASEAN Wave’, it has to be done on a wider scale so that Korean public at large is familiar with ASEAN and its diversity. Darker complexion, different physical attributes as well as other differences should not be a roadblock to achieving the mutually beneficial two-way cultural exchanges between ASEAN and Korea. To achieve this, there is a need to correct public mindset and perceptions about ASEAN in Korea at the most

fundamental level by familiarising Korean public with ASEAN. This is an ambitious plan, but achievable. ASEAN and Korea have to redouble the efforts to achieve mutual, balanced cultural exchange as opposed to the asymmetrical one that currently prevails. Without a change of mindset and willingness to embrace ASEAN diversity, it will be incredibly difficult to sustain ASEAN Wave in Korea.

VI. Conclusion

The road to the actualisation of ASEAN Wave in Korea is rife with challenges and impediments that emerge internally from within ASEAN region itself as well as from within Korea. At the core of the problem from both sides, however, is the lack of understanding and awareness, be it regarding the concept of ASEAN identity or the knowledge of ASEAN and Southeast Asia as a whole. This understanding can be cultivated through several means. This paper has elaborated how the role of media in actualising ASEAN Wave cannot be downplayed, as it can foster intercultural communication and dispel persistent prejudices by increasing the representation of ASEAN nationals in the mass media. Furthermore, this paper also emphasises the need to find common grounds that should be the basis of cultural exchange between ASEAN and Korea through, among others, the incorporation of “Asian values” in ASEAN-Korea intercultural communication that can serve as a unifying force or “social glue” between the two regions. Last but not least, no less important is the need to cultivate a strong sense of regional identity among ASEAN nationals. Given the abundance of avenue that can be harnessed in this fast-paced era, the media

being only one of many, the realisation of ASEAN Wave in Korea is very probable and its prospect promising so long as the efforts to achieve two-way cultural exchanges is conducted in a tenacious and continuous manner.



Growing ASEAN Wave in Korea based on video sharing platform

—Park Hae Lim Pukyong National University

Abstract

The ‘Korean Wave’ has become popular across the globe, and it acts as an important part of introducing the excellence of Korean Culture. Through the Korean Wave, many people in the ASEAN regions consume Korean cultures, especially the K-Pop. This has enabled the increase of cultural interaction between ASEAN and Korea. The growth of the Korean Wave is based on several reasons but this paper focuses on two main reasons. First is Korea’s rapid economic growth and development of media technology such as broadcast devices. The other is the spread of internet service and the development of social media, or social network services [SNS](#). After

analysing these reasons, this paper finds the possibility of developing an ‘ASEAN Wave’ based on growth in contents market. ASEAN’s contents market is growing bigger, and it has led to the increase of collaborations between artists of ASEAN and Korea. For example, some popular Korean singer group’s members are from Thailand, including Lisa of ‘Black Pink’ and Minnie of ‘G-idle’. Through video sharing platforms such as YouTube and TikTok, lots of cultural contents are shared between peoples of ASEAN and Korea. Given their influences, some YouTube creators can affect many users in ASEAN and Korea in many areas, and these platforms help the understanding of respective cultures very well.

Based on these analyses, this paper suggests of making a new video sharing platform only for ASEAN countries. The basic idea of this platform is similar to YouTube, but the main difference is that all videos which will be uploaded are going to be about ASEAN. It could be about ASEAN’s traditional culture, dramas, movies, music and entertainment shows or interesting content videos such as famous YouTube creators’ eating shows and challenges. Any video about ASEAN can be welcomed on the platform. With development of such platform, anyone who is interested in ASEAN can easily find and watch videos about ASEAN. This will help develop the ‘ASEAN Wave’, particularly given that even ASEAN countries do not have many chances to know each other’s cultures. Therefore this platform can help to increase cultural exchanges not only between ASEAN and Korea, but also among the ASEAN member states. If anyone, including Koreans, is curious about ASEAN, they can easily access ASEAN’s video contents through this platform. It would help to further increase their interests on ASEAN and lead to greater cultural exchanges between ASEAN and Korea. Furthermore, it can be effective to increase tourism both ASEAN and

Korea.

Respecting and enjoying each other's cultures is an important part of raising mutual understanding for ASEAN and Korea who are partners for the future. If ASEAN and Korea form a cultural community and promote cooperation, it will be able to move together as close neighbors sharing similar cultures.

영상 플랫폼 확산을 기반으로 한 한국 내 아세안류 성장

1. 서론

한류韓流는 한국의 문화가 해외로 전파되어 인기리에 소비되는 현상을 일컫는 말로, 오늘날 K-POP을 선두로 전 세계에 한국을 알리는 데에 중요한 역할을 하고 있다. 초기의 한류는 한국의 드라마나 일부 배우, 가수의 인기에만 국한되어 있었으나 그 분야가 점차 확대되어 한국의 식품, 화장품, 한국어까지 한국 문화의 전반적인 인기를 의미하게 되었다. 일본과 중국 등의 국가를 중심으로 소비되던 한류는 영향력이 점차 커져 아세안 국가의 수많은 소비자들의 관심을 이끌었고, 이는 아세안과 한국의 문화 교류 확대에도 큰 도움이 되었다.

아세안 국가에서의 한류 소비량은 시간이 갈수록 커져가고 있는데, 이는 현지 방송국들이 한국 프로그램들만 방송하는 전문 채널을 운영하는 모습이나 현지 상점가에 입점해 있는 다양한 한국 화장품 브랜드 매장들의 모습을 통해 알 수 있다. 한국에 대한 관심의 증대로 여러 대학에서 한국학과를 운영하고 있으며, 수많은 대학생들이 교환학생이나 유학을 통해 한국으로 공부를 하러 오고 있기도 하다. 이러한 관심으로 국내 아세안 관광객의 수요도 매년 늘어가는 등 아세안과 한국 간의 사회·문화적 교류가 늘어가는 것은 긍정적으로 평가할 수 있을 것이다.

최근 베트남을 중심으로 아세안에 대한 한국 국민들의 관심이 과거보다 많이 증가하여, 아세안 국가로의 관광객 수가 늘어나고 국내에 다양한 아

세안 국가의 음식점들도 하나 둘씩 찾아볼 수 있게 된 것은 긍정적인 모습이라 할 수 있다. 그러나 한국에서 아세안 국가의 드라마를 보거나 노래를 듣는 사람은 쉽게 찾을 수 없다. 즉, 아세안에서의 폭발적인 한류 열풍에 비해 한국 내 아세안류의 확산은 저조한 것이 현실이다. 따라서 본고에서는 다양한 민족과 종교를 바탕으로 한 아세안 10개국의 문화를 한국 내에 어떤 방법으로 확산을 시킬 수 있을 것인지 미디어 기술 확산을 중심으로 논해보고자 한다.

2장에서 한류 성장의 주요인에 대해 알아보고 아세안류 확산에는 어떻게 이용할 수 있을 지 논해볼 것이다. 3장에서는 아세안류가 앞으로의 성장가능성이 얼마나 될 것인지 현재 아세안 국가의 다양한 대중문화를 바탕으로 논해보고자 한다. 4장에서 앞선 논의들을 바탕으로 미디어 기술의 확산을 통해 어떻게 한국 내에서 아세안류를 성장시킬 수 있는지, 그 방향에 대해 모색해보며 끝으로 결론에서 전체적인 내용 요약과 함께 아세안류의 중요성에 대해 이야기하며 마무리하고자 한다.

2. 한류 성장의 주요인

경제&기술의 발전

한류가 세계적으로 성장한 주요인으로는 크게 두 가지를 꼽아볼 수 있다. 첫 번째는 한국의 경제와 기술의 발전이다. 한국의 경제는 1970년대 이후 굉장히 급속도로 발전해왔고, 그에 따라 각종 기술의 성장도 함께 이루어졌다. 경제성장으로 인해 얻게 되는 물질적 풍요는 사람들로 하여금 문화소비를 촉진하는 데에 영향을 주었고, 이는 1990년대 한국 문화시장의

개방을 기점으로 한 문화산업의 대규모 발전에 기여하였다. 또한 한국의 지상파 방송 3사를 중심으로 운영되었던 방송 산업이 다양한 종편 채널들과 연예인들, PD들의 유튜브 진출과 함께 더 다채로운 콘텐츠들로 채워지며 국내뿐만 아니라 국외의 수많은 소비자들의 유입을 불러왔다.

이렇게 경제성장이 뒷받침되자 다양한 분야에서의 수요가 늘어나기 시작하였고 이에 맞춰 정부와 기업 주도의 투자도 여러 분야에 걸쳐 진행되었다. 대표적으로 교육분야의 수요와 투자가 높아지며 많은 사람들이 양질의 교육을 받을 기회가 늘어나게 되었고, 이 결과 콘텐츠 분야의 인재들이 양성되기 시작하였다. 또한 기술의 진보로 점점 각종 기능을 탑재한 방송장비들도 제작되었다. 이후 문화 관련 업계의 한국 내수 시장의 규모가 확대되자, 양성된 인재들을 중심으로 다양한 성능의 방송통신 기기와 방송 제작 관련 기술을 이용한 양질의 콘텐츠들이 쏟아져 나오기 시작했다.

〈표 1〉 한국 방송산업의 연도별 총 매출액

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
매출액 (단위: 백 만원)	9, 354, 605	9, 884, 954	11, 176, 433	12, 752, 484	14, 182, 479	14, 940, 939	15, 774, 634	16, 462, 982	17, 331, 138	18, 043, 595
전년 대비 증가율 (단위: %)	-	10.3	5.3	5.6	11	10.9	9	6.6	5.1	4.1

출처: 통계청

표 1에서 알 수 있듯이, 한국의 방송산업은 앞서 말한 경제와 기술발달

을 기반으로 하여 드라마, 음악방송을 선두로 매년 지속적으로 성장해 오고 있으며 2017년에는 그 매출액의 규모가 약 18조원에 달한다. 2000년대부터 한국의 각종 방송, 음악, 게임 등 여러 콘텐츠들이 글로벌 시장으로 수출되며 매출액은 더욱 증가하였다고 볼 수 있다. 그리고 이를 발판 삼아 글로벌 콘텐츠 시장에서 우위를 선점하게 된 한국의 방송 산업은 현재 세계적 인기를 얻고 있는 한류의 확산에 큰 영향을 주었다 (이성민, 2019).

SNS의 발달

두 번째 요인은 SNS의 발달이다. 스마트폰 시장 진출, 성장과 함께 국내 스마트폰의 보급률이 높아지고 그에 따라 국민들의 SNS 이용률도 높아졌다. 2018년 구글 플레이 스토어의 소셜 카테고리의 분석 결과 페이스북 이용자는 약 880만 명, 인스타그램 이용자는 약 910만명 정도로 오늘날 젊은 세대를 중심으로 상당히 많은 사람들이 SNS를 이용하고 있다. (모비데이즈, 2018) SNS 사용의 증가로, 다양한 콘텐츠들을 손쉽게 접할 수 있게 되었고 특히 페이스북, 인스타그램과 같이 전 세계적으로 이용되는 SNS에서의 콘텐츠 전파를 통해 한국의 문화가 더 빠르고 쉽게 확산될 수 있었다.

최근에는 특히 유튜브를 이용한 영상공유가 활발해지면서 더욱 인기를 얻고 있다. 영상을 촬영하고, 편집하여 개인 채널에 공유하는 유튜버들이 많아지면서 방송국에서 제작하는 방송들에 버금가는 콘텐츠들을 사람들이 더 쉽게 접할 수 있게 되었다. 한국에서만 경험할 수 있는 콘텐츠들로 제작된 영상들은 전 세계에 한국을 알리는 데에도 큰 역할을 하였다고 할 수 있다. 또한 유튜버들이 국내에서 나아가 국외에서도 여러 콘텐츠들을 제작하기 시작하며, 아세안 국가들에서의 여행관련 콘텐츠들이 특히 증가하였고

이는 수많은 한국의 유튜브 이용자들에게 아세안의 매력을 알려주게 되었다. 이러한 SNS의 발달은 한류의 발달에 가장 중요한 역할을 하였고, 오늘날에는 아세안류 확산의 발판이 되어주고 있다.

3. 아세안류의 가능성

글로벌 시장에서 아세안류의 영향력

아세안류의 확산 가능성을 앞서 살펴보았던 한류의 발전 요인과 연계하여 크게 두 가지 측면에서 각각의 실제 사례와 함께 살펴보고자 한다. 첫 번째는 글로벌 시장에서 아세안류의 현재 상황과 그를 기반으로 한 발전 가능성에 대한 것이다. 아세안 지역의 콘텐츠 시장은 방송뿐만 아니라 게임, 출판, 영화, 애니메이션 등 다양한 분야에서 나날이 성장하고 있다.

〈표 2〉 분야별 아세안 지역 콘텐츠 시장규모 & 연평균 성장률

	지식정보	방송	출판	게임	영화
시장규모 (단위: 백만 달러)	18,000	13,500	12,500	4,500	1,500
연평균 성장률 (단위: %)	12.5	6.9	2.6	7.0	2.2

출처: 한국콘텐츠진흥원

표 2에서 알 수 있듯이, 대부분의 분야에서 성장률을 보이고 있다. ‘보이

스 키즈’와 같은 서바이벌 프로그램들이 촬영·방송되기도 하고, 인도네시아와 태국을 중심으로 게임 시장이 크게 성장하며 매년 부산에서 개최되는 지스타G-Star와 같은 국제 게임 전시회에서 게임을 선보이는 등 매년 확장되고 있다. 영화 산업 또한 수요가 늘어남에 따라 시장이 확대되면서 태국의 ‘배드 지니어스(Bad Genius, 2017)’와 같은 신선한 소재의 영화들이 제작되어 아시아 박스오피스 1위를 차지하는 등 아세안의 영화들이 점점 주목을 받고 있는 추세이다.

이러한 성장세와 함께 한국과 아세안 간의 콘텐츠 협력 사업도 늘고 있다. 그 예로 최근 한국의 유명 아이돌 그룹에는 아세안 국가 출신의 멤버들이 포함되어 있는 경우를 꼽을 수 있다. 유명 걸그룹 ‘블랙핑크’의 태국인 멤버인 리사, ‘여자아이들’의 태국인 멤버 민니 등이 있고, 최근 콜라보 작업도 늘면서 티아라의 효민과 베트남 아티스트 ‘Justa Tee’가 함께 작업한 ‘Cabinet’이라는 노래에서는 베트남어 랩을 들을 수도 있다. 아세안 국가의 아티스트들과 한국의 아티스트들이 함께 활동을 함으로 인해 아세안뿐만 아니라 한국에서도 점점 아세안의 문화에 대한 관심이 높아지고 있다고 할 수 있다. 이러한 아세안의 콘텐츠 시장의 성장은 한국 내 아세안류 확산에도 긍정적인 영향을 주고 있다.

모바일 기술 기반의 SNS와 콘텐츠 활용

두 번째는 아세안 국가들의 현재 모바일 기술을 기반으로 SNS와 다양한 콘텐츠를 활용한 발전 가능성에 대한 것이다. 2017년 기준 아세안 지역의 인터넷 이용자 수는 총 약 3억 4천만 명에 달하며, 스마트폰을 이용한 SNS 이용자 수는 약 2억 7천만 명에 달한다. 즉, 아세안 국가 내에 스마트폰 보

급률이 높아짐에 따라 SNS 이용자 수도 매년 증가하고 있다 (World Bank, 2017).

〈표 3〉 아세안 내 페이스북 이용자 수 (2019년 8월 기준)

	인도 네시아	필리핀	베트남	태국	말레 이시아	미얀마	캄보 디아	싱가 포르	라오스	브루 나이
페이스북 (단위:만명)	1,300	750	610	500	240	210	83	43	27	3.5

출처: Statista

표 3에서 알 수 있듯이, 아세안 국가 내 페이스북 이용자 수는 전체 약 3억 7천만 명에 달하며, 상대적으로 스마트폰 보급률이 낮고 인프라가 부족한 캄보디아와 미얀마에서도 8백만 명과 2천만 명 이상이 사용하는 등 SNS 사용이 증가한 것을 볼 수 있다. 이러한 SNS 사용의 증가는 아세안 국가의 소비자들에게 문화의 접근성을 높여주며 또한 문화의 확산에도 도움을 주고 있다. 앞서 2장에서 살펴보았듯이, SNS의 발달이 한류가 발전할 수 있었던 중요한 밑바탕이었기에 아세안에서의 SNS 발달은 아세안류의 발전 가능성에 큰 기반이 될 것이다.

SNS를 통한 아세안류의 확산 가능성은 실제로 몇몇 유명 어플리케이션의 사례에서 찾아볼 수 있다. 가장 대표적인 것이 유튜브^{YouTube}이다. 전 세계적으로 동영상 공유 플랫폼 중에서는 가장 큰 영향력을 가진 유튜브는 접근의 용이성과 동영상 공유의 편리성으로 수많은 이용자들을 보유하고 있다. 아세안 내에서도 유튜브 이용자들이 늘어나면서 그 파급력 또한 커져가고 있는데, 대표적으로 인도네시아에서 활동 중인 한국인 유튜버 ‘장한솔’씨가 있다. 한국과 인도네시아의 문화와 풍속을 인도네시아어로 소개하는 유튜브 채널 ‘코리아 레오밋^{Korea Reomit}’을 운영하며 2019년 12월 기준

약 230만 명의 구독자를 보유하고 있는 청년 유튜버 장한솔씨는 현재 인도네시아 유튜버 상위 10%에 달하는 등 독창적인 콘텐츠로 인도네시아의 젊은 층에 많은 영향을 주고 있다고 한다. ‘한국은 왜 생일날 미역국을 먹을까, 인도네시아 일상 브이로그^{Vlog}’ 등의 신선한 콘텐츠를 통해 한국의 문화와 아세안의 문화가 쌍방소통이 가능해졌으며, 그 발전 가능성은 무궁무진하다고 볼 수 있다. 아세안에서 최근 인기를 얻고 있는 또 다른 영상 공유 어플리케이션은 틱톡^{TikTok}이다. 중국의 바이트 댄스라는 콘텐츠 기업이 제작한 어플리케이션인 틱톡은 약 15초가량이라는 짧은 영상 공유할 수 있고, 손쉽게 편집을 할 수 있다는 점에서 유튜브와 차이를 가지고 있다. 영상의 길이가 짧기에 지루하지 않다는 장점을 가지고 있으며, 하나의 영상이 길이가 짧기에 적은 시간에 많은 영상을 볼 수 있다. 주로 10~20대의 젊은 층들에게 인기가 많으며, 이 어플을 통해 전 세계적으로 특정 춤이 유행하기도 하고 아세안의 젊은 층들도 각종 댄스 영상을 올리거나 패러디 영상을 올리는 등 틱톡의 영향력도 나날이 커져가고 있다.

이렇듯 현재도 이미 유명 어플리케이션들을 통한 문화 확산이 이루어지고 있음을 알 수 있다. SNS는 접근성이 용이하고 누구나 쉽게 콘텐츠를 제작해서 올리고 공유할 수 있다는 장점을 가지고 있기에 문화 확산에는 가장 효과적인 방법 중 하나라고 볼 수 있다. 그렇기에 이러한 영상 공유 플랫폼들을 활용한다면 아세안류의 확산뿐만 아니라 한국과 아세안 간의 문화 교류에도 효과적인 도움이 될 것이다.

4. 한국 내 아세안류의 확산 방안

앞서 2장과 3장에서 살펴본 내용들을 바탕으로 4장에서는 아세안류의 확산을 위한 방안에 대해 필자가 생각한 영상 공유 플랫폼 기반의 방안을 구체적으로 제시하고, 이를 구축하고 발전시키기 위해서 한국의 어떤 ODA가 현실적으로 필요할 지에 대해 논의해보고자 한다.

아세안 기반 영상 공유 플랫폼 형성

필자가 제안하고자 하는 것은 유튜브, 틱톡과 같은 영상 공유 플랫폼을 새롭게 구축하되, 그 기반이 전 세계가 아니라 아세안이 되는 것이다. 아세안 10개국을 중심으로 각국의 드라마, 영화, 음악 방송 등을 부분적으로 업로드 할 수 있고, 영화나 드라마의 경우 이를 시청하고자 하는 사람들에게 정기간이나 대여권과 같은 방법으로 결제를 하여 이용할 수 있도록 구축하는 것이다. 즉, 유튜브와 비슷한 개념이지만 올라오는 콘텐츠들은 모두 아세안 국가의 것들이고 다만 이를 소비할 수 있는 대상은 전 세계인이 되는 것이다. 앞서 3장에서 살펴보았듯이, 아세안에서는 유튜브와 틱톡을 이용한 영상공유가 활발하게 이루어지고 있으며 이들의 영향력 또한 상당한 수준에 이르고 있다. 영상의 분량에 제한이 없어 다양한 분야의 영상 공유가 가능한 유튜브의 기능과 영상 편집이 쉬운 틱톡의 기능을 활용하여 영상 공유 플랫폼을 구축한다면 아세안류의 확산은 현실 실현 가능성이 크다고 볼 수 있다.

또한 아세안 국가들의 지리적 특성 상 산간, 도서 지역들이 많은데 산간, 도서 지역에는 비교적 인터넷 인프라가 덜 구축되어 있는 것을 감안하여,

네트워크가 불안정한 지역에서도 이용할 수 있도록 ‘페이스북 Lite’와 같은 핵심기능만 담은 저용량 버전을 함께 제작한다면 플랫폼의 확산에 도움이 될 것이며 접근성 역시 보다 용이할 것이다.

새로운 플랫폼 구축을 위해서는 한국의 각종 모바일 어플리케이션 제작 스타트업 기업들과 아세안의 모바일 스타트업 기업들, 제작을 지원해 줄 첨단 모바일 기술을 보유한 한국과 아세안 기업들, 그리고 한국과 아세안의 문화관련 정부부처와 개발원조 기관의 협업이 필요하다. 즉, 플랫폼이 민간 기업의 개인소유가 아닌 국가 간 프로젝트의 일환으로 각 국가별로 플랫폼 운영을 전담하는 팀을 구성해 저작권이나 심의규정 등에 대한 관리를 하고, 국가별 사회의 유행에 맞추어 홍보까지 담당하는 것이다. 이와 관련하여 국가에서 미디어 산업에 대한 지원도 늘리고 문화 교류를 장려한다면 해당 플랫폼은 한국과 아세안 간 문화의 장으로서 중요한 역할을 하게 될 것이다. 필자가 제안하고자 하는 새로운 플랫폼의 대략적인 구성은 아래 표와 같다.

〈표 5〉 새로운 플랫폼의 대략적인 구성

	아세안 기반 영상 공유 플랫폼 We A (Are/ASEAN) (가칭)
운영방식	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 아세안 각 국가의 문화관련 부처에서 플랫폼 운영 전담 팀을 구성, 전담 팀이 해당 플랫폼에 공유되는 영상들의 저작권이나 심의 등 담당. - 플랫폼에 공유되는 영상들은 영화, 드라마, 예능, 음악, 전통문화 등 분야는 상관없으나 모두 아세안 국가와 관련된 것이어야 함. - 각 국가별로 카테고리를 만들고, 하위 분류를 분야별로 생성할 것. - 영상 편집 실력이 초급인 사람도 쉽게 도전해볼 수 있도록 손쉬운 편집 기능을 기본적으로 구축. (틱톡의 기능 활용) - 구독자 수가 많고, 영향력 있는 크리에이터들을 각종 문화행사에 초빙하거나 팬들과 함께하는 방송 등의 이벤트를 마련.
타겟 소비자	아세안 10개국과 한국, 세계의 소비자들.
홍보 방법	‘장한술’과 같은 유명 크리에이터들 섭외를 통한 플랫폼 성장과 한국의 유명 연예인들이 유튜브 채널을 여는 것처럼 아세안 내 유명인들을 중심으로 플랫폼 홍보를 시작. 플랫폼이 어느 정도 성장하게 되면 일반인들의 크리에이터 진출도 늘면서 효과적인 영상 공유가 이루어질 것으로 기대됨.
기대효과	아세안류에 대한 관심 제고와 한국을 포함한 세계로의 아세안류 확산.

이러한 플랫폼 구축에 대해 제안하고자 하는 이유는 크게 두 가지이다. 첫 번째는 아세안 10개국도 각국의 문화를 접하고 소비할 수 있는 기회가 많지 않다는 점이다. 서로 인접해 있는 국가들이지만, 베트남과 라오스, 미얀마와 태국 등 각국의 문화는 많이 다른 모습을 보인다. 뿐만 아니라 아세안 대부분의 국가들은 많은 수의 소수민족들이 함께 살아가고 있으며, 각 소수민족마다 가지고 있는 문화도 다양하다. 이렇듯 아세안의 각 국가들은 국내 다른 민족들의 문화는 물론이고 이웃 국가들의 문화들에 대해 쉽게 접하기 어렵고, 알 수 있는 방법이 제한적이다. 따라서 국가 간에 미디어 관련 협약 체결 등을 통해 이러한 새로운 아세안만의 플랫폼을 구축하게 된다면 아세안이 다 함께 향유할 수 있다는 공공성을 가짐과 동시에 각 국가의 국내 문화 사업과 아세안 국가 간의 문화 교류에도 모두 긍정적인 영향을 줄 것이다.

두 번째는 한국인들에게 아세안 문화로의 용이한 접근성을 제공할 수 있다는 점이다. 기존의 유튜브를 통해서도 아세안류에 대한 영상을 찾아서 시청할 수 있지만 아직 아세안류에 대해 한국 소비자들의 관심이 낮은 상태에서는 소비량이 낮을 수 밖에 없다. 또한 아세안 내에서 제작되는 콘텐츠들이 한국에 잘 알려져 있지도 않다. 그렇기에 아세안 기반의 플랫폼을 구축한다면, 해당 플랫폼에 접속함과 동시에 아세안 전체의 각종 영상들을 접할 수 있기에 쉽게 아세안류에 빠져들 수 있다는 것이다. 플랫폼이 구축된다면 한국의 아세안 전공자들 또는 관심 있는 일반 소비자들을 중심으로 시작하여 남녀노소가 즐길 수 있는 아세안류 확산에 중요한 기반이 될 것이고, 여기서 생긴 관심으로 직접 가보고 싶다는 생각으로 연결된다면 이는 한국과 아세안 간의 인적 교류와 관광산업 발달까지 영향을 줄 수 있을

것이다.

한국의 미디어 기술 개발협력

이러한 플랫폼 구축을 위해 미디어 강국인 한국이 국제개발협력의 차원에서 다양한 기술협력을 제공할 수 있을 것이다. 크게 두 가지 분야로 나눌 수 있는데, 첫 번째는 인프라 구축 분야이다. 아세안 지역 내 스마트폰 보급률이 증가하고 있지만, 산간과 도서지역이 많은 아세안 국가들의 지형적 특성상 아직 통신이나 인터넷 보급 부분의 인프라가 부족한 것이 현실이다. 그렇기에 이를 개선하기 위해 현재 미얀마, 라오스 등의 국가에서 한국 국제협력단(KOICA)이 전개 중인 전력 공급 인프라 구축을 위한 사업들에 덧붙여 통신환경 개선을 위한 사업이 필요하다. 이후 언급할 교육분야의 사업을 통해 배출해 내는 인재들이 보다 나은 환경에서 다양한 콘텐츠들을 제작할 수 있도록 통신환경 개선과 미디어 제작 장비 지원 등의 사업이 필요하다는 것이다.

두 번째는 콘텐츠, 미디어 기술의 전수에 대한 교육 분야이다. 인프라 구축에 비해 상대적으로 다양한 사업들이 이미 진행되고 있는데, 대표적인 사업들로 캄보디아의 'HRD 센터건립' 사업과 라오스의 정보통신기술 보급, 역량 강화를 위한 '청년동맹 IT센터 건립' 사업 등을 찾아볼 수 있다 (ODA 정보포털, 2013; KOICA, 2016). 이러한 교육센터 건립은 미디어 분야 발전에 긍정적 영향을 줄 수 있는 사업이지만, 한편으로는 이 한국의 개발원조가 단순히 센터 건립에서 끝날 우려가 있다. 그렇기에 개발원조는 센터 건립에서 끝날 것이 아니라, 센터에서 진행할 프로그램들을 전문적으로 다양화시키고, 특히 미디어 분야를 영화, 음악, 게임 등으로 세분화시켜 전문교육이 이루어진다면 인재양성에 더욱 도움이 될 것이다. 또한 여기서 양성된 인

재들의 작품 제작을 지원해주고, 앞서 제안했던 플랫폼을 통한 홍보 활동 연계해주는 등 센터를 교두보로 활용할 수 있는 사업들이 이루어진다면 질 높은 콘텐츠들이 많이 제작될 수 있을 것이다. 더 나아가 라오스에서는 ‘코 라오’와 같은 유명 한국기업과 민간협력을 통해 센터를 활성화시키게 된다면 한국과 아세안 간의 활발한 교류는 물론이고, 다양한 콘텐츠들과 뛰어난 인재들로 무장한 아세안류가 더욱 발전할 수 있을 것이라 기대한다.


5. 결론

문화는 국경을 넘어 전 세계가 하나되어 즐길 수 있는 요소 중 하나로, 국가 간 교류에서도 상당히 중요한 부분이다. 이러한 면에서 한류는 여러 요인과 시대적 상황이 함께 작용하며 단기간에 급속도로 성장하였고, 오늘날 전 세계의 주목을 받는 문화로 자리잡게 되었다. 전 세계의 소비자들의 주목을 받고 있기에 한류 성장요인의 분석은 다른 문화의 발전에도 도움이 되는 성공적 요인이라 할 수 있다.

최근 한국 정부에서 신남방정책을 추진하며 한국과 아세안 간의 사회·문화적 교류가 나날이 증가함에 따라 아세안 내 한류의 인지도 상승은 물론 한국 내 아세안류의 인지도도 상승하고 있는 추세이다. 아세안이 한국의 중요한 파트너로 자리하는 만큼 아세안류의 중요성도 대두되고 있다. 아세안은 다양한 종교와 소수민족들을 기반으로 예부터 다채로운 문화들이 공존해왔다. 이 문화들을 바탕으로 오늘날에는 한국처럼 각종 드라마와 예능 방송, 아이돌 등 수많은 콘텐츠를 제작하며 신흥 콘텐츠 시장으로 성장하고 있다. 그렇기에 한류의 발전 요인을 적용한 새로운 영상 공유 플랫폼

품을 이용한다면 아세안류의 확산은 긍정적인 결과를 가져올 것이라 기대할 수 있다.

한-아세안센터, 아세안문화원을 비롯한 다양한 유관기관에서 아세안을 알리고 한국 소비자들에게 아세안류를 보여주고자 매년 각종 강의를 비롯해 영화상영, 문화공연, 체험활동들까지 다양한 프로그램들을 운영하며 노력하고 있다. 이러한 노력들로 한국의 아세안류 소비자들이 실제로 늘어나고 있으며, 아세안 국가들에 대한 인식도 많이 변화하고 있다. 한국과 아세안이 서로의 문화를 존중하고 향유하는 것은 미래를 함께할 파트너로서 중요한 부분 중 하나이다. 문화적 공동체를 형성하고 각종 협력을 도모해 나간다면 한 문화권 안의 가까운 이웃으로 함께 나아갈 수 있을 것이다.



Vitalizing the ASEAN Wave in Korea through the Development of Tourism in ASEAN Nations

—Lee Hohyeong Yonsei University

Abstract

With the advancement of technology and transportation along with changes in people's minds, it has quickly become a trend for Koreans to go on short travels abroad in order for them to relieve stress and escape from their daily lives. While some ASEAN countries have already become well-known tourist attractions for Koreans such as Viet Nam or the Philippines, others, such as Brunei, are barely known to Koreans despite their charms as tourist attractions. Therefore, the author suggests tourism industries in such countries to get involved with university student teams from Korea in

financially supporting them with their tourism projects through a deliberate selecting progress and reviewing the teams' itinerary. The purpose of this is to enhance the tourism market, and some of the ideas have been applied to reality. By benchmarking and analysing the success factors of a similar project conducted by a Korean company, adopting such a project with the purpose of developing tourism in rather unfamiliar ASEAN regions will have the following effects; accumulation of data regarding Koreans' preference in tourism; promotion of brand value of the company as well as the tourism industry of that nation itself; economic prosperity due to the vitalisation of tourism. This will eventually lead to an overall ASEAN wave in Korea through the development of the tourism industry.

I. Introduction

Travelling has become an activity that Koreans love. According to a survey conducted by Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism (2019), 89.2% of Korean citizens had at least one travel experience in 2018. Also, the average number of travels in 2018 per person was 6.9, making the total number of travels by Korean citizens over 311 million. The top three reasons for selecting the destination of trip were: awareness of destination; providing spectacles; and time available for travel. Especially, the number of Korean overseas travellers in their 20s and 30s has nearly doubled from 2005 to 2015 (Korea Tourism Organisation, 2016), which indicates that travelling has become a trend among youth.

Due to the advancement of technology, people can now search whatever, whenever they want, wherever they are. Such development has also led to a new trend in tourism in Korea, which is known as one of the countries with the fastest internet all around the globe. In an era where access to all sorts of information is possible, tourism trend in Korea has also changed. Compared to the past where most people went on a package tour with everything arranged in advance, people nowadays tend to travel freely with information easily found on the internet, mobile webs, applications, social media, and so on. In fact, in the survey executed by Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism, 44.9% of the respondents answered that they have decided on their destination of trip by searching on the internet (Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism, 2019). Moreover, Korea Culture & Tourism Institute (2015) emphasised the power of social media since access to information related to tourism is becoming easier along with the pervasion of smartphones. It also pointed out certain tourism trend keywords, such as interactive tourism,

which emphasises experiencing local life and culture; healing tourism, emphasising relaxation and slowness; Cheap Chic consumption tourism, which focuses on cost-effectiveness of the tour.

Along with the changes mentioned above, the way people live their lives and the perspective of enjoying one's life has also changed. There were times when saving up and living for the future was taken for granted in Korea. However, along with an increase in the income level of Korean citizens and wider application of the social security system in the Korean society, a new trend has emerged. This trend has led to a preference towards consumption and leisure over saving for one's wealth (Yoo & Lee, 2011). Such change of values has led to a change in tourism trend as well. Recognising that travelling can provide an escape from repeated stressful daily lives, people started to focus more on their own happiness and satisfaction through travelling. Rather than going to renowned tourist attractions, people prefer customised tourism to meet personal appetites. Furthermore, instead of planning on long vacations, people with YOLO minds prefer short trips using weekends focused on relaxation for the purpose of relieving stress (Kwak & Hong, 2017).

Considering such change of values and minds of Korean people, especially those within the young generation in Korea, it is possible to say that ASEAN countries are suitable and attractive targets as tourist destinations for Koreans. One of the top priorities for Koreans to consider when they choose their tourist destination is time. ASEAN countries are geographically close to the Korean Peninsula, saving the travellers the time they spend on transportation, allowing them to spend more time on the actual tourist destination. However, the biggest factor for consideration, the awareness of the destination, is not yet fully achieved by all ASEAN countries.


II. Recognition of the Problem

As mentioned in the introduction, countries like the Philippines and Viet Nam are already popular tourist attractions to Koreans. However, there are other ASEAN countries relatively unpopular compared to others. Below is a table showing the results of how many posts appear when the according keyword is typed on one of the famous social media, Instagram. As one can see in this simple example, awareness of each ASEAN country as a tourist destination differs from one another.

Keyword(in Korean)	Viet Nam Trip	Philippines Trip	Cambodia Trip	Brunei Trip
Number of posts	594,000	119,000	25,000	1,000

search date: Feb 9th, 2020


Considering the geographical location and environmental conditions of ASEAN countries, it may as well be one of the most attractive tourist attractions for Koreans. Indeed, some ASEAN nations are well-known



tourist attractions already. However, there exists a tremendous gap between those and the others. The following is the graph of the statistics presented on the website of ASEAN-Korea Centre.

Another problem is that although each ASEAN nation has developed its own tourist attractions, it may not match the preferences or needs of Korean tourists. For example, nowadays, the tourism trends for Koreans are the following: 'exotic activity', 'escape from daily lives', 'healing', etc. (Kwak and Hong, 2017). However, if the tourist attractions within the nation does not match the above – for example, ancient heritage – it would not be appealing to Korean tourists due to lack of interest to travel to that country. However, in order to know the changing tourism trend in Korea, there needs to be a path of communication, which, in current status, is lacking.

Finally, the most crucial problem is in the lack of recognition in ASEAN countries of Koreans. The following is a revised graph showing Korean



citizens' recognition of each ASEAN country from Survey on Public Awareness of New Southern Policy by Presidential Commission on Policy Planning (2018).

This graph shows not only that still a large portion of ASEAN countries are unknown to Koreans, but also that those countries that are relatively unpopular tourist attractions to Koreans are proportional to the scale of its unknowingness. This proves the asymmetric information on Koreans' tourist destinations.

III. Solution: Meeting the Needs of Korean Youths

As youths are the primary consumers of travelling and they are the one who create the trend of tourism, in modern Korean society, the youths should be considered the main target when trying to plan tourism in ASEAN countries, particularly for the places that are less well-known to Koreans (Lee, 2018).

Another factor that we need to focus on is the development of technology. Youths in the modern society grew up with all kinds of digital devices and social media has become a big part of their lives now. Youths are very fond of utilising such IT technology to share and acquire information, which leads to the conclusion that the use of such technology in the tourism industry could influence other travellers who are looking for new places to travel to (Hwang, 2001).

Also, as mentioned in Social Big Data Analysis on the Perception of ASEAN in Korea (ASEAN-Korea Centre, 2018), active promotion of tourism information related to each ASEAN countries is crucial on hot social media

such as Instagram and Facebook in order to lead to an enhancement in Korean citizens' interest towards ASEAN member states. It further mentions that youths, who play the main role in social platforms, should be targeted so that they can actively engage in various fields of programs, one of which is programs related to tourism.

IV. Related Activities

a. Domestic: Active Role of ASEAN-Korea Centre

ASEAN-Korea Centre is playing a major role in promoting ASEAN countries. Not only does it conduct various programs, but it also dives deep into research of Korean citizens in order to understand their perception toward ASEAN. Two main publications are "Social Big Data Analysis on the Perception of ASEAN in Korea", which is an analysis based on big data accumulated on the website, and "Mutual Perceptions of ASEAN and Korean Youth", which focuses mainly on the perceptions of the youths. In both publications, they highlight the importance of the role of website and social media since it was considered to play a major role in both initiating Korean citizens' interest in ASEAN as well as a route that may convey wrong information at the same time. Also, big proportion Korean citizens, as mentioned in the introduction, look for tourist information online or through social media, which adds to its importance in the tourist industry as well.

b. International: ASEAN Tourism Forum

According to the official website of ASEAN Tourism Forum, ASEAN

Tourism Forum, or ATF, is a joint effort between ASEAN countries in order to advertise and promote ASEAN as a charming tourist attraction as a whole. Not only does it involve cooperation between the ASEAN countries, but it also involves its dialogue partners, including Korea. Also, it is a platform where ASEAN countries can learn from each other as well as a platform where ASEAN governments and national tourism organisations can network with other countries and their organisations, individuals, etc.

c. Domestic Reference: High Popularity of a Program that Sends University Students Overseas

In South Korea, there is a program conducted by a private company where groups of university students plan out study trips to other countries or domestically in order to research on a specific topic that they decide on their own that can have a positive impact on the society. The itinerary, which has to be both social and realistic, is then submitted to the host, where certain number of winners are decided. The teams selected get more education and then are sent on the study trips that they have planned in advance with the full financial support from the host. The winning teams that go on trips, in return, record everything on their journey by video, photos, and by documents in which most of them are uploaded on the official website of the host and on social media.

According to the official website of the host company, the average competition rate of this program each year is about 21:1. The main factors of the success of this project are the following: financial support and the marketing strategy. First, according to Lee (2018), youths are somewhat limited in their financial capabilities. The host saw through their needs and provides the full financial support as the benefit of winning this program.

Also, the host recognised the big role the youths play on the social media as mentioned in the literature published by ASEAN-Korea Centre and advertised the program through the voices of the youths. It is indeed making full use of such media; a Facebook page with almost 14,000 followers with pictures and videos took in previous travels by participants; an Instagram account filled with pictures that the participants have taken in their projects; a blog on the most-used Korean website, Naver, with all kinds of information etc. Therefore, it has enormous promoting impacts among university students, who are heavy users of various IT technology and devices. Through such utilisation, the host company is able to reach another one of its purposes, which is to strengthen and enhance the value of the host company among the youths, who are potential consumers of the future.

V. Further Suggestion

Reflecting on such current activities, the following implications could be summarised the active use of social media and its power; the strong and primary role of youths in the social media in promotion of programs; the joint efforts needed between government and the tourism industry; and the need of information about ASEAN countries to Korean citizens.

Taking the above into consideration, the author would mainly like to suggest two possible solutions. First is the 'ASEAN Tourism Supporters' aimed at middle/high school students and university students. In Korea, there are many extracurricular activities by various private companies that mainly focus on promotion of the respective entrepreneurs through the

use of social media. When provided with certain benefits, it is possible for students, especially those interested in either the tourism industry or the ASEAN itself, to participate in such an activity. The main role would be to convey and spread precise information toward Korean citizens as well as revise any wrong information already on the website. Student participants could be divided into teams with one country assigned for each team, get enough education about the country by various activities such as talk shows with locals, travelling, etc., and then get started with the real work. There is actually a similar activity initiated by Voluntary Agency network of Korea, where they recruit students to do similar activities with information related to Korea.

Another program the author would like to suggest is for ASEAN nations interested in promoting tour industries or companies in the tour industry to initiate a project where they financially support a certain number of Korean youth teams to travel around their respective country. The first step would be to advertise such program where Korean youth teams plan out an itinerary for a trip in the host country considering economic, social, cultural environment. Then, the host, either at a government level or a corporate level, decides on a certain number of teams to support financially while in return, they make it mandatory for the winners to leave the traces of their whole journey on the social media in various forms.

There are a lot of advantages following such a program: accumulation of data, promotion of the respective nation/company, and the boost of economy. First, based on the proposals they have received from young generations, they will be able to accumulate the data regarding activities Korean people prefer, places they would like to look around, types of accommodation they would like to use, and so on. There will be a solid

database after carrying on this program for a few years. Such database can be analysed and used to further develop tourist attractions and promote them in the most effective ways, and even predict the future trend of tourism among Korean youths at some point.

Moreover, countries could promote and advertise their own nation as well, mostly as “charming tourist attractions” to Koreans. In the perspective of the participants, those who wish to participate in the program will have to investigate more about the country as they write the proposal for their projects in the country. In such procedures, they will look up not only the countries’ appearances, but also its history, characteristics, etc. Therefore, they are spontaneously going to look up information about the nations involved in the project and its brand value as a tourist attraction will soar. In the perspective of other Koreans who use social media to get tourist information, the record of their travel itinerary will give vivid and real experiences of tourist attractions in ASEAN member states, which will have a big influence in Koreans since both Koreans and ASEAN youths answered that social media affects them the most in getting information about each other’s countries (ASEAN-Korea Centre, 2017).

Also, the economy of the nations engaged in the project will thrive once again along with merits as tourist attractions successfully host more tourists. Considering that one of the well-known tourist attractions, Viet Nam, has reached 26.66 billion US dollars as travel revenue in 2018 (Viet Namnet, 2019), it is possible to predict that other countries have the potential to take the same route to economic success within the tourism industry.


VI. Conclusion

Currently, the tourism trend in Korea is to go on short travels abroad for their own happiness. Usually, it is to get a break from their busy daily lives. However, because people have to return back to their reality soon, people are looking for destinations located close to Korea. Moreover, affordable travels to nearby countries are very attractive especially to university school students who usually are under circumstances where economic status could act as a constraint in travelling.

Despite its advantages as tourist attractions, not all ASEAN countries are renowned tourist destinations for Korean citizens. The reason for such a phenomenon lies within the asymmetrical information depending on the ASEAN country, lack of recognition of ASEAN itself to Koreans, and a lack of a communication platform in order for ASEAN tourists to recognise the needs of Korean tourists.

Several attempts are being made in order for Koreans to understand ASEAN and vice-versa, especially by ASEAN-Korea Centre. Moreover, there are regional efforts among ASEAN countries along with international cooperation with dialogue partners in order to dive deeper into the needs of each other in the tour industry. Also, the author took into consideration of a reference of a travelling program aimed at youth that has been successful for several years now.

Based on such an example, the author suggests that ASEAN countries should initiate two projects, where they can cover the current problems as well as reinforce the strong points. Through the continuous utilisation of such programs, ASEAN countries, even those with relatively few Korean visitors, will contribute to awakening the ASEAN wave in Korea.





Theme 4





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30 Years of ASEAN-Korea Relations: Retrospect and Prospect



With increasing interactions and socio-cultural exchanges between ASEAN and Korea, the perception of ASEAN has been expanding in Korea. However, while Korean cultures are widely spread in the ASEAN region with the tides of the 'Korean Wave', understanding of ASEAN's unique and diverse cultures are still in the growing stage in Korea. How can we effectively promote ASEAN's unique and diverse cultures in Korea? In what ways can ASEAN and Korea cooperate to facilitate and spark the 'ASEAN Wave' in Korea?





30 Years of ASEAN-Korea Relations: Retrospect and Prospect

—Dao Manh Nghia Ho Chi Minh City University of Law

Abstract

2019 is a commemorative year for ASEAN and Korea. Over the past 30 years, the relations between ASEAN and Korea have gained outstanding achievements, especially after the two sides established a strategic partnership in 2010. In particular, the establishment of the ASEAN Community in 2015 and the launching of the New Southern Policy in 2017 have made tremendous switches particularly in the region and generally around the world. In retrospect, although there have been unfulfilled aspects, ASEAN-Korea relations are showing continuous innovation and advancement as well when facing new rapid changes in the international situation. In

which, mutual understanding and trust have helped both sides find a common voice on many issues. This paper will, first and foremost, draw the overview of ASEAN-Korea relations in three pillars, that is to say, Political and Security Cooperation, Economic Cooperation and Socio-Cultural Cooperation, among which the most progressive pillar will be figured out. Secondly, after analysing the characteristics of ASEAN-Korea connectivity, it will explore the mechanism for enhancing connectivity and narrowing the development gap. Last but not least, the prospects for ASEAN-Korea relations in the next three decades, whose nuclear factors are Partnership for Peace and Prosperity for People, will be neatly illustrated.

Introduction

The relationship between ASEAN and Korea has always been regarded as a true, genuine and lasting partnership which is a development process from Sectoral Dialogue partnership to Strategic Partnership. After pursuing diplomatic effort to establish official relations with ASEAN in the late 1970s by Korean government, ASEAN and the Korea first initiated sectoral dialogue relations in November 1989. By virtue of the resounding success of the 24th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July 1991 and the ASEAN-ROK Summit in 1997 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, relations between ASEAN and Korea have been fostered and strengthened further. Having reached a new height by means of the execution of the Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Cooperation Partnership at the 8th ASEAN-ROK Summit on 30 November 2004 in Vientiane, Lao PDR, ASEAN-Korea dialogue relations elevated from comprehensive cooperation to strategic partnership afterwards at the 13th ASEAN-ROK Summit on 29 October 2010 in Ha Noi, Viet Nam. What is more, the Leaders adopted the Joint Declaration on ASEAN-ROK Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity and its Action Plan for the period 2011-2015, hence the new Plan of Action adopted in 2015 which covers the period of 2016-2020.

For its part, Korea has also taken prompt actions, remarkably during the reign of incumbent President Moon Jae-in. Recognising the changing world situation and the potential of promoting partnership with ASEAN to a new level, President Moon announced the “New Southern Policy” in 2017. The “3Ps” *People, Prosperity, and Peace* of the New Southern Policy in its pursuit of a people-centred community are in line with the three pillars of ASEAN Community, to be specific, the ASEAN Political-Security Community *APSC*,

the ASEAN Economic Community *AEC* and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community *ASCC* (Kwak, 2018).

After marking 20th and 25th Anniversary of the ASEAN-Korea Dialogue Relations in 2009 and 2014, in the short term, ASEAN and Korea celebrated 30th Anniversary of ASEAN-Korea Dialogue Relations successfully with a Commemorative Summit held in Busan Korea on 25-26 November 2019. This is an important milestone marking the turning point for ASEAN-Korea relationship. Therefore, in this sense, this paper will clearly analyse the ASEAN-Korea relations corresponding with the three pillars of ASEAN-Korea cooperation from the perspective of achievements in the past 30 years, challenges in the present and prospects for the future.

30 years of ASEAN-Korea relations: Retrospect

ASEAN-Korea relations: The symbol of the success of the ASEAN+1 framework

Along with the development of the region and the trend of global integration, ASEAN increasingly strengthens bilateral relations with partners through the development of mechanisms and international treaties recognising the agreement of the parties. Currently, the ASEAN+1 is a framework of cooperation that has achieved many practical achievements and it is the most effective external cooperation mechanism of ASEAN (Huyen, 2016). Over the past 30 years, relations between ASEAN and Korea – the symbol of the success of this framework, have been strengthened and upgraded. In addition to continuing its open foreign policy, ASEAN attaches great importance to ensuring the relationship between ASEAN and Korea on the basis of mutual respect and mutual benefit. This is to

maintain ASEAN's central role in building the zone structure in accordance with regional characteristics and interests based on ASEAN-led mechanism. Until now, ASEAN and Korea have become strong partners in all aspects of political-security, economy and socio-cultural factors where they have close cooperation in regional and global issues, such as sustainable development, climate change prevention and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, ASEAN and Korea have shared a stance on matters of principle such as the peaceful settling of international disputes, complying with international law, respecting and protecting freedom of navigation and aviation in the Asia-Pacific region.

In regard to the political-security fields, ASEAN and Korea are cooperating on the basis of regular dialogue and exchange of views deeply on regional and international issues through existing mechanisms: ASEAN-ROK Summit, ASEAN-ROK Ministerial Meeting, ASEAN Economic Ministers AEM-Korea Consultation, ASEAN-Korea Dialogue, ASEAN-ROK Joint Cooperation Committee, Mekong-ROK Foreign Ministers' Meeting, ASEAN+3 ASEAN plus Japan, China, Korea and especially the ARF ASEAN Regional Forum (ASEAN-Korea Centre, 2019a). Furthermore, in raising ASEAN's position while establishing institutional framework for the future, Korea has been actively taking part in ASEAN-led mechanisms, including the ASEAN+3, the EAS East Asia Summit, and the ADMM-Plus ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (Kikuchi, 2017). This is the reason why more than 100 ASEAN-Korea official meetings are consequently organised each year. For external relations, ASEAN has gained absolute trust by its positive deeds and has benefited its partners and contributed as well to regional and global peace and stability by its strategic geographic location with ASEAN being the Driving Force for a Peaceful Korea. Specifically, ASEAN has relations with both Koreas

in that there are 5 ASEAN countries that have embassies in Pyongyang and North Korea also simultaneously established diplomatic relations with all 10 ASEAN member states. ASEAN has made its efforts to encourage North Korea to join the ARF – a door that brings North Korea closer to the world – in 2000. In particular, it is no coincidence that Singapore and Viet Nam were chosen to host the historic DPRK-US Summits in 2018 and 2019 since ASEAN is at the forefront of endeavours to usher in an era of Asia marked by peace and coexistence (Moon, 2019). This has been highly appreciated by the international community for what ASEAN dedicated, as an important catalyst for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. By means of ASEAN's "Unity in Diversity", peace and reconciliation is initiated by respecting difference while appreciating commonalities. As opposed, ASEAN's experiences in building the spirit thereof can be extended to the inter-Korean context (Kim Y.-C., 2019a).

In the Economic Cooperation, ASEAN is the second largest trading partner as well as the third largest investment destination of Korea, while Korea is ASEAN's fifth largest partner in respective areas (ASEAN-Korea Centre, 2017). ASEAN exports to Korea and imports to Korea are reported to have escalated lately to more than USD 60 billion and to more than USD 100 billion respectively (ASEAN, 2019a). ASEAN's trade deficit has simultaneously diminished to roughly USD 40 billion. Interestingly, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflow from Korea to ASEAN remained at USD 6.6 billion, rendering Korea fifth largest as external source of FDI. Seeing potentials in trade cooperation, Korea aims for USD 200 billion in two-way trade volume by 2020 (Ock, 2018).

Related to Socio-Cultural Cooperation, ASEAN is also the number one outbound travel destination for Koreans Refer to Figure 1, and the people-

to-people exchanges between the two regions have been thriving as well. More than 500,000 citizens of ASEAN member states, including 65,000 international married couples, live and work in Korea accordingly, whilst roughly 300,000 Koreans settle in Southeast Asian nations (Moon, 2017). In 2018, more than 9 million Koreans visited the ASEAN region and 2.5 million people from ASEAN member countries came to Korea (Lee, 2019). Meanwhile, the ASEAN-Korea Culture Exchange Year in 2017 marked the heights of cooperation between ASEAN and Korea on culture. Moreover, the Hallyu exerted a profound impact on ASEAN culture and people, mainly on the youth. Therefore, with similarities in inherent identity, the connection between the Koreans and the ASEAN community has been sustainably fostered since 1986. In addition, the ASEAN-Korea Centre [AKC](#), an intergovernmental organisation mandated to promote economic and socio-cultural cooperation between the ASEAN member states and Korea,

was established in 2009 in Seoul. With such orders including security-related issues, trade, culture, tourism and academics, it is considered a bridge for building a lasting and genuine partnership between the two sides (ASEAN-Korea Centre, 2019b). Last but not least, AKC played an important role by using educational, cultural and network-building programs for introducing ASEAN, institutionalising people-to-people connectivity, and inspiring ASEAN as well as Korean future leaders (Anantasirikiat, 2019).

On the balance, promoting economic cooperation offers prosperity to people. Although all three pillars of ASEAN-Korea cooperation have gained remarkable achievements, it can be said that the Economic Cooperation has surpassed both sides' expectations. It has been successful in many aspects such as Trade and Investment Cooperation, Transport Cooperation and Information and Communication Technology Cooperation. The scale of ASEAN-Korea trade volume expanded approximately 20 times [from USD 8.2 billion to 160.5 billion](#) from 1989 to 2018 and this figure is expected to increase even more through the impending AKFTA [ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Agreement](#) with the most noticeable evidence in the period 2009-2017 [Refer to Figure 2](#). In other aspects, Korea has bilateral Free Trade Agreements [FTA](#) with Singapore and Viet Nam currently. In the context of increasingly extensive trade protectionism, Korea is targeting enormous efforts to conclude negotiations of FTAs with Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia, and if successful, it will have FTAs with all top 5 trade partners in Southeast Asia region (Jung, 2019). In the near future, the implementation of bilateral or multilateral trade agreements between some ASEAN members and Korea, the most important being Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership [RCEP](#), will continue to promote trade facilitation, remove tariff and non-tariff barriers, and enhance competitiveness for both sides' products.

FIGURE 1. Destinations for Korean Outbound Travelers 2018




FIGURE 2. ASEAN-Korea Trade Volume Status

(Unit: 100 Million USD %)

Category	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Total Trade Volume	750 (-16.8)	972 (29.7)	1,249 (28.4)	1,310 (4.96)	1,353 (3.28)	1,380 (2)	1,199 (-13.1)	1,188 (-0.8)	1,490.7 (25.4)
Export	409 (-16.8)	531 (29.8)	718 (35.0)	791 (10.1)	820 (3.67)	846 (3.17)	749 (-11.4)	745 (-0.4)	952.5 (27.8)
Import	340 (-16.8)	440 (29.5)	531 (20.5)	519 (-2.2)	533 (2.7)	534 (0.19)	450 (-15.7)	443 (-1.6)	538.2 (21.4)
Surplus	69	90	186	272	287	312	299	302	414.3

Source: KITACountry

ASEAN-Korea Connectivity: A New Level

It is difficult to find an area offering both a geographical proximity and a historical and cultural similarity with Korea like ASEAN. ASEAN is made up of delicate cultures, friendliness and members unite integrating and developing for the common benefits with the ASEAN Way. For internal, Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025 confirmed the ASEAN visions “to achieve a seamlessly and comprehensively connected and integrated region that will promote competitiveness, inclusiveness, and a greater sense of Community” (ASEAN, 2016). With this vision, a well-connected ASEAN will not only improve standard of living and bring prosperity to the people but also strengthen solidarity, unity, sincerity and frankness to jointly determine a common position in dealing with issues of the region and the world. Furthermore, ASEAN also wants to connect beyond the region to other countries or regions around the world through various channels of dialogue. Meanwhile, in the past, Korea had neither territorial disputes nor hegemonic interests in the Southeast Asia. On the balance, the connectivity

between ASEAN and Korea is inevitable and it is consistent with the trend of world integration and development.

Back in history, ASEAN had been passive before Korea’s collaborative efforts before 1989 and by the time both sides initiated sectoral dialogue relations, the ASEAN-Korea connectivity was loose. Initially, this connectivity was supposed to be formalism as a transaction despite the annual external activities. While Korea focused on the threat of North Korea and prioritises cooperation with major partners, ASEAN was in the process of seeking direction and shaping the organisation. That hampered the development of ASEAN-Korea relations a long time ago (ERIA, 2019). Finally, after the establishment of the ASEAN community in 2015 and followed by the New Southern Policy in 2017, the ASEAN-Korea connectivity has become substantive and comprehensive. It is time ASEAN realised that Korea is a special partner and Korea recognised the potential for cooperation with ASEAN to reach the next level.

However, this connectivity still leaves many gaps and needs closing by the absolute efforts of both parties. Firstly, ASEAN consists of member countries with different political systems, legal systems and development levels. ASEAN still contains uncertainties, one of which is the reality of development gap among regions, especially among more developed countries including ASEAN-6 [Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand](#) and the rest including CLMV [Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam](#). Meanwhile, Korea is the fast-growing economy in Asia with outstanding development. Therefore, development gap is the cause of inequality and limited opportunities to effectively benefit from integration as well as difficult to reach agreements. Secondly, it is undeniable that despite the decline, the Korean economy was largely dependent on China. In the face

of growing Chinese influence, and with Korea changing the direction of development in relations toward ASEAN, it will take time to adapt and verify the results. Next, the ongoing world contextual elements which are the escalating US-China trade war, complicated developments in the South China Sea issue, the Emerging Indo-Pacific, Brexit, America's withdrawals from Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership [CPTPP](#), Paris Climate Accord [PCA](#), prevailing protectionism, tendency toward national interests, the rivalry among great powers, are considered as both the catalysts but also the barriers for ASEAN-Korea connectivity. With the growing geopolitical importance of ASEAN, between restructuring the regional order and coping with the world's changes, ASEAN has affirmed to maintain the "ASEAN Centrality" (Mic, 2019). ASEAN has proven itself to be a successful model of regional integration and is at the heart of multilateralism (Dao, 2018). As a result, not only the US, China and Japan but India, Australia, the European Union [EU](#) and Canada are also strengthening their approach to ASEAN. Therefore, Korea has correctly judged that connecting with ASEAN instead of other powers and the New Southern Policy has helped ASEAN-Korea relations position rise to par with major countries (Chongkittavorn, 2019). In contrast, ASEAN also wants to approach its partners to deepen relations and deal with issues raised by the region, including the South China Sea issue. Therefore, by means of high support and enthusiastic help, Korea has become a strategic, reliable, comprehensive and friendly partner of ASEAN.

Although there are gaps in the ASEAN-Korea connectivity for subjective and objective reasons, but over the past 30 years, this connection has been really strong. In a very special way, Korea had many different approaches to each ASEAN country through tourism, education, smart-city, finance,

military, etc. Nonetheless, Korea, with its commitments, will become the best helper to narrow the development gap, particularly among ASEAN members and generally between ASEAN and South Korea in economics fields predominantly.

Prospects for ASEAN-Korea relations: Partnership for Peace and Prosperity for People

Partnership for Peace and beyond

30 years from now, ASEAN will continue to carry out its mission of promoting peace not only in the Korean Peninsula but also around the world. In order to realise those prospects, first of all, ASEAN needs to develop a deeper strategic partnership with Korea and strengthen its relations with North Korea. Focusing on inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation, the ASEAN+2 [Korea and DPRK](#) framework should be established carefully and rapidly through the efforts of three parties as well as taking advantages of the support of the international community (Dao, 2019). Through this, ASEAN and Korea will promote the engagement and socialisation strategies such as engaging North Korea in international events like 2022 Asian Games at China, organising knowledge and personnel exchange programs on economic and nuclear development for peaceful use. Then, ASEAN will strengthen the dialogue mechanism in the ARF by establishing an ARF special envoy that could effectively move between the concerned parties: two Koreas, the US, China, Japan, and Russia. In particular, having drawn lessons from the East Sea issue, ASEAN is

expected to develop collective solutions to geopolitical conflicts in its own waters for strengthening internal consensus. Finally, not only Singapore and Viet Nam but also other ASEAN members should actively organise bilateral conferences to share experiences to the North of Korea on the country's development model under fields of economy and socio-culture.

In order to navigate the tides of the emerging Indo-Pacific, both ASEAN and Korea need to evaluate China's Belt and Road Initiative and the United States' freedom, open Indo-Pacific strategy and detailed planning to balance and share cooperation. On the one hand, it is "very desirable" for ASEAN "not to have to take sides" with focus on "ASEAN Centrality" (Lemon, 2018). On the other hand, Korea needs to find the positioning of the New Southern Policy and a specific roadmap for cooperation toward ASEAN (Kim Y.-s. , 2019). In this context, Korea will allow ASEAN nations to reduce their dependence on China by providing ASEAN countries with the opportunity to diversify their interests. That leads to ASEAN+2 framework triangle prospect in which ASEAN and Korea cooperate with another rising power India for establishing a new regional order. Prioritising the construction of defensive systems in three important locations of the Asia-Pacific region will be the result of harmonising the South Korea's New Southern Policy and India's Look East policy by ASEAN. In regard to another aspect - South China Sea issue, Korea has always supported ASEAN's stance in complying with international law in the South China Sea, thus helping ASEAN members in promoting internal problems.

As aforementioned, over the past 10 years, AKC has contributed significantly to the success of ASEAN-Korea cooperation in general and between each ASEAN member state and Korea in many important aspects. Going forward, strengthening the size and role of the AKC will lay the

foundations for the next 30 years of a more prosperous ASEAN-Korea partnership with connecting in not only the field of economy, culture and society but also politics and security. In which, the near-term prospects are that ASEAN countries will complete e-governance model successfully under Korea's help as well as strengthening the channels of legislative field through the National Assembly and the judicial field through the Supreme Court. In short, the ASEAN community established in conjunction with the New Southern Policy will be a solid foundation for the relationship between the two sides.

How ASEAN-Korea offers prosperity for people

Continuing with the "people-centred" philosophy, ASEAN and Korea hereafter need to keep implementing actively the decisions and agreements committed to bringing prosperity to the people, including the 20th ASEAN-ROK Summit Singapore, November 2018 closely aligned with the ASEAN Community Vision 2025. The two sides must develop new mechanisms and agreements to promote people-to-people exchanges and remove border barriers to create more benefits for ASEAN and Korean citizens. In the immediate future, it is necessary to develop a roadmap for visa exemption mechanism for ASEAN citizens when entering Korea and vice versa to develop tourism. Besides, through Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and AKC, the two sides will provide more scholarships by realising the number of 700 scholarships by 2022, institutionalise Korean studies in ASEAN as well as ASEAN studies in Korea (Kim Y.-C. , 2019b), create more youth exchange programmes e.g. Young ASEAN-Korea Leaders or AKC Youth Ambassadors and expand the ASEAN Youth Network in Korea (Phan, 2019). Increasing mutual understanding is an essential issue in bringing prosperity for the people, therefore, it

is necessary to effectively promote the unique and diverse cultures of ASEAN in Korea to create the “ASEAN Wave” through the development of television channels and newspapers that publish a lot of contents of ASEAN, its people and its member countries. Last but not least, ASEAN-Korea friendship universities will be built in all 10 ASEAN countries as well as Korea, which is to emphasise the training of outstanding majors such as ASEAN studies, Korean studies, international law, international relations, etc. and exchange of scientific research. On that basis, Korean is expected to become the first or second foreign language in ASEAN member states. Languages of ASEAN member countries will be taught and disseminated to schools in Korea.

In the trend of multilateral trade, besides AKFTA, the prospect of bilateral FTAs for each ASEAN member with Korea and joining the CPTPP by Korea is very inevitable. In particular, in order to enhance connectivity, boost tourism and trade, AK-ASA [ASEAN-Korea Air Services Agreement](#) will become the progressive upgrade to the AKFTA (Koh, 2019). In addition, Korea will be a long-term comprehensive partner of all 10 ASEAN countries, consequently, ASEAN can completely replace China to become Korea's largest economic partner. In the future, besides traditional fields such as culture, education, tourism, energy, environment and disaster management, the potential fields such as information and communication technology, innovation, digital economy and green technology will be thoroughly cooperated by the parties. In particular, during the Industrial Revolution 4.0, Korea needs to promote digital technology and create favourable conditions for businesses, particularly the micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) of ASEAN and Korea by establishing ASEAN-Korea Standardisation Joint Research Centre and ASEAN-Korea Industrial Innovation Centre (ASEAN,

2019b). The ASEAN Smart Cities Network will be completed with active supports from Korea and the prospects of an ASEAN-Korea “alliance” with tariff barriers removed, freedom of movement, easy circulation of goods, people's lives improvement, and businesses with development investment opportunities are possible by the year 2050.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the paper serves as a mirror to look back on what ASEAN and Korea have accomplished in their relationship and reflect future expectations. Although there are still gaps, in general, this connectivity has gained many important achievements and promises to be continuously successful by specific visions, strategies and implementation roadmap. ASEAN and Korea have basically succeeded in economic and social-culture cooperation, which is the motivation for promoting deeper cooperation in the field of politics. A sustainable and comprehensive partnership can only be achieved when both perceive one another as a shared destiny of sharing hearts and minds based on mutual understanding and respect: ASEAN-Korea relations like “brothers in a family”. In the next three decades, although the world situation cannot be foreseen, ASEAN-Korea relations will become one of the most comprehensive ties, contributing to the preservation of peace and stability for the region and the world.

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ASEAN-KOREA CENTRE

The ASEAN-Korea Centre was established as an intergovernmental organisation mandated to promote economic and socio-cultural cooperation among the ASEAN Member States and Korea. The Centre was officially inaugurated on March 13, 2009, the year that marked the 20th anniversary of the Dialogue Partnership between ASEAN and Korea, in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding signed at the ASEAN-ROK Summit in November 2007.



**ASEAN
University
Network**

The ASEAN University Network (AUN) was officially established in 1995 as an autonomous organisation under the auspices of ASEAN. AUN conducts programmes and activities to encourage and promote higher education cooperation and capacity building within ASEAN and with dialogue partners and to enhance regional integration in achieving global standards.

